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ABSTRACT 
 
Before Banks: Credit, Society, and Law in Sixteenth-Century Palestine and Syria 
 
by 
 
Munther H. Alsabbagh 
 
This dissertation is a social-legal study of credit in the Middle East before the advent 
of European-style banking institutions in the 1850s. Although scholars have long observed 
the importance of credit in daily life since ancient times, little attention has been given to the 
transformation of credit institutions and practices between the late medieval and early 
modern eras. This study evaluates how credit structures developed in Syria and Palestine 
during the long sixteenth century through the lens of Islamic law. While the legalization of 
market interest and the charitable lending institution known as the cash-waqf are rightly 
attributed as major interventions of Ottoman Law, I demonstrate how both were underpinned 
by the Ottoman state-approved legal stratagem of the mu‘āmala, a credit structure that was 
widely used in Mamluk Syria and Palestine (1250-1516). In the first two chapters, I argue 
that rather than being a radical move, the Ottoman contribution was in refining and 
regularizing the use of the mu‘āmala, as reflected in Ottoman legal literature, jurist manuals, 
and the state’s law courts. The sixteenth century Ottoman legal reforms on credit, I contend, 
ix 
 
present a continuity of the credit norms of the fifteenth century and represent a clear 
evolution from Mamluk antecedents.  
Chapters three through six examine historical changes in specific credit structures 
across the late Mamluk and early Ottoman periods. Chapter three attends to the lending 
activities of charitable endowments, waqfs. While the new Ottoman cash-waqf was an 
institution without a Mamluk parallel, I argue that its use was still predicated on the 
mu‘āmala form, and similarly allowed for aspects of Mamluk-era legal pluralism to survive 
into Ottoman Syria and Palestine, such as the widespread practice of registering the loan 
collateral of debts under Shāfi‘ī law. Also, in contrast to the scholarly consensus, I illustrate 
how cash-waqfs in the Levant were integral providers of market credit by the third quarter of 
the sixteenth century. Chapter four addresses the use of mutual surety ties for communal 
loans. I argue that Ottoman judges continued to recognize this Mamluk-era practice, which 
allowed creditors to assert corporate liability on a group of debtors for ensuring tax collection 
of generally weaker social groups, such as religious minorities and hinterland communities. 
Chapter five presents the long-held custom of investing the capital of orphan estates into 
interest-bearing market loans. As with the credit of cash-waqfs, such loans were carried out 
using mu‘āmalāt. Although such credit was supervised by courts, I argue that judicial 
oversight was loose and different than under the earlier Mamluk era, when a dedicated 
bureau existed for managing such capital. Chapter six engages in a comparative evaluation of 
the gender and class dynamics of credit across the Mamluk and Ottoman periods. I compare 
evidence from sixteenth-century Ottoman court records and fifteenth century Mamluk 
biographies to show that a remarkable continuity existed in elite women’s use of courts to 
register and adjudicate debts, particularly those related to marriage. 
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NOTE ON TERMS AND TRANSLITERATION 
The term ribā, which appears throughout this dissertation, can variously refer to an 
unwarranted increase in value (whether in currency or in-kind), a doubling or multiplying, an 
unfair advantage, or a “purchase of time,” to name a few possibilities. In all cases, however, 
ribā implies an illicit gain. The fiqh literature on ribā, given its social-economic importance, 
is significant. Works of legal theory, uṣūl, as well as substantive law, furū‘, emphasize 
identifying the illegal acts that produce ribā and tend to be descriptive in nature. This partly 
reflects the different classifications of ribā and the occasionally conflicting madhhab 
doctrinal views on what constitutes it. A determination of ribā is sometimes dependent on 
jurisprudential reasoning, and not clear-cut definitions or settled doctrine. However, the most 
prescriptive assessment of ribā is found in fatwā works that reproduce legal cases and their 
outcomes.       
In contrast to ribā, fiqh defined licit gain as ribḥ (lit. “profit”). It is this latter term that 
the Ottoman state assigned to any legally contracted interest, below 15%, while anything 
contracted illegally, or above that state’s rate would be deemed usurious. Additionally, in 
both the Mamluk and Ottoman periods, jurists informally used the term fā’ida/fāyda (lit. 
“benefit”) to imply (as it does today), any financial benefit; depending on context, fā’ida 
could imply usury or profit. As I illustrate in chapter one, while the terms ribḥ and ribā 
denote opposites, licit versus illicit gain, fā’ida was used to denote either by Muslim jurists. I 
will highlight instances where fā’ida is used ambiguously where they occur.  
All amounts and percentages related to figures in transactions are presented in 
numerical form rather than written out. I have adopted the convention of writing out numbers 
less than one hundred, as well as when numbers express non-transactional information, the 
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number of years, objects and so forth (e.g., Süleymān’s rule lasted forty-six years). All dates 
are presented in both Hijra year and Gregorian calendar year formats. I have adopted the 
IJMES transliteration format. For Ottoman Turkish historical figures, I adopt the Ottoman 
Turkish transliteration convention for titles and names (e.g., Şeyhülislam Ebu’s-Su‘ud) and 
the Arabic one for figures coming from the Arab Levant or Egypt (e.g., Shaykh al-Islām al-
Ghazzī). For major cities and territories, I spell them according to popular usage (e.g. 
Rumelia, Damascus). 
Due to widely varying pagination conventions between various sijills, the convention 
I have adopted is the following: the first letter refers to first initial of the sijill’s originating 
city (J = Jerusalem, D = Damascus, A = Aleppo); this is followed by a hyphen and sequential 
numbers attributing to the sijill its original archival number (Damascus’ first sijill is thus D-
1); another hyphen separates the sijill number from the page number in question, and then 
each sijill act corresponds to that act’s order in appearance in the page, from top-bottom (e.g. 
the third act on the third page of the first sijill from Damascus is D-1-3-3).  
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Introduction 
 
Although many historical studies of the Middle East before 1800 recognize the 
importance of credit in the region’s social-economic history, relatively little is known about 
the social-economic significance of credit before the introduction of European-style banking 
institutions in the nineteenth century. The social and legal history of credit, especially, has 
been thinly studied. Major social-economic historical studies of the Arab Levant (Bilād al-
Shām) have focused on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in part due to the 
abundance of court records.1 In these studies, credit has tended to play an ancillary economic 
role to partnerships, which have long been perceived as the drivers of trade. The absence of 
banks in the premodern period may have encouraged this bias. Understandably, scholars have 
been less attracted to studying credit outside of the rubric of institutions. Existing credit 
studies for the premodern era have focused on the original and rise of Ottoman moneylending 
charitable foundations, known as awqāf al-nuqūd (or ‘cash-waqfs’).2 Indeed, the rise of 
                                                     
1 Stanford Jay Shaw, The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt, 
1517-1798 (Princeton University Press, 1962); André Raymond, Artisans et commerçants au Caire au 18e 
siècle, 2 vols. (Damas, 1973); Peter Gran, Islamic Roots of Capitalism: Egypt, 1760-1840 (Syracuse University 
Press, 1979); Bruce Alan Masters, The Origins of Western Economic Dominance in the Middle East: 
Mercantilism and the Islamic Economy in Aleppo, 1600-1750 (New York: New York University Press, 1988); 
Abraham Marcus, The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity: Aleppo in the Eighteenth Century (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1989); Nelly Hanna, Making Big Money in 1600 : The Life and Times of Isma’il 
Abu Taqiyya, Egyptian Merchant, 1st ed. (Syracuse  N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1998); Nelly Hanna, 
Ottoman Egypt and the Emergence of the Modern World: 1500-1800, 2014; Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert, 
An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1997). 
2 Jon E Mandaville, “Usurious Piety: The Cash Waqf Controversy in the Ottoman Empire,” Int. J. Middle East 
Stud. International Journal of Middle East Studies 10, no. 03 (1979): 289–308; Murat Çizakça, “Cash Waqfs of 
Bursa, 1555-1823,” Jeconsocihistori Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 38, no. 3 (1995): 
313–54; Ronald C. Jennings, “Loans and Credit in Early 17th Century Ottoman Judical Records : The Sharia 
Court of Anatolian Kayseri,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient XVI (1973): 168–216; 
Neş’et Çaǧatay, “Ribā and Interest Concept and Banking in the Ottoman Empire,” Studia Islamica, no. 32 
(1970): 53–68; Muḥammad al-Arna’aūṭ, “Dalālāt Ẓuhūr Waqf Al-Nuqūd Fī Al-Quds Khilāl Al-Ḥukm Al-
‘Uthmānī,” Mujalat Awqāf, no. 9 (November 2005): 33–47; Muḥammad al-Arna’aūṭ, Jon E Mandaville, and 
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banking institutions in the mid-nineteenth century has attracted recent scholarship on credit 
that is located at the intersection of imperialism, industrialization, globalization and modern-
state formation.3 This dissertation attends to the study of credit before the rise of banking by 
examining the social, legal, and cultural structures underpinning institutionalized credit 
practices, how these were understood, used, and developed through the lens of Islamic law.      
Using the framework of law for a historical study of credit is not unprecedented; but 
its application in the context of identifying specific credit practices as distinct social 
structures is. Islamic law has been heavily mined by social-economic historians of the 
medieval Middle East to study wide-ranging aspects of daily life.4 Economic historians have 
long been intrigued with the idea of origins, whether of specific financial instruments (such 
as the commenda), or the broad origins of capitalism, which some scholars have argued has 
roots in Islamic law, or rather, Muslim substantive law (fiqh).5 Other studies have focused on 
theoretical evaluations of usury in Muslim legal works of the early and middle Islamicate 
                                                     
Avdo Sućeska, ينامثعلا عمتجملا يف ابرلل رياغم موهفم :دوقنلا فقو يف تاسارد /  Dirāsāt fī waqf al-nuqūd : mafhūm 
mughāyir lil-ribā fī al-mujtamaʻ al-ʻUthmānī (  ,،تامولعملاو يملعلا ثحبلل يميمتلا ةسسؤم :ناوغز2001 ). 
3 Cheta, Omar Youssef, “Rule of Merchants: The Practice of Commerce and Law in Late Ottoman Egypt, 1841-
1876” (PhD diss., New York University, 2014); Elena Frangakis-Syrett, Trade and money: the Ottoman 
economy in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (Piscataway, NJ; Istanbul: Gorgias Press ; Isis Press, 
2010); Ali Coşkun Tunçer, Sovereign Debt and International Financial Control: The Middle East and the 
Balkans, 1870-1914, 2015. 
4 Udovitch’s classical study on the law of partnerships in Islam is perhaps the most famous of these: Abraham L 
Udovitch, Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970); The 
most substantial embodiment of applying Islamic law as a framework for understanding the lived experience of 
communities in the medieval Near East is arguably Goitein’s Mediterranean Society, particularly volume one, 
Economic Foundations: Shelomo Dov Goitein, A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab 
World as Portrayed in the Documents of the Arab Geniza (University of California Press, 1988). 
5 Abraham L Udovitch, “Reflections on the Institutions of Credits and Banking in the Medieval Islamic Near 
East,” Studia Islamica, no. 41 (1975): 5–21; Abraham L Udovitch, “Credit as a Means of Investment in 
Medieval Islamic Trade,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 87, no. 3 (1967): 260–64; Abraham L 
Udovitch, At the Origins of the Western Commenda: Islam, Israel, Byzantium? And Credit as a Means of 
Investment in Medieval Islamic Trade (Princeton: Program in Near Eastern Studies, Princeton University, 
1969); Pryor, John H, “The Origins of the Commenda Contract,” Speculum 52, no. 1 (1977): 5–37; Subhi Y. 
Labib, “Capitalism in Medieval Islam,” The Journal of Economic History 29, no. 1 (March 1969): 79–96; 
Maxime Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism (Penguin Books, 1977); Gene W Heck, Charlemagne, Muhammad, 
and the Arab Roots of Capitalism (Berlin; New York: De Gruyter, 2006); Jairus Banaji, “Islam, the 
Mediterranean and the Rise of Capitalism,” Historical Materialism 15, no. 1 (March 1, 2007): 47–74. 
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periods (eighth to fifteenth centuries). 6 For a number of influential studies produced in the 
late 1970s and early 80s, these same decades witnessed an increased interest in the Western 
study of Islam’s relationship to modernity, and invariably viewed through the prism of 
Islamic law. Questions about the place of Western liberal-democratic values, the rise of 
“political Islam,” the Muslim Brotherhood’s suppression, and the success of the Iranian 
Revolution in the Middle East all brewed during this era.7 Not surprisingly, this same period 
also witnessed the rise of the first global Islamic banking institutions that continue to rely on 
Islamic law.8 Since 9/11, interest in Islam and capitalism has been revived on the back of the 
growing influence of Persian Gulf states and the maelstrom of conflicts that are 
disintegrating the region’s fragile polities. The concomitant success of Islamic finance and 
capitalist Islamist ruling elites in Turkey (and briefly Egypt) has compelled some to argue for 
a positive correlation between Islamic politics and Islamic finance/capitalism.9  
For altogether different reasons, scholars of the pre-Ottoman Levant have also 
regularly turned to classical Islamic law to explain the history of commercial exchange.  The 
tendency to seek answers in legal prescriptive works is partially due to the non-survival of 
                                                     
6 Nicholas Dylan Ray, “The Medieval Islamic System of Credit and Banking: Legal and Historical 
Considerations,” Arab Law Quarterly 12, no. 1 (1997): 43–90; Fazlur Rahman, “Ribā and Interest,” Islamic 
Studies 3, no. 1 (March 1964): 1–43; Muhammad Imran Ismail, “Legal Stratagems (Ḥiyal) and Usury in Islamic 
Commercial Law” (University of Birmingham, 2010). 
7 Labib, “Capitalism in Medieval Islam”; Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism; Gran, Islamic Roots of Capitalism. 
8 The three largest Islamic banking conglomerates in the world, Kuwait Finance House, Dallat al-Baraka and 
Dar al-Maal al-Islami were established in 1977, 1978 and 1981 respectively. See: 
https://www.kfh.com/en/home/Personal/aboutus/story.html 
http://www.albaraka.com/default.asp?action=category&id=18 and 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/09/business/09trust.html.  
9 Benedikt Koehler, Early Islam and the Birth of Capitalism (Lexington Books, 2014); Heck, Charlemagne, 
Muhammad, and the Arab Roots of Capitalism; Charles Tripp, Islam and the Moral Economy: The Challenge of 
Capitalism (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Tuğal, Cihan, Passive Revolution : 
Absorbing the Islamic Challenge to Capitalism (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009); Banaji, 
“Islam, the Mediterranean and the Rise of Capitalism”; Murat Çizakça, Islamic Capitalism and Finance: 
Origins, Evolution and the Future (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011); Salah El-Sheikh, “The Moral Economy of 
Classical Islam: A FiqhiConomic Model.,” Muslim World 98, no. 1 (2008). 
4 
  
most archival and documentary sources for the Levant before the sixteenth century, and this 
has complicated the work of social historians, whose work is cushioned between ‘legal 
sources’ on the one hand, such as judicial manuals and legal responsa, and so-called ‘literary’ 
sources on the other, such as chronicles and biographical dictionaries. However, it has also 
been heavily informed by the fact that credit arrangements in some of the earliest 
documentary sources, the geniza letters below, drew heavily on forms found in Islamic law. 
For the Levant, this source constraint is also complicated by the fact that this “problem of the 
sources” has reinforced a hard division between the Ottoman and Mamluk eras, mostly 
drawn along the lines of political history (court records in the Levant begin appearing in the 
1530s, a decade or so after the beginning of Ottoman rule), and this has had the unfortunate 
effect of discouraging scholarship comparing or across periods.10 The problem of 
periodization is not limited to this juncture of history, but it does have its own source 
particulars and constraints that have shaped the research outlook of its historians.11 Historians 
                                                     
10 A substantial subset of historians’ studies have fallen outside of this pattern, many of whom contributed to a 
recent volume: Mamluk-Ottoman Transition : Continuity and Change in Egypt and Bilād al-Shām in the 
Sixteenth Century (Conference), Stephan Conermann, and Gül Şen, eds., The Mamluk-Ottoman Transition: 
Continuity and Change in Egypt and Bilād Al-Shām in the Sixteenth Century, 2017; Also see Michel and Abū 
ghāzī’s work on land tenure: Benjamin Lellouch and Nicolas Michel, Conquête Ottomane de l’Égypte (1517): 
Arrière-Plan, Impact, Échos (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2013); Michel, Nicolas, “Les Rizaq Iḥbāsiyya, Terres 
Agricoles En Mainmorte Dans l’Égypte Mamelouke et Ottomane : Étude Sur Les Dafātir Al-Aḥbās Ottomans,” 
Annales Islamologiques, Les rizaq iḥbāsiyya, XXX (1996) (1996); ʻImād Badr al-Dīn Abū Ghāzī, Taṭawwur al-
ḥiyāzah al-zirāʻīyah fī Miṣr : zaman al-Mamālīk al-Zharākisah : dirāsah fī bayʻ amlāk Bayt al-Māl (مرهلا 
[Giza]: ʻAyn lil-Dirāsāt wa-al-Buḥūth al-Insānīyah wa-al-Ijtimāʻīyah, 2000); Doris Behrens-Abouseif, Egypt’s 
Adjustment to Ottoman Rule: Institutions, Waqf and Architecture in Cairo, 16th and 17th Centuries (Brill, 
1994); Legal historians may have faced less barriers than social-economic historians, perhaps because of the 
strengthening of Ḥanafism between periods, and their dependence on legal literature over court records. See for 
instance Johansen’s landmark study on land-tenure and more recently Burak and al-Azem’s studies. Baber 
Johansen, The Islamic Law on Land Tax and Rent: The Peasants’ Loss of Property Rights As Interpreted in the 
Hanafite Legal Literature of the Mamluk and Ottoman Periods (Routledge, 1988); Guy Burak, The Second 
Formation of Islamic Law: The Hanafi School in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire, 2015; Guy Burak, 
“Between the Ḳānūn of Qāytbāy and Ottoman Yasaq: A Note on the Ottomans’ Dynastic Law.,” Journal of 
Islamic Studies 26, no. 1 (2015); Talal Al-Azem, Rule-Formulation and Binding Precedent in the Madhhab-
Law Tradition: Ibn Qutlubugha’s Commentary on the Compendium of Quduri, 2017. 
11 Hirschler and Bowen-Savant recently edited a special edition of Der Islam dedicated to this problem for a 
variety of fields in Islamic historiography: Hirschler, Konrad and Bowen Savant,  Sarah, “Introduction – What 
Is in a Period? Arabic Historiography and Periodization,” Der Islam 91 (2014): 6–19; See also: Shahzad Bashir, 
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of Mamluk Levant (1250-1516), have a wealth of ‘literary’ sources to choose from while 
those of the Ottoman era (1517-1920) swim in court archives, the traditional source base for 
social historians. Although this has made the task of producing social history on the Mamluk 
period more challenging, many notable social historical studies have been produced for that 
long period.12  
The study of credit in Islamicate societies before the Ottoman era has centered on the 
Cairo geniza community that flourished in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Credit was not 
only indispensable to the activities of the ‘geniza traders,’ it was also omnipresent in many 
aspects of social-economic life in general.13 Notably, the geniza community’s prevailing use 
of Islamic fiqh contractual norms, as well as the frequent reliance of its members on Muslim 
notaries and courts, alongside Jewish institutions, informed the geniza scholars’ views on 
exploring Islamic law as a contractual framework for governing the business affairs of this 
community, which by extension they argued, could be used to understand the history of trade 
                                                     
“On Islamic Time: Rethinking Chronology in the Historiography of Muslim Societies,” History and Theory 53, 
no. 4 (December 1, 2014): 519–44; For a review of the field defining aspects of the source boundaries between 
Mamluk and early Ottoman historiography see: Hirschler, Konrad, “Studying Mamluk Historiography: From 
Source-Criticism to the Cultural Turn,” in Ubi Sumus? Quo Vademus?: Mamluk Studies - State of the Art, ed. 
Conermann, Stephan (Bonn: V&R unipress ; Bonn University Press, 2014), 159–86. 
12 A sample: Amīn, Muḥammad Muḥammad, Awqāf Wa-Al-Ḥayāh Al-Ijtimāʻīyah Fī Miṣr, 648-923 A.H./1250-
1517 A.D. : Dirāsah Tārīkhīyah Wathāʼiqīyah (Cairo: Dār al-Nahḍah al-ʻArabīyah, n.d.); Nelly Hanna, An 
Urban History of Būlāq in the Mamluk and Ottoman Periods (Le Caire: Institut français d’archéologie orientale, 
1983); Huda Lutfi, Al Quds Al-Mamlûkiyya: A History of Mamlûk Jerusalem Based on the Ḥaram Documents 
(Berlin: K. Schwarz, 1985); Adam Abdelhamid Sabra, Poverty and Charity in Medieval Islam: Mamluk Egypt, 
1250-1517 (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Yossef Rapoport, Marriage, 
Money and Divorce in Medieval Islamic Society (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); 
Jonathan Porter Berkey, The Transmission of Knowledge in Medieval Cairo: A Social History of Islamic 
Education (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992); Tōru Miura, Dynamism in the Urban Society of 
Damascus: The Ṣāliḥiyya Quarter from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Centuries, 2016; Tsugitaka Satō, Sugar in 
the Social Life of Medieval Islam, 2015. 
13 Goitein observed, at the start of his section on credit in his volume on Economic Foundations, that “an 
unusually large amount of Geniza documents deals with credit.” 250. For a review of the numerous 
characteristics of credit in the community, see 262. Shelomo Dov Goitein, A Mediterranean Society: Economic 
Foundations, vol. 1 (Univ of California Press, 1967), 250–66. 
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and finance in medieval Islamicate society as a whole.14 Abraham Udovitch, building on the 
genius of S.D. Goitein, was the geniza scholar who most fully elaborated the way this 
community’s use of credit fell within the scope of Islamic law; three of his works explored 
credit along two lines, the question of medieval banking in the Near East, and secondly, its 
use as an instrument in facilitating trade (long-distance particularly), in association with 
partnerships.15 Although banking-like activity abounded in the geniza community, scholars 
have noted key differences between the Islamicate credit instruments and those of medieval 
Europe (such as between the suftaja and the bill of exchange), and have subsequently 
suggested that little evidence exists of proto-banking institutions in the Islamicate Near 
East.16 In observing some basic differences that precluded the rise of banking, such as the 
absence of deposit banking on interest among the geniza moneylenders, Udovitch argued that 
the reason why banking did not rise in the medieval Near East was due to “the social setting 
of medieval Near Eastern economic life.”17 He contended that “mercantile and banking 
activities were based on a network of personal and social relations, and these, in themselves, 
                                                     
14 Goitein, S.D., “The Documents of the Cairo Geniza a Source for Islamic Social History,” in Studies in 
Islamic History and Institutions (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 279–95; While Goitein’s assertion has dominated the 
field of Geniza studies, a recent important study by P. Ackerman-Lieberman challenges this notion: Phillip 
Isaac Ackerman-Lieberman, The Business of Identity: Jews, Muslims, and Economic Life in Medieval Egypt, 
2014; For an excellent analysis of his argument, see: Miriam Frenkel, review of Review of The Business of 
Identity: Jews, Muslims, and Economic Life in Medieval Egypt, by Phillip I. Ackerman-Lieberman, Journal of 
the American Oriental Society 136, no. 3 (2016): 640–43. 
15 Despite its indispensability, which he readily acknowledged, Udovitch’s study of credit was typically framed 
within the context of its role within partnerships. Udovitch, Partnership and Profit, 77–82, 80-86,95-96; 
Udovitch, “Credit as a Means of Investment in Medieval Islamic Trade”; Udovitch, “Reflections.” 
16 Earlier scholarship by Fischel, which relied on literary source evidence, argued for the existence of 
sophisticated early banking enterprises in early Abbasid Baghdad. Goitein and Udovitch later used the Geniza 
records to revise Fischel’s thesis. Walter Fischel, “The Origin of Banking in Mediaeval Islam: A Contribution 
to the Economic History of the Jews of Baghdad in the Tenth Century,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 65, 
no. 2 (1933): 339–52; Charles C. Torrey, “The Evolution of a Financier in the Ancient Near East,” Journal of 
Near Eastern Studies 2, no. 4 (October 1, 1943): 295–301; Ashtor, Eliahu, “Banking Instruments Between the 
Muslim East and the Christian West,” Journal of European Economic History 1, no. 3 (1972): 553; S. D. 
Goitein, “Bankers Accounts from the Eleventh Century A.D.,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of 
the Orient 9, no. 1/2 (1966): 28–66; Udovitch, “Reflections.” 
17 Udovitch, “Reflections,” 7. 
7 
  
were not a firm enough foundation upon which to erect economic institutions which could 
function independently of this social network.”18 In another influential essay, Udovitch would 
argue that the creation of institutions, banking or otherwise, was unsupported by the culture 
of the geniza community, as “informal business cooperation [among the geniza traders] was a 
constellation of individual relationships whose skeins could tie together a fairly large number 
of people; but these bonds were never expressed in terms of membership of a group 
abstractly defined; rather, groups, insofar as they were defined, were defined in terms of 
individuals.”19 This idea of a dependence on individual ties and information cooperation 
initiated a still on-going debate about whether contract enforcement and the development of 
institutions was hindered or enabled by informal communal enforcement mechanisms, and 
the connection that resulting ‘trust’ networks would have to the development of proto-
capitalistic medieval institutions in the West and Near East.20  
For the Mamluk period, the combination of a documentary source deficit and the 
plethora of chronicles and political-administrative manuals has resulted in an exceedingly 
thin examination of the social-historical aspects of credit. Instead, scholarship has focused on 
topics of concern to the state such as prices, economic output, labor, industrial production, 
                                                     
18 Udovitch, “Reflections,” 17. 
19 Udovitch, Abraham, “Formalism and Informalism in the Social and Economic Institutions of the Medieval 
Islamic World,” in Individualism and Conformity in Classical Islam, ed. Banani, Amin and Vryonis, Speros 
(Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1977), 74–75; Udovitch’s formulation built on Goitein’s view that a kind of 
“informal cooperation” governed the trading activities of the Geniza traders: Goitein, A Mediterranean Society, 
1967, 1:165–69. 
20 Avner Greif, “Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders,” The Journal 
of Economic History 49, no. 4 (December 1989): 857–82; A. Greif, “Contract Enforceability and Economic 
Institutions in Early Trade - the Maghribi Traders Coalition,” American Economic Review 83, no. 3 (1993): 
525–48; Jessica L. Goldberg, “Choosing and Enforcing Business Relationships in the Eleventh-Century 
Mediterranean: Reassessing the ‘Maghribī Traders’*,” Past & Present 216, no. 1 (2012): 3–40; Avner Greif, 
“The Maghribi Traders: A Reappraisal?,” The Economic History Review 65, no. 2 (May 1, 2012): 445–69; 
Jessica Goldberg, Trade and Institutions in the Medieval Mediterranean: The Geniza Merchants and Their 
Business World (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 148–50. 
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markets, taxation, fiscal administration, and most recently, the function of market inspectors 
(sing. muḥtasib).21 Scholarly mention of credit during the Mamluk era is usually relayed 
through anecdotes. For instance, from al-Maqrīzī’s rich descriptions, we know of a case of a 
commercial debt dispute in Cairo from 752/1352-3, when a group of Iranian merchants raised 
a lawsuit against Egyptian merchants for purchasing merchandise on credit and then 
defaulting on payment. What is instructive for Mamlukists about this case is that it drew in 
several chief qāḍīs, amīrs, the chamberlain and the sultan himself, and can be used to 
exemplify the expansion of the sultan’s role in the Mamluk judiciary in the mid-fourteenth 
century.22 However, such isolated episodes give a snapshot of mostly politicized moments, 
                                                     
21 Studies that touch on credit during this period do so in the context of political-economy, taxation and 
diplomacy related to monopolization of the spice trade especially. See: Labib, Subhi, Handelsgeschichte 
Ägyptens Im Spätmittelalter : (1171-1517) (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1965); Eliyahu Ashtor, Levant 
Trade in the Middle Ages. (Place of publication not identified: Princeton University Pres, 2016); Eliyahu 
Ashtor, A Social and Economic History of the Near East in the Middle Ages (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1976); Rabie, Hassanein, The Financial System of Egypt A.H. 564-741/A.D. 1169-1341, London Oriental 
Series 25 (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1972); And more recently: Meloy, John Lash, Imperial 
Power and Maritime Trade : Mecca and Cairo in the Later Middle Ages, Chicago Series on the Middle East 
(Chicago, IL: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2010); Christ, Georg, Trading Conflicts : Venetian Merchants and 
Mamluk Offficials in Late Medieval Alexandria, Medieval Mediterranean 93 (Leiden; Boston, MA, 2012); 
Apellániz Ruiz de Galarreta, Francisco Javier, Pouvoir et Finance En Méditerranée Pré-Moderne : Le 
Deuxième État Mamelouk et Le Commerce Des Épices (1382-1517), Anuario de Estudios Medievales 66 
(Barcelona: CSIC, 2009); Studies on the Karimi merchants by Fischel and Ashtor, were exceptional in bridging 
sources across both Geniza and Mamluk studies. E Ashtor, “The Kārimī Merchants,” J.R. Asiat. Soc. G.B. Irel. 
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain & Ireland 88, no. 1–2 (1956): 45–56; Walter J. Fischel, 
“The Spice Trade in Mamluk Egypt: A Contribution to the Economic History of Medieval Islam,” Journal of 
the Economic and Social History of the Orient 1, no. 2 (1958): 157–74; Among other studies that touch on 
credit and depend on chronicle sources: Maya Shatzmiller, Labour in the Medieval Islamic World (Leiden [The 
Netherlands]; New York: E.J. Brill, 1994); For the most recent study on the Muhtasib, see: Allouche, Adel and 
al-Maqrīzī, Aḥmad ibn ʻAlī, Mamluk Economics : A Study and Translation of Al-Maqrīzī’s Ighāthah (Salt Lake 
City: University of Utah Press, 1994); Stilt, Kristen, Islamic Law in Action : Authority, Discretion, and 
Everyday Experiences in Mamluk Egypt (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
22 al-Maqrīzī, Aḥmad ibn ʻAlī, Al-Mawāʿiẓ Wa-Al-Iʿtibār Fī Dhikr Al-Khiṭaṭ Wa-Al-Āthār, ed. Sayyid, Ayman 
Fuʾād (London, 2002), Vol. 3, 717-8; Aḥmad ibn ʻAlī al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk li-maʻrifat duwal al-mulūk (Beirut: 
Dār al-Kutub al-ʻIlmīyah, 1997), Vol. 2, 863; While this event is related in Rapoport’s following article, it also 
appears in articles by Irwin, Escovitz, and Nielsen: Yossef Rapoport, “Royal Justice and Religious Law: 
Siyāsah and Shariʿah under the Mamluks,” Mamluk Studies Review XVI (2012): 83; Robert Irwin, “The 
Privatization of ‘Justice’ under the Circassian Mamluks,” Mamluk Studies Review VI (2002): 63–70; Joseph H 
Escovitz, “The Establishment of Four Chief Judgeships in the Mamlūk Empire,” Jameroriesoci Journal of the 
American Oriental Society 102, no. 3 (1982): 100; Nielsen, Jørgen S, “Maẓālim and Dār Al-ʿAdl under the 
Early Mamluks,” The Muslim World 66, no. 2 (1976): 127. 
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and unlike the geniza letters, do not allow for a study of more routine underlying social-legal 
structures and processes.  
This is not to say that the surviving Mamluk era sources preclude a deeper study of 
social structures. There are non-chronicle Mamluk narrative sources, such as the rare diary 
(ta‘līq) of the Damascene notary/witness (shāhid) Aḥmad Ibn Ṭawq (d. 1509), which has 
been edited in four volumes, and is an invaluable new source for Mamluk social historians.23 
Between the Geniza and Mamluk periods, and outside of surviving waqf documents, the 
documentary source gap has engendered a historiographical tendency, although this is 
changing, to somewhat disengage from actively mining surviving documentary sources that 
afford a “view from below.”24 In addition to studies based on waqf deeds, the Ḥaram al-
Sharīf archive presents valuable material for evaluating the social-legal history of credit. 
Donald Little’s catalogue of the Ḥaram’s legal documents, for instance, has been very useful 
                                                     
23 Wollina, Torsten, “Ibn Ṭawq’s Ta‘līq. An Ego-Document for Mamlūk Studies,” in Ubi Sumus? Quo 
Vademus?: Mamluk Studies - State of the Art (Bonn: V & R unipress, Bonn University Press, n.d.), 337–62; 
Torsten Wollina and Freie Universität (Berlin), Zwanzig Jahre Alltag: Lebens-, Welt- und Selbstbild im Journal 
des Aḥmad Ibn Ṭawq (Göttingen; [Bonn: V & R unipress ; [Bonn University Press, 2014). 
24 Early on, seasoned Mamlukists such as Carl Petry have recognized the untapped potential of documentary 
sources for the Mamluk period: Petry, Carl F., “A Geniza for Mamluk Studies? Charitable Trust (Waqf) 
Documents as a Source for Economic and Social History,” Mamluk Studies Review II (1998); Werner Diem’s 
numerous editions of Mamluk documents, such as the following, are not referenced as much as one would hope 
for. Werner Diem, Arabische Briefe Aus Dem 10.-16. Jahrhundert (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011); Werner Diem 
and Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Arabische Privatbriefe des 9. bis 15. Jahrhunderts aus der 
Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek in Wien (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1996); Bauden’s groundbreaking work 
on al-Maqrīzī’s reuse of Mamluk administrative documents has opened new possibilities: Bauden, Frederic, 
“Maqriziana I: Discovery of an Autograph Manuscript of Al-Maqrizi: Towards a Better Understanding of His 
Working Method: Description: Section 1,” Mamluk Studies Review VII.2 (2002); Bauden, Frederic, 
“Maqriziana I: Discovery of an Autograph Manuscript of Al-Maqrizi: Towards a Better Understanding of His 
Working Method: Description: Section 2,” Mamluk Studies Review X (2006); Bauden, Frederic, “Maqriziana II: 
Discovery of an Autograph Manuscript of Al-Maqrizi: Towards a Better Understanding of His Working 
Method: Analysis,” Mamluk Studies Review XIL (2008); Hirschler has recently taken up the reuse of documents 
in late Mamluk Damascus as a project: Konrad Hirschler, “From Archive to Archival Practices: Rethinking the 
Preservation of Mamluk Administrative Documents.(Essay),” The Journal of the American Oriental Society 
136, no. 1 (2016) Also see his unpublished paper: “Document Reuse in Medieval Arabic Manuscripts” at: 
https://www.academia.edu/33667339/Document_Reuse_in_Medieval_Arabic_Manuscripts. Hirschler’s paper 
on this presented at the 2017 meeting of the School of Mamluk Studies in Beirut is viewable for viewing at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=22GSfKViSTE; Hirschler, Konrad, in Documentary Life-Cycles: Reuse of 
Mamluk Legal Documents (School of Mamluk Studies, 2017, Beirut, 2016). 
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to this study, as has Huda Lutfi’s work on the Ḥaram archive. However, archival sources 
present their own challenges. Amy Singer has cautioned that an over-reliance on sharī‘a court 
registers (sing. sijill) can easily lead to warped conclusions, since Ottoman court records 
typically only record the outcomes of cases. “In order to assess … (the state’s) power 
realistically, we need to check the state’s ability to enforce the norms and ideological 
aspirations it defined for itself. Unfortunately, we cannot accomplish this feat, entirely, as 
even local reports in the sijills do not recount the final resolution of conflicts, but only their 
adjudication. Nor are they an exhaustive chronicle of the encounters between peasants and 
local officials.”25  
The credit studies of Ottomanists noted above, drew very little on the Mamluk period, 
even those that considered credit in former Mamluk territories, such as Abdul-Karim Rafeq’s 
study of market credit in early sixteenth century Hama.26 Except for Rafeq’s and Jon 
Mandaville’s studies (the latter’s being on the sixteenth century cash-waqf), most early 
modern Ottomanists’ credit studies deal with the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when 
the Arab territories had been thoroughly ‘Ottomanized,’ and this perhaps drove them to turn 
a blind eye to the Mamluk era. Such discontinuity is not apparent in European historiography 
where profound changes in the political order did not always diminish archival continuity 
between the late medieval and early modern periods.27 Indeed, the same archives that Eliyahu 
Ashtor used for his foundational studies on Venetian-Mamluk trade are being profitably 
                                                     
25 Amy Singer, Palestinian Peasants and Ottoman Officials: Rural Administration around Sixteenth-Century 
Jerusalem, Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1994), 129. 
26 For instance: Rafeq, Abdul Karim, “Maḍāhir Iqtiṣādiyya Wa Ijtimā‘Iyya Min Liwā’ Ḥamā 942-943/1535-
1536,” Dirāsāt Tārīkhiyya, no. 31/32 (1989). 
27 See for instance: David Stasavage, States of Credit: Size, Power, and the Development of European Polities 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2011); Marc Boone, C. A Davids, and Paul Janssens, eds., Urban 
Public Debts: Urban Governments and the Market for Annuities in Western Europe (14th-18th Centuries) 
(Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2003). 
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mined to produce important revisionist accounts of Mamluk-Ottoman history, on the 
Venetian-Mamluk spice trade and alliance during the Venetian-Ottoman wars in the early 
sixteenth century.28 Even though landmark studies on prices, wages and economic 
productivity have been recently issued for the Ottoman sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
scholarship on the influence of credit on the economy is still in its infancy.29 However, very 
recently, there has been an effort by some economic historians to evaluate  statistically how 
credit was transacted, to understand the nature of the market for credit in the early modern 
era.30 Other scholarship that has touched on credit has focused on in the intersection of 
                                                     
28 Francisco Javier Apellániz Ruiz de Galarreta, News on the Bulaq: A Mamluk-Venetian Memorandum on 
Asian Trade, AD 1503 (European University Institute, 2016); Pedani, Maria Pia, “Venetians in the Levant in the 
Age of Selim I,” in Conquête Ottomane de l’Égypte (1517) : Arrière-Plan, Impact, Échos, ed. Lellouche, 
Benjamin and Michel, Nicolas (Leiden; Boston, MA: Brill, n.d.); For an inventory of the Venetian archives: 
Maria Pia Pedani and Alessio Bombaci, Inventory of the Lettere e Scritture Turchesche in the Venetian State 
Archive (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2010); Pedani and Bombaci; Apellániz Ruiz de Galarreta, Francisco Javier, 
Pouvoir et Finance En Méditerranée Pré-Moderne : Le Deuxième État Mamelouk et Le Commerce Des Épices 
(1382-1517); Christ, Georg, Trading Conflicts : Venetian Merchants and Mamluk Offficials in Late Medieval 
Alexandria. 
29 Barkan, Ömer Lutfi, “The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the Economic 
History of the near East,” trans. McCarthy, Justin, International Journal of Middle East Studies 6, no. 1 (1975): 
3–28; Şevket Pamuk, The Ottoman Economy and Its Institutions (Farnham, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 
2009); İnalcık, Halil, “Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire,” The Journal of Economic History 29, no. 1 
(1969): 97–140; Pamuk, Şevket, “The Price Revolution of the Ottoman Empire Reconsidered,” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 33, no. 1 (February 2001): 69–89; Tezcan, Baki, “The Ottoman Monetary Crisis 
of 1585 Revisited,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 52 (2009): 460–504; The large 
historical surveys of prices and wages conducted by Inalcik and Pamuk are critical sources for any future survey 
study of credit’s political-economic impact: İnalcık, Halil, Pamuk, Şevket, and Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü 
(Turkey), eds., Osmanlı Devletiʼnde Bilgi ve Istatistik/Data and Statistics in the Ottoman Empire, 2396 
(Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü/State Institute of Statistics Prime Ministry Republic of 
Turkey, 2000); Pamuk, Şevket and Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü (Turkey), İstanbul ve Diğer Kentlerde 500 Yıllık 
Fiyatlar ve Ücretler, 1469-1998/500 Years of Prices and Wages in Istanbul and Other Cities, 2397 (Ankara: 
T.C. Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü/State Institute of Statistics Prime Ministry Republic of Turkey, 
2000). 
30 In a current article, T. Kuran and J. Rubin analyze the political-economic and ethnic aspects of credit 
transactions in the courts of Istanbul in the first decades of the seventeenth century, based on a statistical 
analysis of court records from Istanbul courts. Kuran T and Rubin J, “The Financial Power of the Powerless: 
Socio-Economic Status and Interest Rates under Partial Rule of Law,” Econ. J. Economic Journal, 2017; Kuran 
supervised the editing of ten volumes of selections from various court sijills in Uskudar, Istanbul and Galata 
courts from the seventeenth century. Volumes nine and ten are dedicated to credit: Timur Kuran, Kredi 
piyasaları ve faiz uygulamaları (1602-61) = Credit markets and uses of interest (1602-61), vol. 9 (İstanbul: 
Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2013); Timur Kuran, Kredi piyasaları ve faiz uygulamaları (1661-97) 
genel dizin = Credit markets and uses of interest (1661-97): general index, vol. 10 (İstanbul: Türkiye İş 
Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2013); Ali Yaycıoğlu produced a review article relating to Kuran’s editions Ali 
Yaycıoğlu, “Timur Kuran, Ed., Social and Economic Life in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul: Glimpses from 
Court Records, Vol. 1-10 (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2010–2013).,” Int. J. Middle East 
12 
  
communal identity, geography and finance between the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans.31 
Sebouh Aslanian’s study, in particular, has located the continued use of Islamicate 
commercial forms by the Armenians of Julfa, most notably the commenda, in their global 
business well into the late eighteenth century when other forms were available to them.   
The use of Islamic law as a framework was actively applied by S.D. Goitein, 
followed by three generations of his students, who have found that the prescriptions of fiqh 
works widely resonated in the records of Jewish traders from the Cairo geniza community. 
Much of the emphasis of the geniza scholars has been on partnerships, which were the 
preferred mode of financing business ventures, especially long-distance trade. However, in 
doing so, scholars have taken the lead from fiqh works in another way, because fiqh places 
credit in a supporting role to partnerships.32 Such studies of credit are colored by how fiqh 
works presented this topic; for jurists, debt was less complex and intriguing than 
partnerships. In fact, debt (sing. dayn) is not understood as a fully-fledged ‘contract’ in fiqh, 
but rather, a unilateral and revocable obligation (usually, but not always, a pecuniary one). 
Dayn is unlike a variety of bilateral or multilateral contracts that attach rights and 
responsibilities for the rendering of goods or services, such as those found in sales contracts 
                                                     
Stud. International Journal of Middle East Studies 47, no. 03 (2015): 625–27; Pamuk has recently published an 
article that deals with this subject broadly, and his volume on Ottoman economy continues to be an invaluable 
survey of the main political-economic developments in the early modern period. Sevket Pamuk and Sevket 
Pamuk, “Political power and institutional change: lessons from the Middle East,” Economic History of 
Developing Regions 27, no. sup-1 (2012): 41–56; Pamuk, The Ottoman Economy and Its Institutions. 
31 Those of Goldberg, Trivellato and Aslanian stand out in particular. The latter two have relied heavily on 
Italian archives, Venice included, to assess trade within the Ottoman empire. Goldberg, Trade and Institutions 
in the Medieval Mediterranean; Francesca Trivellato, The Familiarity of Strangers: The Sephardic Diaspora, 
Livorno, and Cross-Cultural Trade in the Early Modern Period (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009); 
Sebouh David Aslanian, From the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean: The Global Trade Networks of 
Armenian Merchants from New Julfa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011). 
32 Udovitch, Partnership and Profit; Patricia Crone, Meccan Trade and the Rise of Islam (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1987); Even Kuran’s thesis on decline gives scant attention to credit practices and 
monetization, despite its importance to his overall argument. On commerce, he focuses on partnerships, the 
commenda.: Timur Kuran, The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East (Princeton; 
Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011). 
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(‘uqūd buyu‘). Perhaps it is for this reason that the most prevalent documentary evidence of 
credit in court archives (but also various Egyptian papyri collections) is the debt attestation 
(sing. iqrār).  
As a longue durée study of credit structures, this dissertation addresses the long 
sixteenth century in Bilād al-Shām (Syria and Palestine), from the last quarter of the fifteenth 
century to the first decade of the seventeenth, and analyzes credit structures across three 
broadly overlapping areas: legal-administrative change, monetization, and social-legal 
custom. The first concern tackles the historiographical tendency to faithfully cling to the idea 
that the Ottoman conquest of the Levant introduced significant legal-administrative norms 
and institutions of ‘Ottoman Law’ that largely reshaped those of the late fifteenth and early 
sixteenth century Mamluk period.33 While the Ottoman law was more bureaucratized, I 
illustrate how institutional change was a rather gradual process, that integrated both 
personages and legal-institutional practices of the Mamluk era over many decades. Second, I 
argue that adoption of Ottoman judicial credit norms did not introduce new elements, but 
rather reinforced and institutionalized Mamluk legal precursors, the most salient being the 
so-called credit structure of mu‘āmalāt (discussed below). My findings corroborate the view 
of some scholars on the likely coeval development of similar Mamluk-Ottoman institutions 
                                                     
33 For examples of this view on the events of 1516-1523, see: Reem Meshal, “Antagonistic Sharīʿas and the 
Construction of Orthodoxy in Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Cairo,” Journal of Islamic Studies 21, no. 2 (May 1, 
2010): 183–212; Wollina, Torsten, “Sultan Selīm in Damascus: The Ottoman Appropriation of a Mamluk 
Metropolis (922-924/1516-1518),” in The Mamluk-Ottoman Transition: Continuity and Change in Egypt and 
Bilād Al-Shām in the Sixteenth Century, ed. Conermann, Stephan and Şen, Gül (Bonn: V & R unipress, Bonn 
University Press, 2016). 
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or the cross-pollination of certain institutions into Ottoman law decades before the Ottoman 
conquest of the Levant.34  
Second, how can we best study credit and its role in a pre-capitalist society, and to 
what extent can we speak of a “monetized” society in fifteenth and sixteenth century Bilād 
al-Shām? A little monetized economy, in theory, would have been expected to produce an 
overreliance on credit and the opposite in the case of high monetization. However, my review 
of credit dealings over the second half of the century suggests that it is very difficult to 
identify monetization’s effects, beyond general inflation. Many other factors were at play for 
determining the demand and supply of credit, aside from monetization. For instance, high 
demographic mobility during the middle of the century and turbulent political strife at its end 
both produced spikes in credit dealings in both periods. Other factors, as well, such as 
periodic raids by hinterland Bedouins on villages outside of main towns (common to both 
Mamluk and Ottoman eras and registered throughout the 1500s) could produce periodic 
increases in borrowing. Droughts and the plague (particularly during 1523-6) also caused 
serious economic hardship. At the center of urban economic activity, some waqfs during 
such periods attempted to convert unpaid taxes into debts owed by villagers who farmed their 
waqf lands. Hyper monetization, in the last quarter of the century, did however prompt an 
Ottoman-wide currency devaluation (in 1583-5). Despite all these factors, I illustrate how 
credit structures could withstand significant stress and continue to be used, even when their 
continued use resulted in social disharmony. I argue that stresses affected the extent to which 
credit structures were used, but not their form. Thus, even though increased indebtedness was 
                                                     
34 For instance, Rapoport hints in attibuting the mufti al-adl of the Mamluk’s to the Ottoman Seyulislam at the 
conclusion of his article on the increased role of siyasa in Mamluk courts in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries. Rapoport, “Royal Justice.” 
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recorded during the 1560s and the turn of the seventeenth century, the credit instruments and 
processes used in court remained relatively unchanged. As I show in chapter four, the 
bankruptcy of Jerusalem’s Jewish community at the end of the century from the overuse of 
mutual surety pledges did not result in the judiciary’s barring mutual surety. These and other 
procedures, like the practice of lending out capital from orphan estates (chapter five), 
operated outside of short-term financial booms or busts and were very resilient as customary-
legal (‘urf) devices.  
On the last issue of ‘urf, I study how the assemblage of institutions, codes and 
practices, collectively known as Ottoman Law integrated Mamluk credit structures. Much 
early scholarship on the Ottoman sovereign’s so-called secular legal statutes, the 
ḳānūnnāmes, treated this unique Ottoman contribution as a secular part of the law, that was 
determined by the sultan, and set outside of the discretion of the sharia courts. Scholarship 
from the late 1980s, revised this dated idea to show that the ḳānūnnāmes were, rather, 
designed to be applied in the qāḍī courts, and more recent scholarship still has elevated the 
political-economic role of jurists in playing a central role in determining the development 
and implementation of the state’s legal code. With respect to Bilād al-Shām, current 
scholarship suggests that while Syrian jurists (of the sixteenth century especially) bemoaned 
the Ottoman qānūn, the actual contents of ḳānūnnāmes from Damascus and Aleppo, as well 
as their dates of introduction, suggest that these codes considered local customary law, and 
integrated the more equitable versions of Mamluk-era law. Further, numerous Ottoman edicts 
from the 1550s in Damascus and Jerusalem concern the outlawing of Mamluk-era market 
16 
  
and customs taxes, indicate that one cannot presume the full implementation of ‘Ottoman 
law’ before the century’s second half, at the earliest.35   
In studying ‘urf, I also present evidence of popular Ottoman judicial manuals in the 
mid-sixteenth century, such as that of Muḥammad al-Bursawī (d. 937/1530?) below, which 
reproduced a variety of formularies for mu‘āmalāt, reflecting a bureaucratized court 
environment that was, I suggest, set apart from its Mamluk predecessor. Successive 
ḳānūnnāmes from the 1520s, and legal opinions (fatwās) of Şeyhülislam Ebu’s-Su‘ud (d. 
982/1574) from 1541, criminalized credit arrangements that were formulated outside of the 
mu‘āmala forms described by al-Bursawī’s manual, promoting consistency in court. The 
evidence of the sijills of Jerusalem and Damascus broadly support the application of such 
norms when it came to the registration of financial statements related to the lending from 
orphan estates. Change and continuity were observed together, and I argue that the changes 
were more clearly felt in some areas, such as those concerning the regulation of markets than 
the regulation of market interest and less so in other areas, such as in the gendered dynamic 
of debt-taking in marriage (which appears to have remained consistent with the widely 
recorded Mamluk practice, the subject of chapter six). Substantial portions of chapters three 
(on waqf credit) and four (communal obligations) concern the role of credit in rural-life and 
its connection to the urban centers of Damascus and Jerusalem; I argue that credit was not 
only an inextricable facilitator of exchange between the hinterland ecological-economy that 
supported urban centers, but also vital to the life of rural peasants generally, as it had been in 
centuries prior.  
 
                                                     
35 Burak, “Between the Ḳānūn of Qāytbāy and Ottoman Yasaq,” 9–12. 
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Chapter outline 
The first chapter is a review of the framework of the administration of law between 
the late Mamluk and early Ottoman periods; was there a swift and lasting change in legal 
institutions and procedures change between periods? Drawing on chronicles and biographical 
dictionaries, I argue that the adjudicatory institutions of Mamluk law from the last few years 
of the Mamluk regime in Damascus remained largely in place and were supported by the 
continuity of political-family factions (jamā‘āt) into the 1530s, following a short-lived 
attempt at attempt by Sultan Selim and his legal administration to completely reform the 
legal institutions of Bilād al-Shām in 1517-1519. The legal training and activities of jurists 
from Bilād al-Shām remained localized partly because of their broad exclusion from the 
Ottoman state’s educational institutions in Istanbul, the ilmiye system, and partly because of 
their patronage networks and familial-affiliation with regional institutions of learning. These 
allowed them to maintain the continuity of customary legal and market practices into the 
middle of the century. 
Egyptian and Syrian jurists of the Ḥanafī school of jurisprudence (madhhab) from the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries also shared some of the same grievances. I illustrate how Ibn 
Qutlūbughā’s (d. 879/1474) complaints about widespread bribery, the poor legal training of 
qāḍīs, and the wide discretionary powers given to qāḍīs in the Mamluk legal system 
resonated with succeeding jurists of the school, especially Ibn Nujaym (d. 968/1563), a key 
jurist of the first half of the sixteenth century. In reviewing recent scholarship on 
adjudicatory processes in the region in the first century of Ottoman rule, I find compelling 
evidence to show that, at least in larger cities of Syria and Egypt, “law” was not exclusively 
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situated in courts, but distributed across competing sites of justice such as the governor’s 
court, dīwān, military tribunals, and the Sublime Porte’s own direct intervention on behalf of 
petitions sent to the sultan, and this not to mention the legal opinions issued by regional 
jurisconsults (sing. mufti) and the şeyhülislam which in and of themselves had the effect of 
legal rulings. There is a crude parallel to this variegated system in the legal system of the late 
fifteenth and early sixteenth century Mamluk state; Mamluk sultans took a more active role 
in the ways that law was defined and adjudicated in qāḍī courts and the sultan’s so-called 
secular courts (maẓālim courts), and the participation of the state-appointed jurisconsult 
(muftī dār al-‘adl). Lastly, I reflect on the incorporation of Muslim scholarly elites (‘ulamā’) 
from Bilād al-Shām into the ilmiye system, and contend that this did not take off in a 
significant way until very late in the sixteenth century; further, while the Ottoman state 
restricted access to the chief qāḍīship to the Ḥanafī madhhab, Ḥanafī qāḍīs did not altogether 
displace Shāfi‘ī ones, who remained and operated as important local deputy-qāḍīs.   
This second chapter introduces the history of the legal stratagems for usurious loans 
that were euphemistically referred to as mu‘āmalāt shar‘īya by Sunnī jurists in Bilād al-
Shām between the fourteenth through early nineteenth centuries. I begin by reviewing the 
key legal-historical elements underpinning discourses of illicit gain (ribā) and the 
development of legal stratagems (ḥiyal) to circumvent ribā proscriptions. I argue that 
although the widespread use of mu‘āmalāt shar‘īya is attested in Ottoman sources, its legal 
practice is attested in Mamluk legal manuals and responsa from fourteenth and fifteenth 
century Cairo. While “mu‘āmalāt shar‘īya” referred to a number of stratagems in this earlier 
period (I draw on Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī’s [d. 756/1355] reports of this activity as being 
somewhat contentious in his day), by the mid-sixteenth century, the prescriptive literature of 
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Ottoman-era legal responsa and judicial manuals, as well as the court records show the 
widespread use of specific types of mu‘āmalāt shar‘īya not only became widely accepted, but 
also incorporated into the qānūn, as noted above.  
I contend that the contribution of “Ottoman Law” vis-à-vis mu‘āmalāt was not in its 
popularization but in the bureaucratization of its use as a legal instrument. In doing so, this 
facilitated the state’s own rudimentary attempts to control the rate of market interest, the 
“ribḥ-ceiling,” as I call it. Any loan with interest above this rate was usurious “ribā”, while 
anything obtained below it was legally valid interest and denoted as “ribḥ.” Further, although 
mu‘āmalāt shar‘īya sprouted from a transoxanian Ḥanafī discourse on legal stratagems (ḥīyal, 
sing. ḥīla), I illustrate how they were widely adopted in court registrations by Shāfi‘ī jurists 
before and after the Ottoman conquest. Shāfi‘ī jurists’ promotion of these transactions 
dovetailed with the state’s imperatives to promote legally-sanctioned loans, mu‘āmalāt (sing. 
mu‘āmala) and given the much larger demographic profile of Shāfi‘īs in Egypt and Bilād al-
Shām during the sixteenth century, I contend that Ottoman chief qāḍīs depended on the 
active participation of Shāfi‘ī deputy qāḍīs to handle the registration of these loans. I argue 
that this was not a case of Shāfi‘īs simply obeying Ottoman Ḥanafī doctrine imposed from 
the center; the Shāfi‘īs had adopted the mu‘āmalāt shar‘īya stratagems earlier on their own 
accord in Bilād al-Shām under the Mamluks and were now working in harmony with a state-
sponsored Ḥanafī legal system.  
Chapter three focuses on the deployment of credit by waqfs. Here, I introduce the 
history of the cash-waqf (waqf al-nuqūd) in the Levant and address its effects. I begin by 
providing an overview of the historiography relating to the cash-waqf controversy of the 
1540s and the legal framework for waqf indebtedness in Islamic law. I then move onto a 
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review of prominent cash-waqfs incepted in Jerusalem in the 1550s and 60s. Contrary to 
traditional scholarly views, the cash-waqf’s use in the region was not only not limited during 
this period, it was growing rapidly. I assess the views of the few scholars who have studied 
the Jerusalem sijills to identify these particular waqfs, M. al-Arna’aūṭ being the principal 
figure. My analysis of these waqfs differs from his, which argues that Shāfi‘ī jurists had an 
acerbic reaction to this “innovation” of Ottoman Law. As I illustrate in several cases, Shāfi‘ī 
qāḍīs routinely served as administrators (sing. mutawallī) of such waqfs in sixteenth century 
Jerusalem, and in a few cases established cash-waqfs of their own. On the activities of these 
cash-waqfs, my findings are in line with those of scholars who have worked on these 
institutions in Istanbul and Bursa; among other things. My findings suggest that these 
institutions did not operate like banks at all, their lending did not exhibit sophisticated 
economic decision-making or significant variation in interest rates that would reflect 
different levels of market risk. The emphasis, it seems, was truly on the charitable missions 
that these institutions were endowed for. I adopt al-Azem’s model of inter-madhhab plurality 
(described in chapter one) to reflect on the blurred lines between Ḥanafī and Shafī‘ī practice 
in examining the common court custom of registering mortgages for cash-waqf loans in 
Ḥanafī courts, but according to Shāfi‘ī madhhab rules.   
With respect to conventional (non-cash) waqfs, I show how credit was very far from 
being a largely urban phenomenon, and in fact entangled a wide net of hinterland 
communities in long-term debt cycles where both waqfs and their underlying village 
communities needed each other. Analyzing the accounts of the Ṭāzīya waqf, a Mamluk-era 
madrasa in Jerusalem, I show how waqfs had to rely on re-capitalization, a web of 
indebtedness between waqfs and village communities, and the credit provided by employees, 
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to maintain solvency. This was always a process mediated by qāḍī courts. I argue that the 
introduction of the cash-waqf had the effect of loosening the restrictions on waqf lending by 
conventional waqfs, which is highly regulated under fiqh, and allowed only in extra-ordinary 
situations. By the last decades of the sixteenth century, not infrequently, one comes across 
the issuance of market credit by family and other non-cash-waqfs, indicating a normalization 
of this activity, yet it is difficult to measure the extent of this activity.  
The fourth chapter deals with mutual surety, a practice that several Ottoman 
historians of the early modern period have observed, whereby creditors would secure group 
pledges of creditors that pooled and cross-collateralized their individual liabilities into a 
larger group obligation. I examine the practice of mutual surety in Jerusalem across three 
groups: religious communities (the Jews and Christians of the city), village communities, and 
guilds.  Mutual surety debts were usually imposed by powerful elites on marginalized groups 
in society who had little or no collateral to guarantee their loans. In addition to their financial 
responsibility, the debtors of such mutual surety arrangements, also usually attached personal 
guarantees to creditors, which at times resulted in the imprisonment of a debtor group 
member for default (e.g., a father being imprisoned for his son’s loans, where both had 
guaranteed each other). While fiqh supports these types of individual guarantees, it does not 
support corporate personhood. However, I demonstrate that the use of mutual sureties against 
entire communities, at times, indicates that this is exactly what occurred in practice. The 
Ottoman legal codes, the ḳānūnnāmes, supported the rights of tax-farmers, often military 
officers, to prevent the movement of peasants who controlled their land. The imposition of 
mutual surety debts on villagers who had defaulted on their taxes was one way that tax-
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farmers attempted to prevent the mobility of individuals. The high demographic mobility of 
the middle of the century presented a problem for such creditors.  
My study contends that the rulings of qāḍīs on cases of mutual surety defaults in 
Jerusalem were inconsistent. For non-Muslims in Jerusalem the history of communal debts 
has long standing and is recorded from the Fatimid to Mamluk periods. Members of the 
Jewish and Christian communities in the city regularly resorted to mutual-guarantee loans for 
renovating communal buildings, churches, and synagogues. When defaults occurred, qāḍīs 
had to mediate commercial as well as intra-communal disputes that flared up in these 
communities, particularly the city’s two Jewish communities. With respect to guilds, my 
findings suggest that the use of mutual surety occurred between members of different guilds 
and junior members of the same guild; I have not come across an instance in the Jerusalem 
sijills of a guild’s senior members jointly entering into such arrangements. I suggest this 
reflects the unwillingness of qāḍīs to allow guild members to take on such expansive 
liability, given the critical importance of guild members to the provision of key goods and 
services to the city. It also reflects the entrenched status of guild-heads as extensions of the 
state’s mechanism for taxing groups in society. In several cases, I show how members of the 
city’s butchers and builders guilds were required to attest concerning their guilds’ debts to 
and from the city’s Jewish and Christian communities (noting that Jews and Christians were 
members of both guilds). 
The fifth chapter of this dissertation covers the well-attested practice of lending out 
capital from orphan estates. The religious-social imperative connected to the protection of 
orphans imposed a quasi-legal mandate on the state for supervising, if not regulating the 
provision of orphan credit. I review the extent of this practice in Mamluk times, largely on 
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evidence from the legal responsa of Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī. I argue that the Mamluk institution 
dedicated to the management of orphan estates, the mawdi‘ al-ḥukm, fell into disuse during 
the fifteenth century, yet qāḍīs continued to supervise the investment of orphan capital loans 
and register them in court. By the time of the Ottomans, I suggest that this practice became a 
reified social-legal custom that was largely handled outside of court, and indeed the financial 
accounts (sing. muḥāsaba) that were infrequently requested by qāḍīs reflect this. I focus on 
records relating to orphans of the influential Ḥanafī imam Mūsā al-Dayrī, who came from a 
long line of Jerusalem ‘ulamā’, established his own cash-waqf in the early 1560s, and left the 
executorship of his children’s estate to his cousin, Jamāl al-Dīn Bin Rabī‘, an influential 
merchant and lender in the city. I use the many records of Bin Rabī‘’s activities in investing 
this estate in loans to show that the court demonstrated a loose supervision of this activity in 
Jerusalem. Further, I argue that the bureaucratization of judicial authority in Ottoman courts 
led qāḍīs to only interfere in cases where disputes arose, or suspected malfeasance between 
executors and guardians of orphans’ estates. However, this would arise after the fact. With its 
detached supervisory role, I suggest the court’s principal role was the validation of executor 
activity, rather than its interrogation, which is rare in the sijills.  
The sixth and final chapter attends to the relationship between gender, social status 
and credit. Here, I argue that most women’s moneylending activities in court, and the 
adjudication of debts in general, had social and status constraints that increased their 
transactional costs relative to men’s court registrations. I suggest that while courts did not 
discriminate against women of lower social-economic status, one rarely sees court cases 
raised by them. Elite women, on the other hand, had a range of legal forums and personal 
networks at their disposal to aid them in the management of their financial affairs and they 
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are regularly appear in court records. Most important of these was the agency (wakāla) 
contracts that were used to manage their assets and allowed them to use courts more for 
pressing their claims. Courts appear to have been more concerned with the use of written 
rather than oral evidence for adjudicating debts produced by women, and there is not a 
discernable difference between elite and non-elite women’s cases in this regard, despite elite 
women’s much greater access to services, specialists, and witnesses who could have 
promoted more favorable outcomes. On punitive measures, I contend that courts did not 
display a differential treatment for insolvent female debtors; they were imprisoned as were 
men in Jerusalem’s women’s jail. I refer to the debt imprisonment case of a Jewish female 
moneylender, Bīla, to show that, as with the case of debtor imprisonment reflected in the 
chapter on mu‘āmalāt above, her imprisonment was intended to restore the money she owed 
to her creditors rather than as a punitive measure.   
 
Assessing the Mamluk-Ottoman transition and its impact 
This dissertation deals with the period of Mamluk-Ottoman transition and the 
continuation of Mamluk era social institutions and customs after the Ottoman conquest. 
While the Ottoman conquest reoriented the region’s political center to Istanbul, it would take 
considerable time to Ottomanize the region’s society. For political, economic and legal 
reasons, the social integration of this region did not appear to be a high priority for the 
Ottoman state’s elites in Istanbul. The Ottomans were still in a rapid expansion mode for 
three decades after the fall of the Mamluk state. They gained large swathes of Southeastern 
Anatolia and Iraq, including Baghdad (1534), and after Hungary’s complete incorporation as 
a directly ruled region of the Ottoman state in 1541, the Ottoman state’s attitude in its 
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Eastern provinces began to witness “the beginnings of a significant shift in imperial emphasis 
from territorial expansion to administrative consolidation, that is, from conquest to 
colonization.”36 It is likely not a coincidence therefore that the earliest surviving court 
records from Bilād al-Shām and Egypt begin a decade or so (at the earliest) after the Ottoman 
conquest. Although the earliest extant qāḍī court sijills are from 1528 (for Cairo) and 1530 
(for Jerusalem), their form and structure are not characteristic of Ottoman sijills from a 
decade later; earlier sijills were often made up of loose copies of Mamluk era sijills from 
different courts and periods that were not assembled in a uniform way. As I elaborate in my 
chapter on law, several factors would shift the full incorporation of the region’s legal 
institutions into the bureaucratic-legal norms of the Ottoman center to the mid-1540s. Before 
this time, I suggest, important continuities remained from Mamluk courts.  
The 1540s was also the decade of momentous legal reforms associated with Sultan 
Süleymān’s rule, during which the most famous of the ḳānūnnāmes was issued (in 1541), 
earning him the sobriquet the “lawgiver” (al-qānūnī). 1548 marks the year in which the cash-
waqf was legalized by Süleymān and the new ḳānūnnāme was swiftly promulgated across the 
sultanate. In an apparently coordinated action, in 964/1556 the governors of Aleppo and 
Damascus established the first two cash-waqfs in the Levant (in Aleppo and Jerusalem 
respectively).37 Dozens of new cash-waqfs would follow in later decades in these two cities. 
With respect to the building of landmark Ottoman public waqfs in Bilād al-Shām, these can 
                                                     
36 Leslie P Peirce, Morality Tales: Law and Gender in the Ottoman Court of Aintab (Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press, 2003), 108. 
37 Farrūkh Bayk, the governor of Jerusalem in the early 1550s established the city’s firs cash-waqf in the 
amount of 16,000 dirhams in 964/1556 to support Qur’an reciters in Hebron. al-Arna’aūṭ, “Dalālāt Ẓuhūr Waqf 
Al-Nuqūd Fī Al-Quds Khilāl Al-Ḥukm Al-‘Uthmānī,” 40; In the same year, Aleppo’s governor created a 30,000 
gold dinar waqf in Aleppo. Muḥammad Mūfākū, Dawr Al-Waqf Fī Al-Mujtamaʻāt Al-Islāmīyah, al-Ṭabʻah 1 
(Bayrūt: Dār al-Fikr al-Muʻāṣir, 2000), 71, 77. 
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squarely be traced to the 1540s and early 1550s. The mosque-madrasa complex of Hüsrev 
Pasha (al-Khusrawīya) in Aleppo was completed in 1546, and Süleymān’s mosque complex 
in Damascus began construction in 1554.38 In the early 1550s the Jerusalem sijills also bear 
witness to the acquisition and merger of properties in Jerusalem which created that city’s 
famous “soup-kitchen” by Süleymān’s chief consort Hasekī Sultan, a major institution in the 
city that came to be known as al-‘Amāra al-‘āmira.39  
Studies on the widely investigated demographic explosion and decline of the 
sixteenth century have been enabled by the survival of Ottoman cadastral surveys (tapu 
taḥrīr defters) which were developed for the purposes of measuring taxation; a source base 
that does not exist for Ottomanists of later periods.40  In central Anatolia, these records 
indicate a gradually rising population trend from the fifteenth century and a population surge 
of over 100% in some places during the mid-sixteenth century, followed by a sudden fall 
towards the century’s end. Many factors have been put forward to explain this mid-century 
population explosion: economic (urban mercantile growth), political (dislocations from long 
periods of Ottoman-Safavid warfare), and monetary (the flood of American silver), are but a 
                                                     
38 Bruce Alan Masters, The Arabs of the Ottoman Empire, 1516-1918: A Social and Cultural History, 2013, 
111. 
39 Amy Singer, Constructing Ottoman Beneficence: An Imperial Soup Kitchen in Jerusalem (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2002), 44–45. 
40 Scholars have attributed the lack of tahrir defters for subsequent centuries (they are limited to the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries) to different causes. Lewis and Cohen attributed the disproportionality to the fact that the  
sixteenth century witnessed the apex of Ottoman military expansion, which brought with it a highly centralized 
state bureaucracy; Bernard Lewis and Amnon Cohen, Population and Revenue in the Towns of Palestine in the 
Sixteenth Century (Princeton University Press, 2015). Linda Darling has explained that the lack of defters in 
later periods should be seen outside of a rise and decline framework. She contends that regular tahrir defters 
were abandoned because of a change in the relationship between “military forces and the land”. By the 
seventeenth century, the timar system, and the cavalry forces it supported, was outdated and the military-
technology revolution forced the state to increasingly levy ad-hoc avariz taxes, which made the tahrir defter 
system less relevant; Linda T Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance 
Administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560-1660 (Leiden; New York: E.J. Brill, 1996), 81. 
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few.41 Michael Cook advanced one of the leading theories to explain the lead up to the late-
century depopulation trend, by arguing that the productive ability of arable lands could not 
support the “population pressure” higher populations placed on smaller plots of land in this 
century.42 Before him, M. Akdag, who had observed similar dynamics, indirectly attributed 
the turn of the seventeenth century Celalī revolts as being facilitated by the availability of 
this economically marginalized rural manpower.43 Of late, other scholars who have revisited 
the tahrir defters and other sources containing rich demographic data, such as waqfs and jizya 
registers, have questioned the extent to which the buildup of “pressure” led to a 
“demographic crisis,” and consider a plethora of causal factors, realizing that demographic 
growth was quite variegated across the large empire.44  
Population centers in Bilād al-Shām also experienced a demographic rise and decline 
over the “long” sixteenth century, although not as dramatic as that recorded for some 
Anatolian urban centers.45 Barkan estimated that the populations of significant Ottoman cities 
expanded by 84% on average, comparable to the 96% growth that Braudel suggested for the 
                                                     
41 Huri İslamoğlu-İnan, The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy (Cambridge University Press, 1987), 
112–18. 
42 M. A. Cook, Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia, 1450-1600 (Oxford University Press, 1972). 
43 Oktay Özel, “Population Changes in Ottoman Anatolia during the 16th and 17th Centuries: The 
‘Demographic Crisis,’” International Journal of Middle East Studies 36, no. 2 (2004): 84; Mustafa Akdağ, 
Celâlî isyanları (1550-1603). (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1963); For the Celali revolts see: Karen 
Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
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44 Özel, “Population Changes,” 189–92; Huri İslamoğlu-İnan, State and Peasant in the Ottoman Empire: 
Agrarian Power Relations and Regional Economic Development in Ottoman Anatolia during the Sixteenth 
Century (Leiden; New York: E.J. Brill, 1994); Suraiya Faroqhi, “Political Activity among Ottoman Taxpayers 
and the Problem of Sultanic Legitimation (1570-1650),” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the 
Orient 35, no. 1 (1992): 1–39; İnalcık and Quataert, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 
433–52. 
45 The notable exception to this trend was Aleppo. Barkan’s study on demographic change in Ottoman cities 
shows that Aleppo’s population gradually declined over the century from a population of 67k in 1519, to 57k, 
45k, and 46k for the periods 1520-1530, 1571-1580 and “after 1580” respectively. Barkan, Ömer Lutfi, “Essai 
Sur Les Données Statistiques Des Registres De Recensement Dans L’Empire Ottoman Aux XVe et XVIe 
Siècles,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 1, no. 1 (1957): 27; Lewis and Cohen, 
Population and Revenue in the Towns of Palestine in the Sixteenth Century, 20. 
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Mediterranean centers.46 However, Barkan contended there were two exceptions, the total 
populations of Damascus and Aleppo, he asserted experienced a continuous population 
decline over the sixteenth century.47 Barkan’s data for this is from the taḥrīr defters, although 
limited, and he does not explain the reasons for this purported decline. Using the same 
defters, Bernard Lewis and Amnon Cohen, and Adnan Bakhit, illustrated a different trend for 
Damascus, their studies covered all populations centers of Bilād al-Shām except for the 
district of Aleppo. The latter surveys suggest that urban centers in Bilād al-Shām experienced 
a similar dynamic to those of the Ottoman center, with growth rates of 100% or more 
recorded in some cities. However, the growth and reduction of Damascus’ population itself 
(the city) was far more muted. The district (of Damascus) grew between 30% to 50% or more 
between the 1520s and 1540s, with growth slowing over the next decade. From the late 
1550s populations began to steadily decline.48 In their study on population and taxation in 
sixteenth century Palestine, Lewis and Cohen put it this way, “the general trend in the 
population of the towns … was upwards in the first half of the century … and downwards 
during the second half.”49 Their work centered on six tahrir surveys that covered the years:  
932/1525-6, 945/1538-9, 955/1548/9, 961/1553-4, 970/1562-3, and 1005/1596-7. It is 
notable that these surveys were more frequent than those observed by Barkan for cities in 
Anatolia, indicating that tahrir surveys in Bilād al-Shām were neither limited to periods of 
political succession or confined to the immediate period following conquest.50  
                                                     
46 Barkan, Ömer Lutfi, “Research on the Ottoman Fiscal Surveys,” in Studies in the Economic History of the 
Middle East, ed. Cook, M.A. (Oxford University Press, 1970), 170–71. 
47 Barkan, Ömer Lutfi, 168–69. 
48 Lewis and Cohen, Population and Revenue in the Towns of Palestine in the Sixteenth Century, 18–22. 
49 Lewis and Cohen, Population and Revenue, 21. 
50 Lewis and Cohen, Population and Revenue, 10. 
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Bakhit’s study of 16th century administration and taxation in Damascus indicates a 
similar overall trend as that observed later by Lewis and Cohen, however his study 
reproduced population register data and examined the detailed variations between population 
increases and decreases of all the thirteen constituent municipalities comprising villages 
(sanjaks/nāḥiya), in the district (liwā’) of Damascus. He showed how demographic change in 
the city of Damascus was the largely due to the movement of communities from rural to 
urban areas; during the highest period of population growth, from the 1520s to 1540s, and 
hinterland towns also grew. Unfortunately, only three tahrir defters have survived for 
Damascus, from the years 950/1543, 955/1548, and 977/1569. The first survey carried out 
immediately after the conquest in 1516 has not survived (although a survey from 930/1523 
has survived and records population estimates for Damascus’ surrounding towns - below).51 I 
have reconstituted some of the data reported by Bakhit in the following table which 
summarizes the population changes he presented for seven of the nine nāḥiyas surrounding 
Damascus (those nāḥiyas which had the same villages included in their surveys, with no 
addition/loss of new ones), and I have also included the data he provides for the city itself:52  
Nāḥiya T.D. 430 
(930/1523) 
 
T.D. 401 
(950/1543) 
T.D. 263 
(955/1548) 
T.D. 474 
(977/1569) 
Qalamūn 214 638 367  
al-Zabadānī 673 829  817 
                                                     
51 Muḥammad ʻAdnān Bakhīt, The Ottoman Province of Damascus in the Sixteenth Century (Beirut: Librairie 
du Liban, 1982), 36. 
52 This data excludes data for Imams and certain religious notables, and military officers who were tax exempt 
and excluded from the defters. I have also not included figures for bachelors and simply present the number of 
households to provide a representative summary of trends. Bakhīt, The Ottoman Province of Damascus, 37–49. 
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Wādī Baradā 359 563  418 
Iqlīm Dārānī 413 574 397  
Marj al-Qiblī wal-Shamālī  1838 2229 2072 
Al-Ghawṭa  1560 1816 1233 
Damascus  7213 8119 7054 
 
 
The above data indicates that while population increases in some villages were 
extremely high, sometimes exceeding 100% over the century, the changes around (and 
including) Damascus were not major in the middle of the century. Despite the non-survival 
of defters for the 1520s, it would appear though, if one were to extrapolate from the trends of 
nāḥiyas that do have this data (such as for Qalamūn or Baradā), that populations in outlying 
areas of Damascus had growth rates of 50% or more in the second quarter of the century. It is 
tempting to attribute this increase to economic growth or the influx of new populations, and 
certainly this did occur with the Ottoman demographic expansion. Yet, there are at least three 
other important factors as well to explain the apparent population surge of Damascus and 
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Jerusalem in the second quarter of the sixteenth century. First, was the plague recorded in 
1523, which at its climax resulted in a reported death toll of 220 deaths per day, and this 
event likely instigated the cadastral survey of that same year above (T.D. 430).53 As with 
other incidences of plague, there would have likely been a natural demographic upsurge in 
the years following it, both through organic growth and a repopulation of the area from the 
hinterland through economic pull. Second, as Lewis and Cohen have advanced, the last three 
decades of Mamluk rule were particularly onerous on the population and characterized by a 
ratcheting up of confiscations and forced sales (ṭarḥ). This instability, they contended, 
compelled a great number of urban dwellers to seek refuge in hinterland communities, 
particularly Christians and Jews. Both Lewis and Cohen, for Jerusalem, and Bakhit, for 
Damascus, recorded population surges of Christians and Jews in the 1540s, attributing this 
rise to political-economic stability.54  
Although taxation differed under the Mamluk iqtā‘ and Ottoman iltizām systems of 
land tenure, the political-economic prerogatives of the Ottomans in Jerusalem tended to 
follow a similar pattern to that which had existed under the Mamluks, at least for the first 
three decades of Ottoman rule. In Egypt, the iqtā‘ tax farming system was reformulated as 
sultan-owned land that was tax-administered directly, and managed by employees of the state 
(amīns and ‘āmils). While stripping the Mamluks of their lands, the Ottoman state did, 
however, provide lucrative bureaucratic appointments to previous Mamluk elites in the new 
order and absolved them of certain taxes.55 A key concern for the Ottomans was that a 
preservation of the ‘iqtā‘ system, and any military-elites depending on it, could revive the 
                                                     
53 Bakhīt, The Ottoman Province of Damascus, 52. 
54 Lewis and Cohen, Population and Revenue, 23–26; Bakhīt, The Ottoman Province of Damascus, 40–41, 49–
51. 
55 Shaw, The Financial and Administrative Organization and Development of Ottoman Egypt, 1517-1798, 28. 
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factionalism and conflict in Egypt that preceded their reign and threaten Egypt’s new role as 
the empire’s preeminent granary.56 By patronizing the Mamluk elites, but neutralizing their 
control over land resources, the Ottomans attempted to secure their loyalty and diffuse the 
potential for revolt. As evidenced in the taḥrīr defter of 1538/9 there was an attempt, to 
develop a detailed inventory of the population changes that had transpired since the last years 
of the Mamluk state, and these were not accurately captured by the taḥrīr defter of 932/1525-
6; the 945/1538-9 defter provides many more details, such as the names of household (sing. 
khane) heads and counts of bachelors separately – information that was absent from the 
earlier defter.57  
In Syria, however, the timār, which resembled the Mamluk iqtā‘ system in form was 
adopted, although the organization and size of landholdings differed somewhat, as did the 
demarcation of administrative areas under Ottoman rule.58 That said, there were customary 
taxes and market practices, such as ṭarḥ, that were recorded in both Jerusalem’s sijills as well 
as imperial edicts into the 1560s, reflecting a strong continuity of Mamluk-era taxation 
customs.59 As in Egypt, the Ottomans perpetuated certain social-economic privileges of the 
Mamluk elites and their descendants, such as tax privileges that remained throughout the 
sixteenth century.60 The stability of social-economic relations continued until the introduction 
                                                     
56 Shaw, The Financial and Administrative Organization, 30. 
57 Lewis and Cohen, Population and Revenue, 3–18. 
58 Bakhīt, The Ottoman Province of Damascus, 35–36, 91–94. 
59 A typical example of such taxes were the “ghafar”/“khafar” taxes levied on pilgrims traveling through the 
holy land. Amnon Cohen, Jewish Life under Islam: Jerusalem in the Sixteenth Century (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1984), 102–5. The Ottoman state faced difficulty in controlling such tax which it 
apparently had no control over, even though they were recorded and farmed out by local judges in Palestine. A 
Sultanic decree from 1552 calls for the policing of the illegal khafar taxes. Fāḍil Mahdī Bayāt and Halit Eren, 
al-Bilād al-ʻarabīyaẗ fī al-waṯāʼiq al-ʻuṯmānīyaẗ (Istanbul: Istānbūl : IRCICA , Munaẓẓamaẗ al-Muʼtamar al-
islāmī, Markaz al-Abḥāṯ li-al-Tārīẖ wa-al-Funūn wa-al-Ṯaqāfaẗ al-islāmīyaẗ, 2010), Vol. 2, 187. 
60 This was more so in Syria than in Egypt. Referring to the Ottoman taḥrīr registers, Lewis and Cohen state, 
“awlād-al-nās… outlived the Mamluk regime, at least in some cities of Palestine. These, already exempt from 
taxes (in the taḥrīr defters), are described as ‘former members of the Jund al-Ḥalqa in the time of the 
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of arbitrary avāriz war-taxes that had the effect of dislodging the power of long-standing elite 
families and gradually replacing them with a new class of landed military-gentry and 
janissary elites.61 In other ways, recent scholarship by J. Fitzgerald on the policing of public 
markets and taxation has uncovered many reported abuses by former Mamluk elites that 
continued well into the Ottoman period. He argues that the institutionalization of Ottoman 
law and order – of the sort that could be comparable to the other large Ottoman cities – only 
began to take shape in the mid-1540s for Aleppo.62 For Cairo, Baldwin has argued that 
policing the rule of law and markets, in contrast to the conventional view of H. Gerber, 
among others, was a rather decentralized process that was distributed across a variety of 
actors – most notably, as in the Mamluk era, the Muḥtasib – and not necessarily controlled by 
the office of the city’s chief qāḍī.63 A. Cohen’s study of Jerusalem’s court registers for the 
mid-century has some tentative parallels to Baldwin’s assessment, in that numerous courts 
registered complaints brought against the city’s Muḥtasib complaining of extortion; however, 
this may have been explained by the fact that this position was tax-farmed at considerable 
expense and sometimes incentivized the skirting of the law to make financial sense.64 
Although the Ottoman muḥtasib was typically a trader or merchant, one should not assume 
he had the independence of Mamluk-era muḥtasibs. In Ottoman times, the muḥtasib was 
                                                     
Circassians, now retired.’ They resided mainly in the towns. Throughout the sixteenth century they are still 
recorded as a separate element in most of the quarters of Safed as well as in Gaza.” (emphasis mine), Lewis 
and Cohen, Population and Revenue, 18. For a review of persistence of Mamluk Jund see idem. 33-34.  
61 For the fracture and collapse of the timar system, see: Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The 
Structure of Power (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 206–14; For 
social re-structuring of power relations between military and elite households in connection with the avariz tax 
system in the seventeenth century Levant, see Dror Ze’evi, Ottoman Century, An: The District of Jerusalem in 
the 1600s (SUNY Press, 2012); Charles L. Wilkins, Forging Urban Solidarities: Ottoman Aleppo 1640-1700 
(BRILL, 2010). 
62 Fitzgerald, Timothy J., “Rituals of Possession, Methods of Control, and the Monopoly of Violence: The 
Ottoman Conquest of Aleppo in Comparative Perspective,” in The Mamluk-Ottoman Transition: Continuity and 
Change in Egypt and Bilād Al-Shām in the Sixteenth Century (Bonn: Bonn University Press, 2016), 249–74. 
63 James E Baldwin, Islamic Law and Empire in Ottoman Cairo, 2017, 41–43. 
64 Amnon Cohen, Economic Life in Ottoman Jerusalem (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 11–17. 
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usually a guild member who came under the scrutiny of the judiciary by virtue of this fact, in 
addition to his appointment by the qāḍī, rather than sultan.65     
 
Locating credit and its demographics  
A challenge to studying the history of credit in the premodern Middle East is the 
difficulty in locating bankers or moneylenders as a distinct professional category. It is true 
that , moneychangers (sing. ṣarrāf) were the professional group most associated with market 
lending historically, and they appeared regularly as creditors in the court records of large 
cities. Silversmiths (sing. ṣayyāgh) are likewise considered to have also fulfilled a banking 
role. Yet, neither of these groups or their activities were officially identified as centered on 
lending, as such, and their lending was a byproduct of changing money and trading and 
manufacture of metalwork, respectively. Moreover, there are a host of other social-
professional groups, most notably merchants, who were important providers of market credit. 
Unlike the late medieval/early modern Italian city-states, banker’s guilds did not exist in the 
Ottoman Levant, to my knowledge and this surely must have created a less structured 
environment for credit. Although moneylenders were not institutionally organized as such, 
the footprint of credit was expansive and could be seen in every sector of society. The 
Mamluk-Ottoman economies of the fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries especially, were highly 
monetized, so much so that one may even speak of a debt economy. For instance, O. 
Barkan’s study of the estate inventories of elites in Edirne between the sixteenth and 
                                                     
65 Cohen, 39, 42 Towards the century’s end, the autonomy of this figure appears to have been increasingly 
subsumed by the authority of chief-judges. For instance, in Ramadan 966/August 1588, the chief judge of 
Jerusalem issued a stern warning to a specific group of named traders and shopkeepers in the city who he 
suspected of violating (from a tip-off by the muḥtasib) the law and “selling their wares out of their homes and 
their warehouses, rather than in their shops. The judge warned the traders that they would each be fined 100 
sultani for this criminal offense if caught, and that this amount would be donated to the al-Aqsa sanctuary 
mosque waqf. J-67-389-3. . 
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seventeenth centuries showed that around 20% of all capital held by wealthy elites was in the 
form of credit obligations at the time of their deaths. This rate was much higher, exceeding 
50%, for moneychangers and jewelers, those whose mainstay was lending.66  
Market lending was also indispensable to commerce and merchants were the other 
social group who were engaged as important lenders. From geniza Cairo, hundreds of years 
earlier, Udovitch observed of “merchant bankers” that “no matter how extensive the banking 
operations of any single [genizah] merchant, they are invariably encountered together with a 
correspondingly thriving trade in commodities … even more so than in the medieval West … 
their [merchant] banking activities were closely related to their private trading commercial 
activities.”67 To move seamlessly from geniza to early modern economic life would be 
anachronistic, if not essentialist, yet some key features of moneylending persisted. In spite of 
the rise of the bureaucratization of loans, under the framework of mu‘āmalāt shar‘īya 
discussed below and the development and popularization of cash-waqfs, the absence of 
deposit-banking continued through the early modern period until the middle of the nineteenth 
century. 
Another aspect of moneylending in the early modern Ottoman period, and one that is 
founded on a later stereotype, is that it was an activity dominated by non-Muslims, mostly 
Armenians, Greeks, and Jews. This view is premised on the social-economic effects of 
economic charters (or ‘capitulations’), ‘ahdnāmes, awarded to European states in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that increasingly gave the upper hand, so to speak, to 
non-Muslim Ottoman merchants and lenders affiliated with European powers. Such charters 
                                                     
66 İnalcık, Halil, “Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire,” 124–25. 
67 Udovitch, “Reflections,” 15. 
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allowed these groups to engage in trading and market activity on preferential basis with 
respect to taxation and market monopolies. This shift however began well far after the 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and the court records of Bilād al-Shām show a 
rather diffused picture of moneylending. Moneylenders came from a wide variety of 
professional, social, and confessional backgrounds; and Muslims in rough proportion to their 
demographic majority in society were the dominant moneylenders. For Kayseri, Ronald 
Jennings posited that 82% of loans in the seventeenth century were issued by Muslims.68 
However, a salient feature of sixteenth century credit was the market dominance of sipāhī 
(cavalry-corps) and janissary officers during the century’s second half. Their increasing 
involvement as moneylenders (and borrowers) tracked the fiscal-crises, monetary inflation, 
and restructuring of the Ottoman military tax system.     
Timur Kuran has recently analyzed court sijill extracts from the courts of Galata and 
Istanbul during the first half of the seventeenth century and presents findings that paint a 
somewhat revisionist picture concerning the relationship between religious confession and 
credit. Volume nine of his series of partially edited sijill extracts reviews 1246 debt cases and 
registrations. He observes that while non-Muslims were not overrepresented, relative to their 
demographic presence, the interest rates paid by Christian and Jewish debtors to Muslim 
creditors was lower than that paid by Muslims debtors to their coreligionists.69 Further, 
women in Kuran’s pool also paid a lower rate of interest, on average for their debt, than 
men.70 In addition, he estimates that intra-Muslim lending represented 57.7% of all lending in 
                                                     
68 Ronald C. Jennings, “Women in Early 17th Century Ottoman Judicial Records: The Sharia Court of 
Anatolian Kayseri,” Journal of the Etasiconomic and Social History of the Orient 18, no. 1 (1975): 182. 
69 He calculates that nominal rates for Muslim borrowers were 13.4% and non-Muslim borrowers were 11.9%. 
Kuran, Kredi piyasaları ve faiz uygulamaları (1602-61) = Credit markets and uses of interest (1602-61), 9:27. 
70 women = 11.8% to men =13.5%. Kuran, 9:27. 
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courts, a rate that was much higher than what would be assumed given the demographic 
share of Muslims.71 More significantly, his findings suggest that for lending between 
religious communities, lending mostly occurred in one direction: from Muslims to non-
Muslims, rather than the other way around. Kuran argues that this was due to the “pro-
Muslim procedural biases” of Islamic courts. Christians and Jews would have benefited from 
lower rates of interest than Muslim debtors because they would have been less likely to 
default on their loans given their legal deficiencies (as witnesses).72 He uses also applies this 
rationale to explain why Jews and Christians would prefer not to use Islamic courts, because 
in cases when non-Muslims defaulted on debts in qāḍī courts, Muslim qāḍīs “would side with 
the borrower. Because of their minority status and limited presence among state officials, 
non-Muslims may also have been at a disadvantage in using political connections to secure 
the enforcement of their loans.”73  
While Kuran’s evaluation is notable for opening the statistical study of credit, it is far 
too small a sample to allow for blanket statements about the dynamics of credit across 
confessional lines. Even if we were to restrict ourselves to Istanbul, this city had an 
enormous and much larger non-Muslim population relative to many other Ottoman cities at 
the time. This alone poses the question of whether we can assume a study from Istanbul’s 
sijills on this topic would be indicative of a pattern in the wider Ottoman context. The social-
economic and political backgrounds of the parties to these credit transactions are also not 
addressed in his brief description of the sample and the selection criteria and procedure used 
                                                     
71 Kuran calculates that random probability would result in 34.6%. Kuran, 9:23. 
72 For an elaboration of his use of pro-Muslim “procedural biases” see: Kuran, T. and Lustig, S., “Judicial 
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to create this specific data sample out of tens, perhaps hundreds, of thousands of records is 
unclear. Its use as a representative sample thus requires further research.74  
Review of the primary sources 
This dissertation relies on a diverse set of primary ‘legal’ sources, that is, those produced by 
courts or people attached to them. I draw heavily on the qāḍī court archives of Jerusalem and 
Damascus, as well as fatwā collections, treatises on judicial procedure, and manuals of legal 
formularies (so-called shurūṭ works that fall under the broad “adab al-qāḍī” genre). The 
latter were produced to guide court notaries and other officials to produce the appropriate 
legal entries for court registers. I have also used biographical dictionaries and chronicles, 
principally in chapter one, to sketch aspects of change and continuity in legal culture and 
institutions.   
Qāḍī Court Archives 
The sharia court registers, sijills (sing. sijill) I have drawn on for this study are mostly 
the sharia courts of Damascus and Jerusalem; In a few cases I use material from the sharia 
courts of Aleppo for comparison. Except for published legal deeds from the Haram al-Sharīf 
collection (discussed below) that relate to the sharia court of Jerusalem in the late fourteenth 
century, all the sharia court sijills for Jerusalem used in this study are for the Ottoman period. 
With the exception of several edited founding waqf deeds from the late Mamluk and early 
Ottoman era, that have been preserved in the sijills of Jerusalem, the sijill materials I have 
examined are unedited.  
                                                     
74 For a review of this problem of source selection, see Yaycioglu’s review: Yaycıoğlu, “Timur Kuran, Ed., 
Social and Economic Life in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul: Glimpses from Court Records, Vol. 1-10 (Istanbul: 
Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2010–2013).” 
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The original sijills of Jerusalem are still housed at the qāḍī courts in Jerusalem and 
are difficult to access, although copies of the Jerusalem sijills are available to 
Israeli/Palestinian and Jordanian researchers at a few national universities in Israel/Palestine 
and Jordan. I was fortunate to locate copies of Jerusalem’s 346 extant sijills (covering the 
period 936/1529 to 1280/1863) at the Turkish Religious Foundation’s Islamic Research 
Center (ISAM) in Istanbul, and it was there, in the Spring of 2016, that I was able to access 
the sijill material used herein. ISAM also has copies of sijills archives for most cities of Bilād 
al-Shām during the Ottoman period and my review of material on Damascus and Aleppo is 
also derived from ISAM’s collection. Since then, I became aware of a cataloguing project by 
the Islamic Research Center for Islamic History, Art and Culture (IRCICA) in Istanbul to 
produce annotated catalogues of select sijill defters from Jerusalem’s sijill archive. To date, 
IRCICA has produced twelve such publications, each covering a Jerusalem sijill defter (for 
sijills nos. 36, 46, 67, 78, 96, 107, 119, 136, 149, 167, 183, 191), and these cover the period 
965-6/1557-8 to 1100-1/1688-9. Some of these defters overlap with defter material I 
accessed at ISAM, and their availability in catalog form has allowed me to cross-check and 
uncover further material on individuals and institutions appearing in my dissertation. These 
catalogues have been published by Ibrāhīm Ḥusnī Rabāy‘ah at the Quds Open University, in 
conjunction with Halit Erin of IRCICA and are an invaluable source to researchers, as they 
not only contain headings of each sijill act found in a given defter and useful indices, but 
more importantly, CD-ROM copies of every cataloged defter. I make selective use of sijills 
from the 1530s-1550s, as well as later, 1610s-1630s, however, most sijill material I have 
relied on is from the 1560s-1590s. Following are the most widely-used sijills in this study: 
Sijill 45 – 971-2/1563-4 (uncatalogued) 
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Sijill 46 – 972-3/1564-5 (catalogued by IRCICA in 2017) 
Sijill 57 – 984-5/1576-7 (uncatalogued) 
Sijill 67 – 995-6/1586-8 (catalogued by IRCICA in 2016) 
Sijill 77 – 916, 973,1003-4/1510, 1565, 1594-5 (uncatalogued) 
Sijill 96 – 1023-24/1614-5 (catalogued by IRCICA in 2015) 
Sijill 107 – 1032-33/1622-3 (catalogued by IRCICA in 2013) 
Sijill 119 – 1041-1042/1631-2 (catalogued by IRCICA in 2014) 
ISAM holds eighty-two sijills for Jerusalem in the sixteenth century, representing the 
period 1538-1600, and these sijills provide the most complete historical archival record for 
any city in Bilād al-Shām during this century. Based on my own review, it seems that the 
copies of the sijills used by IRCICA for their editions are identical to those housed at ISAM.  
The earliest sijills from Jerusalem were written in a dynamic notarial style, similar to 
that found in Mamluk administrative and waqf deeds, and very different from the Ottoman 
scribal hand from the 1540s to the end of the century. Sijill acts from the latter half of the 
century are also slightly lengthier, neater and more formulaic – although no more complex in 
the information they contain than earlier ones. Most cover a period of one year, to a year and 
a half (the usual term for an Ottoman qāḍī’s tenure), although several cover shorter periods. 
Each sijill was on average composed of two to four hundred pages. The Jerusalem sijills do 
not strictly cover Jerusalem and its immediate hinterland, but also encompass Hebron, and 
sometimes also include materials related to smaller neighboring towns such as Nablus and 
Ramla. On Occasion, one comes across cases from Gaza or further afield that were registered 
in Jerusalem because of a counterparty’s residence in Jerusalem or the connection with 
41 
  
property in the city. Gaza, in the sixteenth century, was somewhat larger than Jerusalem and 
had its own court, yet the court of Jerusalem held a higher status, being one of the principal 
courts on the Ottoman judicial circuit (after Aleppo and Damascus in Bilād al-Shām). Further 
north, Tripoli and Beirut also had their own courts. 
 In stark contrast to Jerusalem, of 1,556 surviving qāḍī court sijills for Damascus in 
total, only one sijill has survived for the sixteenth century, this being the city’s first extant 
sijill.75 This unique sijill, which has 356 pages comprised of 666 legal acts, covers a period of 
roughly two years between Sha‘bān 991-Rajab 993/ Aug 1583- June 1585.76 This sijill was 
produced at Damascus’ highest court, the maḥkama al-kubrā where the city’s chief qāḍī sat. 
He also heard cases in his own diwān, referred to as maḥkamat al-Bāb in the sources. In the 
latter half of the sixteenth century, there were seven qāḍī courts in Damascus that came under 
his jurisdiction, these were distributed in the city’s quarters and one in its suburb of al-
Ṣāliḥīya. These included two probate courts, a qisma ‘askarīya and a qisma ‘arabīya for the 
‘askar and ra‘āyā classes respectively.77 The maḥkama al-kubrā was also known as 
maḥkamat al-Buzūrīya and was regularly held at the Jawzīya madrasa. It was in this location 
that the Mamluk era high court was also located, known as dār al-ḥukm.78 My chapter on the 
lending of orphan estates relies on material from Jerusalem’s court, as there was apparently 
only one court in that city. There are no surviving qisma court records for the sixteenth 
century, although the second surviving sijill for Damascus, dated 1035-6/1626-7, contains 
                                                     
75 Brigitte Marino, Tūmūkī Ūkāwārā, and Daʻd Ḥakīm, Catalogue des registres des tribunaux ottomans 
conservés au Centre des Archives de Damas, P.I.F.D 179 (Damascus: Institut Français de Damas ; Markaz al-
Wathāʼiq al-Tarīkhīah bi-Dimashq, 1999), 52. 
76 Marino et al., Catalogue, 43. 
77  Marino et al., Catalogue, 42–43. 
78  Marino et al., Catalogue, 42; Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʻAlī Ibn Ṭūlūn, Mufākahat Al-Khillān Fī 
Ḥawādith Al-Zamān : Tārīkh Miṣr Wa-Al-Shām (Cairo: al-Muʼassasah al-Miṣrīyah al-ʻĀmmah lil-Taʼlīf wa-al-
Tarjamah wa-al-Ṭibāʻah wa-al-Nashr, 1962), Vol. 2, 41, 89. 
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some qisma ‘askarīya material.79 Due to this non-survival, my analysis of lending from 
orphan estates (chapter five) focuses on Jerusalem, and excludes Damascus, since Jerusalem 
had one court that addressed all the city’s legal affairs, including probate sijills in the 
sixteenth century. 
Given time and research plan constraints, my evaluation of court records does not 
include those of other sijills that have survived from other cities in Bilād al-Shām from the 
sixteenth century, namely the seven surviving sijills for Aleppo and the (unexplainably large) 
thirty-one sijills from Hama. As I note above, however, I do make a few comparative 
references to some records from these sijills. Aleppo’s seven surviving sijills for the late 
sixteenth century contain much mixed material from seventeenth century sijills and are 
reconstituted versions of original sijills.80 Hama’s thirty-one sijills for the sixteenth century 
covering the period 942/1536 to 1001/1592, however, are complete and original sijills.81 
Hama’s sijills represent the second largest surviving qāḍī court archive for Bilād al-Shām, 
after Jerusalem’s abovementioned eighty-two surviving sijills for the century. 
 
Legal manuals, responsas and other works 
This dissertation’s reliance on legal manuals, treatises and responsa works is mostly 
focused on those produced during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by jurists (in 
Arabic) from Cairo and Damascus.  
                                                     
79 Marino et al., Catalogue, 43. The first complete qisma sijill from Damascus, sijill no. 3, covers the period 
1040-42/1631-3. Ibid. 
80 Marino et al., Catalogue, 52, 157–62. 
81  Marino et al., Catalogue, 52, 203–14. 
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One of the most important works I examine is the unpublished manual of legal 
formularies entitled Biḍā‘at al-qāḍī li’ḥtiyāj ilayh fī al-mustaqbal wa-l-māḍī which exists in 
at least seven manuscript copies in Cairo, Istanbul, Leipzig, Berlin and Gotha.82 The 
authorship of this work is unclear. At least two manuscripts of this work, at the Dar al-Kutub 
library in Egypt and at Istanbul’s Süleymaniye library, attribute this work to Şeyhülislam 
Ebu’s-Su‘ud.83 I have relied on the Leipzig manuscript of this work that is attributed to 
Darwīsh Muḥammad al-Bursawī (d. 937/1530?); for this reason, I refer to it as ‘al-Bursawī’s’ 
manual. Its attribution in other copies to Ebu’s-Su‘ud indicates that it was intended to be a 
standard manual for legal administration. Another anonymous manual for qāḍīs from 
seventeenth century Menteşe (or Muğla) has been studied by Colin Imber and contains 
formularies in Arabic and Ottoman Turkish that are quite similar to Biḍā‘at al-qāḍī and may 
be, I conjecture, from another version of this work.84 I use this manual to model how types of 
credit-related court acts, particularly those using mu‘āmalāt, correspond to the sijills from 
Jerusalem and Damascus. From the Mamluk period, I draw on the well-known legal 
                                                     
82 Pīr Muḥammad b. Mūsa b. Mūhammad al-Bursawī, the author of this work also appears Darwish Muḥammad 
b. Iflāṭūn in other manuscripts. I have relied in my study on the manuscript owned by the Leipzig University 
library (Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig, Vollers No. 866). Versions of this work, which in the Leipzig case is 
titled Biḍā‘at al-qāḍī li’ḥtiyāj ilayh fī al-mustaqbal wa-l-māḍī exist in atleast six other manuscripts. 
Brockelmann lists this author’s name as Darwīš M. b. Aflāṭūn Ṭursūn b. Akmaladdīn Aflāṭūnzāde al-Bursawī 
and records that he was a judge in Istanbul who died in 937/1530. Brockelmann cites two works by this judge, 
several copies of a work called Ṣukūk that reside in five libraries, two of which are in Egypt (Äg. Bibl. Fiqh ḥan. 
1059, Taimūr, Fiqh 186), and a second work, Iḫtiyārāt al-aḥkām, the manuscript of which is in Tunis. Guirguis’ 
references (discussed below) to Biḍā‘at al-qāḍī fī ṣukūk al-sharī‘a are certainly the copies of the work Ṣukūk 
that Brockelmann referred to, now housed at the Dar al-Kutub in Cairo. Although Brockelmann lists this 
author’s death at 937/1530, the manuscript of this work that I have reviewed below from Leipzig, dated 
985/1577, refers to the author as living, and it is dated a year before the Dar al-Kutub manuscript was copied, 
that Guirguis reviewed. Other copies of this manuscript are found in the Arab league manuscript library, ms. 
442 (Shāfi‘ī fiqh), and copies also exist at Gotha, and Berlin. The nearest possible biography I could locate for 
someone who could be the author of this work is that of Muḥammad b. Muḥmmad al-Bursawī, a Ḥanafī judge 
of Egypt who died at sea in 969/1561; al-Ghazzī, Kawākib, vol. 3, 26. 
83 Cairo: Dar al-Kutub Library, MS Fiqh Taymūr 382; Istanbul: Süleymaniye Library, MS Laleli 3,711. See: 
Magdi Guirguis, “Manhaj Al-Dirāsāt Al-Wathā’qiyya Wa Wāqi‘ Al-Baḥth Fī Miṣr,” Al-Rūznāma - Dar Al-
Wathā’iq Al-Qawmīyya 2, no. 2004 (2004): 282–83; Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650, 145. 
84 This manuscript is filed under Turkish MS no. 145 at the John Rylands library, Manchester. See: Colin Imber, 
“Four Documents from John Rylands Turkish MS. No. 145,” Tarih Dergisi, 2011, 173–86. 
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formularies of Jalāl al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505), Jawāhir al-‘uqūd and Shihāb 
al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Nuwayrī’s (d. 733/1333) tract of legal formularies, found in volume nine of 
his encyclopedia Nihāyat al-arab fī funūn al-adab.85   
 As for legal responsa, the ones I have used the most are those of Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī 
(d. 756/1355), Şeyhülislam Ebu’s-Su‘ud (d. 982/1574), Khayr al-Dīn al-Ramlī (d. 
1081/1670) and Muḥammad Amīn Ibn ‘Ābdīn (d. 1252/1836). I have focused on the 
discussion of mu‘āmalāt al-shar‘īya in these works to reflect the long historical arc of these 
legal instruments.86 I have also relied on the eschatological work al-Zawājir ‘an iqtirāf al-
kabā’ir (Cries against the committing of sins), produced by the Egytian-Ḥijāzī scholar Ibn 
Ḥajar al-Haytamī (d. 973/1566), to shed light on intellectual attitudes towards the use of ḥiyal 
like the mu‘āmalāt al-shar‘īya in the sixteenth century.  
This study also makes use of recently discovered historical sources that are a hybrid 
of documentary and narrative sources; most notable is the diary (ta‘līq) of the Damascene 
notary Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad Ibn Ṭawq (d. 915/1509), which has been recently edited in four 
volumes.87 This diary’s holograph, which is preserved at the Asad library, covers Ibn Ṭawq’s 
personal and professional life as a notary in the Ṣāliḥīya district of Damascus between 885-
908/1480-1503, and is unique for both being a first-personal narrative of key events, such as 
                                                     
85 Muḥammad ibn Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, Jawāhir Al-ʻuqūd Wa-Muʻīn Al-Quḍāh Wa-Al-Muwaqqiʻīn Wa-Al-
Shuhūd (Makkah, N/D). 
86 Taqī al-Dīn ʻAlī ibn ʻAbd al-Kāfī al-Subkī, Fatāwá Al-Subkī (Beirut: Dār al-ma‘rifa, 1990); For Ebu’su‘ud’s 
fatāwā, I have relied on the translations found in Colin Imber’s work: Colin Imber, Ebuʼs-Suʻud: The Islamic 
Legal Tradition (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1997) Imbers translations are sourced from 
Ebu’su‘ud’s fatāwā found in the following collections: An anthology of Ebu’su‘ud’s fatāwā, (MS 7979) 
Chetham Oriental Collection, John Rylands Library, Manchester; M.E. Düzdağ, Şeyhülislâm Ebussuûd Efendi 
fetvaları ışığında 16. asır. Türk hayatı, Istanbul, 1972; and P. Horster, Zur Anwendung des islamischen Rechts 
im 16. Jahrhundert,. Stuttgart, 1935;; Khayr al-Dīn ibn Aḥmad al-Ramlī, Kitāb al-Fatāwá al-khayrīyah li-nafʻ 
al-barīyah ʻalá madhhab Abī Ḥanīfah al-Nuʻmān (Cairo, 1893); Muḥammad Amīn Ibn ‘Ābdīn, al-ʻUqūd al-
durrīyah fī tanqīḥ al-Fatāwá al-Ḥāmidīyah, 2 vol. vols. (Cairo: Maṭbaʻat Maymanīyah, 1893). 
87 For a review of Ibn Ṭawq’s diary, see Wollina’s abovementioned review: Wollina, Torsten, “Ibn Ṭawq’s 
Ta‘līq. An Ego-Document for Mamlūk Studies.” 
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the political violence that enveloped the city in the last years of the fifteenth century, as well 
as a notarial record in its own right. The Ta‘līq contains summaries and transcripts of 
hundreds of notarial acts which scholars are increasingly making use of.88 Another hybrid 
work is the diary-biographical dictionary of the Damascene deputy qāḍī Sharaf al-Dīn Mūsā 
Ibn Ayyūb (d. 1002/1593-4), al-Rawḍ al-‘āṭir  fī mā tayassar min akhbār ahl al-qarn al-sābi‘ 
ilā khitām al-qarn al-‘āshir (The fragrant garden concerning the reports that have been 
passed down about the lives of those from the seventh to the end of the tenth centuries).89 
Despite the historiographical importance of Ibn Ayyūb’s works, relatively little is 
known about him. Besides his Rawḍ, Ibn Ayyūb was reported to have produced only one 
other notable work, Nuzhat al-khāṭir wa bahjat al-nāẓir (The promenade of whim and joy of 
the observer), which is a diary-like chronicle of the key events in Damascus in the year 1599, 
interspersed with biographies of qāḍīs from the beginning of Islam to his day.90 The Berlin 
copy of Ibn Ayyūb’s Rawḍ contains a reference on its title page that refers to the same work 
as “al-Ayyūbī’s Tadhkira.” The term tadhkira indicates that the Rawḍ may have been part of 
a commonplace book or memoir of Ibn Ayyūb.91 The last ten pages of al-Rawḍ are indeed 
                                                     
88 B. Shoshan has recently evaluated about 150 marriage contracts found in Ibn Ṭawq’s Ta‘līq: Shoshan, Boaz, 
“On Marriage in Damascus, 1480-1500,” in Developing Perspectives in Mamluk History: Essays in Honor of 
Amalia Levanoni, ed. Ben-Bassat, Yuval (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 177–88. 
89 This work remains in manuscript, and in only two copies, the holograph is held by Damascus’ Ẓāhiriyya 
library (MS 7814) and a copy is at the Berlin National Library. I rely below on the Berlin copy which consists 
of 638 folios and was copied in 1030/1620; Berlin Staatsbibliothek (Wetztein II 289). It is available for 
download online. Sharaf al-Dīn Mūsa b. Yūsuf Ibn Ayyūb, “Al-Rawḍ Al-‘āṭir  Fī Mā Tayassar Min Akhbār Ahl 
Al-Qarn Al-Sābi‘ Ilā Khitām Al-Qarn Al-‘Āshir” n.d., Wetzstein II 289, Berlin National Library, 
http://resolver.staatsbibliothek-berlin.de/SBB00007FCA00000000; A limited collection of this work’s 
biographies was edited with commentary by Ahmet Gunes: Ibn Ayyūb, Sharaf al-Dīn Mūsá, Das Kitāb Ar-Rauḍ 
Al-ʻāṭir Des Ibn Aiyūb : Damaszener Biographien Des 10./16. Jahrhunderts, Beschreibung Und Edition, ed. 
Güneş, Ahmet Halil (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 1981). 
90 The editor of this work used intertextual references in Ibn Ayyūb’s Rawḍ and Nuzhat al-khāṭir to reveal 
biographical information about the author. Sharaf al-Dīn Mūsa b. Yūsuf Ibn Ayyūb, Nuzhat Al-Khāṭir Wa-
Bahjat Al-Nāẓir, ed. ʻAdnān Muḥammad Ibrāhīm (Damascus: Manshūrāt Wizārat al-Thaqāfah fī al-Jumhūrīyah 
al-ʻArabīyah al-Sūrīyah, 1991). 
91 Bauden, Frederic, “Maqriziana I: Discovery of an Autograph Manuscript of Al-Maqrizi: Towards a Better 
Understanding of His Working Method: Description: Section 1”; Bauden, Frederic, “Maqriziana II: Discovery 
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pages from Ibn Ayyūb’s diary for several days from the year 1000/1591.92 Ibn Ayyūb 
subsequently worked as a deputy qāḍī in various district courts of Damascus, until his death 
around 1002/1593-4.93  
 
  
                                                     
of an Autograph Manuscript of Al-Maqrizi: Towards a Better Understanding of His Working Method: 
Analysis”; Bauden, Frederic, “The Recovery of Mamlūk Chancery Documents in an Unsuspected Place,” in 
The Mamluks in Egyptian and Syrian Politics and Society, ed. Winter, Michael and Levanoni, Amalia (Leiden: 
Brill, 2004). 
92 Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī’s Kawākib entry on Ibn Ayyūb states that the latter was born “sometime after 940 
(1533)” and died during the “990s (1580s),” however, ‘Adnān Ibrāhīm, whom edited Ibn Ayyūb’s Nuzhat al-
khāṭir, showed by comparing evidence from Ibn Ayyūb’s two works and al-Ghazzī’s Kawākib, that Ibn Ayyūb 
was actually born in 946/1539 and died after 1002/1593-4. Ibn Ayyūb, Nuzhat, 7–9. 
93 Sharaf al-Dīn Mūsa b. Yūsuf Ibn Ayyūb, Dhayl Al-Thaghr Al-Bassām Fi Thakr Man Wūliyah Quḍā’ Al-
Shām, ed. Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn Munajjid (Damascus: al-Mujama‘ al-‘ilmī, 1956), 329; It is notable that Ibn Ayyūb’s 
grandfather served as a deputy qāḍī for Walī al-Dīn al-Farfūr, the last Mamluk-era chief qāḍī of Damascus who 
is discussed at length below. Ibn Ayyūb, Nuzhat, 11–12. 
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Chapter One – The Legal Framework 
 
“It is worth imagining what the legal historiography of Ottoman 
Egypt would look like if the Ottoman sharī‘a court records had 
not survived. The image of legal practice painted by the 
available chronicles would look more similar to that given by 
Mamlukists: Janissary officers, the police chief, and the 
muḥtasib play a key role in suppressing crime and regulating the 
markets; the beys hold courts in their private residences … 
lacking significant archival material in Egypt, far more 
historians would use the Prime Ministry Archive in Istanbul, and 
so the role of the imperial government in Egyptian legal affairs 
would loom much larger.”94    
For social historians of the Mamluk-Ottoman transition, the above quote from James 
Baldwin’s new work, Islamic Law and Empire in Ottoman Cairo (2017), is more than simply 
food for thought. It posits a plausible alternate view of history based on different source 
constraints. As Baldwin’s implies, fresh ideas do not necessarily spring from the most 
favored sources, but rather, at times, from the commonly overlooked ones or connections 
assembled from disparate threads. Baldwin is not alone in this sort of approach to 
contemporary social and legal historical writing on the early Ottoman period. This view is 
also shared by scholars working in Islamic studies, such as Talal al-Azem’s Rule-formulation 
and binding precedent in the Madhhab-law tradition (2017), which builds on the work of 
                                                     
94 Baldwin, Islamic Law and Empire in Ottoman Cairo, 33. 
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Wael Hallaq and Norman Calder, and depends on rethinking the genre of legal commentary 
as a site of judicial creativity, originality and inventiveness – an idea that would have been 
viewed with cynicism a few decades ago: 
“Our close analysis of Ibn Quṭlūbughā’s commentary teaches us 
that where one looks for ‘originality’ will in turn determine what 
one is able to perceive. The writings of Norman Calder have … 
repeatedly argued that ‘the layered writing (commentaries on 
commentaries) is not a sign of failure of intellect or endeavor, 
but of commitment to tradition.’ … It is clear that writings of 
this genre may contain much originality and legal value, and 
should not be dismissed due to an assumed lack of 
‘independence’ … that is unnecessarily viewed as the sine qua 
non of a scholar’s creative originality.”95 
The work of Baldwin and al-Azem, among other recent studies in Mamluk and 
Ottoman legal history, are important to this study of credit because they delineate how 
judicial authority, doctrine and court practice were transmitted, developed and operated in 
ways that are somewhat different than traditional scholarship suggest. While a wider source 
base can expand our understanding of judicial practices, engaging with different 
methodological treatments are also useful for explaining historical change. In this chapter, I 
rely on the literature from both Islamic studies scholars and historians to examine the history 
                                                     
95 Italics are al-Azem’s. Al-Azem’s studies how the idea of juristic-precedence was adopted by latter Ḥanafī 
jurists to assert legal authority within the "madhhab-law" tradition. Al-Azem’s work analyzes, as its case study, 
Qāsim Ibn Quṭlūbughā’s (802-897/1399-1474) al-Taṣḥīḥ wa-l’tarjīḥ, a legal commentary on the Mukhtaṣar of 
Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Qudūrī (d. 428/1037). Ibid., 20. 
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of credit in the development of jurisprudential doctrines in legal texts alongside the 
development of institutions and judicial practices in courts. The key question I address is 
whether the Ottoman transition in the sixteenth century resulted in a departure from Mamluk 
court practice. If so, how was this manifested, and what were its effects on everyday 
processes of adjudication and settlement? To what extent did structural differences in 
defining “law” (e.g., the Ottoman ḳānūnnāme, Ottoman Ḥanafism) alter the thinking of 
jurists in Bilād al-Shām with respect to the administration of justice?  
Recent scholarship on the evidence of extra-judicial legal undertakings (contracts, 
oaths, associations, etc.) outside of courts in both the Mamluk and early Ottoman periods 
raise questions about the effectiveness of courts as sites of adjudication; some scholars have 
recently proposed that the services provided by courts mainly centered on the registration of 
legal acts rather than on adjudication.96 That said, the wide executive mandate given to 
Ottoman qāḍīs during the sixteenth century, such as the engagement of qāḍīs in tax collection 
and a variety of other extra-judicial roles, also complicates the task of clearly understanding 
the main responsibilities of courts. One must therefore tread cautiously, since seeking justice 
could have involved various institutions, strategies and figures outside of the court’s 
supervision. As Baldwin’s work on the administration of law in sixteenth and seventeenth 
century Egypt suggests, there were, for example, multiple avenues for creditors to pursue 
their claims. 
                                                     
96 In addition to Baldwin’s abovementioned work, other scholars have recently become more interested in 
alternative venues for dispute resolution, with specific emphasis on extra-judicial settlement. See: Metin Coşgel 
and Boğaç A Ergene, The Economics of Ottoman Justice: Settlement and Trial in the Sharia Courts, 2016; 
Reem A Meshal, Sharia and the Making of the Modern Egyptian: Islamic Law and Custom in the Courts of 
Ottoman Cairo, 2014. 
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Although structurally different, late-Mamluk adjudication practices and institutions 
also offered litigants multiple adjudication venues, notwithstanding the corruption of political 
factions that some Mamlukists refer to as the “privatization of justice.” For the Mamluk 
period, scholars are no longer wedded to the idea that a distinct bifurcation of justice between 
maẓālim courts and qāḍī courts existed, as Jørgen Nielsen argued in his famous study, 
wherein law fell under either “secular” or “religious” courts. Rather, the picture is 
complicated by the frequent convergence of legal venues and the sultan’s direct engagement 
as mediator, and at times even as jurist.97  
In this chapter, I argue that court administration in early Ottoman Damascus did not 
make a clean break from Mamluk legal institutions and procedures; rather institutional 
change in Syria and Palestine occurred gradually over the sixteenth century. In the first three 
decades of Ottoman rule, from 1516 to the late 1540s, the procedures that litigants used in 
qāḍī courts may not have substantially differed from Mamluk times. In addition, although the 
powers of the qāḍī were significantly expanded under the Ottomans (among other things, 
qāḍīs now supervised muḥtasibs), other responsibilities continued those of the late-Mamluk 
era. For instance, Mamluk qāḍīs also had supervised the collection of the jizya tax. The 
                                                     
97 Jørgen S Nielsen, Secular Justice in an Islamic State: Maẓālim under the Baḥrī Mamlūks, 662/1264-789/1387 
(Leiden: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul, 1985); Toru Miura, “Administrative 
Networks in the Mamluk Period: Taxation, Legal Execution, and Bribery,” in Islamic Urbanism in Human 
History: Political Power and Social Networks, ed. Tsugitaka Sato (London: Kegan Paul International, 1997), 
39–76; John L Meloy, “The Privatization of Protection: Extortion and The State in the Circassian Mamluk 
Period,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 47, no. 2 (2004): 195–212; Irwin, “The 
Privatization of ‘Justice’ under the Circassian Mamluks”; Rapoport, “Royal Justice”; Scholars increasingly 
view the fifteenth century Mamluk state as one where Mamluks integrated into various classes of society that 
had previously been closed to them, and this points to a gradual transformation of the Mamluk system itself, far 
before its ultimate demise. Such social change was accompanied by the increased presence of members of 
political factions in the courts. For instance, an account by Ibn Taghrībirdī from the 1450s, “observed the 
convergence of the provision of ‘justice’ and protection when Mamluk soldiers (julbān) offered their services as 
strong-men in the settlement of legal disputes by offering their services to plaintiffs [in sharia courts].” Meloy, 
“The Privatization of Protection,” 210. 
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introduction of Damascus’ first ḳānūnnāme was relatively late, coming in 1546, much later 
than Egypt’s ḳānūnnāme of 1523-26. At the time of the Ottoman conquest, key figures of the 
Damascene ‘ulamā’, such as the (converted) Ḥanafī chief qāḍī Walī al-Dīn al-Farfūr (in 
office from 1518 to 1530) would serve as transitional intermediaries between the Mamluk 
and Ottoman eras, promoting and preserving their control over legal administration through 
their hold over influential jamā‘āt. 
While the first half of the sixteenth century witnessed Mamluk-Ottoman institutional 
continuities, I also contend that political-economic stresses in Syria and Palestine during the 
last decades of the Mamluk-era and the last quarter of the Ottoman sixteenth century had 
similar destabilizing effects on legal institutions. Historians writing during these periods have 
chronicled widespread judicial corruption. In both eras, qāḍīs took on greater political 
responsibilities, most notably in tax-collection that was aimed at funding military campaigns. 
Similarly, both periods witnessed the entrance of new classes into elite posts, artisans 
attained qāḍīships in the late Mamluk-era and members of artisans also began to dominate 
the Ottoman janissary corps in the late sixteenth century. Recent scholarship is revising the 
view of a stable meritocratic ilmiye order during the sixteenth century. While judicial posts 
circulated within a closed group of ‘ulamā’ patrician families, the so-called mevali or ‘lords 
of the Law,’ at the beginning of the century, its end witnessed the incorporation of previously 
marginal groups into the political and legal system.98 
 
                                                     
98 Baki Tezcan, “The Ottoman Mevali as ‘Lords of the Law,’” Journal of Islamic Studies 20, no. 3 (September 
1, 2009): 383–407; Baki Tezcan, The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the 
Early Modern World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
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1.1 The Ottoman conquest and its effects on court administration 
Since, the thrust of my thesis concerns the continuity of legal practices, it is useful to 
first review the historiography on the immediate and medium-term social and religious 
historical effects that the Ottoman conquest of 1517 had on local ‘ulamā’ networks and legal 
institutions in Bilād al-Shām. One of the most significant events that marked Selim I’s 
conquest of Damascus was his patronage of a new mausoleum-mosque complex at the site of 
Ibn ‘Arabī’s grave, which had apparently been littered with refuse when Selim descended 
upon it. Damascene ‘ulamā’ elites often ignored Ibn ‘Arabī, partly owing to the controversial 
notion of the unity of existence (waḥdat al-wujūd) that is attributed to him. Influential local 
‘ulamā’ viewed his ideas as heretical.99 However, Ibn ‘Arabī, was also revered by numerous 
Ottoman jurists and sultans. Over a century later, the Ottoman traveler Evliya Çelebi would 
commemorate Sultan Selim I’s conquest. As Selim I prepared to battle the Mamluks on Marj 
Dābiq, Çelebi narrates that Selim I saw an apparition of Ibn ‘Arabī in a dream in which the 
latter said “I have been expecting your arrival in Syria. I herald your Egypt campaign. 
Tomorrow you will ride a black horse that will carry you to me. Then build for me in al-
Ṣāliḥīya a sepulcher, a Sufi convent, a mosque, a soup kitchen, a medrese, a children’s 
school, a bath, a law court, a hospital, a fountain with running water, and more.” As Michael 
Winter noted, “this was quite a wish list”, nevertheless Selim acted on it in 1518, authorizing 
the construction of a mosque and Sufi lodge (zāwīya/takīya) with ten thousand dinars set 
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aside for the construction and the assignment of several villages’ income to its new waqf.100 
This complex came to be known as the Salīmīya in Damascus. Although dwarfed by other 
mosques later in the century, Ibn ‘Arabī’s complex continued to hold great political-spiritual 
significance for Ottoman elites in Damascus in later periods. It was well known that Ottoman 
governors customarily visited and prayed at Ibn ‘Arabī’s turba before leaving the city after 
completing their term. 101 
In patronizing Ibn ‘Arabī, Selim sought to cast himself as the “perfect man” (al-insān 
al-kāmil) of the Sufi tradition, and Ibn ‘Arabī’s in particular, projecting himself as the 
protector of Sunni Islam.102 Of course this act of political legitimation in Bilād al-Shām 
cannot be viewed outside of the rising millenarian and Shi‘ī movements in eastern Anatolia 
(e.g., the Kızıl Baş) that threatened Ottoman hegemony there.103 Although, one is compelled 
to view Selim’s patronage of Ibn ‘al-Arabī complex in Damascus as the beginning of a 
building campaign that brought many new Ottoman institutions to the capitals of Bilād al-
Shām, this was not the case.104 Rather, the building of major Ottoman educational institutions 
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103 Ibn Ṭūlūn reported that crowds of “a‘jām” engaged in processions chanting for the martyrdom of al-Ḥusayn 
a few days before ‘Āshūra, and that these parades were immediately suppressed by the governor, on 7 
Muharram 924/19 January 1518. Later in the month, an embassy was received in Damascus bearing gifts to 
Sultan Selim from the Safavids. Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʻAlī Ibn Ṭūlūn, Mufākahat al-khillān fī ḥawādith 
al-zamān (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʻIlmīyah, 1998), 378. 
104 From the standpoint of its political-religious symbolism and meaning, the construction of this complex was 
immense for the Ottoman polity. In this regard, the appropriation of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s tomb shared much in 
common with the discovery of the grave of Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣārī, a companion of the Prophet, in 
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only took off thirty years later. In 1546, the first mosque-madrasa complex of Hüsrev Pasha 
(al-Khusrawīya) in Aleppo was completed, and then in the case of Damascus, it was not until 
1554, that the architect Sinān was commissioned to develop Süleymān’s complex there.105 
The reason for this almost three-decade lull between the Selīmīya and the formative period of 
Ottoman construction in Bilād al-Shām is not clear - why did the Ottomans not patronize key 
institutions of learning in Bilād al-Shām earlier? One possibility is that although Bilād al-
Shām was a prize for the Ottomans; it was still very much a borderland region that was the 
site of continuous Ottoman-Safavid warfare during the during the first decades of Ottoman 
rule. Despite their control of Damascus, Ottoman control over Eastern and Southern Syria 
was tenuous. The Ottoman expansion into Iraq and the Arabian peninsula continued well 
after the fall of the Mamluk state, and it would be in 1536 that Baghdad fell.106 Consequently, 
this I suggest resulted in a delay in both Ottoman patronage as well as real institution-
building. The beginnings of incorporating the local ‘ulamā’ elite families into the Ottoman 
legal-educational system of the center would also be delayed. The influence of local ‘ulamā’ 
notables who regularly held deputy qāḍīships, and some sporadic cases, even chief qāḍīships 
(invariably held by Turkish ‘ulamā elites appointed from the center), is registered throughout 
the century.  
                                                     
Constantinople following Memhmed II’s conquest, and the “purification” of the tomb of Abū Ḥanīfa in 
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The symbolism attached to the Ibn ‘Arabī complex, as an Ottoman landmark, was not 
lost on the inhabitants of Damascus and especially not on Jānbardī al-Ghazālī (r. 924-
27/1518-21), the Mamluk amīr who was granted the governorship of the province of 
Damascus by Selim after the region’s conquest. Al-Ghazālī revolted immediately after 
Selim’s death (8 Shawwāl 926/21 September 1520) and sought to revive the Mamluk 
sultanate under his rule in Damascus. By February 1521, al-Ghazālī had proclaimed himself 
sultan and received fealty oaths from a former Mamluk amīr, the Ḥanbalī chief qāḍī, and a 
few other elites. By and large, however, as Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn Ṭūlūn’s (880-
953/1473-1546) chronicle Mufākahat al-khillān suggests, there was little if any support from 
Damascene ‘ulamā’ for al-Ghazālī’s revolt and it was only a matter of months before his 
revolt would be put down.107 Al-Ghazālī’s first largely symbolic act was to board up Selim’s 
Ibn ‘Arabī mosque-tomb complex, loot its contents, and revoke the salaries of its 
employees.108  
Upon the Ottoman retaking of the city several months later, Damascus’ chief qāḍī 
Walī al-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn al-Farfūr (d. 937/1531), inspected and reinstituted Selim’s 
complex.  Fearing for his life, al-Farfūr had taken refuge in Aleppo in January 1520.109 Like 
al-Ghazālī, Walī al-Dīn al-Farfūr had been a grandee of the Mamluk-era, and arguably had 
greater political and social significance than al-Ghazālī. It was Walī al-Dīn who had presided 
over leading the Friday prayers and sermon (khuṭba) at the Umayyad Mosque following 
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Selim’s capture of the city on 7 Ramaḍān 922/4 October 1516, during which he proclaimed 
Sultan Selim the “victorious servant of the two holy cities” (Mecca and Medina), thus 
recognizing his symbolic dominion over all Muslims, and not just his subjects in Bilād al-
Shām.110 Al-Farfūr was taken on as a trusted figure by Selim and was tasked with the 
planning and execution of the Ibn ‘Arabī complex, a major undertaking that required the 
purchase of new land for the project.111 Selim invested him with the chief qāḍīship of 
Damascus on 24 Muḥarram 924/5 February 1518, and as chief-justice, he now presided over 
four deputy qāḍīs, each representing one of the Sunnī madhhabs. Al-Farfūr’s deft conversion 
to Ḥanafism (to serve as the chief-justice of Damascus’ court) drew criticism from local 
Ḥanafī elites like Ibn Ṭūlūn who questioned al-Farfūr’s sincerity. Unfazed, al-Farfūr 
reappointed as his deputies Damascus’ former Mamluk-era chief justices, one for each of the 
four madhhabs.112 Through political savvy, al-Farfūr secured Selim’s patronage and 
maintained continuity for Damascus’ ‘ulamā’.  
The foundations for Walī al-Din al-Farfūr’s position had been secured by his father, 
Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad Ibn al-Farfūr (d. 911/1505) who had established the family’s fortune 
and consolidated its control over the judiciary of Damascus, as well as that of Cairo in the 
late fifteenth century. Between father and son, these two figures managed to monopolize 
(with gaps of a few years in between) chief qāḍīships in Damascus for a combined period of 
roughly forty-five years, that is between 886/1481 to 936/1530. This period was split roughly 
in half, between father and son with Shihāb al-Dīn serving as Damascus’ Shāfi‘ī chief qāḍī 
between 886/1481 and his death in 911/ 1505; as explained below, he also briefly jointly held 
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Cairo’s chief qāḍīship between 910-11/1504-5. Walī al-Dīn inherited his father’s position 
and became the Shāfi‘ī chief qāḍī of Damascus and held that position until 921/1515, shortly 
before the Ottoman conquest. Apart from the period of al-Ghazālī’s revolt, when al-Farfūr 
was reposted to Aleppo, al-Farfūr served as Damascus’s chief qāḍī from 1518 to 1530.  
Shihāb al-Dīn, the father, had served under Zayn al-Dīn Ibn Muzhir (d. 893/1488), 
the sultan’s confidential secretary (kātib al-sirr) for many years in Cairo before raising 
enough funds to procure the chief qāḍīship of Damascus from Sultān Qāytbāy, a position for 
which he had outbid the incumbent.113 Shihāb al-Dīn al-Farfūr’s tenure then had ensured that 
the judicial practices that were rising in the second half of the fifteenth century became 
institutionalized and resilient, even after the Ottoman conquest. This was complemented by 
the rise of household factions (jamā‘āt or abwāb) in the latter half of the fifteenth century 
which had military or militia characteristics (a source for infantrymen) and also fulfilled 
fiscal function for the decentralized state (the collection of local taxes for mounting 
campaigns). As discussed below, the jamā‘āt also administered offices that replicated the key 
offices of state, the defterdār, ḥājib and so forth.  
Purchasing offices in the jamā‘āt, a form of tax farming in itself, which could be 
made up of extensive mini-bureaucracies, was costly, but these offices could be lucrative if 
managed well.114 In Ṣafar 886/April 1481, at the age of thirty-three, Shihāb al-Dīn al-Farfūr 
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(Walī al-Dīn’s father) reportedly paid the exorbitant price of thirty thousand dinars to acquire 
the Shāfi‘ī chief qāḍīship of Damascus from Sultan Qāytbāy; at the time he had held several 
other lucrative posts in Cairo: viz., the superintendent of the army (nāẓir al-jaysh), the 
sultan’s agent (wakīl al-sulṭān), and superintendent of the Citadel (nāẓir al-qal‘a).115 It was 
this office that propelled him to form his own jamā‘a. Shihāb al-Dīn’s purchase price was 
recouped in installments over the tenure of his office as he appointed (sold) a total of twenty-
four deputy qāḍīship posts during his twenty-six year tenure, and had up to fourteen deputy 
qāḍīs operating under him at one time.116 In Rabī‘ I 910/August 1504, about a year and a half 
before his death, Shihāb al-Dīn obtained the chief qāḍīship of Cairo, while continuing to hold 
that of Damascus, a first for any Mamluk qāḍī. Remarkably, Shihāb al-Dīn al-Farfūr also 
negotiated with Sultan al-Ghawrī to allow for a provision in the former’s will that would 
allow for passing the Damascus chief qāḍīship to any deputy qāḍī of his choice in the event 
of his death. Shihāb al-Dīn specified the appointment of his son Walī al-Dīn. Upon his 
father’s death a year and a half later, in Jumada II 911/November 1505, Walī al-Dīn al-Farfūr 
succeeded in claiming his father’s chief qāḍī post and held it for another ten years, until 
Rabī‘ I 921/May-June 1515.117 Adding to the stranglehold that the Ibn al-Farfūr held over the 
Damascus courts was Shihāb al-Dīn’s influential hand in installing his nephew Badr al-Dīn 
(Walī al-Dīn’s paternal cousin) as the Ḥanafī chief qāḍī of Damascus, a position that was 
held until Dhu’l-Ḥijja 913/March 1508.118 In this way, the family controlled most of 
Damascus’ courts (Shāfi‘ī and Ḥanafī) in the sixteenth century’s first decade.  
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According to Toru Miura’s count, Ibn Tūlūn’s Mufākahat al-khillān, referred to 
twenty-one jamā‘āt of governors and qāḍīs in Damascus at the turn of the century.119 Thirteen 
of these were controlled by chief and deputy qāḍīs. Notably, these jamā‘āt had bureaucracies 
that modeled that of the sultan. The al-Farfūr jamā‘a, for instance, had its own dawādār, 
ustādār, nā’ib, and wakīl.120 Although Mamluk qāḍīs were mandated to carry out their 
activities in their specific courts, it appears that qāḍīs routinely ran courts from their homes at 
the turn of the sixteenth century. The reported activities of jamā‘āt in this period indicate that 
this customary practice was the norm. In doing so deputy qāḍīs effectively supervised 
notaries, professional witnesses (sing. shāhid), and bailiffs (sing. naqīb/rasūl) outside of 
courts. It was very common for witnesses and bailiffs to pit defendants and plaintiffs against 
one another, by offering to secure desired legal outcomes based on bribes, and this was 
accentuated in periods of social instability. Moreover, this informal aspect of legal 
administration was compounded by the presence of professional adjudicators (sing. wakīl) 
who were tasked by qāḍīs to mediate between the courts and litigators in settling disputes 
that would later be registered in Mamluk courts.121 Since each deputy had a dedicated 
professional staff, the judicial bureaucracy at-large became very inflated.122 
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An indication of just how bloated the quasi-legal jamā‘āt were was seen when Sultan 
Selim I passed his legal reforms in the newly conquered Mamluk domains between Sha‘bān 
922/August 1516 and Rabī ‘ I 924/ February-March 1518. Kemalpaşazâde (Ibn Kamāl), who 
would later become the Shaykh al-Islam (1526-1534) under Sultan Süleymān, accompanied 
Selim on his campaign and likely supervised the legal reforms in Damascus.123 The objective 
was to force deputy qāḍīs to return adjudication back to the chief qāḍī’s court and reduce, or 
eliminate, the influence of jamā‘āt. The reforms explicitly called for reducing the numbers of 
deputy qāḍīs and shuhūd associated with each chief qāḍī’s court. However, Ibn Ṭūlūn’s 
Mufākaha suggests that these measures had few lasting effects and both al-Ghazālī and Ibn 
al-Farfūr allowed for the reforms to be ignored, leaving room for reversion to Mamluk-era 
norms. Miura observes that “no one in Cairo or Damascus obeyed the order. After Selim’s 
departure to Istanbul, the provincial governor of Damascus, Jānbirdī al-Ghazālī, allowed 
shāhids to go back to their offices and restored the jamā‘ah of the qāḍīs, that is, shāhids and 
rasūls. Legal factions (jamā‘ah) could survive despite the Ottoman attempt at reform because 
they had already taken root in urban society.”124   
It is compelling to think that Selim’s reforms were the implementation of Ottoman 
justice in response to Mamluk corruption, but these reforms may not necessarily have been 
that different, in spirit at least, from previous attempts of the Mamluk regime to rein in its 
own judicial corruption, even when the Mamluk state was struggling for life in its last years. 
Allowing extra-judicial networks to exist naturally diverted valuable court revenues away 
from the state. Moreover, a great deal of wealth and political influence was concentrated 
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among the heads of the jamā‘āt, a source of contention for the late Mamluk sultans. About a 
decade before the Ottoman conquest, in a period of forced taxation/sales and confiscations, 
Sultan al-Ghawrī had the six senior most members of Walī al-Dīn’s jamā‘a imprisoned and 
mulcted in Dhū’l Ḥijjah 911/April-May 1506.125 Notably, it was Walī al-Dīn’s staff (rather 
than Walī al-Dīn himself) who were the focus of these raids, indicating the substantial wealth 
that his staff had accumulated in their positions. In Cairo, al-Ghawrī had also issued a decree 
that forbade Mamluk amīrs from allowing their bailiffs to extort payments from the parties to 
trials held in maẓālim courts.126 Such action, striking similarity to Selim’s own reforms of a 
decade later, indicates that the jamā‘āt system was problematic for the Mamluk authorities as 
well.  
The Ottoman policy in Damascus, it seemed, had two opposing objectives: to 
preserve and stabilize the administrative elements of the prior regime that secured the 
continuity of taxation, and to undercut possibilities for rebellion, often from the same 
elements of the ancient regime. Some historians have recently observed that the policing and 
governance of the Ottoman administration in Bilād al-Shām displayed similar features of 
arbitrary taxation and market abuses, such as the forced sales of commodities on merchants, 
punishments and retributions that the late Mamluk period was famous for.127 The Ottomans 
exempted Mamluk elites in Egypt and Syria from taxes that were imposed on the rest of the 
civilian population, giving them ‘askarī status.128 Al-Ghazzī’s Kawākib al-sā’ira shows that 
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some of Ibn al-Farfūr’s administration continued to serve in Damascus’ judiciary long after 
his removal in 937/1530; such was the case of the Ḥanbalī qāḍī Muḥammad b. Ṣibṭ al-
Rujayḥī, who had apprenticed under Ibn al-Farfūr’s administration (al-Rujayḥī was born in 
917/1511, meaning he was 19 when Ibn al-Farfūr died in 1530); al-Rujayḥī occupied the 
Ḥanbalī deputy qāḍīship of Damascus (al-maḥkama al-kubra) between 963/1555 and his 
death in 1002/1593, a period only interrupted by a brief political insurrection.129    
The fact that Walī al-Dīn al-Farfūr held Damascus’ chief qāḍīship until 1530 is a 
testament to the stability of the Mamluk-era judiciary, and the case of Damascus may not 
have been an isolated case, but rather characteristic for other Levantine cities in the first 
decades of Ottoman rule. L. Peirce’s study on the “Ottomanization” of the provincial city of 
Aintab found that greater interest in asserting the central state’s dictates over the Aintab’s 
market activities and institutions, only took off quite late, in the late 1530s, after it was 
determined that early cadastral surveys had grossly miscalculated the tax potential of the 
region, and this set off the fiscal and legal reforms that came into full swing with its centrally 
appointed qāḍī Hüsameddin Efendi in 1541.130  
“Without knowledge of the identity of qāḍīs preceding Hüsameddin Efendi – 
whether they were local mollas or outside appointments – it is difficult to 
know how significant the events of 1541 were for the legal life of Aintab. But 
if developments in late-Mamluk Damascus, where qāḍīships became the 
province of a closed corporation of local families, are indicative of a general 
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phenomenon in the northern Mamluk domains, the Aintab qāḍīships may well 
have been a local office, and Hüsameddin Efendi the first, or one of the first, 
to be appointed to the province through the central administration of the 
Ottomans. Moreover, given the coincidence of dates and the shifts observable 
in the climate of the court, it is hard to resist speculating that Hüsameddin 
Efendi introduced Süleymān’s newly issued law book to the court of 
Aintab.”131  
Similar to the case of Damascus, the courts of Cairo in the years immediately 
following the Ottoman conquest also faced a period of consolidation and reorganization that 
sought to do away with the corruption of extra-judicial legal forums operated by deputy qāḍis 
and the dozens of shuhud (professional witnesses) who often served as their surrogates 
outside of court. In Ṣafar 923/March 1517, two months after the Ottoman conquest of Cairo, 
the four chief qāḍīs of the city were replaced with a Ḥanafī chief qāḍī. It was not until five 
years later that a royal decree called for reducing the number of deputy qāḍis to four, one for 
each madhhab, and the dismisal of all shuhud, except eight who were tasked to serve the four 
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the Ottoman core area and the outer provinces, where universalistic and bureaucratic processes were weaker 
than at the center.” Haim Gerber, State, Society, and Law in Islam: Ottoman Law in Comparative Perspective 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 106–8, and also 114-117; For similar earlier views, see: 
Jon Elliott Mandaville, “The Muslim Judiciary of Damascus in the Late Mamluk Period” 1969, 20–23. 
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deputies. Like Damascus, however, these initial attempts failed and the old networks of naibs 
and their shuhūd seemed to return to their former activities shortly after these reforms.132  
Y. Rapoport has illustrated how the legal reforms of Sultan Qāytbāy (r. 872-
901/1468-1496) and Sultan al-Ghawrī (r. 906-922/1501-1516), at the end of the Mamluk 
period, suggest that latter sultans began to assert greater authorities as sources of the law. In 
some respects, the actions of these sultans had similar features to the role of Ottoman sultans 
in the development of Ottoman legal institutions during the fifteenth-century.133 Rapoport 
contends that the Mamluk legal system developed in three stages. First was the inception of 
the four-madhhab judiciary under Sultan Baybars which heralded an age of madhhab 
pluralism. Second, from around 1350, Rapoport observes that “the jurisdiction of military 
officers, especially the chamberlains, expands significantly to include family law and debts.” 
This stage also witnessed the creation of a new post, that of the muftī dār al-ʿadl, dedicated to 
opining mainly on matters of state.134 Lastly, the maẓālim courts became so widespread in the 
fifteenth century that there was significant overlap in cases between these and the qāḍī courts 
to such an extent that by the end of the sultanate, sultans would view “themselves as 
champions of the shariʿah and openly dispute the formalistic doctrines of the judiciary.”135  
At the turn of the fifteenth century, al-Qalqashandī observed in his Ṣubḥ al-aʻshā fī 
sināʻat al-inshā (completed in 815/1412) that the retinue of the dār al-‘adl had by his time 
                                                     
132 Baldwin, Islamic Law and Empire in Ottoman Cairo, 84; Muḥammad Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʻ Al-Zuhūr Fī Waqāʾiʻ 
Al-Duhūr (Cairo, 1960), Vol. 5, 165, 453-454.; Aḥmad ibn Aḥmad al-Damīrī, Quḍāt Miṣr Fī Al-Qarn Al-ʻāshir 
Wa-Al-Rubʻ Al-Awwal Min Al-Qarn Al-Ḥādī ʻashar Al-Hijrī (Cairo: al-ʻArabī lil-Nashr, 2000), 214–218. 
133 Rapoport also highlights that with “the Mamluks we can also identify the emergence of important 
antecedents to Ottoman institutions, such as the Royal Hall of Justice, the Dār al-ʿAdl, with its associated state-
appointed muftīs.” Yossef Rapoport, “Royal Justice and Religious Law: Siyāsah and Shariʿah under the 
Mamluks,” Mamluk Studies Review XVI (2012): 76. 
134 Nielsen, Secular Justice, 91–92; Rapoport, “Royal Justice,” 84; Aḥmad ibn ʻAlī al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-
aʻshá fī sināʻat al-inshāʼ (Cairo, 1913), vol 11, 207. 
135 Rapoport, “Royal Justice,” 76. 
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expanded to include three appointed muftīs (muftūn dār al-ʿadl) of the Shāf‘ī, Ḥanafī, and 
Mālikī madhhabs, having that hierarchy of importance, and that three military qāḍīs (qāḍī 
‘askars) were also associated with these madhhabs, abiding to the same hierarchy and 
attached to the dār al ‘adl. By giving an account of a similar list of positions from the 
chancery of Aḥmad b. Yaḥya al-‘Umarī (d. 749/1348) a little over half a century earlier, al-
Qalqashandī indicates that the muftī dar al-‘adl and the qāḍī ‘askar positions were new.136  
The active engagement of state-appointed muftīs under Mamluk rule goes back in practice to 
the 1370s, when the position of chief-muftī (muftī dār al-‘adl) was first created in Cairo. The 
main responsibilities of this post-holder appear to have been to advise the sultan on issues 
concerning “royal justice”.137 The maẓālim courts included sharia court qāḍīs, or at least 
those trained in fiqh, and augmented qāḍī courts rather than replaced them. Over time, 
however, the disputes that were heard in maẓālim and qāḍī courts overlapped. The maẓālim 
courts of chamberlains (ḥājibs) in the early fifteenth century regularly began pursuing 
debtors, despite several attempts by sultans to delimit such activities and keep them under the 
control of qāḍī courts.138 Nielsen has noted in this period, that al-Maqrīzī, al-Qalqashandī and 
al-Subkī all complained about the ḥājibs’ usurpation of the authority of qāḍī courts.139 R. 
Irwin has shown how the dominance of maẓālim courts with respect to most aspects of the 
law, the so-called “privatization of justice”, came into full view (being manifested at a 
variety of administrative levels) by the middle of the fifteenth century.140      
                                                     
136 Al-Qalqashandī draws on al-‘Umarī’s Masālik al-abṣār fī mamālik al-amṣār for his comparison al-
Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-aʻshá, Vol. 4, 44-45. 
137 Rapoport, “Royal Justice,” 84; Nielsen, Secular Justice, 91–92; al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-aʻshá, Vol. 11, 207. 
138 Rapoport, “Royal Justice,” 86. 
139 Nielsen, Secular Justice, 83–85, 107–9; Irwin, “The Privatization of ‘Justice’ under the Circassian 
Mamluks,” 64. 
140 Irwin, “The Privatization of ‘Justice’ under the Circassian Mamluks.” 
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The above developments were coeval with the formative period of Ottoman qānūn 
development, between the reigns of Murad II (r. 1421-1451) through to Selim I (r. 1512-
1520).141 Early developments in the fifteenth century augured the increasingly wide role that 
the Mamluk sultan took in managing justice. For instance, an increasing norm in this late 
period was the sultan’s holding of an appeals court in which he personally received cases that 
were deemed to have been unfairly adjudicated in either the qāḍī or maẓālim courts. Further, 
the majālis of al-Ghawrī adjudicated disputes and procedural inconsistencies between the 
‘ulamā’ themselves; this may partly explain al-Ghawrī’s involvement in resolving disputes. 
A dispute between Damascene ‘ulamā’ from Ramaḍān 913/January 1508 serves as an 
example; the (Shāf‘ī) appointed muftī of Damascus (muftī dār al-‘adl) at the time, 
Muḥammad b. Ḥamza al-Ḥusaynī (d. 933/1527) issued a fatwā on the illegality of “building” 
in cemeteries in order to have a pretext for demolishing a newly constructed tomb complex 
(turba) for the son of Damascus’ nāẓir al-jaysh at the time, Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Aslamī. 142 In 
the following months, al-Aslamī lobbied for restoring this building, and succeeded in 
obtaining another fatwā, this time from Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī ‘Ajlūn that overturned al-
Ḥusaynī’s. Of note is the fact that Ibn Qāḍī ‘Ajlūn was al-Ḥusaynī’s maternal uncle and more 
                                                     
141 Rapoport has viewed the Mamluk legal system as having undergone three distinct phases: the first between 
1250-1350 being one where the quadri-chief-judgeships, one for each Sunni madhhab, and the development of a 
royal dār al-‘adl institution that administered justice for the Mamluks were created; the second, between 1350 
and the early fifteenth century as one where the dār al-‘adl’s influence was extended outside of the citadel and 
where senior military officers who ran siyāsa courts began to use these to adjudication common debt and family 
disputes, formerly the exclusive domain of sharī‘a courts; and lastly, during the last century of Mamluk rule, 
sultans directly intervened in the adjudication of select cases in maẓālim and sharī‘a courts. Rapoport, and other 
scholars, have proposed the idea that certain features of the Mamluk system, such as the muftī dār al-‘adl, were 
antecedents to the Ottoman Seyhulislām as the maẓālim courts were a gradual move towards what came to 
materialize under the Ottoman qānūn. In Rapoport”s view, the Ottoman state’s legal institutions should 
therefore not be seen as exceptional in their development. Rapoport, “Royal Justice,” 76, 84, 100–101; Masud, 
Muhammad Khalid, Messick, Brinkley, and "Powers, S. David, eds., Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and 
Their Fatwas (Oxford University Press, 2005), 10–11. 
142 al-Ghazzī explicitly attributes this to a record of the event written by Ibn Ṭūlūn, but does not elaborate on the 
precise source. Najm al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ghazzī, Al-Kawākib Al-Sā’ira b’a‘Yān Al-Mā’a Al-
‘Āshira (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-‘ilmiya, 1997), vols. 1, 40–43. 
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senior in the hierarchy of Damascene Shāfi‘ī ‘ulamā’. Over several rounds of failed 
negotiations with the Damascene notables on the matter, al-Aslamī finally appealed the 
matter to Sultan al-Ghawrī, relying on Ibn Qāḍī ‘Ajlūn’s fatwa. Al-Ghawrī summoned all the 
chief qāḍīs of Damascus to his majlis in Cairo, including Ibn Qāḍī ‘Ajlūn and al-Ḥusaynī, 
and additionally requested advice from Cairo’s chief qāḍīs. Following his review, the sultan 
ruled in favor of Ibn Qāḍī ‘Ajlūn’s position. This dispute resulted in the rescinding of Walī 
al-Dīn al-Farfūr’s chief qāḍīship and its temporary award to Ibn Qāḍī ‘Ajlūn’s son Najm al-
Dīn.143 Ibn Ṭūlūn, who first reported this event, noted that the general disagreement (ikhtilāf) 
among the Damascene ‘ulamā’ at this majlis was characteristic of their nature, where each 
muftī would opine on the basis of his limited-interests.144 The Damascene Shāfi‘ī jurists who 
served the Mamluk state thus did not maintain agreement within their own madhhab (let 
alone others). In comparison, this was vastly different from the close relationship that Ḥanafī 
jurists (in the Ottoman center at least) had in adopting the norms of Ottoman Ḥanafism.  
Thus, the political transition to Ottoman rule does not appear to have overhauled the 
legal system in Bilād al-Shām as much as set it on a course for gradual reform. Initial efforts 
to streamline the courts were met with resistance by Mamluk era officials who stood to lose 
their livelihoods. For the first twelve years of Ottoman rule, Ibn al-Farfūr presided as chief 
qāḍī of Damascus’ courts, allowing for a smooth transition. The fact that the first extant qāḍī 
court sijills from Bilād al-Shām are from the mid-1530s indicates that it took at least two 
decades for court archival practice to adapt to Ottoman standards elsewhere. The earliest 
                                                     
143 “Wa kāna mayl al-Ghawrī ila mā afta bihi al-shaykh Taqī al-Dīn.” al-Ghazzī, vols. 1, 41; It appears that al-
Ḥusaynī received a significant fine from al-Ghawrī, which caused him to sell most of his books to repay. al-
Ghazzī, vols. 1, 117; For Najm al-Din’s appointment, see: al-Ghazzī, Al-Kawākib Al-Sā’ira, vols. 2, 21. 
144 Wa-kāna min kalāmihim li-l-sulṭān al-Ghawrī ana’l-‘ulamā’ mā-zālū yakhtalifūn fi-l-waqā’i‘ wa-kul afta bi-
ḥasab mā-ẓahar lahu. al-Ghazzī, Al-Kawākib Al-Sā’ira, vol. 1, 41. 
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court records from Egypt share the same trend. While subsequent chief qāḍīs in Bilād al-
Shām were all Ottoman, their underlying administration relied on local staff, most notably 
the deputy qāḍīs. The fact that Damascus’ high court continued to operate in the same 
location as in the Mamluk era, without a dedicated building, also presents a measure of 
continuity. An important sijill record from Jerusalem indicates that the court had been housed 
in the same place since Mamluk rule and was only relocated to the first Ottoman educational 
endowment in the city, known as al-madrasa al-uthmānīya, in Sha‘bān 996/July 1588.145 This 
move coincided with heightened political-military instability in the area on the back of 
mobilizations of troops during the Ottoman-Safavid wars that would end in the following 
year, 997/1589.146  
With respect to the structure of the courts, the activities of the three non-Ḥanafī 
madhhabs continued, albeit under the supervision of a Ḥanafī chief qāḍī. Ibn Ayyūb 
described the breadth of the chief qāḍī’s authority in his Nuzhat al-khāṭir, in which he lists 
the various courts under the chief qāḍī of Damascus’ supervision. These consisted of: the 
Damascus’ chief-judge’s court (al-Bāb), the city’s central court (al-Maḥkama al-Kubrā), the 
city’s three district courts (Qanāt al-‘Awnī, al-Maydān, and al-Ṣāliḥīya), the city’s probate 
(Qisma) court, and the eight deputy-judiciary courts of Damascus’ suburbs.147 In the year of 
his diary, 999/1590, Ibn Ayyūb lists the names of each of the Shāfi‘ī, Ḥanbalī and Mālikī 
                                                     
145 J-67-333-10 Rabāyiʻah, Ibrāhīm Ḥusnī Ṣādiq and Eren, Halit, eds., Sijillāt Maḥkamat Al-Quds Al-Sharʻīyah 
(Istanbul: IRCICA, Markaz al-Abḥāth lil-Tārīkh wa-al-Funūn wa-al-Thaqāfah al-Islāmīyah bi-Istānbūl, 2010), 
Vol. 9, 208. 
146 Rabāyiʻah, Ibrāhīm Ḥusnī Ṣādiq and Eren, Halit, Sijillāt Maḥkamat Al-Quds, Vol. 9, intoduction. 
147 “al-nawāḥī a-thamānya: al-Marjayn, al-Ghawṭa, Nāḥiyat Jubbat ‘Assāl, Wādī al-‘Ajam, al-Zabadānī, 
Ḥammāra, al-Biqā‘, Wādī al-Nīm, and al-Turkumān.” Ibn Ayyūb, Nuzhat, 161–62. 
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deputy qāḍīs of al-Maḥkama al-Kubrā and the three district courts above; Ibn Ayyūb lists 
himself as the deputy-qāḍī of the Qanāt al-‘Awnī court at this time.148  
Beyond the wide representation of non-Ḥanafī qāḍīs in Damascus’ courts, which 
would have allowed litigants legal forum-shopping opportunities, judicial authority was 
wider under Ottoman rule. When Ibn Ayyūb was asked by an Ottoman Ḥanafī deputy qāḍī to 
list the areas supervised by Damascus’ chief qāḍī (presumably these differed slightly between 
major cities), he issued a list that included the supervision of markets (the ḥisba), charitable 
and family waqfs, the city’s mint, and public policing. As for services, the chief qāḍī’s courts 
offered the public the services of reviewing and authenticating the validity of financial 
accounts (khidmat al-muḥāsaba), the authentication of weights for goods (khidmat al-
qubbān), and of preparing petitions (khidmat kitābat al-‘urūḍ).149 As Baldwin’s work on law 
in early Ottoman Egypt argues that petitioning in legal forums other than the courts was an 
important strategy for settling disputes, yet the courts still played an important part in this 
communication, and this is also apparent in the case of the notarial services that Ibn Ayyūb 
referenced. These services had fixed fees and provided important income to courts. The 
court-registered financial statements (muḥāsabāt) analyzed in this dissertation often include 
references to court expenses for preparing such statements (rasm al-muḥāsaba).  
These notarial services were not only valuable to the public, but also provided a 
substantial revenue for the courts, and several biographical dictionaries of qāḍīs and notables 
of Damascus reported that court employed shuhūd routinely overcharged for their services, 
and there was often an excessive financial burden on Damascene using court services. Ibn 
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Ayyūb reported, in his biographical dictionary al-Rawḍ al-‘Āṭir that when Çivizade (who 
would later become a Şeyhülislam) took up the chief qāḍīship of Damascus in 977/1569-70, 
his year in the city was preoccupied with slashing by a third the inflated rates that notaries 
charged for producing court notarized deeds (sing. ḥujja) and copies (sing. ṣūra). This qāḍī 
also clamped down on the apparently widespread judicial corruption among the deputy qāḍīs 
in Damascus’ suburbs who, beyond overcharging, skimmed over half of the courts’ revenues 
for themselves.150  
 
1.2 Bilād al-Shām’s ‘ulamā’ and the Ottoman ilmiye system  
There are divergent scholarly views on the extent and scope of the integration of 
Bilād al-Shām ‘ulamā’ elites into the ilmiye system. The distance from the Ottoman center 
had mixed effects on the Damascene ‘ulamā’. On the one hand, notables such as the al-
Ghazzī family were able to maintain, and in some instances build, their religious-political 
clout and economic security as the Ottoman appointed vanguards of Shāfi‘ī institutions in 
Damascus for most of the sixteenth century. However, on another level, some of these same 
families were excluded from full participation in the ilmiye system. In the first decades of 
Ottoman rule, I contend this undoubtedly resulted in the localization in the power of 
Damascene ‘ulamā’ elites and reinforced the jamā‘āt dynamics that had preceded the 
Ottoman conquest. For Ottoman military and administrative officials who were posted to 
Damascus, this meant working in a way that coordinate with and integrated local jamā‘āt 
political elements. 
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Further, I argue that at least into the third quarter of the century, the Ottoman ilmiye 
system did not substantially change the social-educational identity of the ‘ulamā’ class in 
Bilād al-Shām. Although the chief qāḍīships of Damascus and Jerusalem were held by 
Ottoman qāḍīs appointed from Istanbul, the attendant legal administration and bureaucracy 
beneath them was thoroughly a locally developed one. This was despite the fact that the new 
system of ‘Ottoman Law’ introduced a new centralized legal bureaucracy, in the form of the 
ilmiye system, headed by the şeyhülislam who was at once the chief jurist and muftī of the 
empire. Thus, the integration of learning institutions in Bilād al-Shām into the broader ilmiye 
system would be quite gradual.  
The fact that the integration of ‘ulamā from Bilād al-Shām took several generations to 
cement itself is reflected in the long-term madhhab conversion of the region’s ‘ulamā’ elites. 
Following the Ottoman conquest, the leading non-Ḥanafī ‘ulamā’ families of Bilād al-Shām 
were not cast aside, and nor did they immediately convert to Ḥanafism, with a few notable 
exceptions (such as al-Farfūr’s abovementioned conversion to Ḥanafism from Shāfi‘īsm). 
Egyptian ‘ulamā’ appear to have followed a similar trajectory.151 Studying madhab 
conversion over the long-term in Palestine, Rafeq used entries from al-Mūrādī’s eighteenth 
century biographical dictionary to tabulate the statistics of ‘ulamā’ madhab affiliation in 
Palestine from two centuries prior. For the sixteenth century, Rafeq calculates that only 6% 
of the ‘ulamā’ notables in Palestine were Ḥanafī, while 85% were Shāfi‘ī. It was only in the 
seventeenth century, he asserts, that evidence of conversion to Ḥanafism becomes reflected 
in a redistribution of madhhab affiliation whereby 53% of the ‘ulamā’ were now Ḥanafīs and 
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38% were listed as Shāfi‘ī adherents. By the eighteenth century, though, the numerical 
difference between Shāfi‘īs and Ḥanafīs narrows and becomes balanced, reflecting a 
resurgence of Shāfi‘īsm:152  
 
The Madhhabs of the Palestinian Ottoman ‘Ulamā’* 
 
Century Ḥanafī Shāfi‘ī Ḥanbalī Mālikī Total 
 No. % No. % No. % No. %  
10/16 3 6.38 40 85.11 3 6.38 1 2.13 47 
11/17 24 53.33 17 37.78 4 8.89 ---- 45 
12/18 23 46 20 40 6 12 1 2 50 
*Table is reproduced from Rafeq, “The Syrian ‘Ulamā’”, 68. 
Since Rafeq’s objective was to chart the conversion patterns of local ‘ulamā’, his data 
in the above table excluded figures for Ottoman Turkish Ḥanafī ‘ulamā’ and chief qāḍis 
appointed from the Ottoman center. Rafe’s table suggests that a rapid conversion out of 
Shāfi‘īsm to Ḥanafism took place between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and 
stabilized thereafter. He attributes this to the stabilization of Ottoman Ḥanafism during the 
seventeenth century, on the one hand, and on the other to the growing dominance of a new 
“powerful class of military personnel, both janissaries and sipahis” who preferred the 
increased flexibility that Shāfi‘ī and Ḥanbalī qāḍīs gave them to monopolize the long term 
lease of agricultural land belonging to waqfs over periods of several decades (Ḥanafī doctrine 
allowed for a maximum lease period of 3 years on waqf land).153  
                                                     
152 Abdul Karim Rafeq, “The Syrian ‘Ulamā,’” Turcica, no. 26 (1994): 68. This table is drawn from Rafeq’s 
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153 Further, the fact that Ḥanafī qāḍīs continued to monopolize the courts did not appear to be a barrier for those 
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occasionally to a Ḥanbalī, qāḍī who would authorize them according to their madhhabs, the Ḥanafī (chief) qāḍī 
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of the waqf, and the necessity for all beneficiaries of the waqf to be present in the court, especially if the waqf 
was a family waqf.” Rafeq, “The Syrian ‘Ulamā,’”71. 
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 However, the arrival of Ottoman rule in the Levant did of course bring its own unique 
state controls over the legal-bureaucracy, and these ushered in a gradual tightening over the 
appointment of muftīs and their issuance of fatwās over the course of the sixteenth century. 
This process was detrimental to the work of local ‘ulamā’ notables, even though they 
continued to serve as deputy qāḍīs in district courts and as administrators of waqfs, albeit 
under the supervision of Istanbul-trained chief qāḍīs. Guy Burak’s The Second Formation of 
Islamic Law observes four areas in which the new Ottoman legal bureaucratic order 
formalized its presence in Syria and Egypt: the integration of local ‘ulamā elite into an 
imperial learned hierarchy; the appointment and sanctioning of muftīs by the state, rather 
than through the independent practice of local ‘ulamā dynasties; the state’s advocacy and 
regulation of its own specific branch of the Ḥanafī  madhhab, with its own doctrines; and 
lastly, “the rise of dynastic law in the post-Mongol eastern Islamic lands.”154 All of these, in 
unison, were hallmarks of the new order, one which was markedly different from its Mamluk 
predecessor on a number of fronts. Burak argues that ‘ulamā’ elites in Bilād al-Shām 
developed a parallel form of Ḥanafīsm that operated next to the Ottoman state’s own ilmiye 
“canon.” 
Other evidence supporting the idea that the watershed for Ḥanafī dominance came in 
the seventeenth, rather than sixteenth, century, can be found in the record of teaching and 
fatwā certificates (sing. ijāza) issued over time across madhhabs. While much later Syrian 
biographers, most notably al-Murādī, would project backwards the notion that the Ottoman 
reforms were “sweeping and abrupt,” Burak’s quantitative review of muftī licensure in the 
sixteenth-century indicates that change was rather shaped over many decades of the sixteenth 
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century.155 Even after the sixteenth century though, certificates obtained outside of the state-
sponsored learned hierarchy, while not bankable as currency to obtain Ottoman judicial 
posts, continued to be bestowed by Shafi‘i (in particular), Mālikī and Ḥanbalī elites.156 Syrian 
Ḥanafī muftīs who did not hold an official appointment began to create their own clique, 
reflecting the cleavage that formed between Arab Ḥanafī muftīs who were incorporated into 
the Ottoman state’s legal order and those Arab Ḥanafī ‘ulamā’ who resisted some of the 
Ottoman ḳānūnnāme interventions.157 A curious feature that supported this division was the 
fact that none of the learning institutions in Bilād al-Shām were integrated into the ilmiye 
system, both those that pre-existed Ottoman rule and those that were constructed during it.158   
Yet, there are even threads of continuity between the Arab Ottoman Ḥanafī elites in 
Bilād al-Shām who held official appointments and leading Ḥanafī jurists of the Mamluk-era. 
In a fatwā epistle from the 1670s, the chief muftī of Damascus ‘Abd al-Ghanī al-Nabulusī 
(1050-1143/1640-1731) had instructed the state’s subordinate muftīs in Bilād al-Shām to 
refrain from issuing judgements outside of their madhab’s legal tradition, taqlid, because 
such junior jurists were not trained to engage in legal reasoning, (ijtihād). Indeed, al-
Nabulusī reiterated the common refrain that no one was fit for ijtihād in his day.159 This view 
is mirrored in an almost identical plea made by Ibn Quṭlūbughā’s in his treatise The Judge’s 
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jurisdiction (Risāla fī quḍā’ al-qāḍī). It is noteworthy that both al-Nabulusī and Ibn 
Quṭlūbughā were not central figures in the state’s curriculum, each having held official posts 
only briefly during their long careers. Notably, al-Nabulusī’s intellectual genealogy is 
connected, indirectly, to Ibn Quṭlūbughā via the works of Ibn Ṭūlūn whom al-Nabulusī 
studied. Significantly, the Ottoman state-sponsored tabaqāt works rarely mention Ibn 
Quṭlūbughā’s major works, Tasḥiḥ al-Qudūrī and Tāj al-tarājim, whereas his works 
continued to be very popular among Ḥanafīs in the Ottoman “Arab lands well into the 
seventeenth century.”160    
Tropes about cultural differences between Arab and Turkish Ottoman provide a 
further point of differentiation between early Ottoman Syrian jurists and jurists in the 
Ottoman center. When the notable Damascene Shāfi‘ī qāḍī and muftī Badr al-Dīn 
Muḥammad al-Ghazzī (d. 984/1577) visited Istanbul in the mid-sixteenth century and sought 
to develop relations with ‘ulamā’ elites at the center, his travelogue, al-Maṭāli‘ al-badrīya fī 
al-manāzil al-rūmīya, he related his disapointment at the lack of attention given to people of 
prestige and power from the Levant, such as himself.161 However, al-Ghazzī did not view the 
Ottomans antagonistically. After all, he referred to Sultan Süleymān in this same work as 
“Sulayman al-zamān wa-Iskandar al-‘aṣr wal-awān.”162 Yehoshua Frenkel studied the 
attitudes of elites in Bilād al-Shām towards Turks and Ottomans during both Mamluk and 
Ottoman periods, and he does not detect resentment in the writings of Arab ‘ulamā’ towards 
their new Ottoman rulers. Rather, he suggests that Ottoman Arab ‘ulamā’ “envisioned (the 
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Ottomans) as a continuation or even as a renewal of the Mamluk Circassian (jarākisah) 
Sultanate.”163  
On the other hand, working on accounts from a century later, Rafeq detects a proto-
Arab identity in the writings of seventeenth century authors such as Najm al-Dīn Muḥammad 
al-Ghazzī (d. 1651; son of Badr al-Din above) and ‘Abd al-Ghanī al-Nabulsī who expressed a 
sense of cultural dejection.164 Further still, biographers from much later, such as Muḥammad 
al-Murādī (1173-1206/1760-1791) would register surprise when they came across members 
of the Syrian ‘ulamā’ who were fluent in Turkish, something that was considered a rarity.165 
It is not clear whether the later period marks a cultural shift away from earlier attempts at 
integration into the Turkish center, or that the spread of the Turkish language among the 
Syrian ‘ulamā’ was never popular to begin with. However, what is certain is that some jurists 
from Bilād al-Shām, like the Aleppan historian Muṣṭafa Na‘ima (Tarih-i Na‘ima) who lived 
and died in Istanbul and wrote in Turkish, did thoroughly integrate into the ilmiye system.166  
Rafeq’s analysis of al-Murādī’s dictionary found that about 47% of Damascene 
Ḥanafī ‘ulamā’ elites had received some training in Istanbul during the eighteenth century, 
while the rate was 20% for Damascene Shāfi‘ī ‘ulamā’ elites.167 Syrian ‘ulamā’ obtained 
teaching degrees in Istanbul at varying levels, some were even able to obtain positions in 
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Sahn-i Seman, Istanbul’s eight colleges.168 However, as Rafeq observes, attendance at 
Istanbul’s teaching institutions, by this time, was not necessarily a prerequisite for obtaining 
an advanced degree that was issued from the center.169 Undoubtedly, such professional 
achievements were aided by a network of small but significant community of Damascene 
elites who had by then established permanent residence in Istanbul.170  
From the first half of the sixteenth century, Ibn Ṭūlūn’s biographical dictionary of 
Damascene qāḍīs, Al-Thaghr al-bassām fī dhikr man wulliya quḍā’ al-shām, is one of a few 
works that traverse the Mamluk-Ottoman transition, and its supplement (dhayl) which was 
produced by Ibn Ayyūb is also an invaluable source on Damascus’ legal elites. Ibn Ayyūb’s 
highlights a few cases of apparent solidarity between Turkish chief qāḍīs and the city’s local 
‘ulamā’, who were mostly Arab. In an episode recounted by Ibn Ayyūb from 965/1557-8, the 
chief qāḍī of Damascus, Muḥammad Celebī b. Abī al-Su‘ūd al-‘Imādī171, who we are told 
was held in high esteem by Damascene ‘ulamā’, had the custom of riding through town thrice 
a week led by an entourage of forty-men, which included Ottoman administrators (yasaqīya) 
and his deputy qāḍīs from the four madhhabs.172 On one occasion, during the ‘īd feast, 
trouble ensued between his jamā‘a and the governor’s:  
“The chief qāḍī’s procession approached the governor’s palace (dār al-
sa‘āda) and in his (the chief qāḍī’s) service on that day were Shaykh ‘Imād al-Dīn al-
Ḥanafī, Ismā‘īl al-Nābulusī [Shāf‘ī], and the [Ḥanbalī] qāḍī Kamāl al-Dīn Bin 
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Mufliḥ.173 The procession passed the jamā‘a of the governor (malik al-umarā’) 
Aḥmad Bāsha … and its members were beating their drums in a garden – none paid 
respect to the honorable afandī [the chief qāḍī]. And so the afandī ordered their drum 
to be burned and their swings cut, and the drum was burned. In response, Aḥmad 
Bāsha’s jamā‘a approached and cut the tail of the afandī’s mule, and then proceeded 
to attack those ahead of the afandī. Shaykh Ismā‘īl fell off his horse as did all the 
others. Turbans fell, and the entourage fled. Word reached Aḥmad Bāsha that the 
sultan’s drum had been burnt, and a conflict ensued between the Qāḍī and the Bāshā 
with each hurling accusations at the other.”174   
In spite of the ethnic and madhhab diversity among Damascene jurists, one is inclined 
to read Ibn Ayyūb’s above entry as stressing the cohesiveness of Damascene ‘ulamā’. In Ibn 
Ayyūb’s Rawḍ. Ibn Ayyūb, who was a friend of Badr al-Dīn al-Ghazzī (d. 984/1574) and 
lived through the century’s middle decades, reported that it was a regular custom for both 
Ottoman chief qāḍīs and governors to visit al-Ghazzī and seek his teachings and blessings. In 
their biographies of al-Ghazzī, both Ibn Ayyūb and Najm al Dīn al-Ghazzī (Badr al-Dīn’s 
son) stressed that the elder al-Ghazzī grudgingly continued receiving visits by Ottoman 
dignitaries even after he became reticent and lived in semi-seclusion. Al-Ghazzī issued 
teaching certificates to a number of high-ranking Ottoman chief qāḍīs in Damascus.175 At 
least three of the Turkish Ottoman qāḍīs that studied under al-Ghazzī became Şeyhülislams: 
Çivizade Hacı Mehmet Efendi (Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad Ibn Jawī Zādah, 1582-87), 
Bostanzade (Muḥammad Bin Bustān, 1589-92, 1593-98), and Malūlzade (Ibn Ma‘lūl Zādah, 
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1580-82).176 While al-Ghazzī developed friendships with the former two, Malūlzade was 
apparently disdainful of Badr al-Dīn al-Ghazzī’s lack of deference.177 Remarkably, although 
al-Ghazzī did not hold any  appointments in the judiciary or ilmiye institutions, he drew a 
high pension of 70 akce per day in the 1560s from the Ottoman state; this income was in 
addition to that which he received from his various teaching and waqf supervisory duties. 
According to Ibn Ayyūb, al-Ghazzī held the “leadership of the [Shāfi‘ī] madhhab” in 
Damascus up to his death, and was widely called upon to issue fatwās, despite the fact that he 
was not the city’s state-appointed muftī.178 Al-Ghazzī’s high standing in Istanbul is evident 
from the type of teaching certificates that Ottoman mevalī sought from him. When 
Çivizade studied with al-Ghazzī in 977/1569-70, it was not to expand the former’s 
knowledge of Shāfi‘ī law. Çivizade received certificates for reciting the “six [canonical] 
works” of ḥadīth (al-kutub al-sitta), the Mu‘tazalī al-Zamakhshari’s tafsīr work al-Kashshāf 
(d. 538/1143), and al-Bayḍāwī’s (d. 685/1286) tafsīr Anwār al-tanzīl, among other works.179 
According to Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī, one of the first orders Çivizade issued after becoming 
Şeyhülislam (twelve years after leaving Damascus), was to increase Badr al-Dīn’s pension to 
80 akce per day, a paygrade “that had never before been achieved by any member of the 
Arab senior jurists (mawālī) under the Ottoman (Banī ‘Uthmān) state.”180 Çivizade’s 
relationship with al-Ghazzī elicits no surprise from Ibn Ayyūb or Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī and 
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reflects the seemingly fluid social-intellectual interaction in Damascus across both Ottoman-
Arab and madhhab lines.   
However, the intimate portrait of Çivizade above should not be taken as a normative 
portrait of chief qāḍīs’ relationships to Damascene ‘ulamā’; the proximity or distance of such 
relationships was highly variable. In general, Ottoman chief qāḍīs in Bilād al-Shām were not 
entrenched within the social-legal networks of Syrian ‘ulamā’ elites. Partly, this was due to 
the exceedingly short tenure of their appointments; the Aleppo-Damascus-Cairo judicial 
circuit that most chief qāḍīs completed was a stepping-stone for achieving tenure in the 
Istanbul judiciary, and thus, postings in each city rarely exceeded two years. Moreover, most 
court administration was managed by local deputy qāḍīs, many of whom represented leading 
established Damascene ‘ulamā’ families, such as the Ibn al-Farfūr, al-Sābūni, and Ibn 
Mufliḥ. It is notable that Walī al-Dīn al-Farfūr’s son and grandson served as deputy qāḍīs in 
Damascus. The grandfather of the historian Ibn Ayyūb (who himself was a deputy qāḍī in 
Damascus) had served as a deputy qāḍī under Walī al-Dīn al-Farfūr in the last years of the 
Mamluk regime. A second marker of difference was the fact that the chief qāḍīs of Damascus 
over the century, with two exceptions, were all Turkish Ottoman elites trained and appointed 
from Istanbul.  
Ibn Ayyūb’s supplement to Ibn Ṭūlūn’s biographical dictionary of judges is also an 
important source for assessing norms on judicial bribery under both the Mamluks and 
Ottomans.181 As noted earlier, judicial malfeasance during the Mamluk period was widely 
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reported.182 Ibn Ayyūb narrates that the chief qāḍī of Damascus Ibn al-Ma‘lūl Afandī 
(Malūlzade), who took office in 975/1567, was not just excessively greedy but also 
“overbearing in responding to the public’s needs”, and that his days in office “were a burden 
upon the people”; he “accumulated an unheard of amount of money.” Following his time in 
Damascus, this qāḍī was promoted and took up the chief qāḍīship of Cairo and would later 
become a şeyhülislam.183 A little over decade later, another qāḍī, Mustafa Afandī (989/1581) 
is described as having mixed with grandees and notables (al-akābir wa-l a‘yān) and had a 
large appetite for money and bribes (ṭama‘ zāyid fī tanāwul al-māl wa akhdh al-rashwa). A 
few years later, Ibn Ayyūb recorded his pleasant surprise when the city’s new chief qāḍī 
Ahmad Afandī (994-995/1585-6) declined Ibn Ayyūb’s offer to purchase a better qāḍīship 
for himself, and simply submitted to his request without insistence of compensation. Ibn 
Ayyūb recalled that Ahmad Afandī had “assigned me a district qāḍīship in the Ṣāliḥīya 
district of Damascus … and he did not take from me anything in value or kind, as it is the 
customary practice of (chief) qāḍīs when they appoint deputies (man yūwallūnahu al-
niyāba).184    
The norms expressed in Ibn Ayyub’s narrative on judicial bribery in Damascus are 
corroborated by Ibn Nujaym who devoted a short treatise on judicial bribery in Cairo during 
the mid-sixteenth century.185 Just as a bribe is impermissible, so too, Ibn Nujaym contends, is 
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the gift granted to a qāḍī from a person from whom he had never received a gift before taking 
up the post of qāḍī.186 The same applies to plaintiffs who advance loans to qāḍīs, or lend them 
property in exchange for a desired ruling.187 Ibn Nujaym acknowledged, however, that gifts 
to a qāḍī after he had issued his ruling, were permissible so long as these were given in good 
faith and without any prior conditions that could have influenced a ruling.188 Ibn Nujaym also 
fully endorsed the discretionary punishment (ta‘zīr) associated with calling out a litigant for 
trying to bribe a qāḍī – viz., removing his turban, tying it around this person’s shaved head 
and parading him around town. Such punishment was necessary for preventing, in Ibn 
Nujaym’s view, the widespread harm caused by such corruption in his day.189 
Notwithstanding Ibn Ayyūb’s narrative on judicial corruption, it should be noted that 
the sale of bureaucratic offices was a long-standing legal custom and form of legitimate 
income for chief qāḍīs, who sought compensation for their investment. Work as a qāḍī 
assumed that qāḍīs, as with other offices of state, such as that of the market inspector (the 
muḥtasib), would recoup their investment through the various fees and taxes that they 
ordinarily levied. Such income, in the eyes of the jurists of the period, was qualitatively 
different from the explicit bribery (irtishā’) paid to a qāḍī to influence a ruling.  
In the late Mamluk-era, political-economic changes led to the opening up of the qāḍī 
post to numerous merchants, Mamluks, and other non-‘ulamā’ members of society. This was 
a source of great ire for some ‘ulamā’ patricians who felt increasingly left out of qāḍīships 
because they were out-bid by wealthier candidates. While the Ottoman ilmiye system’s 
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centralization and bureaucracy was founded on a meritocratic order, it had certainly 
developed into a oligarchy by the early sixteenth century; the senior-most posts in the ilmiye 
system and Ottoman judiciary were reserved for the so-called “Lords of the Law,” the senior 
members of the ruling ‘ulamā’ elite.190 For junior candidates, when appointments were 
scarce, young ‘ulamā’ would need to the better part of a decade before receiving a junior 
judicial post.191  
By the early seventeenth century, the appointment of qāḍīships to major outside 
courts of Edirne, Bursa, Cairo and Damascus was increasingly subject to arbitrary sultanic 
appointments or venality and narratives of widespread corruption came to dominate 
appointments to lower judicial and teaching posts, although movement up through the ranks 
continued to follow the ilmiye rung-ladder system. For instance, Mulakkab Musliheddin (d. 
1648), whose sobriquet reflected the many epithets that were constructed around his 
“unwholesome pastimes” arose from a modest background to become – very briefly – the 
chief qāḍī of Damascus in 1646. Shortly thereafter, he climbed further to become the chief 
qāḍī of Istanbul, and then finally became the Chief Justice of Rumelia, momentarily, before 
“he was hacked to pieces by the party that deposed Ibrāhīm I.”192 A few years prior, Sultan 
Ibrāhīm I had given a series of qāḍīships to Karabaşzade Hüseyin Efendi (d. 1648) that 
culminated with the latter becoming the Chief Justice of Anatolia in 1645. Madeline Zilfi 
commented about Cinci Huseyn, known by the epithet the “demon chaser” who cured the 
sultan’s impotence and was violently murdered, that “since the new administration did not 
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attack the system of favors any more than had the old, other Mulakkabs and Cincis continued 
to pass into the ulema from essentially non-ulema sources.”193  
Notwithstanding the stability of the local Damascene ‘ulamā’ for much of the 
sixteenth century, the century’s end brought a period of important structural changes to the 
Ottoman legal order. Zilfi has illustrated how the examinations that earlier career jurists had 
to undergo, when vacancies arose on a somewhat ad hoc basis, became more regularized and 
distinguished along hierarchical lines between the academies of the Süleymaniye complex 
(Tr. dahil) and colleges outside it (Tr. haric).194 Structurally, these changes appear to have 
been symptomatic of the unhindered fiscal expansion of the Ottoman state. Relying on state 
treasury data, Zilfi estimated that between 1589 and 1622 the Ottoman military corps grew 
from 65,000 to roughly 100,000. “For the ulema, the numbers were equally telling. Between 
1550 to 1622, the number of ulema in hierarchy positions nearly tripled.”195 The 
overextension of both military and ‘ulamā’ bureaucracies was especially salient given that 
the above period came several decades after the greatest period of Ottoman expansion under 
Sultan Süleymān. In the first half of the seventeenth century, therefore, this created a 
bottleneck of too many ulema chasing too few jobs, however this process would be reversed 
– or at least balanced – after the construction of a huge number of new institutions of 
learning by secular elites but it was only in the second half of the seventeenth century that 
some parity was reached between the supply and demand for academic jobs.196  
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 On the other hand, Tezcan explained the political rise of the lords of the law as an 
outcome of social-economic integration and monetization in the late sixteenth-century.197 He 
had observed that qāḍīs were not only among the wealthiest members of society in the early 
modern period, but also among the most significant lenders in the towns and cities where 
they were posted.198 Naturally, the activities of the courts that qāḍīs supervised would have 
expanded their opportunities to lend. But, as Tezcan has argued, it was likely the 
monetization of the late sixteenth-century that brought about an unprecedented expansion of 
power and wealth for the jurists, as a function of their increased role in tax-farming and from 
the increased political-administrative power wielded by the jurist bureaucracy.  Accordingly, 
two processes ran in parallel during this period: “the gradual transformation of the Ottoman 
society from a predominantly feudal to a market-oriented society and the lifting of the barrier 
between public and private law, which led to the increasing politicization of the jurists’ 
law.”199 Tezcan further highlights how the cash-waqf controversy cannot be viewed outside 
of this tension. In his view, the legitimization of the cash-waqf, an unorthodox institution in 
Ḥanafī fiqh, should not be viewed as the sovereign’s will over that of scholars, but rather, as 
an outcome of the “politicization of the jurists’ law.” In other words, Sultan Süleymān’s 
legitimation of the cash-waqf, while it was in opposition to the majority legal view on this 
instrument, was in line with the growing market custom of the cash-waqf, an accepted legal 
practice by certain (influential) jurists that propelled the legitimization of the cash-waqf in 
the first place. In that sense, “Süleyman was drawn into the sphere of the jurists’ law that 
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previously had primarily governed social relations and operated mainly within the spheres of 
commercial and family law.”200 Tezcan’s view helps to explain why qāḍīs appeared so 
frequently as lenders to tax-farmers; this was due to their expanded role in the taxation 
system. The reformed tax regime of the late sixteenth century, which saw a transition from 
the timār tax-farming system to a system of direct taxation with the avāriz and other taxes, 
relied on the qāḍīs’ management of tax farms.201 Qāḍīs were regularly prime lenders to those 
bidding for tax-farms.  
The Jerusalem sijills reflect the roles of qāḍīs as administrators (sing. nāẓir) of state-
run endowments. In addition to being in charge of their own courts, qāḍīs were regularly 
employed to manage other state institutions and special courts such as the probate (qisma) 
courts, the treasuries for the management of Jewish properties (bayt māl al-yahūd), the 
administrative institution for the jizya tax (diwan al-jawalī), the military/state affairs courts 
(diwan al-maẓālim) and so on.202 Michael Winter has observed that it was customary for 
qāḍīship appointments to be accompanied by “ex-officio rights” for holding other posts in 
“religious institutions and the civil financial administration.”203 Far beyond their juridical 
duties, qāḍīs in Syria, as in Egypt, carried out these activities alongside their own private 
business pursuits which could often involve trading in market goods and the holding of a 
wide variety of real estate and manufacturing enterprises such as “water mills, dye houses, 
tanneries, orchards, plantations, and warehouses.”204 Naturally, their intimate access to a wide 
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array of cases could often provide market opportunities that could have been closed to, or 
overlooked by, other elites. In the Jerusalem sijills, it is therefore not surprising at all to find 
qadis appearing as lenders of the highest order. 205 
 
1.3 The practice of the courts: inter-madhhab pluralism, the qānūn and siyāsa 
How did the sovereign’s “secular” laws, the qānūn, affect judicial authority in Bilād 
al-Shām with respect to credit dealings? How did the Ḥanafization of sixteenth-century 
courts and the muftī-qāḍī merger influence rulings? One of the key distinguishing features of 
Ottoman Law was the state’s adoption of an official madhhab affiliation, in its own strand of 
Ḥanafīsm, and the degree to which non-Ḥanafīs as well as Ḥanafīs who did not follow the 
state’s canon and its imposition of Ottoman Law, has been a central topic in several recent 
studies.  Baldwin contends that scholars have overplayed the boundary lines of madhhab 
identity in early Ottoman Egypt courts and argues that jurists had a more utilitarian view of 
madhhab identity than previously assumed. He provides several examples of high ranking 
qāḍīs in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries who switched madhhab confessions for 
employment opportunities.206 These parallel late Mamluk period changes such as the case of 
Badr al-Dīn al-Farfūr (first cousin of Walī al-Dīn al-Farfūr) who switched to Ḥanafism in 
order to become the Ḥanafī chief qāḍī of Damascus.207  
Yet, while the madhhab barriers may have been more important for the employment 
track of Mamluk era ‘ulamā’, it was not so for the common-folk (the a‘wām) who would 
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have turned to “forum shopping” to obtain the most suitable legal outcomes for their needs in 
the qāḍī courts (not to mention the availability of maẓālim courts and extra-judicial 
tribunals). As far as the qāḍī courts are concerned, al-Azem’s recent study of Ibn 
Quṭlūbughā’s work operated on the legal norm that “the four madhhab-courts all had 
concurrent jurisdiction” and for the common man this had legal sanction in custom as well, in 
the dictum that “the layman is bound by no madhhab” (al-‘āmmī lā madhhab lahu).208  
According to G. Burak in The Second Formation of Islamic Law, the 
bureaucratization of muftī appointments under the Ottoman state, was initiated under the 
Şeyhülislam, who was the most senior qāḍī and muftī of the empire, creating a process that 
privileged the opinions of state appointed muftīs, since only their opinions were sanctioned to 
be employed in Ottoman courts.209 In Ibn Nujaym’s day between the 1520s-1540s, 
Şeyhülislam Ebu’s-Su‘ud made it clear that his legal rulings that were preserved in his fatwās 
would not be contradicted by any Ottoman qāḍī/muftī.210 As Burak noted, “the authority of 
the Ottoman muftī to issue legal rulings, unlike that of his Mamluk counterparts, was 
revocable. In other words, if in the Mamluk sultanate the muftīship was first and foremost a 
status, the Ottomans perceived the muftīship as an office. Accordingly, those who were not 
appointed could not have issued enforceable legal opinions.”211  
Burak’s argues that proponents of a “Greater Syrian ‘Ottomanized’ canon” operated 
in contradistinction to the “authoritative texts” (al-kutub al-mu‘tabara/al-mu‘tamada) of the 
Ottoman state’s legal bureaucracy, whereby these two schools were situated at two ends of a 
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legal “continuum” in the Ḥanafī madhhab, may find a parallel in the apparent power 
differential between local muftīs and state appointed jurists in Bilād al-Shām, if one takes al-
Muḥibbī’s above account as more than just hyperbole.212 The other side of the coin may be 
seen in a biography of Ibn Nujaym which was written by the biographer and legal scholar 
Nev‘îzâde Atâî (d. 1635). The latter cites that the Şeyhülislam Ebu’s-Su‘ud approved of Ibn 
Nujaym’s work, al-Ashbāh wa’l-naẓā’r ‘alā madhhab Abī Ḥanīfa al-Nu‘mān, in his day and 
that several commentaries were compiled on it, making it part of the officially sanctioned 
Ottoman legal canon.213 Several decades later, though, in the early seventeenth century, a 
fatwā issued by the Şeyhülislam Ṣun‘Allāh Afandī revealed that this work may not have been 
as representative of the Ottoman canon. In response to the question “Do the issues contained 
in (Ibn Nujaym’s) al-Ashbāh wa’l naẓā’ir correspond to the issues discussed in other 
jurisprudential texts (of the canon)?” Ṣun‘Allah Afandī offered: “Although parts of the work 
are accepted as sound,  there are also parts that are rejected.”214 However, the fact that Ibn 
Nujaym’s work, that of a provincial deputy qāḍī in Cairo who did not rise through the legal 
colleges of Istanbul, could carry such cache without being a part of the legal circles of the 
center, indicates I think the pragmatism of the Ottoman judiciary and the tolerance of legal 
divergence. Notably, though, this is evidence that non-establishment authors in Bilād al-
Shām “sought to establish the authority of some of his rulings by referring to works and 
rulings of eminent Arab Ḥanafīs, whose authority in turn rested on their scholarly credentials 
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and on their affiliation with a specific chain of transmission with the Ḥanafī madhhab.”215 Ibn 
Nujaym’s criticism of free-wheeling muftīs appears to be a veiled critique of the new legal 
order that appeared to accept the blurring of lines between qāḍī and muftī. Undoubtedly, as 
he explicitly noted, Ibn Nujaym was troubled by the historical continuity of this aspect of the 
law, which may have been a vestige of a developing late Mamluk practice.  
In his posthumously assembled collection of short treatises, al-Rasā’il al-zaynīya, Ibn 
Nujaym paid special attention to cases of interdiction, emphasizing that a determination of 
mental competence (sifh) can only be made as part of a court adjudication process, and not 
independently. He was wary and critical of the practice in his day of qāḍīs issuing 
interdiction orders without a dispute brought to court, and his view was an outgrowth of that. 
In his view, such extra-judicial orders served as fatwās that were non-binding, unless they 
were part of a court proceeding (da‘wa) and had evidence (bayyina). He reiterated the 
divergent views of Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yūsuf and al-Shaybanī on the issue of interdiction for 
new adults.216 Ibn Nujaym’s acerbic view is notable given that he held a qāḍīship in Cairo 
and received widespread recognition among scholars in Anatolia during his short life (he 
died at 44). Ibn Nujaym lamented:  
“The accepted practice of qāḍīs in our day, and in the past, of providing 
rulings without the presentation of a case proceeding or dispute (khuṣūma), 
has prompted many to question this practice in Cairo. I have issued many 
opinions concerning the lack of its validity, and (in spite of this), this has not 
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raised any disagreement (khilāf) on this issue, whether the concerned qāḍī is a 
Ḥanafī or otherwise.”217  
Ibn Nujaym’s angst is not only aimed at the Ottoman qāḍīs of his day, but also very 
likely the reports of this in Mamluk judicial practice. However, although the official rhetoric 
was that legally binding opinions could only be issued by state-appointed muftīs, during this 
period, the popularity of fatwās from non-state sanctioned muftīs seems to suggest that the 
policing of this principle may not have been strictly followed. The fatwās of the highly 
influential seventeenth-century Palestinian Khayr ad-Dīn al-Ramlī (993-1081/1585-1670), 
who drew on Ibn Nujaym, as well as the Gazan jurist al-Tumurtāshī were actively 
reproduced and continued to carry weight among his followers well after his death. In his 
biography of al-Ramlī, the seventeenth-century chronicler and biographer, Muḥammad Amin 
al-Muḥibbī (1061-1111/1651-1699), in Khulāṣat al-athar fī ‘ayān al-qarn al-ḥādi ‘ashar, 
related the power of al-Ramlī’s fatwās in this way: 
“[The town of] Ramla in his times was the most just of all places, and 
the sharī‘a was upheld there and in neighboring areas as well. If someone was 
ruled against in a non-sharī‘a fashion, the person could come with a copy of 
the qādī’s ruling and Khayr ad-Dīn could issue a fatwā that nullified that 
ruling, and it was his fatwā that would be implemented. Rarely would any 
problem arise in Damascus or other main cities without him being consulted 
for an opinion about it, despite the availability of many other muftīs.”218  
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Beyond the muftī-qāḍī overlap, the introduction of Ottoman sovereign law codes, the 
ḳānūnnāmes, was a keystone of Ottoman law. What was the impact of the ḳānūnnāmes in 
Bilād al-Shām on the judicial authority of qāḍīs in qāḍī courts? Did these ḳānūnnāmes, arise 
from sovereign edicts that preceded them in Mamluk times, the yasa/yasaq, as the Ottoman 
sources imply? The promulgation of ḳānūnnāmes was often tailored for newly acquired 
territories, and in the case of Arab lands, the ḳānūnnāmes there ascribed their codes as 
incorporating those that had preceded them; Süleymān’s ḳānūnnāmes for Egypt (1522-25) 
and for the province of Damascus (1548), claimed to have drawn on the pre-existing 
ḳānūnnāme of the Mamluk sultan Qāytbāy.219 Benjamin Lellouche’s study of the Ottoman 
Egypt’s conquest reproduced an Ottoman account from the chronicler Celālzāde Ṣāliḥ Çelebi 
(d. 1565) who also served as a qāḍī in Egypt during the 1530s that suggests that this is indeed 
what happened there:  
“[We] asked the city dwellers [şehirlü ṭāifesi]: ‘‘Of the padişāhs of the past, 
for whose justice are you grateful and whose ḳānūn did you favour?’’ We shall search 
for his ḳānūnnāme and, in accordance with [that ḳānūnnāme we] shall promulgate a 
fermān ordering the writing of a ḳānūnnāme. The people said: ‘We are content with 
the sultanic ḳānūn [ḳānūn-i sulṭānīye] that prevailed during the time of the late Sultan 
Qāytbāy’, and they chose it. On his behalf, he [the Ottoman sultan] issued a noble 
fermān [fermān-i hümāyūn] ordering the search for [buldurmışlar] the sultanic 
ḳānūnnāme [ḳānūnnāme-i sulṭānī] of his [Qāytbāy’s] time. He ordered that from that 
[day] on, the affairs of the province [of Egypt] [umūr-i vilāyet] will be administered 
according to an imperial ḳānūnnāme [ḳānūnnāme-i hümāyūn] that is compatible 
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[with Qāytbāy’s ḳānūnnāme]. At that same time, an imperial edict [emr-I hümāyūn] 
was issued ordering the deposit of [the ḳānūnnāme] in the Divan of Egypt [divān-i 
Mıṣr].”220 
As appealing as Ṣāliḥ Çelebi’s account is, there is no documentary evidence (Mamluk 
or Ottoman) to suggest that a Mamluk ḳānūnnāme ever existed.221 In explaining the Ottoman 
establishment’s insistence on a pre-existing Mamluk qānūn, Burak advocates that “the 
Ottoman sovereigns and their ruling elite attempted to translate the legal landscape they 
inherited from the Mamluks into their political-legal vocabulary. In the new rulers’ 
vocabulary, the sultan, and more generally the dynasty, must have a ḳānūn – that is, a law 
that was associated with them, whether codified or not.”222 While the attribution of 
ḳānūnnāmes in the Levant to Qāytbāy is doubtful, the formulation of Ottoman codes in the 
region certainly drew on (with the exception of criminal codes) on Mamluk-era edicts and tax 
customs, particularly with regard to agricultural and market taxation.223 For instance, in 
Egypt, “fees (rüsūm) for the maintenance of the irrigation systems as well as for land 
measurement (misāḥat) were levied according to Qāytbāy’s ḳānūn, and in Damascus, as late 
as 1548, the market inspection (iḥtisāp) was said to follow the ḳānūn of Qāytbāy, as was the 
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administration of the city’s horse market.”224 Court records and imperial edicts from 
Jerusalem in the 1550s and 60s also indicate that the ḳānūnnāme for that city included 
Mamluk era customary market taxes and tolls, such as the “measuring-tax” (rasm al-kiyāla) 
and “road tax” (ghafar/khafar) that was paid by pilgrims and caravans.225  
Although the ḳānūnnāme market and agricultural taxes might not have burdened the 
inhabitants of Bilād al-Shām more than they had been under Mamluk times, in at least one 
way the new tax unleased the ire of local ‘ulamā’: in the form of the new marriage tax (resm-
i ‘arūs). This tax, which was levied on brides, and was “double in case of a virgin than a 
woman who had been married before” was considered blasphemous by many jurists in Bilād 
al-Shām and Egypt.226 Writing almost a century after its introduction, one of the more 
colorful descriptions of this tax comes from Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī’s (d. 1651) al-Kawākib 
al-sā’ira, in which he says that “this state [the Ottomans] had imposed illegal taxes on 
women’s genitalia. What outrage can be worse than this? (ḍarabat hādhihi al-dawla al-
mukūs ‘ala furūj al-nisā’… ayyu fitna a‘ẓam min ḍālika?)”227 As Rafeq observed, however, 
the issue resented by many ‘ulamā’ was the usurpation of the shar‘īa, and by extension, their 
control over law and their ability to benefit from it.228 Both Ibn Iyās in Egypt and Ibn Ṭūlūn 
in Damascus observed that this tax cut into the income of local qāḍīs, and the former claimed 
that the “commended practice of matrimony was forsaken (fa-imtana‘a al-zawāj wa’l-ṭalāq fī 
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tilka al-ayyām wa-baṭṭalat sunnat al-nikāḥ wa’l-amr li’lāh fī dhalika)”.229 As Winter 
comments, even ‘Abd al-Wahhāb al-Sha‘rānī, the highly influential and “usually mild and 
compromise-seeking man” took issue with the Ottoman qānūn, when he made the following 
statement about the qānūn, that he attributed to ‘Alī al-Khawwāṣ, his master: 
“The spirit of the Revelation regulates the world order. If religious 
laws disappear, the [secular] rule (nāmūs) replaces them in each generation in 
which they are lacking. This is what is meant now [by the term] Qānūn in the 
Ottoman state. Its application, however, is lawful only in countries that have 
no religious laws. As for Egypt, Syria, Baghdad, North Africa, and the other 
lands of Islam, the application there of the Qānūn is unlawful, because it is not 
infallible, and it may have been set down by the kings of the infidels.”230  
In an essay on judicial administration in early Ottoman Egypt, Magdi Guirguis 
contends that qāḍīs in the mid-sixteenth century, in producing sijills records, distinguished 
between cases that they heard and did not rule on versus those for which they issued rulings. 
That is, in official terms, the state promoted a legal distinction between the two, even if 
practice regularly contravened this (as Ibn Nujaym’s comments suggest).231 Just as all kinds 
of people used the sijills to register their transactions and disputes, as a means to register a 
public record, so too were qāḍī court qāḍīs required by the state to distinguish between their 
roles as legalizing agents of the public record, as opposed to their roles as adjudicators. Most 
                                                     
229 Rafeq, “The Syrian ‘Ulamā,’” 12; Ibn Iyās, Badāʾiʻ Al-Zuhūr Fī Waqāʾiʻ Al-Duhūr, Vol. 5, 417-18, 424; Ibn 
Ṭūlūn, Mufākahat, 1962, Vol. 2, 30. 
230 Winter translated this passage from Sha‘rānī’s al-Jawāhir wa-l-durar, printed in the margin of Aḥmad b. 
Mubārak al-Sijilmāsī’s Kitāb al-Ibrīz alladhī talaqqāhu ‘Abd al-‘Azīz al-Dabbāgh (Cairo, 1346/1927). Winter, 
Michael, “The Ottoman Conquest and Egyptian Culture,” 294. 
231 Guirguis, “Manhaj Al-Dirāsāt Al-Wathā’qiyya Wa Wāqi‘ Al-Baḥth Fī Miṣr,” 282–83; Cited in: Nelly 
Hanna, “Guild Waqf: Between Religious Law and Common Law,” in Held in Trust: Waqf in the Islamic World, 
ed. Pascale Ghazaleh (Cairo: American Univ in Cairo Press, 2011), 149. 
96 
  
sijills records did not involve the judicial intervention of qāḍīs, however, the acts in sijills 
frequently end with a statement affirming a qāḍī’s ruling, where none was required according 
to either sharī‘a prescriptions or Ottoman Law. Guirguis cites evidence from al-Busrawī’s 
shurūṭ work, Biḍā‘at al-qāḍī to illustrate his point. In its opening pages, al-Busrawī discusses 
the different types of judicial remarks (‘alamāt al-quḍāt) recorded by qāḍīs in sijills: 
“Know that agreements (ṣukūk) are of different types (wujūh). Some of them 
are judicial rulings (minha ḥukman), as in when the qāḍī records, ‘this is what 
has transpired in my court and I have issued my ruling on it’ (jara mā fihī 
‘indī wa ḥakamtu bihī), or he might say, ‘it is legally valid to me’ (ṣah mā fīhī 
‘indī). And there are others that do not involve his own ruling, as in when the 
record says, ‘this is what transpired in my court’ (hadhā mā jarā mā fih ‘indī), 
or is accepted by some ‘ulamā’ has been registered with me (in my court).”232  
Explaining the reasons behind the rise of jurist legal remarks (‘alāmāt al-quḍāt) al-Bursawī’s 
adds this very important distinction: 
“Agreements (ṣakk) are of two types in our day, sharī‘a based contracts, as 
originally intended (wa-hūwa’l-maqṣūd), and ḳānūnnāme (qānūnī) contracts, 
such as military oaths, employment agreements, and financial accounts of 
revenues and losses from village partnerships and rural estates. These types of 
financial agreements (wa’amthāl hādhihī al-buyū‘), even if they are 
corrupt/illegitimate (fāsida) are still adopted contractually (in courts). As for 
sharī‘a contracts, the qāḍī writes atop them judicial formulas related to 
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rulings, however, for the qānūnī contracts, he only writes above it the 
following formula: ‘the act is recorded as presented by the humble qāḍī so and 
so…’ (al-amr kamā dhūkar ḥarrarahū al-faqīr fulān), since this formulary 
relates to the acknowledgement of the contract (ṣakk) and not a given 
ruling.”233   
While I have come across identical ‘alāmāt to those noted above in the Jerusalem and 
Damascus sijills for the “qānūnī” type of contracts, they are fairly infrequent (occurring when 
registering military disputes among officers). Rather, the norm was that qāḍīs issued rulings 
all manner of sijill acts, irrespective of the categories presented by al-Busrawī above.234 The 
sijills of Bilād al-Shām reviewed in the following four chapters indicate that qāḍīs had a 
fairly free hand to make such determinations, and typically chose to issue “rulings” on many 
types of proceedings that did not merit a ruling since no dispute was involved. These 
included cases when, for instance, executors of orphan estates or the nāẓirs of waqfs 
submitted balance sheets of their operations and sought a qāḍī’s “ḥukm” to legally 
authenticate their accounts and absolve them from liability. In my view, this seems to 
reinforce Tezcan’s view of the jurists’ law becoming a synthesis of “public” (qānūn) and 
private (sharī‘a) law. Effectively, what is attributable to “qānūnī” contracts as being that 
which is restricted to high affairs of state, increasingly represents a tiny sliver of court cases, 
while judicial rulings allowed qāḍīs authority over all manner of other things. This leads one 
                                                     
233 My translation of Gerguis’ transcription. Guirguis, “Manhaj Al-Dirāsāt," 283. 
234 Jerusalem sijill from Muḥarram 971/August 1563 (J-Sij 45-218) is of a dispute between two senior military 
officers from Gaza over the sale of some property in Jerusalem. The sijill contains various depositions and a 
history of the disputes. At the top of the sijll, are two “‘alāmāt.” One by the Mālikī deputy-judge of Jerusalem, 
and the other by the Shāfi‘ī deputy-judge. It is phrased exactly the same as that prescribed in the jurist manual 
discussed by Gerguis, i.e. “al-amr kamā dhūkir ḥarrarahū” indicating that he is simply there to record the deed 
and not pass judgement.  
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to reconsider, as numerous scholars have pointed out, the usefulness of viewing qānūn as a 
discrete category, since many “qānūn” matters were adjudicated in “qāḍī” courts and not in 
separate “qānūnī” courts that would have been analogous to the Mamluk maẓālīm court 
(notwithstanding Baldwin’s abovementioned study of extra-judicial venues).     
Conversely, the above consideration of qāḍīs’ explicit distance from taking issuing 
rulings over adjudication they preside over, within certain spheres of activity, may also be 
seen as a sign of the state’s increased centralization and the central judiciary’s control over 
qāḍīs. The ability of litigants to effectively appeal a qāḍī’s decision by seeking reappraisal 
with another qāḍī’s ruling, and similar issues of enforcement were very problematic in Ibn 
Qutlūbughā’s day. In his treatise on the “The Qāḍī’s Adjudication” (Qaḍā’ al-qāḍī), as part 
of a larger collection of treatises (Rasā’il Ibn Qutlūbughā), Ibn Quṭlūbughā presents this 
dynamic by introducing a case study of an insolvent debtor who wishes to establish waqfs. In 
Ibn Quṭlūbughā’s story, a Mālikī jurist narrates the case of a debtor going from one Ḥanafī 
qāḍī to another seeking a gullible jurist who will let him register his waqf on the sly (Ibn 
Quṭlūbughā undoubtedly chose a Mālikī narrator because qāḍīs of that madhhab allow for 
greater flexibility for debtors wishing to endow waqfs with mortgaged properties). Here, he 
presents the case of a Mālikī qāḍī who files a complaint against a Ḥanafī qāḍī who had 
approved a waqf for a man mired in insolvent loans (duyūn al-mūstaghriqa). The Mālikī qāḍī 
sardonically asks the erring Ḥanafī qāḍī: 235   
                                                     
235 The term duyūn al-mustaghriqa I believe refers to insolvent debts relating to the rolling interest from 
previous debts. I base this on Ebu’s-su‘ud’s interpretation of Qur’ān 3:130  (al-‘Imrān) in his tafsīr work, Irshād 
al-‘aql al-salīm īla mazāyā al-kitāb al-karīm. Ebu’s-su‘ud interprets the last part of this verse, “Oh you who 
have believed, do not consume ribā doubled and multiplied” (yā ayyuha aladhina āmanū lā tā’kulū al-ribā 
aḍ‘āfan muḍā‘fatan), as referring to the practice of extending a loan to the point that a debtor can no longer 
service it and must keep extending it simply to keep up with interest payments, “such that an originally small 
obligation completely consumes the debtor’s wealth, and in its place is occupied the current portion of interest” 
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“Does your ruling, that which legitimizes the establishment of 
a waqf for an insolvent debtor, prevent one from holding the 
opposite view, namely that which agrees with those who 
believe that waqfs created by insolvent debtors are invalid?”236  
In response, and realizing his mistake, the Ḥanafī qāḍī jumps to clarify his stance by 
arguing:  
“my ruling was intended to be in accordance with the 
consensus of jurists (al-muttafaq ‘alayhī), however, my 
adjudication was for an issue on which there is disagreement 
(fi mukhtalaf fī), and is, therefore, invalidated. There is 
nothing that prevents another qāḍī who disagrees with my 
ruling from re-adjudicating the case and overturning my 
ruling.”237  
In adjudicating on the validity of the above waqf scenario, Ibn Quṭlūbughā’s adopts 
the view that the issue is not simply a matter of legal procedure, but rather one of establishing 
the ruling qāḍī’s qualifications and his jurisprudential method in ruling over such a case. If 
the above Ḥanafī qāḍī was qualified to identify and rule on matters that are open to 
independent reasoning (maḥal yasūgh fīhī al-ijtihād), and not simply a lesser qāḍī, one who 
issues formulaic rulings based on the legally required practice of his madhhab (al-qāḍī al-
                                                     
(“fa-yastaghraq b’l-shay’ al-ṭafīf mālahū b’il-kulliyā wa-maḥallahu al-naṣbu ‘ala al-ḥālīya min al-ribā”). Abū 
al-Su‘ūd, Irshād al-‘aql, vol. 2, p. 84.   
236 Qāsim Bin Qutlūbughā, Kitāb Rasā’il al-Marḥūm Shaykh al-Islām Qāsim b. Qutlūbughā al-Ḥanafī , Leiden 
MS. Or. 789, (220ff.), 73 r.  
237 Ibid. 
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mūqallīd mūstawwfiyan al-mashrūṭ), then he would be able to rule on the basis of his own 
ijtihād. However, a less able qāḍī would be accountable unless he ruled in accordance to the 
letter of the law. 238 Of course, there were very few qāḍīs in Ibn Quṭlūbughā’s day that he 
would have held in such high esteem, to rule according to ijtihad; the vast majority of qāḍīs 
were therefore required to rule according to the madhhab’s practice, taqlid. Thus, in the case 
concerning this specific waqf, Ibn Quṭlūbughā determines it to be null and void (bāṭil) due to 
the Ḥanafī qāḍī’s ignorance of the facts, and the latter’s failure to follow the procedures of 
his madhhab. Ibn Quṭlūbughā’s admonishment of the Ḥanafī qāḍī, we must remember, was 
on the grounds of this qāḍī’s incompetence, rather than the general impermissibility of 
issuing waqfs to insolvent debtors.  
In al-Azem’s Rule Formulation and Binding Precedent, al-Azem observes that that 
Ibn Quṭlūbughā paid special attention to this problem of judicial jurisdiction in his al-Ṭaṣḥīḥ 
wa-l-tarjīḥ as well as in his judicial manual, Mūjabāt al-aḥkām wa-wāqi‘āt al-ayyām, which, 
as its title suggests (Mūjabāt al-aḥkām), refers to the “consequential obligations resulting 
from court judgements”. Ibn Quṭlūbughā developed the latter work to be used as a manual by 
qāḍīs and muftīs who were insufficiently trained to recognize and issue rulings following 
what al-Azem calls a form of “rule review” or  “binding-precedent” (taṣḥīḥ) of jurists within 
a madhhab of senior jurists in their madhhab-tradition.239 This is different from rule-
formulation (tarjīḥ) which is the domain of master-jurists, like Ibn Quṭlūbughā.240 “This, 
obviously, could lead to a break-down of the judicial system as a whole, and eventually to a 
destruction of the public’s (or government’s) trust in the practicality and coherence of the 
                                                     
238 Bin Qutlūbughā, Kitāb Rasā’il, f. 78r 
239 Al-Azem, Rule-Formulation, 46–47. 
240 Al-Azem, Rule-Formulation, 144–45. 
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system. He thus wished to address procedural challenges facing qāḍīs who, as part of the 
pluralistic legal system, were often unsure how to respond to judgements passed by other 
madhhab-jurisdictions that contradicted their own, if the consequences of those rulings were 
then disputed, and the case was brought before his own court.241 Al-Azem argues that by Ibn 
Quṭlūbughā’s time in the mid-fifteenth century, the legal-pluralism of the Mamluk era was so 
entrenched that it pervaded the working basis of this Ḥanafī’s scholar’s worldview to the 
extent that his Ḥanafism could not be viewed outside of the unitary worldview of law:  
 “as witnessed by the plethora of (Ibn Quṭlūbughā’s) citations of 
authorities from beyond the Ḥanafī legal tradition, one can clearly delineate 
in Ibn Quṭlūbughā’s polemic a statement as to the inherent unity of the four 
Sunni legal traditions in their processes and procedures regarding precedent 
and taqlīd, within the wider legal system (i.e. the judiciary of the Mamluk 
state). Likewise apparent is a respect for the distinctive internal particulars 
of these processes, as well as of the particular legal doctrines, of the co-
existent rival traditions. Secondly, the pluralistic system bequeathes a 
responsibility of upholding the distinctive particulars of each tradition with 
the wider system; thus, the judge is under obligation to respect and observe 
madhhab-specific sanctioned judicial procedure as to rule-determination 
when passing a judgement, in order to ensure consistency in judicial 
procedure and provide coherency to the rulings issued within the 
jurisdiction of that madhhab within the judicial system. These virtues in turn 
benefit the populace who are under the jurisdiction of that system: 
consistency bequeaths predictability, in turn entailing fairness for the 
                                                     
241 Al-Azem, Rule-Formulation, 48; al-Qāsim ibn ʻAbd Allāh Ibn Quṭlūbughā, Mūjibāt al-aḥkām wa-wāqiʻāt 
al-ayyām (Baghdād: Wizārat al-Awqāf wa-al-Shuʼūn al-Dīnīyah, 1983), 69–74. 
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jurisdiction’s subjects, and their ability to understand the consequences of 
their actions.”242  
With regards to such issues complicating the real-world application of the provision 
of venues for the exercise of “legal-pluralism,” the recent scholarship of Baldwin and al-
Azem unsurprisingly takes to task the traditional view adopted by scholars of medieval 
Islamic law and social-historians concerning what pluralism should mean. Baldwin contends 
that a more correct usage of the term should refer to the existence of a plurality of competing 
legal systems, ones that by definition, must include those outside the control of the state – 
and this is not what scholars generally understand by “legal pluralism” under the Mamluk 
sultanate.243 For al-Azem the issue at hand when using the term legal-pluralism to refer to the 
choice of Islamic madhhabs is that this term ignores the inter-borrowing between madhhabs 
and the practice among some jurists to deliver rulings outside of their madhhab tradition, a 
frowned upon, but historically prevalent practice. Rather than ‘legal-pluralism’, both 
Baldwin and al-Azem apply the term ‘madhhab-pluralism’. Baldwin uses this term to 
describe a kind of pluralism that was constrained by enforcement capabilities and the 
“relationship between judgement and compromise”, rather than doctrinal difference, an 
“institutional pluralism.”244 He argues that it is more useful to think of legal/madhhab 
pluralism in the sixteenth and seventeenth century as the state making available specific legal 
options to people: “the state structured the options available, controlling access to non-Ḥanafī 
doctrines … it is not clear that most litigants were well versed in legal doctrine; rather, the 
                                                     
242 Al-Azem, Rule-Formulation, 147–48. 
243 Baldwin, Islamic Law and Empire in Ottoman Cairo, 10–13. 
244 Ibid. For Baldwin’s use of the terms ‘madhab pluralism’ and related fluidity in adjudicatory frameworks, see 
77-82. Baldwin observes that in some spheres, such as marriage laws, the diversity of legal options available to 
women in the Mamluk period carried forward into the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in spite of periodic 
Ottoman attempts of ‘Ḥanafization,’ to push the implementation of Ḥanafī law for marriages always. Baldwin, 
Islamic Law and Empire in Ottoman Cairo, 77. 
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legal solutions for different problems were encoded within the bureaucratic procedures of the 
court system, and professional practitioners communicated the options available to ordinary 
Cairenes, mediating between them and the complex madhhab-plural legal system.”245   
Lastly, extra-judicial settlements, the outcomes of which were typically recorded in 
court, often reflect that settlment was not necessarly the most desirable option for litigants, 
but rather an option out of an intractable legal conflict that could ensnare a defendant in court 
indefinitely. As is the case in contemporary society, litigants with more political and 
economic clout stand a far better chance of positive adjudication outcomes than those of 
lesser standing. As such, the cases of weak plaintives, without the social-economic and 
political network and resources of wealthier defendents, were often hampered, even when the 
law was on their side in a clear-cut case. More powerful defendents could delay, petition, and 
re-adjudicate cases in a way that could place an exceeding amount of financial and personal 
stress on the weaker party. Settlement, then, as today, therefore often presented the less 
worse option than dragging the case on in court and the court records manifest this.246 Both 
earlier and recent studies have observed an overwhelming emphasis on the  settlement of 
disputes through mediation (ṣulḥ) rather than through adjudication in the qāḍī courts of the 
empire’s central lands as well as its Arab provinces.247 Ergene has ventured to argue, in the 
case of Kastamanou’s court, that the principal function of the courts was to register 
arbitration settlements rather than to serve as an adjudicatory venue. This scholarly position 
is, however, somewhat tenuous. since ṣulḥ registrations usually give the outcome of the 
                                                     
245 Baldwin, Islamic Law and Empire in Ottoman Cairo, 91. 
246 Baldwin, Islamic Law and Empire in Ottoman Cairo, Ch. 6.; Coşgel and Ergene, The Economics of Ottoman 
Justice; Aida Othman, “‘And Amicable Settlement Is Best’: Sulh and Dispute Resolution in Islamic Law,” Arab 
Law Quarterly 21, no. 1 (2007): 64–90; Meshal, Sharia and the Making of the Modern Egyptian, 187–89. 
247 Baldwin, Islamic Law and Empire in Ottoman Cairo, 49–53; Othman, “And Amicable Settlement Is Best”; 
Gerber, State, Society, and Law in Islam. 
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settlement, and rarely details about the process of mediation, (the objective of these 
registration was after all to clear liability of the parties involved), the procedural role of the 
qāḍī in ṣulḥ arrangements remains ambiguous.248   
Notwithstanding the debate about ṣulḥ in qāḍī courts, ṣulḥ registrations were common 
in the sijills, particularly for debts.249 On casual observation, it is more likely for one to 
observe the settlement of debt disputes through by way of mediation and ṣulḥ attestations 
than to let the law run its course through a debtor’s ilzām proceedings and imprisonment. The 
reasons for this may have been several. Creditors could draw on loan collateral which many 
times exceed the loan value. Second, as reviewed in chapter one, debtor imprisonment was 
often counterproductive inasmuch as it would tie up the debtor’s assets in court 
administration and not likely to quickly repay the debt, aside from the fact that it impaired 
the debtor’s income-earning ability. This could be significant for people of modest means. 
Procedural constraints, and the cost and length of adjudication could also work against 
creditors, particularly those who held claims to long overdue debts. While qāḍīs would 
ordinarily stand by a creditor’s right to being repaid their advanced loan principal, obtaining 
full compensation for late interest was not a foregone conclusion and always carried the risk 
that a qāḍī could rule against any profit beyond that obtained in the past. 
  
                                                     
248 Baldwin, Islamic Law and Empire in Ottoman Cairo, 50–51. 
249 Al-Bursawī’s manual contains a number of formularies related to ṣulḥ registrations such as what al-Bursawī 
labels as “What is written for settlement and the clearing of liability for both parties” (Biḍā‘at al-Qāḍī, f. 55a). 
This manual also contains other ṣulḥ formularies such as the one concerning when a gifted asset is the subject of 
a dispute (Biḍā‘at al-Qāḍī, f. 59b), and a formulary for when a debtor’s liability is transferred to a third party 
through the use of an agency-transfer (ḥawāla) assignment (Biḍā‘at al-Qāḍī, f. 55a-56b).  
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Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have attempted to show that there was a broad continuity in law and 
its administration between the late Mamluk and the first three decades of the Ottoman period. 
The so-called Ottomanization of legal institutions in Bilād al-Shām and the incorporation of 
Damascene ‘ulamā’ households into the patronage networks of the center was slow in 
coming. Indeed, institutes of learning in the region were not incorporated into the ilmiye 
system and there is some evidence of an aloofness in attitudes of ‘ulamā’ in Egypt and Bilād 
al-Shām toward the Ottoman legal establishment, yet accommodation was of course a 
requirement for maintaining professional privileges. In this sense, lineages of ‘ulamā’ elites 
were able to negotiate and maintained some political power well into the end of the sixteenth 
century, and for some families, such as al-Ghazzī, well beyond it.  
A small but growing cluster of recent studies, most notably those of Burak and al-
Azem, are reshaping our understanding of what it meant to belong to the Ḥanafī madhab in 
the Levant in the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries. Given that the Ottoman conquest 
neither subverted the ‘ulamā’ of Egypt or Bilād al-Shām, nor mandated the absolute adoption 
of Ottomanized Ḥanafī law, how did law change on the ground? What was the response of 
Ḥanafīs in the previous Mamluk lands to the new order? From the perspective of juristic 
discourse, there was a difference between Ḥanafīs in the center and those in the Arab 
periphery. Studying “canonical” texts of the tradition, Burak contends that the first two 
centuries of Ottoman rule witnessed a continued development of a Ḥanafī legal-canon by 
jurists of the Arab lands (from the late Mamluk period) that was made up by a considerably 
different group of scholarly works than those that the Ottoman state’s learned hierarchy 
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pursued in their “Ottoman imperial canon.” With respect to the courts, although the courts 
were immediately restructured under the state’s Ḥanafī court system, non-Ḥanafī deputy 
judges continued to operate under liberal supervision, in general, in Cairo and Damascus in 
the first decades of Ottoman rule. While obtaining the permission of Ḥanafī judges was a 
requirement of any adjudication outside of Ḥanafī law, forum-shopping and the opportunities 
it provided to litigants continued to be in place, and as Baldwin suggests, continued to 
provide powerful elites the ability to successfully use the courts to assert their social-
economic powers in ways comparable to what could have been obtained under the Mamluk 
legal system.   
Notwithstanding the delay in the Ottomanization of law in the Levant, there is also 
evidence of continuity among leading Ḥanafī jurists in the late fifteenth century, such as in 
the rasā’il of Ibn Quṭlūbughā and Ibn Nujaym, on the problem of judicial corruption and the 
policing of judges who ignored the madhab’s rules governing judicial procedure and rule-
determination (tarjīḥ). Both these senior jurists held dim views concerning the abilities of 
judges in their day, and reported that corruption was commonplace. The worldview of these 
jurists, as it concerned judicial procedure, recognized the interaction of non-Ḥanafī madhabs 
in issues that concerned the tendency of litigants to forum-shop and disputate rulings. The 
domination of Ḥanafism as the state’s madhab did not do away with the ongoing 
phenomenon of inter-madhab adjudication.       
As will be elaborated in chapter two, some extra-judicial norms and political factions 
in Damascus continued to operate into the first two decades following the Ottoman conquest. 
From the Ottoman sijills alone, it is difficult to claim with confidence that the office of the 
chief qāḍī had overwhelming control over much of the law before the mid-1540s. Given that 
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qāḍīs also carried out some of these same functions under Mamluk rule, I suggest that 
preexisting legal custom (‘urf) was enmeshed into the ḳānūnnāmes of the region. I focus on 
the mu‘āmalāt shar‘īya to show how it became elevated and formalized in Ottoman shurūṭ 
manuals that were used in the region’s courts. 
 
Chapter Two – Ribā versus Ribḥ  
 
This chapter addresses the moral, legal and cultural framework that surrounded 
instruments of credit in Bilād al-Shām between the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries. Further 
to studying the history of the term most often associated with usury in Islamic law, ribā, I 
evaluate the institutionalization of legitimized modes for the charging of interest in loans 
under early Ottoman rule in the practice of contracts known as mu‘āmalāt shari‘īya and trace 
their recorded application in Mamluk courts for the management of orphan estates. In the 
course of discussing these developments, I engage in four core arguments on this and related 
topics in this chapter:  
The first section addresses the discursive transformation of “ribā” in eschatological 
and ḥadīth works. Here, I argue that ribā moved from being a grave sin in earlier works that 
closely associated its consumption with punishments in the afterlife, while later works, 
particularly al-Haytamī’s tract on grave sins, applied a more nuanced and accommodating 
approach to ribā, that allowed for discretion in its consumption via legal stratagems. In this 
section, I also review the basic juristic rules of the four Sunnī madhhabs on ribā in its three 
types: ribā al-faḍl, ribā al-nasī’a, and ribā al-Jāhilīya.  
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In the second and third sections, I move on to discuss the opposite of illicit gain, ribā, 
that is ribḥ (profit). I show how the early sixteenth century debate over the cash-waqf 
resulted in an institutionalization of an effective interest rate ceiling for legitimate loans, 
those issued as mu‘āmalāt shari‘īya. I refer to this official state sanctioned interest rate limit 
as the “ribḥ-ceiling”. Further, I show how, while juridical prescriptive literature proscribed 
connecting any monetary profit explicitly to a time-period (on basis that it produces ribā) 
Ottoman court registers reveal that qāḍīs approved of this concept and instituted policies in 
support of the time-value-of-money. Qāḍīs for instance, accepted the reduction of future ribḥ 
(interest) owed that was settled early in court. In such cases, there was a reduction in the 
interest charged, in proportion to the time reduced on the loan, versus when a loan was left to 
mature full term. However, with respect to terminology, I contend and show that the 
construction of the term ribḥ as a term to describe “licit interest” that was counter posed to 
ribā, is a pre-Ottoman legal construction that has its basis in early fiqh works and was 
popularly used in Mamluk Syria. It is the Ottomans who are first to formalize and enshrine 
its use in a public manner, by using it in the Ottoman ḳānūnnāme from Sultan Bayezid 
onwards, and this was reiterated and most popularized in the fatwās of Şeyhülislam Ebu’s-
Su‘ud.    
The last section of this chapter is a study of the evidence for debtor imprisonment and 
its use. I argue that although imprisonment and torture were advocated by jurists such as Ibn 
Quṭlūbughā, there was never a systematic political-administrative policy in either Mamluk or 
Ottoman periods concerning the punishment of debtors, and for all practical purposes, debtor 
prisons did not exist as such. The imprisonment of debtors though was commonplace, and by 
and large, I show that it was enforced in line with the prescriptions of Ḥanafī doctrine as it 
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concerns debtors. I contend, in this context, that the purpose of such imprisonment was to 
solely to pressure debtors to reveal hidden money and settle their debts, or failing to do so, to 
prove their insolvency and declare them bankrupt with immediate release. These findings on 
imprisonment contrast to those of studies on the institution of imprisonment in medieval 
Europe, whereby imprisonment for debts was mostly coercive in nature, the element of 
mandatory clemency for extreme poverty or bankruptcy seems not to have existed – in Italy 
debtors remained in prison for years irrespective of their ability to pay their debts.250  
 
2.1 The eroding significance of ribā as a vice in late medieval ethical and 
eschatological works 
The Qur’ān delivers many lessons on ribā to Muslims. Among those most framed in 
the spirit of “commanding right and forbidding wrong,” are the following Qur’anic verses:  
“Those who give, out of their own possessions, by night and by day, 
in private and in public, will have their reward with their Lord: no 
fear for them, nor will they grieve. But those who take usury (al-
ribwā) will rise-up on the Day of Resurrection like someone 
tormented by Satan’s touch. That is because they say, ‘Trade and 
usury are the same,’ but God has allowed trade and forbidden usury. 
Whoever on receiving God’s warning, stops taking usury, may keep 
his past gains – God will be his judge – but whoever goes back to 
usury will be an inhabitant of the Fire, there to remain. God blights 
usury, but blesses charitable deeds with multiple increase: He does 
                                                     
250 Guy Geltner, The Medieval Prison: A Social History, 2008, 52–56. 
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not love the ungrateful sinner... give up any outstanding dues from 
usury (mā baqā min al-ribwā), if you are true believers. If you do 
not, then be warned of war from God and his Messenger. You shall 
have your capital if you repent, and without suffering loss or causing 
others to suffer loss. If the debtor is in difficulty, then delay things 
until matters become easier for him; still if you were to write it off as 
an act of charity, that would be better for you, if only you knew. 
Beware of a Day when you will be returned to God: every soul will 
be paid in full for what it has earned, and no one will be wronged.” 
(Q 2:274-281)251    
The above verses present the characteristic Qur’ānic juxtopositioning of rights against 
wrongs in several interesting ways as they relate to usury. These and other similar Qur’ānic 
and Ḥadīth injunctions not only would frame later discourses on debt and usury, but also 
would support the traditional concept of the early Muslim community as a religious 
movement that arose in a trading society.252 There is the distinction that trade is just, while 
ribā is not and that the former can, and should exist, without the latter (Q 2:275-6). But for 
their contradistinction, these two are not opposites. Rather, ribā’s opposite is charity (Q 
2:277).253 While usurers are repeatedly reminded of their sins, they are also offered 
redemption in the hereafter if they repent and abstain from their practice and “write off” their 
                                                     
251 M. A Abdel Haleem, The Qurʼan (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 31–32. All English 
quoted passages from the Qur’an will rely on Abdel Haleem’s translation. Going forward, I will simply refer to 
the number of the sura and verse without citing Abdel Haleem’s translation.  . 
252 Crone’s famous critique of this notion did not overturn this still dominant view. Crone, Meccan Trade and 
the Rise of Islam. 
253 Fazlur Rahman’s purpose in writing his article on riba was to support this contention: Rahman, “Ribā and 
Interest” I take up the connection between riba and charity in chapter three where I study the cash-waqf and its 
implications. Of note is that the cash-waqf was justified by some jurists on the basis that it served charitable 
ends, even if the means were usurious. 
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usury as “an act of charity” for weak debtors. These admonishments do not have attached 
punishments other than the accounting that will take place on the day of judgement, itself an 
ironic inversion of the usurer’s craft “every soul will be paid in full for what it has earned” 
(Q 2:281).  
In this section, I argue that while ribā regularly featured highly in early lists of vices 
compiled by polemical works of exegetes and narrators, by the sixteenth century, and 
probably much earlier, the moral-ethical standing of this vice became rather marginal. Legal 
treatises and chronicles from the late fifteenth century and sixteenth centuries illustrate that 
courts in Jerusalem and Damascus in the second half of the century were usually lax in their 
prosecution of debtors. This was especially the case creditors did not have high socio-
economic standing.  
A survey of epigraphic data from around the Islamicate world illustrates the extent to 
which the Qur’ānic eschatological topos of trade was grounded in the medieval Near East. Q 
24:37-38 calls on: “men who are not distracted, either by commerce or profit (lā-talhīhim 
tijāratūn wa-lā bay‘ū), from remembering God, keeping up their prayer, and paying the 
prescribed alms, fearing a day when hearts and eyes will turn over. God will reward such 
people according to the best of their actions, and He will give more of his bounty…” A 
search of the Max Van Berchem foundation’s online Thesaurus d’Epigraphie Islamique 
produces sixty-one instances where these two verses were found adorning mosques and 
mausoleums, but most particularly caravanserais and market buildings. Roughly a third of 
these inscriptions are from fourteenth and fifteenth century Mamluk Egypt and Syria, but 
others range in provenance from Spain to Iran and Afghanistan; one of the earliest 
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inscriptions appears on a facade of the Ibn Ṭūlūn mosque in Cairo.254 It is not surprising that 
traders and merchants always featured in tropes that often depicted their vices, and 
sometimes their beneficence, survive in both high-brow culture and popular representations 
of the premodern period, ranging al-Jāḥiẓ’s Book of Misers (Kitāb al-bukhalā’) and the 
Arabian Nights to those appearing in the popular shadow-play of Ibn Dāniyal. However, 
works dedicated to the sins of usury were not, as far as I can tell, produced in the medieval 
Arabic literature as they were in Catholic Europe. 255 This presents a stark contrast to the 
treatment of this topic in medieval European scholastic writings and never did the charge of 
usury in the Islamicate world become associated with a charge of heresy as it did in some 
parts of medieval Europe.256 
In popular terms, lists of sins were important for helping the faithful to distinguish 
lesser sins from graver sins, and eschatological works that contained sin-lists, largely drew 
on the ḥadīth collections of Muslim and al-Bukhārī, although they could vary widely in their 
hierarchies. There are seven oft-quoted sins that came from a single ḥadīth: polytheism 
(shirk), magic (siḥr), suicide (qatl al-nafs), usury (akl al-ribā), consuming orphan property 
(akl māl al-yatīm), deserting the battlefield (al-tawallī min al-zaḥf) and slander for adultery 
(qadhf).257 While shirk and qadhf found their way into law as ḥudūd (criminal acts against 
God that are prescribed mandated punishments), the graveness of the others seems to have 
been left up to qāḍīs to determine, as discretionary punishments (ta‘zīr). This list, which is 
                                                     
254 Search was performed at http://www.epigraphie-islamique.org/epi/search.php. For fifteenth century Cairo, 
see for example the khan built by Sultan Qāytbāy in 877/1472-3 in Cairo and that built by Sultan Barsbāy in 
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(567-923 H/1171-1517 M) (Cairo: Maktabat Madbūlī, 1997), 638, 702. 
255 Ibn Ḥabīb’s (d. 239/853) Kitāb al-Ribā is an exception to the rule. ʻAbd al-Malik Ibn Ḥabīb, Kitāb al-Ribā 
(Dubai: Markaz Jumʻah al-Mājid lil-Thaqāfah wa-al-Turāth, 2012). 
256 Charles R Geisst, Beggar Thy Neighbor: A History of Usury and Debt (Philadelphia: University of 
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commonly referred to as the “seven transgressions” (as-saba‘a al-mūwabiqāt) or the “seven 
grave sins” (as-sab‘a al-kabā’ir), appear frequently in early jurisprudential and exegetical 
works.258 I argue that the frequent pairings of akl al-ribā and akl māl al-yatīm in tafsīr works 
and ḥadīth compilations are more than an aesthetic theme on the consumption (akl) of 
proscribed things, rather, as I illustrate in Chapter Five on orphan-estate lending, these seem 
to have arisen in a conjoined way out of the active association between the management of 
capital from orphan-estates and the lending activities provided by market-lenders who could 
and did serve as executors and guardians of such estates.  
The imagery of akl al-ribā and akl māl al-yatīm, as “consuming” forbidden things, 
has eschatological significance in parallels where one finds stories of usurers eating stones 
and hell in early sīra works, most notably in Ibn Hishām’s hagiography of the Prophet 
Muhammad. These certainly draw from Qur’ānic imagery, such as the verse sends a warning 
“to those who unjustly consume the money of orphans, they will be consumed by fire in their 
bellies and burn in a blaze” (Q 4:10).259 In Ibn Hishām’s narrative of the Prophet’s life (sīra), 
in the passage where the Prophet receives a guided tour of Hell by its guardian, Mālik, 
sinners “receive measure-for-measure types of punishments in the first heaven: those who 
devoured the wealth of orphans (with hot stones shoved into their mouths); those who 
charged usury (with swollen bellies that got trampled); male adulterers (who left good meat 
for rotting meat); women adulterers (who hang by their breasts)” and so forth.260 Such 
                                                     
258 Christian Robert Lange, Paradise and Hell in Islamic Traditions, 2016, 173–74. 
259 Qur’ān 4:10, ina-alladhīna ya’kulūna amwāl al-yatāmā ẓulman inama ya’kulūna fī’buṭūnihim nāran wa-
sayaṣilūna sa‘īran.  
260 Frederick Colby, “Locating Hell in Islamic Traditions,” in Locating Hell in Islamic Traditions, ed. Christian 
Robert Lange, vol. 119, Islamic History and Civilization (Leiden ; Boston, MA: BRILL, 2016), 127; Lange, 
Paradise and Hell in Islamic Traditions, 114; Ibn Ḥabīb transmits the same passage in his treatise on ribā: Ibn 
Ḥabīb, Kitāb al-Ribā, 53. 
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punishments echo other physical and psychological tortures that are also described of hell in 
the Qur’ān261 and were popularized in medieval eschatological works like al-Qurṭubī’s 
thirteenth century al-Tadhkira bi-aḥwāl al-mawtā wa-umūr al-ākhirā, as well as Ibn Ḥabīb’s 
Kitāb al-ribā.262  
In Paradise and Hell in Islamic Traditions, a work that studies the proliferation of 
eschatological literature between the ninth and sixteenth centuries, Christian Lange makes 
two observations about the historical development of this genre, relevant here. First, while 
early discourses focused more on instilling fear in believers of hellfire for their sins than the 
heavenly rewards that awaited them after death, later Islamic discourses from the high 
medieval period onwards reverse this emphasis. The earlier emphasis, Lange suggests, 
reflects an interplay with similar apocalyptic motifs in early Jewish, Christian and 
Zoroastrian eschatological works. This shift appears to have been accompanied by an attempt 
to focus less on compilation and more on the parenetical aims of instilling hope of heavenly 
reward, rather than fear of hellfire.263 The second aspect is the massive expansion in the size 
of these sin-lists. The earliest ḥadīth compilations are not all in agreement on the total 
number of sins, but they numbered in the tens and dozens, rather than the hundreds and 
thousands that characterized later works. Lange observes that the expansion of lists of kabā’ir 
especially in later works represented an easing in the priority given to the veracity of such 
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262 al-Qurṭubī,  Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad, Kitāb al-Tadhkirah bi-aḥwāl al-mawtá wa-umūr al-ākhirah, ed. al-
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ḥadīths. In other words, authors allowed themselves greater license to accept weak ḥadīths – 
or to invent ones – because these sin-list works were not a genre of fiqh.264  
Turning to the works themselves, I have attempted to identify whether akl al-ribā and 
akl māl al-yatīm appear to shift in the continuum of grave sins over time, as well as to get a 
sense of the severity of these crimes in jurists’ minds. In the sixteenth century, both akl al-
ribā and akl māl al-yatīm continued to appear at the top of sin lists. However, I suggest that 
this reflects an observance of the Qur’ān’s explicit injunctions mentioned above, rather than a 
genuine belief in these as grave sins, because related sins to moneylenders appear much 
farther below in these lists. I review two important works of the sixteenth century in this 
regard. The first is a relatively short sins-list of 96 sins produced by the Damascene Shāfi‘ī 
Badr al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Ghazzī (d. 984/1577) that survives in the polemical work Ḥusn 
al-tanabbuh li-mā warad fī al-tashabbuh (Guarding against the likeness of vices) that was  
produced by his son, Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī (d. 1061/1651), the Shāfī‘ī muftī of Damascus 
and renowned author of al-Kawākib al-sā’ira.265 The second is a sins-list of 467 in a work 
called al-Zawājir ‘an iqtirāf al-kabā’ir (Cries against the committing of sins) by the Egyptian 
Shāfi‘ī jurist Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī (d. 973/1566), who spent much of the latter part of his life 
teaching in Mecca. While al-Ghazzī’s list is simply that, a list without elaboration, al-
Haytamī’s is a polemical work with extensive descriptions of the listed sins.  
Although both earlier and later works exhort Muslims to follow the injunction of 
commanding right and forbid wrongdoing (al-amr bi’l-ma‘rūf wa-l-nahy ‘an al-munkar), I 
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backwardness and achieve pro gress by imitating the worthy people of the past.” Rafeq, “Relations between the 
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have observed, in line with Lange’s findings, that the language in al-Haytamī and al-Ghazzī 
works is less visibly concerned with diatribes on hell-fire, than much earlier works ostensibly 
were. Indeed, in al-Ghazzī’s work, “refuting the injunction of commanding right and 
forbidding wrongdoing” is recorded as sin number thirty-five, indicating its relatively lower 
importance. Also, sins that were on the minds of conquest-era Muslims, and reflected in 
works from six to eight centuries prior, such as the sin of deserting the battlefield (al-tawallī 
min al-zaḥf), which are part of the earlier mentioned mūwabaqāt ḥadīth, are of lesser 
importance in the latter works. The reduced eschatological emphasis in these two works not 
only suggests a shift in concerns, but also reflects the highly subjective nature of this genre, 
notably so given the fact that both authors were well known members of the same madhhab.  
However, the hierarchical differences that characterize much of the material in these 
two-latter works is not the only distinguishing feature that sets them apart. The subject matter 
is arranged much like that found in books of fiqh, where sins are grouped according to 
subject matter. In al-Ghazzī’s work this is implied, the list is not segmented under topic 
headings, while in al-Haytamī’s case it is explicitly so. It is no surprise therefore that while 
the first sin that was listed in both works was that of polytheism/idolatry (shirk), the order of 
the sins after that differ considerably between these works. However, there is a little overlap 
early on. In al-Ghazzī’s case, most of the first twenty or so sins relate largely to issues of the 
marketplace and private morals. In al-Ghazzī’s list, sins seven through fifteen are market 
sins/public crimes (theft, seizure by force, gambling, bribes, ribā, akl māl al-yatīm, cheating 
in weights and measures, market taxes (al-mukūs), false testimony (shihādat al-zūr).266 Some 
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of these appear in al-Haytamī’s work, such as sins six and seven (cheating and collusion) that 
do overlap with al-Ghazzī’s. Not surprisingly, the first seven sins presented by al-Ghazzī and 
al-Haytamī differ from the seven mūwabaqāt hadīth sins. 
Indeed, al-Haytamī insists that the canonical version of the mūwabaqāt ḥadīth should 
not limit the super-sins to seven, because there are many other recensions that he lists that 
offer nine, twelve and more sins under this label.267 Indeed, al-Haytamī reviews some of the 
disagreements between the Shāfi‘ī jurists over this and lays out his rational for considering 
that all sins should be viewed as “grave” (kabā’ir), thus the title of his work.268 In 
reproducing his father’s list in his own work, Najm al-Dīn al-Ghazzī also observed that his 
father’s material was sourced from a variety of leading works produced by the Shāf‘īs, 
implying an authentic attempt to capture a madhhab-normative sin-list, and he elaborates that 
“scholars have disagreed about classifying vices into greater (kabā’ir) and lesser (saghā’ir); 
some have said that there is no such thing as a lesser vice and that all should be considered 
grave because of their deleterious consequences (to society).”269 The variegation present in 
these works is thus emblematic of the fact that these types of work were inherently 
subjective, which nevertheless felt that they had to abide to their own madhhab’s world-view 
of the kabā’ir sins, even if these were disputed. 
To return to ribā, these works projected different views concerning its importance 
(severity), although both not grant it a somewhat lesser status. Although al-Ghazzī lists ribā 
and akl māl al-yatīm together, at positions eleven and twelve respectively, these appear 
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immediately before other market sins, as mentioned above, such as cheating in weights and 
measures and the levying of market-taxes (mukūs), both of which were supervised by the 
market-inspector (muḥtasib). While this may imply that these were market regulated 
activities, Mamluk era muḥtasib manuals are silent about moneylending. This may imply 
that, for al-Ghazzī the prevalence of usurious lending, although undesirable, was a market 
norm and it fit schematically along with other market wrongs. In al-Ghazzī’s Damascus, the 
muḥtasib was a post that Ottoman rule continued to deploy, yet the determination of ribā and 
the management of orphan estates were the responsibilities of the chief qāḍī and his deputies 
– not the muḥtasib. It is notable that the sin of an “executor’s malfeasance” (al-iḍrār fī’l-
waṣīya) occupies the seventy-seventh position in al-Ghazzī’s sin-list, which reflects perhaps 
the lower priority Ghazzī gave towards consuming an orphan’s property, since an executor’s 
malfeasance would often have been associated with lending of their orphan’s estate.270   
For al-Haytamī, the relative low-priority given to ribā and surrounding issues is more 
apparent. Like al-Ghazzī, al-Haytamī commences his list with the sin of polytheism/idolatry 
(shirk), since it represents the gravest ideological threat to the central tenant of tawḥīd, the 
unity of God. As for ribā, it appears as “grave sin number 185” in al-Haytamī’s list of 467 
sins, and also like al-Ghazzī, is placed between the sins related to sales and other commercial 
contracts, as well as to cheating on weights and measures. The sin of ribā, which al-Haytamī 
labels as those who “the use of ḥīyal for averting ribā by those who do not recognize such 
stratagems” (“al-ḥīyal fī’l-ribā wa-ghayrahū ‘ind man qāl bi-taḥrīmuhā”) reiterates that the 
ribā prohibition is a prohibition on any unwarranted increase in value of a given thing that is 
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not mediated by a monetary exchange.271 However, al-Haytamī does advocate ḥiyal as a 
solution for removing ribā. He does this, by first reviewing the well-known prophetic ḥadīth 
concerning the exchange of dates with a ḥīla, to avert ribā, and then notes the doctrinal 
disagreement between madhhabs over the topic of ḥiyal. In large part, therefore, the sin Al-
Haytamī’s describes is aimed at those who flagrantly employ ribā – without using ḥiyal – and 
at those who reject ḥīyal as a suitable means for overcoming ribā (thus the title of this sin). 
In the version of the above-mentioned ḥadīth presented by al-Haytamī, the Prophet is 
approached by a Medinan tax-collector who presents him with a load of high-quality dates 
from the tribe of Khaybar. The Prophet inquires whether the dates of Khaybar are always of 
such high quality, to which the tax-collector answers, “no, when we have dates of a poor 
quality, we trade two loads of them for one load of better quality dates.” Al-Haytamī 
continues, “the Prophet then taught him the ḥīla of selling the two loads of poor-quality dates 
for dirhams. He then legally used that money to buy the better-quality dates.”272 This ḥadīth 
was commonly cited in fiqh texts, for defining a basic form of circumventing ribā.273 The 
insistence on financial exchange, rather than barter, as a means for purifying trade from ribā 
would become a fundamental way that ḥiyal circumvented ribā, and would also be a 
cornerstone of the lending contracts, known as mu‘āmalāt that arose around these ḥiyal, that 
are discussed later in this chapter. Since al-Haytamī was a Shāfi‘ī, it is not surprising to see 
him advocate his school’s position concerning ḥīyal. In this regard, he clarifies that “the two 
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imams Aḥmad (Ibn Ḥanbal) and Mālik (Ibn Anas) … have forbidden the ḥīyal of ribā; by 
means of analogous reasoning (qiyās), equating the sale and exchange of dates with the 
unequal barter of dates… therefore, making the ḥīla of ribā just like ribā itself.” He 
continued, “and so a disagreement arose (between the madhhabs) concerning the ḥīla of ribā, 
with al-Shāfi‘ī and Abū Ḥanīfa approving the ḥīla of ribā, among other ḥīyal. Our associates 
(aṣḥābunā) approve of it.”274  Preceding his section on the ḥīla of ribā, al-Haytamī pays 
considerable attention (eight pages) to reviewing the three classifications of ribā (discussed 
further below) that arose from scripture and are agreed upon in principle by all madhhabs, 
and al-Haytamī spends considerable energy in decrying the sinners who engage in these, 
dwelling on the innumerable punishments that await them in hell, including the ‘consumption 
of stones by those who consume ribā” variety, as mentioned earlier. Interestingly, however, 
in delineating the practice of one form of ribā, the ribā al-nasī’a, (the interest arising from a 
deferred credit-sale for a commodity), al-Haytamī notes “this type of ribā is the most 
prevalent form in our times and is very popular among people.”275  
In assessing al-Ghazzī’s and al-Haytamī’s positions, it is notable that both scholars 
classify the topic of ribā as a market-related sin, and place it among sins related to sales and 
similar contracts. Notably, however, it does not appear as a criminal act, but rather a personal 
sin that is to be accounted for in the hereafter. For al-Haytamī, this sin is only realized when 
it is not circumvented by a ḥīla, as he dedicates a complete section to explaining that ribā is 
contingent on neglecting the use of a ḥilā. Slight references in al-Ghazzī and al-Haytamī’s 
work suggest though that usurious lending, whether it was treated by ḥīyal, or flagrantly 
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carried out in the open, were commonplace in their societies. The above works, therefore, 
serve a prescriptive function, of an eschatological nature, intended to inform their readers of 
ideals they should aspire to, in commanding right and forbidding wrong, rather than serve as 
vivid reflections of the world they inhabit. It is only in occasional side-mentions (such as al-
Haytamī’s note about the prevalence of ribā al-nasī’a in his day) that one glimpses the real 
world. This mindset of ribā as a personal vice rather than a crime, and the widespread 
legitimation of ḥīyal as both a legal and spiritual solution to usury, inform the section below.  
 
2.2 Classifiying ribā and the ḥīyal of mu‘āmalāt in the Levant 
The contemporary definition of ribā is of any form of usury or interest, yet no 
singular or precise definition is offered in the Qur’ān, Sunna or Ḥadīth. In the Qur’ān, ribā 
(from the root r-b-w) is variously described as a ‘growing’, ‘increasing’, ‘swelling’, a 
‘raising’ and so forth, occurring some twenty times.276  The closest use of the term to imply a 
compounding of interest occurs in Q 3-130: “Oh you who believe, do not consume usurious 
interest (ribā), doubled and redoubled. Be mindful of God so that you may prosper.”277 The 
belief in a commerce-driven ethos dominating pre-Islamic Mecca may have led early leading 
exegetes such as al-Ṭabarī and al-Jaṣṣāṣ to primarily define ribā as a form of illicit gain 
arising from lending, rather than a hidden form of interest in a sale of goods.278 Such usurious 
lending is referred to in the exegetical sources as ribā al-jāhilīya. To an extent, this informed 
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122 
  
the views of medieval and modern thinkers who considered the opposite of ribā to be trade or 
sales (bay‘). 279 However, while Qur’ānic references to ribā do not proscribe sales, 
prohibitions on ribā are at times found in the same surās as those mentioning sales, or in 
nearby verses. For instance, the earlier mentioned verse Q:2-275, “But those who take usury 
(al-ribwā) will rise-up on the Day of Resurrection like someone tormented by Satan’s touch. 
That is because they say, ‘Trade and usury are the same’”, is followed a few verses later by 
one of the most important Qur’ānic verses concerning the documentation and witnessing of 
debts and sales: 
“You who believe, when you contract a debt for a stated term (idhā 
tadāyantum bi-daynin ilā ajalin), put it down in writing: have a 
scribe write it down justly between you … Do not disdain to write 
the debt down, be it small or large, along with the time it falls due: 
this way is more equitable in God’s eyes, more reliable as testimony, 
and more likely to prevent doubts arising between you. But if the 
merchandise is there and you hand it over (tijāratan ḥāḍiratan), there 
is no blame on you if you do not write it down. Have witnesses 
present whenever you trade with one another, and let no harm be 
done to either scribe or witness” (Q: 2-282) 
Undoubtedly, the Qur’ānic injunction for recording all debts and would be 
instrumental the juridical emphasis on written procedure, even though witness-oaths 
remained a primary form of attestation. The phrase tijāratan ḥāḍiratan (lit. “present trade”) 
above, has generally been interpreted by scholars to mean trade carried out by the principal 
owning the capital, rather than at another time through an agent. It is worth noting that the 
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frequent opposition of ribā in the fiqh literature to buyū‘ was a product of the ḥadīth literature 
rather than the Qur’ān.280 The most famous ḥadīth in this regard is the so-called “six 
commodities ḥadīth” which profoundly informed jurists’ understanding of what comprised 
ribā:  
“The Prophet said: Gold for gold, silver for silver, wheat for wheat, barley 
for barley, dates for dates, and salt for salt should be exchanged like for like, 
equal for equal and hand-to-hand [on the spot]. If the types of the exchanged 
commodities are different, then sell them as you wish, if they are exchanged 
on the basis of a hand-to-hand transaction.”281       
Although the above reference to gold and silver above alludes to currencies, the 
emphasis on a quantitative and exactly equal exchange of goods also points to the importance 
of barter for the Meccan community. The necessity for protecting the more destitute of 
society from extortion by elites who could, for instance, trade good quality wheat for a 
disproportionate amount of lesser quality wheat and profit from was surely an impetus for 
this and related ḥadīths.282 That said, this presented jurists with a host of problems. For one, 
the quality of the goods at hand and its role in the exchange of goods is left an open question. 
There is also the curious question of why anyone would want to trade in two identical goods 
of the same quantity, at the same time. Jurists subsequently developed a doctrine that 
bifurcated ribā into two general forms, that were also sub-divided into two: ribā al-faḍl and 
ribā al-nasī’a. Ribā al-faḍl was defined by jurists as any excess in one of the counter values 
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being exchanged at the time of the exchange (e.g., two loads dates for one load of dates). 
Ribā al-nasī’a extends this to refer to the ribā implied or hidden in a deferred payment for the 
value of such an exchange at some point in the future, as in the hidden interest in the 
installments of a deferred sale on credit.283 The aforementioned ribā al-jāhilīya, is like the 
ribā al-nasī’a, except that it refers to an outright usurious loan and not necessarily one where 
interest is concealed in a trade or sale of goods.   
Among the four dominant madhhabs, this division between ribā al-faḍl and ribā al-
nasī’a was significant because it allowed each tradition’s jurists to develop quite variegated 
and multi-tiered views on what distinguished licit from illicit gain. Consequently, there is no 
single comprehensive view on what ribā entails and what it does not. In general, though, 
among the four major madhhabs, if ribā was found to be inherent to the transaction itself at 
the time of exchange (ribā al-faḍl), any future deferred gain would also have ribā in it. 284 
That is, any exchange which displays ribā al-faḍl automatically precludes ribā al-nasī’a. 
Conversely, if no ribā was deemed to be present at the time of an exchange, ribā could arise 
in future if payment was deferred. Using analogy (qiyās), some jurists (of the Mālikī and 
Ḥanbalī madhhabs in particular) extended the types of exchanges (and the underlying goods 
involved) as an outgrowth from the above ḥadīth. Rules governing ribā were extended “to all 
species (anwā‘) which are jointly governed by the same efficient cause (‘illa) or belong 
jointly to any one of the genera (jins) to which the six articles in the Tradition are 
subordinated.”285     
                                                     
283 Nabil A Saleh, Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law: Riba, Gharar, and Islamic Banking 
(Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 13. 
284 Saleh, Unlawful Gain, 19–25. 
285 Saleh, Unlawful Gain, 14. 
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This situation presented a challenge because, while rules on ribā between madhhabs 
differ widely, all madhhabs promote versions of sale contracts that support the deferment of 
the price of a traded good in one way or another, such as the  credit-sale (bay‘ bi’l-ta’khīr ) 
and future-sale (salam) contracts. Many such contract forms were refined to incorporate, or 
be used alongside, with various legal stratagems to allow for ribā in a circumvented form - of 
the ribā al-nasī’a variety. Further, sales contracts – as far as long-distance trade was 
concerned in the premodern period – were almost always used in conjunction with other 
agreements such as the agency (wakāla) and bill of exchange (suftaja). The latter were quasi-
credit instruments in and of themselves that were indispensable to trading. Al-Sarakhsī (d. 
483/1090), the famed Ḥanafī jurist, went as far as seeing the credit-sale as the fulcrum of 
trade, without which such trade could not exist.286 The formulation of such contracts by 
necessity had to therefore attend to the problem of ribā, mostly through ḥīyal.   
 One of the first Western scholars to study the development of ḥīyal was Joseph 
Schacht who described them simply as “the use of legal means for achieving extra-legal ends 
– ends that could not be achieved directly with the means provided by the sharī‘ah, whether 
or not such ends might in themselves be illegal.”287 Although Schacht’s theory on the origins 
and development of Islamic law has been widely critiqued and revised, his views on the 
development and use of ḥīyal continue to have currency, in particular the notion that ḥiyal 
bridged the [since proven to be erroneous] wide-gap  between legal theory and practice; 
                                                     
286 “We hold that selling for credit is part of the practice of merchants, and that it is the most conducive means 
for the achievement of the investor’s goal which is profit. And in most cases, profit can only be achieved by 
selling for credit and not for cash...”, al-Sarakhsī, Mabsut, 22:38. (Translated by Udovitch) Udovitch, 
Partnership and Profit, 79. 
287 Udovitch, Partnership and Profit, 11; Joseph Schacht, “The Schools of Law and Later Developments of 
Jurisprudence,” in Law in the Middle East, ed. Majid Khadduri and Herbert Liebesny, 1955, 78. 
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allowing for a “modus-vivendi” to operate.288 Moreover, Shacht’s own minimization of the 
ḥīyal’s importance for other madhhabs, aside from the Ḥanafīs, has led scholars to maintain 
the popular view that ḥīyal were really “an exclusively Ḥanafī  phenomenon”.289 This is in 
spite of the fact that Schacht edited early on one of the first Shāfi‘ī works on ḥīyal by 
Maḥmūd b. al-Ḥasan al-Qazwīnī (d. 440/1048).290 Indeed, the Shāfi‘īs were adopters of the 
Ḥanafī ḥīyal; the prolific Egyptian Shaf‘ī jurist of the sixteenth century, Muḥammad Abd al-
Ra’ūf al-Munāwī (952-1031/1545-1621) was also reported to have produced a work on ḥiyal 
in the sixteenth-century.291 The Shāfi‘īs were especially known for advocating ḥīyal to avert 
ribā using the ‘īna (double-sale) or mukhāṭara contract, in their makhārij (stratagem) works, 
the genre of writing concerned with ḥiyal.292 So wide was its use in the Levant that the term 
“contrats mohatra” were adopted by European traders in the seventeenth century to refer to 
such subterfuges that were used in the Eastern Mediterranean.293  
The ḥīyal though not only resonated with Shāfi‘ī  jurists, but also with Mālikī ones, 
who relied on similar but different instruments for circumventing the ribā prohibition.294 
                                                     
288 Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Clarendon Press, 1964), 80. 
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290 Abū Ḥātim Mahmūd ibn al-Ḥasan al-Qazwīnī and Joseph Schacht, Das kitāb al-ḥiyal fil-fiqh (Buch der 
Rechtskniffe), (Hannover: H. Lafaire, 1924); Other early Shāfi‘ī jurists who wrote ḥiyal works are Muḥammad 
b. Abdullah al-Ṣayrafī (d. 189) and Abū al-Ḥasan Muḥammad b. Yaḥya b. Surāqa al-‘Āmirī (d. 416). Saeed, 
Islamic Banking and Interest, 38. 
291 Ismail, “Legal Strategems,” 166. 
292 Çaǧatay, “Ribā and Interest,” 57 The ‘īna sale was where a borrower would would sell a commodity they 
owned for say 1,000 dirhams and then repurchase it from the  lender for 1,100,  with the increase being interest. 
This was usually done with deferred payment or in installments and was the most common form of ḥilā 
described in al-Khaṣṣāf’s book of legal strategems. Satoe Horii, “Reconsideration of Legal Devices (Ḥiyal) in 
Islamic Jurisprudence: The Ḥanafīs and Their ‘Exits’ (Makhārij),” Islamic Law and Society 9, no. 3 (2002): 
346. 
293 For the “contrats mohatra” see: Frank E Vogel and Samuel L Hayes, Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, 
Risk, and Return (Boston, Mass.: Kluwer Law International, 1998), 39; Çaǧatay, “Ribā and Interest,” 57. 
294 Even in the case of early law, the development of ḥīyal and the makhārij literature around it is not clear-cut. 
Satoe Horii argues that the Makhārij literature dominated by the Ḥanafīs sought to address a specific aspect of 
the law itself, not something outside it and in this sense early jurists working on makhārij - including Mālikī 
ones - were not addressing the “formalism” of the law. Horii is concerned with Mālikī views on hīyal, and 
differentiates between traditionalist views that rejected the hiyal and other Medinese jurists who had some of 
the same concerns as the Ḥanafīs. Horii, “Reconsideration of Legal Devices (Ḥiyal) in Islamic Jurisprudence” 
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While both Mālikīs and Ḥanbalīs rejected ḥiyal, in theory, Mālikīs recognized the common 
issues that the Ḥanafī ḥīyal sought to solve through their doctrine of sadd al-dharā’i‘ by 
emphasizing the intent underlying engaging in an illegal act, instead of its utility as the 
formalism of the Ḥanafī ḥīyal suggested.295 
As for the Ḥanbalīs, they shunned the Ḥanafī form of ḥīyal, and viewed it as skirting 
around the law; this placed them at odds with the other three schools on the issue of ribā. 
However, they too were not averse to a most practical view and attacked the ribā proscription 
from the bottom up. That is to say, that jurists such as the famed Ḥanbalī jurist Ibn Taymīya 
and his student Ibn al-Qayyim conceived of ribā as something that could be tolerated if it 
were shown to be necessary in order to serve the public good (al-maṣlaḥa al-rājiḥa). Ibn al-
Qayyim and Ibn Taymīya consequently held lenient views towards ribā in sales-contracts, 
and allowed for a type of credit-sale contract that was prohibited by the other madhhabs, the 
ḍa‘-wa-ta‘ajjal sale.296 This contract was one where a debtor could retire their loan for a 
reduction in the amount of outstanding interest owed. Jurists from the other schools decried 
this practice because it inherently associated time as an element of value, whereby less 
interest was associated with less time, an inherently usurious affiliation that other madhhabs 
viewed as simply the reverse of the ribā al-jāhilīya concept where the time value of money is 
realized in the compounding of interest when a loan is renewed.297  
A genre that illustrates the practical borrowings, and boundaries, between schools on 
ḥīyal, among other things, is that of the shurūṭ (notarial) manuals that were produced over the 
                                                     
Horii notes that “Schacht did not pay sufficient attention to the commitment of non-Ḥanafī jurists to ḥīyal. In 
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295 Horii, “Reconsideration of Legal Devices (Ḥīyal) in Islamic Jurisprudence,” 343–44. 
296 Ismail, “Legal Strategems,” 85–86 This contract allowed a debtor to reduce the amount of loan outstanding if 
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centuries to primarily aid notaries, but also court clerks and jurists, and the educated public, 
in the drafting of sundry legal documents, from oaths to contracts. There is ample evidence in 
these manuals that they were produced to serve the purposes of people using contracts 
drafted under the legal rules of different madhhabs. Shurūṭ manuals often, therefore, offered 
inter-madhhab compatibility in their practical use offering notaries and others, who may not 
have been necessarily schooled in the law of another madhhab, the basic information they 
needed to know to draft a contract that met the conditions of one or more madhhabs. 
Drawing on the shurūṭ manual of the ninth-century jurist Egyptian jurist al-Ṭaḥāwī (d. 
321/933), Kitāb al-shurūṭ al-ṣaghīr, Abraham Udovitch observed that al-Ṭaḥāwī, in the case 
of his ‘inān partnership, “formulated the partnership contract in such a manner as to be 
acceptable to Ḥanafīs, Shāfi‘īs, and Mālikīs alike … thus making it quite easy for any notary 
to change or exclude certain clauses in conformity with his client’s wishes.” Despite the fact 
that al-Ṭaḥāwī was himself a Ḥanafī, a number of restrictive conditions that were attached to 
his model contract only benefited adherents of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab.298 As Janette Wakin has 
shown, such customizability was a central feature of al-Ṭaḥāwī’s shurūṭ manual.299  
Centuries later, the shurūṭ manual of the extraordinarily prolific Egyptian Shāfi‘ī 
scholar al-Ṣuyūṭī (d. 911/1505), Jawāhir al-‘uqūd wa-mu‘īn al-quḍāt wa-l-muwaqqi‘īn wa-l-
shuhūd, reflects a similarly pragmatic and inter-madhhab outlook. Most sections of al-
Suyūṭī’s work begin by summarizing the differences that mark the disagreements between 
the madhhabs concerning the type of contract in question. In his review of sales contracts, al-
Suyūṭī reviews the different doctrinal views concerning – among others – issues such as 
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provisions for rescinding a contract, the death of a counterparty, or the restrictions on a 
variety of types of sales.300 Notably, al-Suyūṭī does not provide such a review for loans or 
credit dealings. His work, in common with most works of fiqh, treats the subject of debt in 
the context of a variety of contract-types (e.g. sales, divorce etc.) rather than an object of 
study in and of itself. As with the polemical works of al-Ghazzī and al-Haytamī reviewed 
earlier, the practical manual of al-Suyūṭī manual discusses the doctrines of ribā al-faḍl and 
ribā al-nasī’a in the section of the work pertaining to commercial contracts, particularly 
sales.301 Notably though, although, this work provides an instructive tutorial to the untrained 
notary on the divergent madhhab views concerning what constituted one of the two broad 
forms of ribā, it does not exactly spell out the ḥīyal to be used for ribā.  
Determining the extent to which shurūṭ manuals were useful, therefore, for generating 
desired legal outcomes applying ḥīyal for ribā is moot, if we take al-Suyūṭī’s manual as 
representative for his period.302 The fact that so few Mamluk court-produced documents have 
survived also makes the work of determining the fidelity of court documents to the manuals 
difficult, although D. Little has shown that the legal forms concerning depositions (iqrār), 
legal certification (thubūt), and sales (buyū‘) largely conform to those found in al-Suyūṭī’s 
manual of legal formularies, Jawāhir al-‘uqūd.303 Yet, for the Mamluk case of ḥiyal, we have 
exceedingly few documentary sources, and only a few descriptions of how such instruments 
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301 al-Suyūṭī, Jawāhir Al-ʻuqūd, 63–65. 
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were used in documentary sources. The diary of Ibn Ṭawq (d. 915/1509) presents numerous 
descriptions of ḥiyal he used for averting ribā. As El-Leithy observes, Ibn Ṭawq used a ḥīla 
to sell a Qur’ān recitation position from a waqf that he had occupied “5 times over,” making 
a substantial profit from the interest that would accrue from selling this position on credit.304 
Ibn Ṭawq does not make direct reference to ribā, but occasionally uses the euphemism fā’ida 
(lit. benefit) when referring to interest. The oblique reference to usury is indicative of the 
great social stigma linked to it in the open, at least for aspiring scholars like him.  
Other challenges present themselves when trying to square the material from shurūṭ 
manuals and the documentary sources, even in the Ottoman period. Court sijills usually 
presented precis of the contracts, oaths and other undertakings (except when legalized copies 
of deeds, ḥūjjas, were reproduced in the sijill). This meant that many of the contract 
formularies presented in al-Suyuṭī’s manual may have been represented in somewhat 
truncated form in the sijills. The efficient retrieval and referencing of information in the 
sijills by court clerks would have necessitated this. The ḥiyal-laden contracts, therefore, 
whether sale contracts or otherwise, would have been recorded and retained only by the 
contracting parties. What we have therefore in the sijills are the summaries of these 
documents. 
 Unlike the shurūṭ manuals that say little about the ḥīyal of ribā, the genre of manuals 
known as adab al-qāḍī (lit. the “conduct of qāḍīs”), had by the sixteenth century begun to 
address ḥīyal quite routinely. In contrast to the shurūṭ works, that were aimed at the general 
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public, the adab al-qāḍī works were aimed at a specific audience, qāḍīs or jurists, and ranged 
in content and purpose from advising on the ideal comportment and temperament that a qāḍī 
should have, to works that presented boiler-plate formats displaying how sijill acts should be 
composed for sundry matters – as they would actually appear in the sijills.  
A notable work in this regard is al-Bursawī’s earlier discussed Biḍā‘at al-qāḍī which 
contains a number of forms for ḥīyal related to ribā and these are called “mu‘āmalāt” (lit. 
“transactions”), a moniker that was popularized in the Levant during the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries to refer to customary legal stratagems for usurious loans. Although this 
label existed as early as the first half of the fourteenth century, as I demonstrate below, it 
only came into full adoption as a legal norm that was endorsed by both the state and the qāḍī 
courts, during the first half of the sixteenth century. One routinely finds references to 
“mu‘āmalāt” in fatwās and the ḳānūnnāmes by mid-century. While I think that this term 
probably borrowed from the uṣūl al-fiqh designation of fiqh al mu‘āmalāt, its use in the sijills 
from sixteenth and seventeenth century Bilād al-Shām referred exclusively to the legal 
stratagems for circumventing ribā through a double-sale. The most frequently used type of 
double-sale in mu‘āmalāt involved a scenario where, for example, Party A (a lender) would 
sell a silk-cloth at an inflated price to a Party B (borrower) and also provide the latter with a 
non-interest-bearing loan. Both loan and sale would be combined in one transaction, with the 
inflated price of the silk-cloth representing the interest. The non-interest loan issued would 
serve as the principal portion of the loan and was referred to using the legal term for “loan” 
in fiqh, “qarḍ,” while the sale-value of the silk-cloth was called a “debt”, “dayn.” The 
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underlying interest in such transactions was called ribḥ or fā’ida. This type of ḥīla was the 
most frequently recorded form of mu‘āmala in the records under study in this dissertation.305  
Historians and Islamicists have tended to view the underlying intent and meaning that 
Muslim jurists ascribed to the ḥīyal of mu‘āmalāt by focusing on the functional utility of 
these devices as subterfuges of interest, rather than on any social-legal imperatives or 
rationales that these jurists may have held in developing these instruments. Schacht viewed 
the development of mu‘āmalāt as nothing more than a “legal-fiction” used to avoid an 
undesired outcome, “whether or not such ends might in themselves be illegal.”306 In the case 
of N Çaǧatay, although he keenly observed that the Ottoman legal system had allowed 
mu‘āmalāt to be used as a framework for distinguishing between licit interest (anything 
above 15% interest rate was considered usurious), he referred to mu‘āmalāt themselves as 
“fraudulent interest” because of their use of “deception” as a means to achieve their ends.307 
A. Rafeq, on the other hand, took a somewhat dogmatic view on the practice of mu‘āmalāt as 
something alien to the sharī‘a itself; for Rafeq it was an ethnocentric intervention of Ottoman 
Law, one that had not set roots in Bilād al-Shām prior to the Ottoman conquest.308 Rafeq 
maintained that the qarḍ (an interest-free obligation) form was not polluted by interest before 
Ottoman innovations, “in an Arab-Islamic context, qarḍ always conformed to the sharī‘a and 
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maintained its good, pious, interest-free character.”309 Lastly, R.C. Jennings who worked 
extensively on lending in seventeenth-century Kayseri, observed that the subjects of Kayseri 
who engaged in loans in the sijills (all via mu‘āmalāt) “felt no need to conceal interest or 
resort to dubious ḥiyal or other “fraud.”310 Jennings’ mention of interest was due to explicit 
references to profit (ribḥ) in mu‘āmalāt that were recorded in the sijill.   
For those who do not hold that Islamic law was unresponsive to change and shrouded 
in legal-formalism, the above views do not fully explain why the Ottoman state and its legal 
establishment insisted on the use of mu‘āmalāt. If lawful interest-bearing loans were as 
popular as the court sijills indicate, why did mu‘āmalāt persist? Indeed, as countless sijill 
records attest, mu‘āmalāt were taken up wholeheartedly across many cities of Anatolia and 
the Levant (contrary to Rafeq’s assertion, as I show below).311 Certainly, the mu‘āmalāt 
provided a practical solution for the problem of providing loans at interest, but there was also 
political-legal dimension as well. On the one hand, leaving loans to be enacted unhindered by 
any state supervision would lead to extortion and exploitation of the ribā al-jāhilīya variety. 
In the late fifteenth century, beginning with Sultan Bayezīd II, ḳānūnnāmes established by 
fiat the maximum legal “ribḥ” rate that could legally be enacted in courts. These of course 
had to be enacted via mu‘āmalāt or other ḥīyal. The ribḥ-ceiling of Sultan Süleymān, in 
particular (an interest rate of 15%), as espoused by the writings and rulings of his 
Şeyhülislam Ebu’s-Su‘ud, remained as the benchmark for ribā until the introduction of 
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banking institutions into the Ottoman Empire in the mid-nineteenth century. Anything above 
this rate was deemed usurious, and anything below it was lawful as long as it was carried out 
in a legal-form acceptable to the sharia courts.  
For the state’s jurists, these ḥīyal seemed to provide an equitable legal solution to a 
common problem. Certainly, the mu‘āmalāt were a ruse to conceal interest; even the tone of 
juridical literature that discusses mu‘āmalāt infers this. However, if one were to view these 
instruments in terms of their legal merits for borrower and lender, then it quickly becomes 
apparent that these arrangements provided some legal protections and, arguably afforded 
debtors more equitable lending arrangements. The mu‘āmalāt did two things: for the lender, 
they guaranteed both his principal and his interest. By dividing the loans into two parts, 
lenders were able to legitimately register and claim both principal and interest as debt 
obligations with a specified loan term. For creditors who were interested in “rolling-over” 
their loans, they simply extended the period for repayment of the principal and entered into a 
new sale contract for another commodity, with a new loan term (usually of one year). For the 
borrower, the ribḥ (i.e., interest) of the mu‘āmala was fixed and unchangeable, preventing the 
problem of “doubling” of interest (compound interest) that was the source of the earlier 
mentioned Qur’ānic prohibition, making the mu‘āmala quite different from an open-ended 
loan. Once a loan term ended, a new loan had to be contracted, separate from the first. From 
the perspective of the jurists, this would allow for a balancing of risks and rewards between 
lender and borrower, limit the potential for loss of either party, and create a venue for 
supervision by the state’s courts. One of the most frequent critiques that jurists levied at 
interest outside of mu‘āmalāt was that provided a “guarantee of an absolute return” (ribā 
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maḥḍ maḍmūn), that is one that was not produced by a sale, an investment or by other 
productive means. As a result, it cannot have a legal basis. 
There is some evidence from fatwā works that supports the individual’s duty to obey 
the sultan’s injunction to both use mu‘āmalāt for usurious loans and not to exceed the 
abovementioned ribḥ-ceiling. Many times, loans were enacted outside of court and if such 
lending was not legalized in court through the appropriate mu‘āmalāt, they could be nullified. 
Two fatwās issued by Khayr ad-Dīn al-Ramlī (993-1081/1585-1670) and Ibn ‘Ābdīn (1198-
1252/1783-1836), the leading muftīs from Bilād al-Shām of their periods, evidence the 
extremely long-lasting mu‘āmala norms that Şeyhülislam Ebu’l-s-Su‘ud institutionalized for 
the next three centuries. In the following fatwā, an executor of an orphan’s estate gave out a 
loan to two non-Muslims, through a sale of some goods on credit (outside of court), and this 
transaction was not entered into using a mu‘āmala format. The debtors approach al-Ramlī to 
inquire about what their liability is, whether the payments they had made on this loan would 
be deemed as ribḥ or as ribā, if they were to register their loan:  
Q: An executor of orphans transacted a loan in the form of a sale on credit 
(bāshara ‘aqd murābaḥa) to two non-Muslims (dhimmīyyayn) and attested (a‘taraf) 
that he received the profit on the transaction. Subsequently, he denied having 
received anything. What is valid, his attestation of receipt or his later denial? Further, 
if the two debtors repaid their loan and profit without having entered into a mu‘āmala 
contract, is the resulting transaction considered usurious (ribāwīya), thereby, making 
them [the borrowers] only liable for the principal (aṣl al-māl) [and not the interest]?  
A: Yes, the executor’s first attestation, concerning his receipt, is binding and 
irrevocable. In principle, the obligations of counterparties in contracts of sale and 
purchase oblige the parties to exchange a good/service at the time of payment, 
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irrespective of whether the contract was undertaken before or after the executor took 
up his position. And, I agree with the view of the latter jurists (al-muta’akhirūn) that 
permits filing a case for the purpose of obtaining a deposition (jawāz da‘wa al-iqrār), 
as in the case of the oaths solicited by two dhimmīs who proved that the denial of the 
[executor] liar showed that he did in fact make the former attestation [of receipt]. As 
for the issue of profit-taking without a mū‘āmala contract, this is pure and absolute 
usury (fa-hūwa ribā maḥḍ muṭliqan). This is so irrespective of whether it relates to 
orphans’ assets or otherwise and all extant [legal] sources proscribe it. Woe to those 
who take it [ribā] and there is no lesson to be learned from those who go astray, for 
that which violates the state-Ḥanafism’s law books (al-nuṣūṣ) is always ruled against 
even if they [the executor] appeals to the sky for mercy!”312  
 
In another fatwā that stresses similar issues, this time by Ibn ‘Ābdīn a century and a 
half later, the importance not only of registering mu‘āmalāt is stressed, but also of abiding by 
the “sultan’s edict” is stressed, as it concerns the maximum interest rate that could be charged 
in a mu‘āmala, the ribḥ-ceiling:313 
 
Q: If Zayd took a debt from ‘Amr and additionally bought from ‘Amr a 
dagger for a specified price on the basis of a deferred payment with a specified 
installment period, and Zayd began paying to ‘Amr monthly installments for a full 
two years, completing the installment period, and thereby having repaid both the 
original debt as well as the value of the murābaḥa [for the dagger], without having 
entered into a mu‘āmala shar‘īya. At this juncture, ‘Amr dies, and the executor of his 
                                                     
312 al-Ramlī, al-Fatāwā al-khayrīyah, Vol. 1, 242-243. 
313 Ibn ‘Ābdīn, al-Fatāwā, Vol. 2, 258-259. 
137 
  
estate insists that Zayd has not fully settled his abovementioned obligation. If this 
debt was legalized according to the legal-standard (idha thabbat bi’l-wajh alshar‘ī), 
then will the past amounts paid by Zayd be recognized as settled?       
A: His (Zayd’s) loan principal will be recognized as settled, according to the 
Jawāhir al-fatāwā and Ṣurrat al-fatāwā. Ibn Nujaym opined that any profit (ribḥ) 
that has been concluded without a ḥīla shar‘īya is considered ribā because it is based 
on a guarantee of an absolute return (ribā maḥḍ maḍmūn) for what has been 
exchanged, and the sharī‘a absolutely does not support this, this (ribā) would be 
considered as part of the principal … the fatwās of Qāḍīkhān have numerous ḥīyal 
concerning sale contracts and you should consult these … I say, at the end of [Ibn 
‘Ābdīn’s] al-Durr al-mukhtār, towards the end of my section on loans, “in the fatwās 
(ma‘rūḍāt) of the Muftī Ebu’s-Su‘ud, if Zayd gave a loan out of ten-for-twelve (20% 
interest), or ten-for-thirteen (30% interest) in the form of a mu‘āmala in our days 
after the existence of the sultanic edict (al-amr al-sulṭānī) and the fatwā of the 
Şeyhülislam that bans anyone from issuing a debt of ten for more than fifteen (15% 
interest) and if the lender persists in his wrongdoing he is given a discretionary 
punishment (ta‘zīr), and if he persists, he is imprisoned until he recants … know that 
the above creditor’s action is punishable because of a violation of the sultan’s order 
and not a corrupt use of the sale (al-mubāya‘a). This would be the case if a creditor 
lent 100 dirhams to a debtor and sold something for 20 dirhams to him in a legal-
contract (‘aqd shar‘ī), even if the commodity was only worth 1 dirham.  
  
The above fatwās, but especially Ibn ‘Ābdīn’s, illustrate the importance that jurists 
attached to the “sultan’s order” in later centuries. Most notably, that the crime of exceeding 
the ribḥ-ceiling, was couched in terms of disobeying the sultan, and not in commercial 
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reasons related to not fulfilling the mu‘āmala contract. It is important here, to stress that 
engaging in ribā, in its own right, was therefore as only viewed as a punishable offense if it 
exceeded the rate set by the ḳānūnnāme, independent of whether a mu‘āmala was involved or 
not. In section 1.4 of this chapter, I address the extent to which discretionary punishments by 
qāḍīs (ta‘zīr) were used to punish creditors for such abuses, as well as assessing the use of 
temporary imprisonment as a means of punishment and extraction of debts from defaulting 
debtors, as apparent in the sijills. For now, though I would like to turn my attention to the 
origins of the use of the mu‘āmala in the Mamluk period. 
    
 
2.3 Origins of Mu‘āmalāt in the Mamluk fourteenth century 
It is notable that two of the most circulated works in the adab al-qāḍī genre from the 
late-Mamluk period, lisān al-ḥukkām fī ma‘rifat al-aḥkām by the Aleppan qāḍī Aḥmad Ibn 
al-Shiḥna (d. 882/1477), and Mūjabāt al-aḥkām wa-wāqi‘āt al-ayyām of the Cairene jurist 
Qāsim Ibn Quṭlūbughā (d. 879/1474) did not dwell on mu‘āmalāt, in stark contrast to al-
Bursawī’s previously noted Biḍā‘at al-qāḍī from the mid-sixteenth century which has 
numerous references to sijill formularies for mu‘āmalāt. Although both jurists were Ḥanafīs, 
their works also contain few references to ḥīyal, even though ḥīyal were associated with the 
Ḥanafī madhhab. Where ḥīyal do appear in these works, they appear as minor topics, and 
often not concerned with ribā at all. The scant attention to ḥīyal can be explained, I suggest, 
in the purpose and orientation of these works by Ibn al-Shiḥna’s and Ibn Quṭlūbughā’s 
works. They were aimed at solving problems of legal procedure and the enforcement of 
rulings rather than as serving as reference manuals for boilerplate templates of contracts, and, 
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their readership was senior jurists and not necessarily qāḍīs. However, these lacunae – and 
the absence of documentary evidence pointing to Mamluk era mu‘āmalāt, should not lead 
one to think that they were a development of “Ottoman Law”, as Rafeq suggested. As I 
illustrate below, the fatwās of the major Egyptian jurist Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī (d. 756/1355), 
cast substantial light onto the world of such dealings in the heyday of the Mamluk-era, 
providing explicit descriptions of the mu‘āmala at work, as stratagems, during his tenure as 
the chief-justice of the Shāfi‘ī courts at different intervals in both Cairo and Damascus. In 
what follows, I argue that while the mu‘āmala became a fully normative practice in the legal 
literature and court practice of the Ottomans sixteenth century, its prevalence in Bilād al-
Shām (at least in the sector of managing orphan-estates) can be traced back to the first half of 
fourteenth century Damascus and, likely to a lesser extent, Cairo. If anything, the mu‘āmala 
as a customary-legal practice spread and became established in the Ottoman realm after its 
popularization in Mamluk lands.  
In his fatwā compendium, al-Subkī gives insight into his own experience as the 
director of the Orphan’s Bureau (Diwān al-aytām), and narrates this bureau’s common 
practice of commissioning agents to engage in mu‘āmalāt on behalf of orphan estates 
managed by the state. Al-Subkī’s passage on mu‘āmalāt was drafted in response to the many 
queries posed to him on the matter of whether such “mu‘āmalāt,” an instrument that was 
apparently contentious in his day, should be a legitimate means for managing the investment 
of orphans’ capital. He notes that he was the first person to issue a detailed fatwā on this 
topic. Al-Subkī begins his discussion by elaborating the nature of managing the capital of 
orphan estates, the ups and downs of markets, and the great uncertainty involved in investing 
the capital of orphans in commodities or trade because the value of goods can go up, as well 
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as down.314 Al-Subkī takes that view that the investment of an orphan’s estate in trade should 
only be undertaken when markets are prosperous, and when the executor’s ability, and 
dedication to the investment at hand allows him to do so.315 “If it is undertaken in this 
manner, I support the investment of orphan’s capital”, he said. Al-Subkī introduces the topic 
of lending out orphan capital via mu‘āmalāt as a contrast to the ideal picture of trade; “as for 
the mu‘āmala which is relied upon these days, which I have reproduced (wa-ṣawwartuhā), as 
follows: 
A man approaches the dīwān al-aytām and requests from them, for instance, 
1,000 (dirhams). He agrees with them on an interest (fā’ida) of 200, more or less, and 
then reappears with a commodity (sil‘a) worth one thousand dirhams. He sells this to the 
orphan and receives one thousand from them [the dīwān al-aytām on behalf of the 
orphan], and he takes possession of the commodity. Then, he repurchases this 
commodity from them [the dīwān al-aytām] for 1,200 with a deferred payment, and 
deposits some collateral as a guarantee. This results in the desired result of obtaining 
(for the orphan) 1,200 dirhams deferred. This mu‘āmala is used to avert ribā (yaj‘alūn 
tawassuṭ hādhihi al-mu‘āmala ḥadhran min al-ribā).”316  
Elaborating on the above practice, al-Subkī states that it is considered unlawful 
among the Mālikīs, Ḥanbalīs, and even by some Shāfi‘ī jurists, although the Shāfi‘ī madhhab 
permits it. That said, al-Subkī notes that, although permitted, it is a strongly-discouraged 
practice (wa hiya ‘indana ma‘a ṣiḥḥatuhā makrūha karāhat tanzīh).317 According to al-Subkī, 
the Shāfi‘ī’s who call for it to be banned do so on the basis that the capital of orphans should 
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not be engaged in bay‘ al-‘īna (double-sale) or bay‘ al-nasī’a (deferred sales having potential 
of ribā al-nasī’a), and yet, the reason mu‘āmalāt have been adopted by the Orphan’s Bureau 
is that they affords orphans a secure and known return (al-ribḥ fīhā ma‘lūman).318 While al-
Subkī himself accepts the permissibility of this practice on legal grounds, he presents a host 
of issues that complicate its use: 
“It should be noted that these (mu‘āmalāt) face several perils. Most debtors do not 
settle their debts when they become due, delaying, promising, going bankrupt, and 
the guarantees of some debtors are even proven to not be theirs … and there is 
another danger and it is that if a Mālikī or Ḥanbalī qāḍī issues a ruling that 
invalidates a mu‘āmala. In such event, the interest (fā’ida) due to the orphan is lost, 
and even their principal is at risk, and this is what a number of our (Shāfi‘ī) 
colleagues have also noted.”319   
These transactions were farmed out by the state to market lenders, who would agree 
to lend out these sums and share a portion of the interest they collected. Per al-Subkī’s 
admission, obtaining a favorable return for children from such loans was challenging, given 
that the dīwān al-aytām shared in 25% of the profits arising from this lending, and he 
expressed disapproval of this practice.  
“Notwithstanding the legality of the mu‘āmala contracts, I have witnessed very few 
debtors who judiciously repay their loans. Rather, in most cases, the onus is on the 
creditor to hire intermediaries to chase down debtors and he relies on the goodwill of 
debtors to repay their loans. This is coupled with the fact that the Orphan’s Bureau is 
also affected because it is due one-quarter of the interest (fā’ida), while the creditor 
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(the Orphan’s Bureau) earns a profit without taking any risk (ghanm bilā ghurm), the 
poor orphan truly realizes risk (ghurm muḥaqqaq) because his money has left him 
without recompense and in the future, he does not know if his capital will be returned 
with its profit, making him richer, or whether some or all of would be lost, leaving 
him indebted. This is the truth of the matter. Man should not commit such wrongs, 
and God almighty is in every person’s heart, and he knows about him what others do 
not know and what he does not know about himself. The debtor who has caution 
should consult his heart, because it is the orphan’s interest and it is best. (that the 
lender should advance)320 
In concluding his fatwā, al-Subkī decided to leave the decision of whether or not to 
use a mu‘āmala to the discretion of the orphan’s executor. As he explains, this is all 
contingent on the status and needs of the orphan (rich/poor, healthy/sick etc.) as well as the 
conditions of the market. It would not be prudent, he advances, to extend such lending during 
periods of market downturn or political strife. This is his conclusion of the dilemma he 
presented at the outset, namely, what is more just, increasing an orphan’s estate by lending it 
out, or allowing its capital to remain uninvested (in loans), and risk depletion from the dues 
related to zakāt (the alms tax)? The usurious and proscribed option would increase an 
orphan’s estate, and future resources for the orphan’s welfare, while its avoidance might 
harm them.321 Al-Subkī’s view of mu‘āmalāt, was thus grounded in pragmatism and not on 
legal or even on strictly ethical grounds. While his dour opinion does not denounce 
mu‘āmalāt as a legal ruse per se, he provides the exact formulary that he personally 
administered in Mamluk courts for such loans (“wa ṣawwartuhā” as shown above). The fact 
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that mu‘āmala dealings relied on a commodity exchange of some kind, to disguise ribā, in the 
form of the ‘īna contract mentioned by al-Subkī earlier, not only exposed orphan estates to 
risks of debtor defaults, but also to a manipulation in the value of assets placed as collateral 
for such loans. As al-Subkī’s account suggests, even if collateral was deposited, these may 
have been nominal or trivial in value and well below what was needed to truly secure these 
loans.  
It should be noted that al-Subkī’s use of the term “mu‘āmala” varied in application in 
a few parts of his fatwā, making it evident that the term did not automatically connote a ḥīla 
for ribā transaction in his day, but rather referred to any number of possible “transactions,” in 
line with the original definition of the word. Some additional evidence of this appears in 
another part of al-Subkī’s fatwās; in a discussion regarding the way a husband should 
document a debt immediately before declaring an irrevocable divorce, al-Subkī provides a 
formulary entitled “Question concerning when a husband says to his wife, “this divorce is 
irrevocable and there is only a mu‘āmala between us.” Here, al-Subkī elaborates that “if he 
(the husband) intends to maintain a specific mu‘āmala, such as a debt undertaking 
(mudāyana) or another kind, it is permissible for him to do so in the event (he anticipates) an 
irrevocable divorce, and can take an oath to such a mu‘āmala, which would not impair the 
marriage at the time.”322 His alternative use of the term mu‘āmala here clearly indicates it had 
a more varied use in his day and did not refer to debt contracts exclusively.  
Although produced three centuries later, the exegetical work, Irshād al-‘aql al-salīm 
ilā mazāya al-kitāb al-karīm, of Şeyhülislam Ebu’s-Su‘ud imparts a similar ethos. In his 
exegesis of the Qur’ānic verse “give orphans their property, do not replace (their) good 
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things with bad, and do not consume their property with your own – a grave sin”(Q 4:2). The 
only part of the mu‘āmala transaction that Ebu’s-Su‘ud implies is problematic is the one that 
deals with the exchange of value. Interpreting the part of this verse that instructs executors to 
“not replace (their) good things with bad” (lā tatabādalū al-khabīth bil-ṭayyib), Ebu’s-Su‘ud 
stresses: “the form of mu‘āmala that calls for the taking of good money from an orphan and 
replacing it with bad money of their own (of their guardian), has been proscribed by al-Zuhrī, 
al-Saddī, and al-Nakha‘ī as reprehensible, not in general terms but specifically with respect 
to the exchange of bad for good … noting that guardians should be working for the interests 
of orphans, not for themselves.”323 If the problem of exchange was the key crux of the matter 
for Ebu’s-Su‘ud, then he may have agreed with al-Subkī’s admonishment of the bay‘ al-‘īna 
contract that was in use during al-Subkī’s time. However, by Ebu’s-Su‘ud’s time, the widely 
accepted mu‘āmala form had taken on a different two-part sale and debt structure that has 
been reviewed earlier above, and this ḥīla raised far less doubt than the bay‘ al-‘īna (even 
though the abuse of ribā was no different).  
Al-Bursawī’s abovementioned manual gives us several samples of the formularies to 
be used for this latter type of mu‘āmala, a type that appears frequently in sixteenth-century 
Ottoman sijills from Bilād al-Shām, but also observed by social-economic historians who 
have worked on Bursa, Kayseri and other cities whose work has touched on this topic. Al-
Bursawī’s version of the mu‘āmala related to the loan from an orphan’s estate is substantially 
different from that described by al-Subkī.324 In al-Bursawī’s version, the mu‘āmala is 
bifurcated into two loans that are viewed as one transaction, rather than as a sale and resale of 
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a given commodity. A non-interest loan, a qarḍ shar‘ī, is issued to a debtor and 
simultaneously, the creditor (the executor on behalf of the orphan) sells to the debtor a 
(fictitious) commodity on credit, and these often took the form of sales of broadcloth (jūkh) 
or soap. The interest rate is implied and represented by the value of the commodity. Unless 
otherwise stated, the loan durations for repayment of the loan principal was generally for one 
year and the interest-cum-profit (ribḥ) of the loan was implicit in the declared price of the 
commodity. Frequently, mu‘āmalāt were accompanied by sureties (ḍamān) provided by one 
or more guarantors (sing. kafīl) as al-Bursawī’s below formulary suggests:  
“Fulān (so and so), has attested that he owes the minor fulān, the son of fulān, 
the deceased, a mu‘āmala arranged by his executor (waṣī), fulān, in the 
amount of 1,100 silver dirhams on such and such date. Of this amount, 1,000 
dirhams is a qarḍ shar‘ī and the rest of this is a deferred payment for the value 
of the cloth that was purchased; both these amounts are due within one whole 
year from the date of this deed…and the entire amount was guaranteed by 
fulān of such and such place ...” 
Al-Bursawī’s Biḍā‘at al-qāḍī provides qāḍīs with a number of the mu‘āmalāt forms 
for different applications (although these are all of the above noted double-sale variety); 
these ranged from the “issuance of a mu‘āmala” for a nondescript loan, and the above 
transcribed “mu‘āmala issued by an executor on behalf of his/her legatee”325, to the 
“mu‘āmala to be used by the administrator (mutawallī) of a cash-waqf when issuing 
loans”.326 Other forms presented in Al-Bursawī’s work include those such as the “the 
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settlement of mu‘āmala accounts between two traders”327, and the “form to be used by a 
creditor for absolving (ibrā’) their debtor of any liability after the latter settle’s the full 
balance of their mu‘āmala”328. These mu‘āmala types compliment a host of other formularies 
for debts undertaken for sundry purposes, and a lengthy section of Al-Bursawī’s manual is 
dedicated to formularies of marriage debts and guarantees.329 So popular was the use of the 
mu‘āmala as a lawful stratagem in the sixteenth century, that the founding deeds of a number 
of cash-waqfs of the sixteenth-century discussed below insisted that all transactions had to be 
carried out adopting “al-mū‘āmala al-shar‘īya.” The implication here was that any interest-
based lending that did not use these ḥīyal in the courts was deemed usurious and violated the 
charters of these waqfs.  
Of note from these loans records is the frequent absence of a recorded ribḥ whether 
absolute or in terms of a rate. However, as noted the interest amount is often deduced from 
the commodity’s sale price. That said, the frequent absence of the label “ribḥ” attests to the 
fact that most of the time, the interest involved was well above the mandated ribḥ ceiling. I 
contend that declaring the ribḥ in these transactions would have unnecessarily implicated 
most creditors, those lending at say 20% or above, in exceeding the lawful rate and could 
face losing much of this profit if qāḍīs were to take action against them. Qāḍīs were of course 
fully aware of the actual interest charged in their court sijills, yet the lack of mention of ribḥ 
would have allowed creditors to evade the law, from a formal point of view. Qāḍīs would 
only pursue such cases in the event of a debtor who complained to the court of unjust ribḥ, 
usually with substantial documentation of amounts paid and witnesses.  
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2.4 Debtor imprisonment and the policing of lending  
Imprisonment in the medieval and early modern Middle East was the means to 
achieving a certain outcome, extracting a confession, hidden money, or information, and 
typically not an ends unto itself.330 While imprisonment and torture were advocated by jurists 
such as Ibn Quṭlūbughā and other, there did not seem to be a systematic political-
administrative view on this issue, as it concerned debtors, in either Mamluk or Ottoman 
periods. Very often, for debtors, the qāḍī’s purpose of using imprisonment was twofold: to 
pressure debtors as much as possible to pay or arrive at a settlement for their debts, and, if 
that failed, to genuinely prove bankruptcy, which in most cases would pardon the accused. 
From a moral-ethical standpoint, the vice of benefiting from ribā in the sixteenth century did 
not carry much weight and appeared very low in lists of vices in polemical works produced 
by Badr al-Dīn al-Ghazzī and al-Haytamī.  
When faced with imprisonment, debtors often used the legal stratagem of declaring 
bankruptcy; when proved bankrupt, all madhhabs except the Ḥanafīs, absolved debtors of 
wrongdoing. The objective of imprisonment, however, was often deployed by qāḍīs as a 
temporary detention during which information was extracted concerning hidden money, and 
it was also a period during which bankruptcy would be determined – if the debtor’s 
bankruptcy was in doubt. Some jurists, such as Ibn Qutlūbughā occasionally advocated 
torture, as a tool to extract hidden money, yet as a legal method, this was generally 
proscribed. A complicating factor in assessing the normative legal practice in both late 
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Mamluk and the Ottoman sixteenth century is that both these periods faced severe political 
crises where torture and imprisonment were used to mulct persons of high-status, who were 
implicated in political crimes.   
The prisons of Cairo in the fifteenth century were notorious for their terrible 
conditions. Per the account of al-Maqrīzī, we are told that chained prisoners were routinely 
paraded through the city begging for food and corvée labor was commonly used.331 The 
severity of prison conditions was something that earlier Ḥanafī thinkers debated at length 
when considering the punishments for debtors, and these could differ widely; for instance, al-
Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 981) advocated the view of al-Khaṣṣāf who held that prisoners should be able to 
fulfill their personal rights in prison, such as carrying out their prayers, having ease of access 
to their own food and drink, and even (by analogy) advocating a prisoner’s legal right to 
sexual intercourse. On the other hand, al-Sarakhsī (d. 1096) advocated a hardline for debtor 
prisoners; he held that such prisoners should always be confined indoors and prevented from 
attending gatherings and funerals, and even be imprisoned without a bed or other amenities 
in order to apply the most pressure possible to force them into repaying their debts as soon as 
possible.332  
 From a utilitarian point of view, al-Maqrīzī viewed debtor imprisonment as an 
irrational choice taken by rulers, considering that this “contributed to the fiscal decline of the 
state … At a time of labor shortages brought on by plague mortality, the removal of debtors 
                                                     
331 Carl Petry, “Al-Maqrizi’s Discussion of Imprisonment and Description of Jails in the Khitat,” Mamluk 
Studies Review, no. I (2003): 139; The practice of parading debtors draws on a long history. In early Islam, the 
punishment that debtors should face was quite debated. A decision against a debtor issued by the jurist Ibn Abī 
Layla (d. 765) reportedly ordered “a solvent debtor who was evading payment to be publicly paraded.” Irene 
Schneider, “Imprisonment in Pre-Classical and Classical Islamic Law,” Islamic Law and Society 2, no. 2 
(1995): 159, footnote 9. 
332 Schneider, “Imprisonment,” 168. 
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from the work force amounted to gross incompetence on the part of the ruling authorities. 
Not only would debtors be unable to reimburse their claimants, but the economy would 
suffer the loss of potential laborers, many of them skilled.”333 Of course, the irony that the 
corvée system served to bridge the state’s labor shortages did not go unnoticed by al-Maqrīzī. 
A similar view was echoed by Ibn Ḥazm (d. 1064) who held that imprisonment for debts 
should be done away with because it was an injustice (ẓulm) to the creditor, as it deprived 
him of the chance to otherwise retrieve his money quickly without having to wait for the 
debtor’s release.334 These criticisms evidence the power held by qāḍīs to either ease or 
complicate the matter of debt adjudication and settlement for both debtors and creditors, 
especially given the fact that the punishment for defaulting on debts merited discretionary 
punishment (ta‘zīr).335 
That said, the default fiqh punishment for debtors was temporary imprisonment, a 
form of administrative detention that could last from a few days to several months (Ḥanafī 
doctrine advocated 4-6 months detention) where the purpose was to pressure the debtor to 
settle his dues with his creditor, or failing to do so, to prove the debtor’s insolvency, which 
would establish his bankruptcy and be followed by his release.336 Such imprisonment of 
debtors never served a long-term punitive purpose.337 According to most fiqh works, the 
debtor should be set free “if it becomes clear that he is impecunious.”338 Significantly, early 
fiqh works in the four Sunnī madhhabs barred creditors from using a debtor’s labor to repay 
his loans (Roman law called for the enslavement of debtors), but rather, to demand the 
                                                     
333 Petry, “Al-Maqrizi’s Discussion of Imprisonment and Description of Jails in the Khitat,” 139. 
334 Schneider, “Imprisonment,” 171. 
335 Ibid. 
336 Schneider, “Imprisonment,” 158; Farhat J. Ziadeh, “Mulāzama or Harassment of Recalcitrant Debtors in 
Islamic Law,” Islamic Law and Society 7, no. 3 (2000): 289–90. 
337 Schneider, “Imprisonment,” 169. 
338 Schneider, “Imprisonment,” 159. 
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confiscation of his property – to the extent required – in order to settle his debts. This 
informed the later practice of qāḍīs.339  
The four Sunnī madhhabs all legally-sanctioned creditors to harass or stalk their 
debtors independently of court litigation, in a practice known as mulāzama (“close 
attachment to” or “clinging to”), and this had to be specifically allowed for by a qāḍī.340 
However, the purpose of mulāzama was usually to prevent a debtor from absconding before a 
creditor was able to collect witness testimony for trial, and carried out before a qāḍī’s ruling. 
Except for the Ḥanafīs, the mulāzama of debtors was viewed as unnecessary and 
impermissible if the debtor was proven to be insolvent, following a period of imprisonment, 
with the Shāfi‘īs in particular relying on the Qur’ānic injunction of “and if the debtor is in 
straitened circumstances, then [let there be] postponement to [the time of] ease” (Q 2:280) to 
free insolvent debtors from pursuit, until such time that they can begin to settle their debts.341 
Abū Ḥanīfa allowed the mulāzama of debtors even after the bankruptcy of debtors had been 
established in prison, while the other madhhabs did not allow for this. Ḥanafīs in the tenth 
through twelfth centuries appear to have largely adopted Abū Ḥanīfa’s view, such that this 
became their dominant position.342 However, as F. Ziadeh has questioned the prevalence of 
this practice by latter Ḥanafīs, since al-Shawkānī (d. 1250/1834) claimed that “the majority 
of jurists (al-jumhūr) say that mulāzama is inoperative (ghayr ma‘mūl bihā), so that, if the 
plaintiff claims that his witnesses are absent, the qāḍī is to give him the choice of either 
                                                     
339 Schneider, “Imprisonment,” 160. 
340 Ziadeh, “Mulāzama,” 289–90. 
341 Ziadeh, “Mulāzama,” 292. 
342 Ziadeh, “Mulāzama,” 294–95. 
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requiring the defendant to swear an oath denying the debt, or waiting until the witnesses 
appear.”343   
A late fifteenth-century fatwā from Ibn Qutlūbughā’s rasā’il suggests that debtors in 
Cairo tried to preempt the claims of creditors by unilaterally requesting certificates of 
insolvency, for lack of a better phrase, produced by qāḍīs in self-depositions presented by the 
debtors and their witnesses. These seem to have been the focus of non-Ḥanafī jurists, since, 
as Ibn Qutlūbughā points out, his madhhab strictly prohibits this activity on procedural 
grounds. Ibn Qutlūbughā criticized this practice of issuing insolvency certificates, without 
just cause, as harmful in both obstructing a creditors’ access to due-process and as a violation 
of basic principles of adjudication that required that such proofs only be issued in the course 
of evidence resulting from a court dispute. Insolvency for Ibn Qutlūbughā had to be proven 
through a process that necessitated the imprisonment of the debtor. According to him, “the 
filing of a debtor’s claim (to announce his insolvency) to a qāḍī … does not have a basis in 
the sharī‘a for our (Ḥanafī) scholars, due to their (Ḥanafī) agreement that creditors have a 
right to pursue debt claims at any court of their choice. Producing the (above) deposition, and 
related witness testimony in court, has no basis for us (the Ḥanafīs) because evidence can 
only be heard in (cases) that involve principals, agents, or arbitrators unless a written 
requested is issued by a qāḍī. In truth, evidence of insolvency (should) not be heard before 
imprisonment (lā tasma‘ al-bayyna illā fī wajh man yakūna aṣlan aw wakīlan aw ḥakaman 
illā fī kitāb al-qāḍī wa lā tasma‘ al-bayyna bi-l’i‘sār qabl al-ḥabs fī al-ṣaḥīḥ).344   
                                                     
343 Ziadeh, “Mulāzama,” 294. 
344 al-Qāsim ibn ʻAbd Allāh Ibn Quṭlūbughā, Majmūʻat Rasāʼil Al-ʻallāmah Qāsim Ibn Quṭlūbughā, ed. ʻAbd 
al-ʻAlīm Muḥammad Darwīsh (Beirut: Dār al-Nawādir, 2013), 700–701. 
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In the case of Al-Busrawī’s manual, there are several examples of formularies 
connected to different parts of the judicial process for indebtedness, perhaps the most popular 
would have been the formulary for authenticating (ithbāt) a debtor’s loan to a creditor in 
court.345  Such oaths served as a legal-statement of record that could be referred to by courts 
in the future in the event a debtor failed to meet his obligations. Although loans could in 
theory take the form of a contract, shurūṭ works often neglect to provide a format for a 
standard debt contract – and this is also reflected in court practice. I have not come across a 
debt undertaking in the form of a contract yet. All the debts records I have studied were 
registered either through attestations (iqrār) or claims (da‘wa) for a debt, or through a debt 
that was produced as an outcome of a contract for a commodity sale, partnership, inheritance, 
or other claim. The reasons for this are unclear. Jennings observed that mu‘āmala 
registrations in Anatolian courts were done in the form of depositions and that is consistent 
with what I have found in the court records in Bilād al-Shām.346 For an earlier period, Goitein 
suggested that the limited information provided in debt depositions, may have been intended 
to conceal interest.347 I contend that a likely reason for the lack of debt contracts was due to 
the fact that debt was already attached to contracts of specific uses, such as credit-sales (bay‘ 
bi-ta’jīl), forward-sales (salam), or usufruct and buy-back (bay‘ al-wafā’) contracts. This 
attachment could, using Goitein’s view, be explained as imbedded in the need to conceal 
interest, or it could simply be due to fact that the qarḍ ḥasan,(interest free loan) in fiqh could 
not by definition have any conditions attached to it - precluding the possibility of it turning 
into a fully-fledged contract model in fiqh. 
                                                     
345 al-Bursawī, Biḍā‘at Al-Qāḍī, f. 60b. 
346 Jennings, “Women in Early 17th Century Ottoman Judicial Records,” 172. 
347 Goitein, A Mediterranean Society, 1988, Vol. 1, 11. 
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There are also numerous other formularies in al-Bursawī’s manual that relate to debts 
across different stages of the legal process of debt adjudication, which could include 
arbitration and settlement acts that were registered in courts. There is for instance, the pledge 
that is recorded by a guarantor for an existing debtor’s debt, and this ostensibly would have 
been used when a debtor was already imprisoned.348 In another formulary, a guarantor 
registers his pledge for a debtor in a court deposition (maḥḍar), for a debt that the debtor 
denied having taken, but that he was nevertheless shown liable for (usually as a result of 
witness testimony against the debtor, and in absence of contradicting written evidence).349 
There is also the formulary that a creditor would use for registering a lawsuit against a debtor 
in another town or city because of the latter’s relocation there, something that was not 
uncommon in the high demographic mobility associated with the sixteenth century.350  
 Al-Bursawī’s manual also provides the formulary for “what is written for a legal-
ruling on (a debtor’s) bankruptcy.”351 This specimen was the typical form for judicial rulings 
issued on insolvency in the Ottoman sixteenth and century sharia courts, and it also appears 
in other Ottoman manuals of qāḍīs.352 The formulary on bankruptcy follows: 
 
“(1) Fulān b. fulān and fulān b. fulān and fulān b. fulān witnessed the court 
deposition of the court-case filed and registered by fulān b. fulān (2) that was 
                                                     
348 al-Bursawī, Biḍā‘at Al-Qāḍī, f. 56b. 
349 al-Bursawī, Biḍā‘at Al-Qāḍī, f. 60a. 
350 al-Bursawī, Biḍā‘at Al-Qāḍī, f. 63a. 
351 al-Bursawī, Biḍā‘at Al-Qāḍī, f. 70a. 
352 Colin Imber studied and published four specimans of legal documents from an anonymous seventeenth 
century manual for judges, similar it seems to al-Bursawī’s, that was compiled sometime after 1625 and likely 
belonged to a judge from the sanjak of Menteşe, or Muğla and filed under Turkish MS no. 145 at the John 
Rylands library, Manchester. Imber edited a formulary from this work, document #3 in his article, for a “deed of 
bankruptcy” (ḥujjat iflās) which appears in Arabic and is mostly the same as al-Bursawī’s in terms of structure, 
but with a few minor variances in wording. Imber, “Four Documents from John Rylands Turkish MS. No. 145,” 
180–81. 
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issued concerning the holder of this deed, fulān b. fulān, the imprisoned 
debtor who owes a debt to the honorable fulān since a period of such-and-
such, that the abovementioned person (3) is bankrupt, destitute, and incapable 
of settling the debt he owes. He owns nothing aside from what he wears and 
garments (wa-lā-shay lahu sawā mā yalbisahu wa yaksīh) and is in a state of 
(4) impoverishment. He is worthy of attaining leniency until he regains some 
prosperity (ḥarīya li-l’imhāl ila ḥālat al-yasār). This has been legally 
witnessed and accepted in accordance with the conditions for acceptance (of 
bankruptcy) (5) A ruling has been therefore issued (declaring) his bankruptcy 
(fa-ḥukim bi’iflāsihi) and he has been discharged from prison and left (to go) 
on his own way (aṭlaq min al-ḥabs wa khallā sabīlahu).353 This legally valid 
ruling was enacted and recorded on such and such date.”  
   
The procedure for determining bankruptcy, as evidenced in the sijills, required 
several steps, at the creditor’s instigation:  
Step 1: Iqrār. Creditors typically registered their loans in court by requiring their 
debtors to attest to their loan in court, an iqrār. Once repaid, former debtors would require 
their creditors to evidence another iqrār clearing them of any liability (ibrā’ dhimma, step 6 
                                                     
353 In the section on adab al-qāḍī from his Mukhtaṣar, the Ḥanafī jurist al-Qudūrī uses this phrase khallā sabīlihi 
to indicate that the penniless debtor should be left to go in his way unmolested by his creditors after being 
released from prison. “If the debtor says “I am impoverished” and his creditor cannot prove that he has money, 
following a two or three month period of imprisonment, then the case of the debtor is revisted and if it is 
apparent that he has no money, then he left to go his way and his creditor is not allowed to impede it (khallā 
sabīlihi wa lā-yahūl baynahu wa bayn ghuramā’ihi). Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Qudūrī, Mukhtaṣar Al-Qudūrī 
(Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-‘Ilmye, 1997), 226. 
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below). Less common was the registration of debts through a “legal authentication” (thubūt) 
of the debt.  
Step 2: Da‘wā. In the event of a debtor’s default, the first step undertaken by creditors 
was to file a da‘wā, a claim against the debtor. These could be registered without the 
presence of the debtor, but most often both parties would be present and be given the 
opportunity to submit evidence. Copies of iqrārs and witnesses’ testimony could be given by 
the creditor, and the debtor would be asked to acknowledge the claim made against them or 
challenge it. If the debtor sought to challenge the creditor’s claim, he would usually be given 
time to obtain witnesses or other evidence and the trial deferred.  
Step 3: I‘tirāf &/or Ilzām: Upon giving the debtor sufficient time to assemble his 
evidence or gather witnesses (typically debtors would partially or completely deny their 
creditor’s claims), a deposition would be ordered by the qāḍī to determine liability. Both 
creditor and debtor were given the opportunity to provide their evidence and, per the qāḍī’s 
review, declare personal liability. Oftentimes, when a creditors claims were exaggerated or 
unsubstantiated, debtors would present counterclaims, claiming that they had overpaid ribḥ, 
or were charged usurious amount of interest and demanded compensation. In such cases, 
qāḍīs would adjudicate the outcome and the guilty party would be required to register a 
statement of admission of guilt, i‘tirāf. Per the qāḍī’s discretion, the guilty party at this point 
could either have been afforded time, from a few days to as long as a month, to settle the 
claim against them (particularly if they were someone of notable standing). In the event a 
creditor’s claim was proven valid and a debtor gave their i‘tirāf, the qāḍī could also impose 
an ilzām order on the debtor (according to the mulāzama rules referred to above that “attach” 
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the creditor to pursue the debtor, without causing him bodily harm). A qāḍī’s ilzām order 
could be issued without a voluntary admission of guilt, i‘tirāf, though.  
Step 4: I‘tiqāl. The term i‘tiqāl in the sijills refers to a period imprisonment which is 
rarely defined; it could be temporary or extended and refers to imprisonment in general, not 
just for debt-related offenses. Imprisonment was carried out at prisons attached to or under 
the supervision of the chief qāḍī’s court. Ilzām orders could be issued with imprisonment 
(i‘tiqāl), in the case of strict or punitive qāḍīs, an ilzām-cum-i‘tiqāl. However, in most of the 
sijills I have reviewed, i‘tiqāl was for debts was used less frequently than would suspect. 
During a debtor’s imprisonment, which in the case of Jerusalem appears not to have extended 
to beyond a few months, interim court hearings (maḥḍars) could be held for a number of 
reasons such for recording the testimony of the debtor’s previously unavailable witnesses, 
obtaining a guarantor for the debtor’s debt, or a debtor’s entering into a settlement with his 
creditor.  
Step 5: Taṣāduq. Debtors with substantial assets could avoid indefinite imprisonment 
by reaching an amicable settlement with their creditors, recorded as a “taṣāduq” in court. The 
court records do not give sufficient details about process of court-mediated settlement, since 
such settlements occurred while the debtor was still in prison. However, the final terms 
agreed between the parties was recorded in the court sijill, and a taṣāduq deed would be 
produced in court, often involving a discount of the outstanding debt, or its rescheduling after 
a partial repayment. It is worth noting that taṣāduq did not necessarily have to be an outcome 
of imprisonment. Debtors who were given a grace period to settle their debts out of court, 
and following a mulāzama decision (step 3) could also register their mutually agreed 
settlement, taṣāduq, in court later on.  
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Step 6: Ibrā’/Iflās. Once a satisfactory and full settlement of the loan is reached, each 
party absolves the others liability formally, through an ibrā’ statement. However, if the 
debtor’s imprisonment failed to produce either repayment or a settlement of some sort, then it 
is the qāḍī’s duty to carry out an investigation to identify and seize the debtor’s assets and 
use these to the extent of repaying his debts and court administration fees and expenses. The 
debtor’s release and absolution of debt would follow. In the event of a debtor’s 
impoverishment, the court would be required to seek witness testimony to substantiate the 
debtor’s claim (usually) of insolvency and after obtaining evidence to his satisfaction, the 
qāḍī would preside over a maḥḍar (as shown in al-Bursawī’s manual above) that would 
declare the debtor’s bankruptcy and absolve him (ibrā’) of liability for his debts, until such 
point that he is again in a healthy financial position. 
 In view of the above procedural norms, I would like to now turn to the state’s 
policing of creditors and debtors. Did qāḍīs and market inspectors have an economic policy 
on policing ribā abuses or the failure of creditors to use mu‘āmalāt? Certainly, the 
explicitness of the previously noted Ottoman ḳānūnnāme on the ribḥ-ceiling of 15% should 
have compelled qāḍīs to crack-down on creditors giving loans exceeding that, or at least this 
is the suggested imperative. We have for instance Şeyhülislam Ebu’s-Su‘ud’s two well-
known fatwās on the matter that instruct qāḍīs to admonish with discretionary punishment 
(ta‘zīr) creditors who charge above this rate. These fatwās were produced by Ebu’s-Su‘ud’s 
in the period between the cash-waqf edicts of 1548 and 1565 (discussed in chapter three), and 
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illustrate that the punishment for usurers included “lengthy imprisonment” and was not to be 
taken lightly354: 
Fatwā # 1: 
“Q: Is it licit to perform a transaction of ten for twelve (20 per cent)? 
A: It is absolutely forbidden. The qāḍī should chastise the offender.” 355 
Fatwā # 2: 
“Q: Zeyd performs transactions at ten for twelve (20 per cent), 
thirteen (30 per cent) or even more. In our time, the Sultanic decree 
and the noble fatwās of His Excellency the Muftī of the Age are that 
ten should not be given for more than eleven and a half (15 per cent). 
If, after this admonition, [Zeyd] does not obey, but still persists, what 
should happen to him? 
A: A severe chastisement and a long imprisonment are necessary. He 
should be released when his reform becomes apparent.” 356 
  In most versions of the ḳānūnnāme of Sultan Süleymān, the ribḥ-ceiling rate was set 
at 10%, that is, that the code stated that “[persons] who make [loan] transactions (mu‘āmalāt) 
in accordance with the sharī‘a shall not be allowed [to take] more than eleven for [every] ten 
                                                     
354 Heyd noted that “the ḳānūn does not usually prescribe the length of the prison term. According to a fetvā of 
Şeyhülislām Ebu’s-Su‘ud, there is no fixed limit for a ‘long’ prison term (ḥabs-i-medīd); it is left to the 
discretion of the judge, who fixes it in accordance with the commited crime.” Uriel Heyd and V. L Ménage, 
Studies in Old Ottoman Criminal Law; (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 302. 
355 Imber, Ebu’ Su‘ud, 146; An anthology of the fatwas of Ebū-Sū‘ūd and others, compiled by Veli b. Yūsuf 
(Veli Yegan), copied in 1584, John Rylands Library, Manchester, England, Chetham Oriental MS 7979, f. 54b 
356 Ibid. 
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[pieces of money lent].”357 Some ḳānūnnāmes, however, mention a rate of ten and a half 
(15%) for ten and this appeared to be the legally sanctioned band for ribḥ, with 15% being 
the upper limit.358 The compilation of ḳānūnnāme codices was somewhat diffused in the 
1520s, and codes from older ḳānūnnāme were merged with newer ones in their process of 
being updated; the code on the ribḥ-ceiling was itself something that only came into being in 
the ḳānūnnāme of Sultan Süleymān.359 While the officially sanctioned interest rate was in the 
ten to fifteen percent band, it was up to qāḍīs to determine if creditors had indeed violated the 
ḳānūnnāme and institute the appropriate punishment.  
Notwithstanding these edicts, qāḍīs in sixteenth century Bilād al-Shām rarely seem to 
have administered prison sentences to creditors who violated the above ribḥ-ceiling 
injunction. In fact mu‘āmalāt recorded in the sijills of various cities in Anatolia and Bilād al-
Shām in the latter half of the sixteenth century and early seventeenth century readily 
exceeded 15% per annum in interest. If one was to guess at a “market rate” it would have 
been somewhere between 20%-25% during the last two decades of the century. While it is 
possible to detect slight differences in the “market” lending rates in different cities, it is quite 
difficult to establish a schedule of such rates over time without carrying out an exhaustive 
statistical analysis of interest rates for given cities. However, there are data from disparate 
cities, at different periods, that support the assertion that the predominant market lending 
rates exceeded the official ones, and were registered in sharia courts without the reprehension 
of sharia court qāḍīs. The fact that rates between 20% to 25% were tolerated and registered in 
court suggests that qāḍīs either ignored or failed to institute punishments of prison for the 
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offence of usury. Rather, the most common punishment (to the creditor) was a qāḍī’s 
revocation of the supposed interest that was due to them, and its replacement with the lawful 
interest rate of 10%-15% as a form of punishment.    
In his study of Christian-Muslim relations in Cyprus in the period 1571-1640, Ronald 
Jennings observed numerous cases of courts cracking down on corrupt cash-waqf 
administrators who were lending at rates far higher than the legal limit. Jennings noted that, 
among many similar cases, “a mutawallī of a (cash) waqf for repairing roads and bridges in 
Lekosa was accused of lending money to the poor at 20% or 30% interest, thereby violating 
the condition of the donor that only 10% interest be charged.”360 Jennings’ study of 
mu‘āmalāt recorded in the court of the central-Anatolian trading city of Kayseri (1605-1625) 
yielded similar results. Taking into account that this was a period of steep monetary 
devaluation, general lawlessness and the Jelali revolts, it is not clear to what extent these 
seemingly high rates were a product of the price revolution or political instability – or both.361 
That said, the mu‘āmalāt from Kayseri that Jennings reviewed were mostly in the 20% range, 
without any instances of repudiation by qāḍīs on the matter of ribā. In the few cases where 
repudiation does show up, qāḍīs repudiate creditors not for engaging in ribā, but for claiming 
unjustified ribḥ - that is demanding a right to ribḥ without the use of a mu‘āmala shar‘īya.362 
Jennings transcribed one case as follows: “Abdur-Rahman b. Mahmud Cavus b. Haci Ahmed 
                                                     
360 Ronald Jennings, Christians and Muslims in Ottoman Cyprus and the Mediterranean world, 1571-1640 
(NYU Press, 1992), 45. 
361 Jennings also observed that the vast majority of loans were “atomized”, that is given out by unrelated parties 
who did not enter into subsequent contracts. He also did not observe a visible class of lenders in the city. 
Jennings, “Loans and Credit in Early 17th Century Ottoman Judical Records : The Sharia Court of Anatolian 
Kayseri,” 172–79. 
362 See for example the following case reported by Jennings: “Abdur-Rahman tm Mahmud Cavus bn Haci 
Ahmed of Kizil Viran village: On campaign I gave Mahmud 50 gurus for 17 gurus interest (faide). He gave me 
a camel and an ox worth 54 gurus. 13 gurus remains. Mahmud claims the rate of interest was not mu’amele’-i 
ser’iyye and that he should not even have paid the extra 4 gurus. Abdur-Rahman confesses that he collected 
unlawful interest. He is ordered to restore the 4 gurus to Mahmud.” Jennings, “Loans and Credit," 198. 
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of Kizil Viran village: On campaign I gave Mahmud 50 gurus for 17 gurus interest (faide). 
He gave me a camel and an ox worth 54 gurus. 13 gurus remains. Mahmud claims the rate of 
interest was not mu'amele'-i ser'iyye and that he should not even have paid the extra 4 gurus. 
Abdur-Rahman confesses that he collected unlawful interest. He is ordered to restore the 4 
gurus to Mahmud.”363 By way of comparison, for eighteenth-century Aleppo, A. Marcus 
reported that “for all intents and purposes the credit market operated freely without effective 
regulation” and that “lenders agreed on all sorts of rates, depending on the familiarity 
between them, the terms of the loan, the perception of the risk, and the current cost of 
money.”364  
In this context, I argue that the records from sixteenth century Jerusalem and 
Damascus courts show that loan adjudication took place largely in line with fiqh 
prescriptions and was administered as a purely corrective measure to get a creditor’s money 
back and not meant to advance punitive or reformative justice. I contend that Bilād al-Shām 
qāḍīs, like those in Anatolia, were really concerned with making sure that lending was 
transacted through legal mu‘āmalāt forms, rather than with punishing market usurers. In 
effect, the courts were interested in maintaining overall order of the markets and rather 
disinterested in regulating market morality. While scholars have generally observed that 
interest rates varied widely, and some, as Marcus has, observed that courts took a passive 
approach to regulating lending, I rather argue that courts were keen to only ensure the rights 
of creditors who engaged in what they deemed to be “legal transactions” and expressed this 
view in sijill acts. So, whereas qāḍīs do not seem to have been concerned with market 
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morality, they were concerned with maintaining the legal norms of interest-based lending, 
which was only sanctioned on the basis of using mu‘āmalāt. Any interest-bearing loans that 
did not fall outside of the law and were not recognized by courts. Further, as noted earlier, 
Çaǧatay had argued that Ottoman jurists before the mid-nineteenth century held that ribā was 
only that interest that exceeded the lawful mu‘āmala shar‘īya rate, what I have referred to as 
the ribḥ-ceiling of 15% per annum. Yet Çaǧatay, and other scholars, did not investigate the 
extent to which this was reflected in the sijills. In the few examples below, and more so in 
other parts of this dissertation, I attempt to show that while Çaǧatay’s assertion was correct in 
nominal terms, qāḍīs did not follow up their views of excessive “ribā” and were largely not 
concerned with the punishments prescribed by Ebu’s-Su‘ud’s fatwās. The sijills under review 
in this study do not show any systematic, or even occasional concern, with the level of 
interest rates, which in most cases exceeded the lawful rate. 
The sijills of Jerusalem indicate that discretionary debtor imprisonment and fines 
were not the preferred corrective measures of qāḍīs – in general. There are some exceptions, 
however. Sijill 46, covering a period of seventh months during 972/1564-5, provide an 
unusually high number of debtor related punishments instituted on a variety of members of 
society. In this sijill, we find for instance, the court’s bailiff, the Maḥḍarbāshī Muḥammad b. 
Mūsā bringing to court a man named Ahmad b. Ibrāhīm al-Musalsa‘ who he raised a claim 
against for owing the former five sulṭānīs. After soliciting the debtor’s admission, the qāḍī 
jailed him (without even first issuing an ilzām order).365 In what appears to be a one month 
punishment, exactly one month later, on 15 Sha‘bān/17 March, the same debtor and the 
                                                     
365 J-46-154-4, 14 Rajab 972/15 February 1565 
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Maḥḍarbāshī recorded a taṣāduq settlement for a reduced amount to his debt.366 This 
Maḥḍarbāshī’s use of jailing as a coercive measure to obtain repayment from his debtors was 
of course within his legal rights, although one can also view his actions as an abuse of his 
power and influence in the court. This Maḥḍarbāshī had previously imprisoned other debtors 
and was active in Jerusalem’s soap trade.367  
Far less questionable, as far as conflicts of interest go, was the common practice of 
wives who raised cases against their husbands, requesting temporary imprisonment (i‘tiqāl) 
as a coercive measure to force them to meet their marital expense commitments, those that 
were contractually prescribed in their marriage deeds (the history of which is discussed at 
greater length in chapter six).368 As is discussed in chapter six, although such practices were 
criticized and debated by Mamluk polemicists, such as Ibn al-Ḥājj, they were the order of the 
day in late-Mamluk Cairo and Damascus, and Mamluk qāḍīs often sided with women against 
their husbands, instituting punishments. Again, for Jerusalem, such cases appear in select 
sijills (as in the case of sijill 46), and do not appear to have been routinely used much of the 
time. Rather, wives had to make do with an ilzām injunction ordered by the qāḍī, and when 
that proved ineffective, wives could request courts to forcibly sequester their husband’s 
assets. However, sijill 46 does provide one example of the stricter practice. On 3 Ramaḍān 
972/ 4 April 1565, the chief-qāḍī of Jerusalem jailed al-Zaynī ‘Abd al-Qādir Abī al-Sifa after 
                                                     
366 J-46-204-5 
367 J-46-256-5 and 6 
368 Of course, usually in such cases imprisonment was preceded by numerous complaints submitted in court that 
included “da‘wā” and “mulāzama” acts, before wives had to resort to imprisonment. Moreoever, such acts were 
often – but not exclusively – raised by close male relatives of women raising cases against their husbands, 
acting as their agents. These cases therefore were usually heavily mediated by extended-family members and 
their concerns and should not be viewed exclusively as women simply asserting their rights against husbands in 
court. It should also be noted that the cases of wives imprisoning their husbands were a minority relative to 
those involving ilzām, which were sufficient to frieghten most husbands in repaying debts, even at the cost of 
incurring debts themselves to do so. For such cases see: From Jerusalem’s sijill 67, see acts 487-4, 292-6/7, 
293-7, 311-10, 317-1, 319-4, 353-7, 377-3, 8-3, 
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reviewing a case brought against him by his wife, Um al-Ḥamd bt. Khalīl Minṭāsh. ‘Abd al-
Qādir admitted that he had long overdue dotal gift payments related to clothing (kiswa) that 
he owed to his wife.369 After spending the night in jail, Umm al-Ḥamd arranged to drop the 
charges against him, having arrived at an amicable settlement (taṣāduq) for the amount owed, 
and this was recorded in court by the same qāḍī.370   
The Jerusalem sijills do point to the normative practice of qāḍīs holding depositions 
of iflās, bankruptcy, however, the length and treatment of the prisoner was absolutely 
discretionary. In theory, legal procedure called for exhausting attempts to prove a debtor’s 
solvency. Failing to do so, and after a prolonged imprisonment of several months, debtors 
would be issued with a bankruptcy ḥujja declaring their insolvency, in line with al-Bursawī’s 
earlier mentioned specimen of a “bankruptcy deed.” This could be given easily, or with 
difficulty, as the two following examples show. In an article on communal-legal strategies, 
A. Cohen examined one such case for a debtor from Jerusalem’s Jewish community in the 
1590s, Isḥāq Ibn Murdukhāy. Ibn Murdukhāy had been imprisoned for his role in organizing 
a collective debt by the Jewish community that had later defaulted. He was absolved of his 
initial liability when he was found to be genuinely insolvent. The key to his insolvency was 
that he held nothing to his name; and this could not be (legally) affected by the fact that his 
wife was wealthy.371 This case follows the legally prescribed model concerning insolvency, 
that is that insolvency was determined solely by calculating an individual’s balance sheet, 
that is the assets and capital owned by him or her, independent of his capacity to repay a loan 
                                                     
369 J-46-228-3. For another case from the same month, see that of ‘Uthmān al-Sharīf b. ‘Alī who is jailed by his 
wife for not paying her dowry (mahr). J-46-240-1. 
370 J-46-230-1. For other cases of a husband’s imprisonment for not paying for his wife’s clothing payments, 
kiswa, see J-46-36-7 and J-46-137-3.  
371 Amnon Cohen, “Communal Legal Entities in a Muslim Setting Theory and Practice,” Islamic Law and 
Society 3, no. 1 (1996): 87 J-79-471. 
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through family and other connections. While this was the letter of the law, not all qāḍīs 
followed its prescription. Yet in this debtor’s case, “he now had become insolvent … because 
he had spent all that he had at his disposal toward (payment of) the debt, he was no longer 
well to-do … when his insolvency became evident to him (the qāḍī), he released him from 
jail and set him free and lawfully forbade anyone else to contravene him by demanding 
payment, since he is incapable of paying the debt, or even part of it.” (fa-lamma ẓahar lahu 
iflāsihi aṭlaqahu min al-sijn wa khallā sabīlahu wa mana‘ man yu‘āriḍahu … wa taḥaqaq 
‘adam iqtidārahu wa-l-muflis fī amān Allāh ta‘ālā).372 This sijill notes that this decision had 
followed a “long-imprisonment” and “much interrogation.” In contrast, in another (unrelated) 
case of insolvency from a little under a decade earlier, a qāḍī who was ill-disposed to 
allowing a debtor flexibility can be seen in a case brought by a former muftī of Jerusalem, 
‘Afīf al-Dīn Bin Jamā‘a al-Kannānī, against his debtor Muḥammad b. Abī al-‘Aḍma. The 
latter was imprisoned for failing to settle his 80 sulṭānī debt, and the debtor’s son appeared in 
court to plead with the qāḍī to release his father from custody on the grounds that he was 
extremely ill, and to allow him to arrange the sale of their house which was sequestered by 
the court – and he was presumably already shown insolvent. While the son’s deposition was 
taken, the qāḍī neither allowed for the father’s release nor allowed the debtor to manage the 
disposition of his property to settle the debt.373 The repayment of debts while in prison, 
appears therefore, to have been a negotiated process, and was never independent of social 
status or influence.374  
                                                     
372 Cohen, “Communal Legal Entities," 88. J-79-471, line 13. 
373 J-67-8-7 
374 Not surprisingly, a commonly observed trend in the sijills is that people on the margins, rural peasants or the 
urban poor, suffered the punishment of imprisonment with greater frequency than elites did. Imprisonment 
could be metted even for very small debts of one sulṭānī or less, that is a few week’s wages for the urban poor. 
For instance: J-57-105-3: “Arafat b. Mūsa al-Qar‘ī filed a case against (ad‘ā) Abī Bakr b. Nūḥ, concerning the 
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With respect to interest rates, the thrust of Ebu’s-Su‘ud’s warning was rarely heeded 
by creditors, and especially not by qāḍīs who themselves were among the key creditors and 
cash-waqf nāẓirs in Jerusalem and Damascus. As in our own day, the interest rate a debt 
carried was often dependent on a variety of factors, such as the supply of money, the credit-
worthiness of the debtor, the perceived risk of the loan, which could be mitigated through 
collateral and guarantors. Moreover, one’s social-standing only took one so far. Towards the 
last decade of the century, an elite member of society, such as a sipāhī (cavalry officer) who 
was hard-pressed for credit could easily secure a mu‘āmala with an interest rate of 30%, 
without attaching any collateral.375 Conversely, an artisan with modest means could secure an 
interest rate of 13%, by providing substantial collateral (often mortgaging a share or entire 
title of their house) that likely in itself exceeded the value of the loan, along with the personal 
guarantees of one or more sponsors.376 Nevertheless, the “norm” for many loans in this period 
was a rate of exactly 20%, particularly were those given by cash-waqfs that were flush with 
cash in the last two decades of the century and would at times lend indiscriminately at one 
point annually. That said, in reviewing hundreds of debt cases, I have not come across any 
creditor’s imprisonment for charging ribḥ above the ribḥ-ceiling rate.377 
                                                     
debt of one sulṭānī, which was given as a non-interest loan (qarḍ shar‘ī). He (the debtor) was asked about this 
and he accepted liability (al-‘itirāf). He was required to pay it and did not. His oath was then recorded, and he 
was imnprisoned lawfully (wa-‘taqal i‘tqāl shar‘īyan).” In another case from J-67-446-5, a judge imprisoned 
two Christian men for a debt of 1.5 sultānī to a certain Ḥasan b. Fawwāz and were released shortly after serving 
a short period following its settlement. 
375 Such an example is the case of a debt-renewal to a “timārī” sipāhī in Damascus who rolled over a mu‘āmala 
from a Jerusalem based lender, Shaykh Abd al-Wāḥid al-Surūrī of 10 sulṭānī principal, with 3 sulṭānī of new 
interest from 10 Ṣafar 966/7 January 1588. J-67-80-4. Shaykh Abd al-Wāḥid al-Surūrī was sub-contracted 
Jerusalem’s Jizya tax-collection for that year, see J-67-96-1. See also J-67-86-9 for another unsecured loan at 
30% in following month. 
376 From same sijill as above, J-67-142-3 
377 Cohen cited only case of a judge censuring a creditor for riba, from his review of all the legal acts pertaining 
to Jerusalem’s Jewish community over the course of the sixteenth century, but it did not involve imprisonment. 
Amnon Cohen, A World within: Jewish Life as Reflected in Muslim Court Documents from the Sijill of 
Jerusalem (XVIth Century), 2 Vols. (Philadelphia, PA: Center for Judaic Studies, University of Pennsylvania, 
1994), 201 J-80-17-2. 
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While the introduction of the cash-waqf to Bilād al-Shām (in Aleppo, Jerusalem, and, 
in a few cases, Damascus) in the middle of the sixteenth century certainly created new 
institutional venues for credit, these institutions neither supplanted the pre-existing channels 
of credit and market networks (such as the practice of lending of capital from orphan estates, 
which later co-existed with cash-waqfs in providing market credit), nor did the cash-waqfs 
alter the legal framework for debt-taking – all cash-waqfs depended on the customary and 
legally sanctioned mu‘āmala subterfuges that had preexisted them. Rather, what is noticeable 
is the mushrooming in the value of loans in the last quarter of the century, the increased pace 
of lending, and in the century’s last decade, the frequency of defaults amidst a credit-crunch. 
Undoubtedly, these were effects of the currency inflation associated with the price-revolution 
of that period (a subject tackled in chapter three), however, it must be noted that the increase 
in the velocity of money did not alter the structures of credit from earlier in the century.        
 
Conclusion 
 
Beyond the myriad ways in which usurious lending could be defined across 
madhhabs, and the intersecting subterfuges that were used to facilitate it in Islamic law, this 
chapter has shown how jurists from the era through the Mamluk-Ottoman transition came to 
recognize a common legal-credit structure, the mu‘āmalāt, as a popular lending contract. Its 
simplicity and widespread adoption across madhhabs would secure its success, and entry into 
the Ottoman qānūn. The increased popular legitimation of this credit contract coincided, in 
the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, with a wane in the importance of ribā as a sin, 
when compared to other leading sins, in moralistic works of eschatology. Ibn al-Haytamī’s 
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tract on the hīyal of ribā, in particular, not only offers a window onto the popular circulation 
of such instruments, but also frames such solutions as a pragmatic solution to averting strife 
in the afterlife.   
 A central argument of this chapter has been that the adjudication of disputes in Bilād 
al-Shām during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries had a similar view of adopting fiqh 
prescriptions that sought to administer punishments, typically debtor imprisonment, as a 
purely corrective measure to get a creditor’s money back and not as means to institute an 
indefinite punitive measure, or to fulfill some kind of reformative justice. Thus, the judicial 
emphasis in Bilād al-Shām, as well as those in Anatolia, for the adoption of mu‘āmalāt was 
to use these instruments as a legal means for prosecuting debtors, rather than as a way to 
punish market usurers, something that is rarely evidenced in the sijill records.  
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Chapter Three – Waqf Lending 
 
This chapter examines the lending activities of waqfs in Bilād al-Shām along two 
lines: the cash-waqfs of Jerusalem, most notably those of the sixteenth century’s last quarter, 
and the use of credit by three conventional waqfs in the city: the Ṭāzīya waqf, a significant 
Mamluk-era madrasa, the Hasekī Sultan waqf, and the Ḥaramayn endowments in the city. I 
also selectively draw on a few examples of cash-waqfs in Damascus and Aleppo for 
comparison. After reviewing the cash-waqf controversy, I examine the impact that credit had 
on the waqf dominated economy of Jerusalem and its hinterland in the latter half of the 
sixteenth century. Jerusalem’s sijills provide some evidence that conventional waqfs (i.e., 
waqfs that were endowed with land or other property, rather than cash) advanced and 
received loans on a limited basis in connection with their operations. This raises the issue of 
urban-hinterland economic exchange and the frequent indebtedness that results from, among 
other things, pestilence and drought.  
I argue that the cash-waqf’s legalization, following its official sanctioning by Sultan 
Süleymān in 1548 following a three-year period of intense debate over its legality, quickly 
gave rise to its adoption in Bilād al-Shām, in both Aleppo and Jerusalem in the year 1556, 
paving the way for the creation of numerous new cash-waqfs that had significant impact on 
the regional economy. The presence of such waqfs would give greater legitimacy to the 
infrequent, but preexisting pattern, of lending that was undertaken by conventional waqfs. 
Mu‘āmalāt shar‘īya were used throughout, as the legitimate loan form used by cash-waqfs. I 
suggest that the new cash-waqfs shifted dominant local juridical norms concerning the giving 
out of credit by waqfs in general, and resulted in a loosening of the legal rules that, at least in 
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theory, heavily restricted this activity only to cases of absolute necessity. At the turn of the 
seventeenth century, I argue that it was no longer a taboo for a conventional waqf in 
Jerusalem to issue a loan, on a limited basis, irrespective of the waqf’s financial health.    
With respect to the cash-waqfs of Jerusalem, I show that the interest rates charged by 
them do not reflect a sophisticated market mentality or profit motive by their administrators; 
rather, the activities of cash-waqf administrators accurately reflected the wishes of their 
waqf’s founders, that is to simply issue enough loans, at uniform rates, in order to meet their 
stipulated charitable expenses. In contrast to the findings of M. Çizakça, who contended that 
the administrators of cash-waqfs in Bursa exploited them as sinking funds of cheap capital 
used by themselves and merchant-bankers to relend at higher rates in commercial markets, I 
have found little evidence of such activities by the cash-waqfs of Jerusalem at the turn of the 
seventeenth century. This may have been due to Jerusalem’s smaller size and markets. Nor 
did Jerusalem’s cash-waqfs display bank-like features. Because of their uniform lending 
style, I suggest that the loan management of cash-waqfs could not have been at par with that 
of professional moneylenders. While interest rates were sometimes in line with the rates 
established by cash-waqf founders, often 15% in the late sixteenth century, interest rates 
were typically higher, 20% to even 30%. That being the case, however, the interest rates 
charged by a given cash-waqf were very stable across its pool of debtors (i.e., all loans for a 
given waqf would be at exactly 20% or 25%), despite the fact that debtors came from all 
walks of life and social-backgrounds.   
The sijills registrations of registered cash-waqf loans indicate that loans were often 
enacted out of court and registered in court in batches, over several days during intervals in a 
given year, or once a year. This aspect of their operations gives the unusual appearance of 
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uniformity and points to, as I argue, an indirect court supervision of these institutions. This is 
supported by the fact that most financial accounts (muḥāsabāt) of cash-waqfs are absent from 
the sijill record, which suggests one of three possibilities; it may have been that cash-waqf 
administrators were not required to submit accounts to the courts; or that qāḍīs had a separate 
extra-judicial process for reviewing and administrating them; or that cash-waqf 
administrators simply failed to abide with the court’s requests for such statements. I advocate 
one of the first two possibilities. Of 27 cash-waqfs examined in sijill 67, covering a fifteen-
month period during 995-97/1586-87, only three cash-waqfs (or a little more than 10%) 
provided muḥāsabāt of their balance sheets and loan portfolios (noting that such accounts do 
not appear to have been related to mismanagement or graft). Such muḥāsabāt make it clear 
that qāḍīs were in-charge of supervising these institutions, vetting their administrator 
appointments, the validity of their loans, and deduction of expenses related to their charitable 
purpose. However, the exceedingly low percentage of muḥāsabāt in the sijills, suggests that 
court supervision was both selective and inconsistent.   
There is no doubt that Ottoman qāḍīs during this period were in charge of the state’s 
fiscal-economic regulation, at a local level, they were in charge of regulating lending and 
market interest rates in their districts. In my chapter on law, I investigated the transition 
towards uniformity in legal doctrine and court procedures, towards a state-sponsored 
Ḥanafism; here, I investigate how such changes affected the juridical views of non-Ḥanafīs 
on how credit was deployed by waqfs. The scholarly consensus is that the cash-waqf 
institution, being a development of Ottoman Ḥanafism, was one that was not warmly 
embraced in Bilād al-Shām by Shāfi‘īs who represented both a numerical majority and had a 
historically greater mindshare of control over legal life in comparison to Ḥanafīs, who 
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occupied a second-place position in the region in Mamluk times. Contrary to the perception 
of a historical resistance to the cash-waqf, I argue that not only was the cash-waqf widely 
adopted by local ‘ulamā’ in Bilād al-Shām (frequently appearing as founders, administrators 
and debtors of these waqfs) but that, moreover, Shāfi‘ī qāḍīs were indispensable to the 
activities of such institutions. A sizable minority of Jerusalem cash-waqfs in the second half 
of the sixteenth century, that I have examined herein, were established and managed by local 
‘ulamā’ notables, both Ḥanafīs and Shāfi‘īs. I illustrate how Shāfi‘ī deputy qāḍīs in 
Jerusalem were regularly requested to register mu‘āmalāt in sijills when loan collateral was 
deposited, this being due to the fact that Shāfi‘ī fiqh provided debtors more rights in their use 
of collateralized property than did Ḥanafī rules. I argue that pragmatism and a view towards 
inter-madhhab operability was, therefore, a key driving force facilitating cash-waqf 
mu‘āmalāt in the region. The solution for registering collateral for cash-waqf loans in cities 
where Ḥanafism was overwhelmingly dominant, such as in Istanbul or Bursa, would surely 
have been different.    
Although prominent Damascene jurists, such as the Shāfi‘ī muftī of Damascus Najm 
al-Dīn al-Ghazzī, railed against Ottoman legal “innovations” (bida‘), such as the marriage tax 
– something they considered foreign as well as un-Islamic, their response to the cash-waqf 
was mostly characterized by remarkable silence. Their voices were not heard among the 
chorus of Ottoman Turkish ‘ulamā’ in Istanbul who wrote treatises against the cash-waqf. 
The notable Levantine jurists of the sixteenth century, such as al-Tumurtāshī and al-Ghazzī, 
did not publish polemics against this Ottoman institution. This may have to do with the fact 
that the cash-waqf controversy was officially settled by its legalization in 1548, a decade or 
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so before the development of Ottoman endowments went into full swing, as discussed in my 
chapter on law.  
This chapter begins with a review of the doctrinal views surrounding the cash-waqf’s 
origins and its controversy in Istanbul. Subsequently, I review the scholarship on activities of 
known cash-waqfs in Bilād al-Shām followed by a discussion on the likely indirect effects 
that this institution had on conventional waqfs. Thereafter, I take up as a case study the 
operations of the Ṭāzīya madrasa waqf of Jerusalem at the turn of the seventeenth century, 
and make some general observations about the role of debts in urban-rural exchange using 
this waqf as an exemplar. I also draw on some observations of credit activities of the large 
public waqfs of Jerusalem in the last quarter of the sixteenth century to support my views.   
     
3.1 The cash-waqf controversy  
The cash-waqf controversy was as much about Şeyhülislam Ebu’s-Su‘ud’s carving 
out of political authority for the Ottoman legal establishment as it was about ensuring a 
system of new institutions for public welfare and the stability of a new monetary order.378 
The opposition to the cash-waqf was significant, and its opponents, most notably the chief 
qāḍī of Rumelia, Çivizade, were not at all marginal figures. Rather, they represented a 
politically powerful madhhab-normative view that was shared by those in Bilād al-Shām.379 
However, the cash-waqf had been taken up as a practice from the second decade of the 
fifteenth century in the Ottoman Balkans and by the time of its political controversy (1546-
8), Çivizade’s opposition may have been too little, too late. As Mandaville observed:  
                                                     
378 Tezcan, The Second Ottoman Empire, 31–36. 
379 Imber, Ebuʼs-Suʻud, 144–45. 
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“Suddenly the conflict between traditional Islamic judicial theory and practice and that 
of the Ottoman establishment broke out in the open. It had done so, it seems, long after 
there was any chance for a reversal of the practice. Yet however unrealistic the 
opposition, the debate continued on through that century and into the next, scholarly 
surrejoinder following rejoinder. Gradually the cash-waqf became a major issue in the 
larger ongoing struggle between Ottoman strict, as opposed to loose, constructionists 
of political, legal, and religious policy - between the liberals and the conservatives.”380   
Even though Çivizade was a pillar of the conservative camp, and one time 
şeyhülislam, opposing the Ottoman dynasty’s patronage of Ibn ‘Arabī and other Sufis, he 
remained politically powerful during the early years of Süleymān’s reign.381  The voice given 
to Çivizade’s opposition in the sultan’s court has, in my view, pushed some scholars to 
interpret the muted reception of the cash-waqf in Bilād al-Shām as a silent adoption of 
Çivizade’s view that this new instrument was an assault on the mainstream Ḥanafī 
tradition.382 My own research into this question shows that such a determination, at least in 
the late sixteenth century, is not so clear-cut. Moreover, one cannot claim that the cash-
waqf’s rise in Anatolia was the result of Ottoman Law’s corruption, because Ottoman Law 
was undergoing a considerable shift at the time. Although Ebu’l-s-Su‘ūd did have Sultan 
Süleymān’s ear, the rising legalization of this institution was not a given. The view of ‘ulamā 
elites from the periphery of Bilād al-Shām during the 1540s observing this debate was 
seemingly one of pragmatic silence; although they may have been produced, I have failed to 
uncover any polemical tracts by Syrian ‘ulamā’ against the cash-waqf.   
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Doctrinal views on the cash-waqf in Islamic law 
At the center of early Muslim debates on the institution of the waqf, Abū Ḥanīfa’s 
position on the wholesale rejection of the waqf is famous and stands in stark contrast to the 
views of his disciples, Abū Yūsuf and al-Shaybānī. Abū Ḥanīfa held that allowing the 
endowment of an asset into perpetuity (ta’bīd) would give such an institution legal primacy 
over the inheritance rights of a waqf founder’s children, and go against their inheritance 
rights enshrined by the sharī‘a. He therefore did not accept the legal irrevocability (ilzām) of 
the waqf but rather left it up to qāḍīs to apply their judicial reasoning (ijtihād) when ruling on 
the specific circumstances that could warrant a waqf’s establishment. On the contrary, 
Muḥammad Ḥasan al-Shaybānī and Abū Yūsuf held views that defined the normative 
position of the Ḥanafī madhhab, which absolutely accepts the waqf (i.e., endowment in 
perpetuity) of land and buildings. With respect to endowing movables, Abū Yūsuf accepted 
their permissibility so long as movables were related to a land’s given use. For instance, 
horses and farm tools on a farm could be endowed along with the land of the farm into a joint 
waqf. Al-Shaybānī went a step further and stipulated that by following the principle of 
juridical preference (istiḥsān), a variety of other movables could be endowed independent of 
any land or physical property, on the basis of the popular/customary use (ta‘āmul) of such 
movables.383 However, al-Shaybānī and Abū Yūsuf never issued rulings approving the 
endowment of money; for them capital in the form of coins and currency were viewed as an 
                                                     
383 al-Sarakhsī, Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad, Kitāb al-Mabsūṭ (Beirut: Dār al-Maʻrifah, 1993), Vol. 12, 45; al-
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altogether separate category outside of the physical things that could not be endowed and 
therefore did not merit discussion.384 However, as elaborated below, Ottoman apologists for 
the cash-waqf, most notably Ebu’l-s-Su‘ūd, would conveniently ignore this aspect in arguing 
for their position. 
At the center of Ottoman opposing views on the cash-waqf, such as those of Çivizade, 
two seemingly unsurmountable issues had to be resolved to warrant its valid use. First was 
the concern that trading in a waqf’s money would unnecessarily expose the waqf to a loss of 
its capital over time, due to devaluation. Second, although cash was a movable asset, it was 
also a fungible one (its use entailed its consumption), and this would be deleterious to the 
condition that a waqf be held in perpetuity (ta’bīd).385 Early debates on endowing movables 
as waqf centered on evaluating the extent to which an asset was fungible. Most jurists (aside 
from Abū Ḥanīfa and the Ḥanbalīs) accepted the endowment of movable assets that could 
largely retain their nature after use, such as animals, books, equipment and furniture. 
However, more fungible assets, such as food, oil, and money did not qualify for endowment 
in the eyes of most jurists, since their use required their consumption.386 The cash-waqf, as it 
was understood and debated by Ottoman jurists in the late-fifteenth and early sixteenth 
century, was not a form of waqf that existed (or therefore discussed or debated) in the earliest 
founding fiqh texts of the four Sunnī madhhabs. This is one reason that warranted it being 
termed by some modern scholars a “distinctly Ottoman contribution to Islamic Civilization.” 
Those who called for its adoption, however, most notably the Şeyhülislam Ebu’s-Su‘ud, did 
so by broadly interpreting a minority opinion of a disciple of Abū Ḥanīfa, al-Imām Zufar (a 
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disciple of al-Shaybānī), that allowed for waqfs that invested their capital in trade using 
muḍāraba (the commenda) and deploying the profits from such trading to be used to benefit 
the community in perpetuity.387 The Ottoman adoption of Zufar’s view was also based on the 
juristic favoring of adopting laws that drew on customary market practice, particularly those 
that served a societal good.  
Zufar was the only early Ḥanafī authority who supported the waqf of money, as long 
as it was invested in trade, through a muḍāraba (commenda) or similar contract. The 
exchange of money for goods would alleviate or remove the risk of devaluation and 
fungibility. While Zufar’s ruling would be the basis for the Ottoman’s legitimation of the 
cash-waqf, the most closely related form to the cash-waqf can actually be found in the 
teachings of the Mālikī madhhab. The jurist Ṣaḥnūn, in his authoritative al-Mudawwana, 
which transmitted the ruling of Mālik Ibn Anas, the madhhab’s founder, relates that Mālik 
allowed the lending of money (on a non-interest basis) to be used as a means to pay for 
communal needs, through the payment of zakat (alms).388 In his chapter on zakāt, Mālik 
responds affirmatively to the question: “If a man endowed 100 dinārs to be lent out, and 
people return this money, is it considered a form of zakat?”389 The Shāfi‘īs and Ḥanbalīs are 
not known to have endorsed the cash-waqf on the account of their strict views on the 
endowment of fungibles, such as money.   
Mandaville argued that the pro-cash waqf Ottoman jurists, led early on by the practice 
of Mulla Hüsrev (Ar. Munlā/Mullā Khusrū), did so “simply by neglecting to mention that 
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Muḥammad [al-Shaybānī] and Abū Yūsuf explicitly denied the validity of the cash-waqf,” by 
exercising “judicious silence”.390 That is, the magnum opus of Mulla Hüsrev (who served as 
Şeyhülislam between 1460-1480), Durar al-ḥukkām fī sharḥ ghurar al-aḥkām, which was 
used as a core textbook in the ilmiye system curriculum centuries onwards, only referred to 
Zufar’s ruling by mentioning that “Imām Muḥammad [al-Shaybānī] accepted certain 
movables on the basis of ‘generally recognized practice’ (ta‘arūf).391 As I discuss below, an 
analogous explanation was provided by the leading Damascene jurist Ibn ‘Ābdīn to explain 
the cash-waqf’s validity in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  
  The practice of the cash-waqf was first observed in Balkan courts in the 1420s; the 
first cash-waqf that Mandaville found recorded was one from Edirne in 1423 and its popular 
spread did not cause any public debate until the number of such waqfs came to be the 
predominant newly registered waqfs at the end of the fifteenth century, and by 1540 it “could 
not be overlooked any longer.”392 The fact that Mulla Hüsrev signed on several extant cash-
waqfs deeds while in office as Şeyhülislam points to this commonplace practice before the 
first quarter of the sixteenth century; in addition many notable qāḍīs of the period issued such 
deeds and engaged in a form of ‘silent practice’.393 However, “sometime between 1545 and 
1547, the military justice of Rumeli, Çivizade (d. 1547), issued an opinion which completely 
opposed the practice of the cash-waqf.”394 Almost immediately, Ebu’s-Su‘ud issued a treatise 
in Arabic, al-Risāla fī jawāz waqf al-nuqūd, in response to Çivizade’s ruling, in which he 
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strongly argued for the legal-validity of the cash-waqf. This prompted a backlash from 
Çivizade’s supporters and instigated a century long debate over the cash-waqf.  
Ebu’s-Su‘ud’s treatise called for the recognition of the waqf al-nuqūd on the basis of 
it fulfilling three qualities. First, the fact that capital in a cash-waqf was exchanged as a part 
parcel of its activities would mean that a cash-waqf’s capital could not be viewed as 
“fungible”, thereby meeting a key requirement for the endowment of movables.395 Second, 
the fact that the cash-waqf was already widely in-use during his day allowed Ebu’s-Su‘ud to 
argue for its recognition on the basis of ta‘āmul, as well as on the basis of its custom (‘urf). 
Both these legitimizing techniques adopted the guidance of the Ḥanafī imām, Muḥammad al-
Shaybānī. Third, Ebu’s-Su‘ud insisted that the perpetuity of the cash-waqf was not 
compromised by inflation or currency devaluation, on market grounds, that whatever affects 
cash-waqfs equally affects other things in markets, and therefore (ceteris paribus) the 
condition of cash-waqfs in the long-run would even out any short-term inconsistencies 
related to such risks.  
Although he does not show evidence for it in the fiqh literature, Ebu’s-Su‘ud asserts 
that it is evident that the cash-waqf is legally valid because the principle of common usage 
(ta‘āmul) advocated by al-Shaybānī for the waqf of movables, applied to it.396  Ebu’s-Su‘ud 
states that “the leading jurists (mashāyikh) of every age choose to attach conditions (in their 
dealings) that meet their general requirements and they bring into each specific article things 
that they determine to add or discard according to the popular custom of their day (wa-
yujībūn fī kull māda bi-l’ījāb wa-l-nafī ḥasbamā ‘āyanū fī a‘ṣārihim min al-ta‘āruf) as relates 
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to (the waqfs of) movables.397 With respect to the problematic nature of money’s devaluation, 
and its associated complications for the waqf’s condition of perpetuity, Ebu’s-Su‘ud is 
unabashedly forthright in minimizing the effects that such changes could have on a waqf’s 
longevity. Per Mandaville’s review, Ebu’s-Su‘ud did not express concern about the 
fluctuation of currency over time, Ebu’s-Su‘ud states:  “I say it does not matter. It evens out 
in time. Today some say 60 dirhams to the dinar, some say 59. It varies from place to place, 
and even in the sample place from time to time. No one profits over another in the long 
run.”398 Ebu’s-Su‘ud’s rationale evinces an uncannily modern laissez-faire attitude towards 
the market for money and its effects on such waqfs.  
Ebu’s-Su‘ud’s argument drew inspiration from a minority Ḥanafī opinion to support 
the opposite claim, that money was as validly used for creating waqfs as property and had the 
benefit of being easier to exchange. Significantly, Ebu’s-Su‘ud did not argue against the use 
of a mu‘āmala framework for this, but rather depended on it. The mu‘āmala, Ebu’s-Su‘ud 
argued, was used for all sorts of movables and land. Ebu’s-Su‘ud “shows how many things 
have been added to the ‘movables’ category … ta‘āmul applies to cash as well.”399 While 
Mandaville observed this, he gave more attention to the issue of usury than it actually played 
in the debate itself. The advent of the cash-waqf, I contend, did not bring a revolution (at 
least in the central Ottoman lands) as much as a legalization of existing practice that was 
already managed by courts. As Mandaville showed in his essay, evidence of cash-waqf deeds 
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registered in courts goes back at least one hundred years before the controversy (the first 
cash-waqf was established in Edirne in 1423).  
By moving the cash-waqf from a customary instrument to an official one, the 
Ottoman state established a better means for distinguishing between legitimate market 
interest (profit/ribḥ) and illicit market interest (usury/ribā). This was not a new practice. 
Bayezid’s qānūn, and likely earlier ones, attempted to place an explicit cap on market 
interest, but in general terms for all market debts. On the other hand, an instrument like the 
cash-waqf, as an instrument that dealt only with money, rather than the plethora of other 
assets that were used as the underlying assets for market lending, could better serve as a 
common denominator for what was acceptable and not. The state’s official interest-rate range 
became expressed through this common denominator that could serve as the barometer for 
legitimate versus illegitimate gain. The way that courts actually used the benchmarked rates 
to distinguish between excessive and lenient uses is addressed in my first chapter. However, 
suffice it to say, that Ebu’s-Su‘ud’s reform should be viewed as a market-organizing and 
regulating reform as much, if not more, than a legal reform for legalizing the practice of the 
cash-waqf.  
It is notable that the legal impediments to the establishment of the cash-waqf in the 
debate between jurists did not account for other market factors, such as the credit-worthiness 
of borrowers, or for that matter an elaboration of the legality of the mu‘āmalāt that such 
waqfs depended on. The longevity of waqfs in general has been a topic that has been studied 
by a number of Ottomanists. In his article “the cash-waqfs of Bursa, 1555-1823,” M. Çizakça 
set out to test the hypothesis of jurists who opposed the cash-waqf because of concern over 
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economic loss from devaluation and the perpetuity debate.400 A much earlier study by Barkan 
and Ayverdi of the Istanbul waqfs (both conventional property waqfs and cash-waqfs) in the 
mid-sixteenth century showed that over a relatively short period of 76 years, the majority of 
waqfs in the three taḥrīr registers they reviewed had disappeared.401 Çizakça’s own review of 
(only) 761 cash-waqfs in the city of Bursa over a 268 years found that 148 (or 19%) survived 
more than a century, which demonstrates, that cash-waqfs probably did not suffer a different 
fate from conventional ones in terms of longevity. Further, Çizakça shows that of the 148 
long-living cash-waqfs in his study, 81% had relied on an infusion of capital (above their 
initially endowed capital) at some point in order to prevent their insolvency.402  
 Almost immediately after Ebu’s-Su‘ud’s treatise response, Çivizade’s rejoinder came 
in the form of a short essay that outlined the twenty or so most important scholarly references 
that Ebu’s-Su‘ud had drawn upon and called his reliance on generalities to be unconvincing, 
arguing that “the weakness of Zufar is manifest; under no circumstances, certainly, could it 
support irrevocability. As for ta‘āmul … ‘there is no guide or clarification for its 
permissibility.”403 Where Çivizade’s response was a comprehensive scholarly critique of 
Ebu’s-Su‘ud’s position, it would be the treatises of the grammarian and Sufi moralist 
Mehmet Birgevi, from the Anatolian town of Birgi, that would deliver the sharpest blows to 
the argument in favor of the cash-waqf in the eyes of conservative jurists. Over a span of 
three decades, Birgevi produced five treatises against the cash-waqf, the most famous of 
which was “The Sharp Sword for the Inadmissibility of the Movable and Cash Waqfs (al-
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Sayf al-ṣārim fī ‘adam jawāz waqf al-manqūl wa'l-darāhim).404 In an early treatise, Birgivi 
presented a scholarly criticism of Ebu’s-Su‘ud’s approach: 
“Waqf is defined as property that has been frozen, cannot be transferred to 
another. It is clearer than the sun that this definition does not include the cash-waqf. 
Obviously, property that has been put into a partnership (muḍāraba), used as capital 
for commerce, or loaned at interest using legal devices (mu'āmala) has been 
transferred to another. In the established texts, the argument of Zufar, which is 
connected with its permissibility, is a weak one. Kāḍikhān, for example, gives it in 
citation thus. There are respectable works that were written to reconcile the 
differences of opinion among the scholars [on certain problems]; the subject doesn't 
even come up there. In general, the statement of Zufar in regard to its admissibility is 
weak. Zufar's student, al-Anṣarī, mentions it; certain persons not entirely devoid of 
intelligence relate it. But since, of the classical works, neither the Imāms Abū Ḥanīfa, 
Abī Yūsuf, Muḥammad, nor other masters of the school permit it, clearly they did not 
accept this aforementioned weak statement. This is why it is not permitted. As for its 
irrevocability, there is not a single statement to this effect. Zufar says nothing about 
it. There is nothing in the arguments (of Ebu’l-s-Su‘ūd) supporting anything of 
irrevocability, absolutely nothing. Those who rule and record in favor of 
irrevocability of awqaf are acting on something about which they know nothing.”405 
In a more moralistic tone from his al-Sayf al-ṣārim, the same author lambasts the 
waqf nāẓirs who take up the cash-waqf as only doing so to fulfill their own greed:  
“most of the waqf administrators are ignorant and do not recognize the 
pictures [examples?] of usury in the Book; they make profit with loans and sale. Any 
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loan from which profit is made is usurious. Some of them lead a dissolute life, taking 
interest without even going through the motions of using legally permissible devices 
to do so. They make waqf of usury and the forbidden, pure and simple, giving it to 
the administrators who consume the usury. They are in the same position as someone 
struck mad and frenzied by the devil…”406  
While the debate continued over the century, the clear winner was Ebu’s-Su‘ud, 
considering the support his position received from Sultan Süleymān. The economic 
prosperity and public services of much of the Rumelian territories were founded on cash-
waqfs, and in the fifty years preceding the cash-waqf debate, the registration of cash-waqfs 
consistently outnumbered conventional ones by a significant margin.407 Following his fatwā 
of 1546, Çivizade’s “persuaded the Sultan [Süleymān] to abolish them by decree” and the 
sultan became convinced of Ebu’s-Su‘ud’s private argument that legalizing the cash-waqf 
would best serve the public interest, and did so in an edict issued in 1548 that reformed the 
qānūn.408 C. Imber has argued that Ebu’s-Su‘ud’s objective was that the legalization of such 
waqfs would allow for their regulation and the restriction of runaway usurers from abusing 
cash-waqfs that had been in existence for decades.409 By doing so, Ebu’s-Su‘ud exercised his 
legal knowhow as well as displayed his widely recognized political savvy. 
 
The view from jurists in the Bilād al-Shām periphery 
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What was the reception of the cash-waqf within the periphery of Bilād al-Shām? 
From a legal point of view, the cash-waqf certainly would have been a point of consternation 
to many jurists of Bilād al-Shām, since the Shāfi‘ī madhhab continued to be numerically 
dominant well into the second half of the sixteenth century and Shāfi‘ī deputy qāḍīs were 
well represented in courts.410 For the Shāfi‘ī s, the main bone of contention with the cash-
waqf, and Ebu’s-Su‘ud’s Risāla, would have been on its glossing over of the problem of 
currency devaluation’s interference with the waqf’s condition of perpetuity. Ebu’s-Su‘ud 
himself acknowledges that the al-Shāfi‘īs would find it problematic, and he says of al-Shāfi‘ī, 
“but his analogy is not our [Ḥanafī] analogy; his plea (ta‘līl) is not our plea” and later 
hypothesizes that al-Shāfi‘ī would have likely allowed for an exception for this waqf’s 
problem on the basis of their own form of juristic preference (istiḥsān).411 Reactions from 
jurists in Bilād al-Shām, however, on the establishment of the cash-waqf are hard to come by. 
Perhaps these jurists were evidencing their own kind of “silent-practice” and protecting their 
academic and judicial positions by not entering into overt critiques of the regime, even 
though treatises admonishing certain Ottoman-introduced taxes, such as the previously noted 
marriage-tax (resm-i ‘arūs) were written. It may very well have been that the cash-waqf, 
which had yet to manifest itself in Bilād al-Shām at the time of the controversy, was not 
significant enough for comment in the sixteenth-century, unlike the marriage tax that was 
instituted from the very beginning of Ottoman rule. One has to wonder though at the fact that 
even works on waqfs by leading sixteenth-century Shāfi‘ī figures, such as the Egyptian al-
Munāwī’s (d. 1031/1621) Taysīr al-wuqūf, do not analyze or review this debate. This work 
                                                     
410 Refer to Rafeq’s statistical analysis of the breakdown of the Palestinian ‘ulamā’ over the sixteenth century, 
reproduced in chapter two. 
411 Mandaville, “Usurious Piety,” 299. 
186 
  
does not mention the cash-waqf at all, even though it has sections on what constitutes 
permissible and impermissible forms of waqfs, the debt-taking and guarantees of waqf nāẓirs 
and the recourse that creditors could obtain from the assets of waqfs established by 
debtors.412 
The view from Damascene jurists becomes clearer much later on, in eighteenth and 
nineteenth century commentaries, most notably (the Ḥanafī) Ibn ‘Ābdīn’s (d. 1252/1836) 
Radd al-muḥtār ‘alā al-durr al-mukhtār, the most famous commentary on al-Ḥaskafī’s (d. 
1088/1677) al-Durr al-mukhtār fī sharḥ tanwīr al-abṣār, which itself was a commentary on 
the Gazan jurist al-Tumurtāshī’s (d. 1004/1596) Tanwīr al-abṣār wa-jāmi‘ al-biḥār. Here 
what one observes is a reinforcement of the official doctrine promulgated by Ebu’s-Su‘ud. In 
his section on the prerequisites for the waqfs of movables, Ibn ‘Ābdīn begins by reviewing 
the popular consensus (mashhūr) of jurists on Muḥammad al-Shaybānī’s position concerning 
the permissibility of endowing movables in common use. Regarding the cash-waqf, al-
Ḥaṣkafi (as related in Ibn ‘Ābdīn’s commentary) first cites the Egyptian Ḥanafī jurist al-
Shurunbulālī (d. 1069/1659) who “permitted the waqf of dirhams and dinārs in our day, after 
its common usage in our days in Bilād al-Rum and other territories, and these were accepted 
on the basis of Muḥammad’s (al-Shaybānī’s) ruling on all movables, without needing to refer 
to the approval of its specific use given by the Imām Zufar” (falā yaḥtāju ‘ala hadhā ilā 
takhṣīṣ al-qawl bi-jawāz waqfihā bi-madhhab al-imām Zufar).413 Then Ibn ‘Ābdīn provides 
the view of the Palestinian jurist al-Ramlī (d. 1081/1671) who contended that this waqf was 
contingent only upon the specific ruling (of an issuing qāḍī) on the non-fungibility of money 
                                                     
412 ʻAbd al-Raʼūf al-Munāwī, Taysīr Al-Wuqūf ʻalá Ghawāmiḍ Aḥkām Al-Wuqūf (Makkah: Maktabat Nizār 
Muṣṭafá al-Bāz, 1998), 32–35, 322–325. 
413 Muḥammad Amīn Ibn ‘Ābdīn, Rad Al-Muḥtār ‘alā Al-Durr Al-Mukhtār (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1992), Vol. 4, 
363. 
187 
  
that it is to be endowed, that is that its investment does not result in the asset’s depletion.414 
Ibn ‘Ābdīn weighs in on the issue of fungibility by first attesting that this instrument is 
legally sound, on the basis of Ebu’s-Su‘ud’s fatwās (the “ma‘rūḍāt”), but then argues that 
“(the waqf of) money should not be evaluated through (this) asset’s quantification. The 
benefit (of the cash-waqf) is not obtained through the prevention of its depletion, but rather 
through the means of exchange as a stand-in for (solving the problem of) asset 
quantification.”415 In supporting his assertion, Ibn ‘Ābdīn refers to a report of al-Anṣārī, a 
student of Zufar, who stated that in his day money endowed as muḍāraba would be used to 
purchase goods that would be dedicated to charity (ṣadaqa) and then resell them to attain 
specie again. Ibn ‘Ābdīn argues, by analogy (qiyās) that this kind of exchange resolves the 
question of the cash-waqf’s fungibility. Further, he gives an example of other applications for 
exchange; he suggests that fungibles such as grains can be endowed in a waqf to benefit 
farmers who would plant such grain, and then retrieve a share from its profits at harvest.416  
From the point of view of court practice, jurists would certainly have had experience 
with the common form that such “exchanges” of goods took in registrations of mu‘āmalāt 
from cash-waqfs, even if they were not necessarily widespread in their midst. Al-Bursawī’s 
court manual which would have been found in libraries of the region’s qāḍīs, provides a 
succinct formulary for “what is written for a debt owed to a waqf through a mu‘āmala (issued 
by) its mutawallī”:  
“(1) Fulān b. fulān attests that he owes to the waqf of the deceased fulān b. fulān 
through a mu‘āmala issued by his mutawallī, the holder of this record (2) fulān b. 
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fulān in the amount of three thousand and three hundred silver dirhams in current 
circulation. (3) Three thousand of this is a loan (qarḍ) and the remainder of the 
amount (4) consists of the transferred cloth (to the debtor) sold on a deferred basis on 
this date (to be repaid) until one complete year from it. His (the debtor’s) gold 
bracelet weighing thirty (5) mithqāls, and a silver drinking cup worth one hundred 
dirhams, and his tall blond and blue-eyed Russian slave named Yūsuf b. ‘Abd Allah, 
(6) have all been recorded and received as mortgage by the above-referenced 
mutawallī with respect to meeting the loan obligation noted above. (7) This legally 
valid attestation has been duly recorded. Fulān b. Fulān, the silversmith, is present 
and has given the received above-referenced mortgaged items which have been 
registered as a legal guarantee. Executed on such and such date..”417   
   
3.2 The cash-waqfs of Bilād al-Shām in the second half of the sixteenth century 
The cash awqaf of Bilād al-Shām are understudied, although they were important 
economic institutions in at least three cities during the second half of the sixteenth century: 
Aleppo, Jerusalem and Damascus. Al-Bursawī’s formulary on cash-waqf lending was 
frequently reproduced in the sijills of these cities and appears often in the Jerusalem sijills. It 
is useful to review the literature concerning these waqfs prior to delving into examples of 
their operations and to discuss the key questions that concern their use.  
 With respect to Jerusalem, the existence of dozens of cash-waqfs in Jerusalem during 
the sixteenth and seventeenth century has long been known to historians of the city’s waqfs, 
most notably K. al-‘Asalī and M. al-Ghawsheh, who edited and published numerous cash-
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waqf endowment deeds, found among conventional waqfs of Jerusalem.418 However, the 
secondary scholarship on the activities of these waqfs is scant. There are but a few works that 
tackle their operations from the vantage point of social history; perhaps most exhaustive, 
although by way of a catalogue, is Yusuf Natshah’s study, Ottoman Jerusalem: The Living 
City.419 Recently, M. al-Arna’aūṭ, who has long written on the topic of the cash-waqf in the 
Balkans and Anatolia, published an article on Jerusalem’s cash-waqfs, and he also has 
contributed to a comparative discussion of their role in his co-edited study with Mandaville 
and Sućeska on the spread and reevaluation of the cash-waqf in the Ottoman empire.420 Al- 
Arna’aūṭ’s estimates that roughly half of the waqfs established in Jerusalem in the first two 
centuries of Ottoman rule were cash-waqfs.421 According to his own count, al-Arna’aūṭ 
identified waqfīyas for 65 cash-waqfs from Jerusalem and asserts that far more cash-waqfs 
existed in that city than those we know of since not all cash-waqfs were legalized in courts. 
This is evident from the fact that the sijills record debts issued by cash-waqfs, the founding 
deeds of which have not survived.422  
Al-Arna’aūṭ identifies the first cash-waqf founded in Jerusalem as being that of 
Jerusalem’s governor Farrūkh Bey in the amount of 16,000 dirhams in 964/1556, the interest 
from which was used to pay for ten Qur’ān reciters at Abraham’s tomb in Hebron.423 al-
Arna’aūṭ attributes the large number of waqfs established in Jerusalem to the increased 
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prominence that Jerusalem took under the Ottomans as a site of religious patronage, since the 
heavenly rewards for doing so in this city were many-fold higher than for establishing 
endowments elsewhere.424 Of the sixty-five cash-waqfs identified by him, all except for two, 
instructed their nāẓirs to lend out their capital at specific rates. Five waqfīyat called for 
lending at 10%, forty-five instructed to lend at 15% and 13 waqfīyat instructed to lend at 
20%.425 With the exception of a few references, Arna’aūṭ does not provide a list of the names 
or dates of the 65 waqfs he studied. In spite of the clear prominence of these institutions in 
Jerusalem and their important influence on the city’s economic profile during the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, al-Arna’aūṭ adopts the traditional scholarly narrative used to 
explain the lack of the cash-waqf’s success in Bilād al-Shām, in general terms. He notes that 
most of the waqfīyat of the Jerusalem cash-waqfs refer that to the juristic disagreement 
(ikhtilāf) between conservative ‘ulamā’ and the ruling of the Imām Zufar and describe a 
legalistic process of rescindment and reinstatement by Jerusalem’s qāḍī, to verify and uphold 
the efficacy of the cash-waqf at its founding.426 More explicitly, al-Arna’aūṭ argues that 
despite the large numbers of cash-waqfs established in Jerusalem, local ‘ulamā’ elites did not 
establish cash-waqfs, reflecting their antipathy towards this institution.427 Of the 65 waqfs 
reviewed, al-Arna’aūṭ observes that the vast majority were founded by Ottoman elites from 
Bilād al-Rūm (Anatolia or the Balkans). Seven (or roughly 15%) of these were established by 
Ottoman women elites, who were also Rūmīs, with the exception of one that was founded by 
a daughter of a local ‘ālim whom he names as Fakhr bt. Muhammad al-Jā‘ūnī.428 Following a 
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line of argument similar to Rafeq’s (reviewed in chapter one), al-Arna’aūṭ contends that the 
number of active cash-waqfs in Jerusalem receded during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries as a result of its unpopularity with local ‘ulamā’ and the increase in power of new 
local political elites (a‘yān).429  
With respect to Aleppo, three historians of this trading city’s sijills, Masters, Marcus 
and Wilkins, have all observed that cash-waqfs had an important place and function in 
Aleppo during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. There are no earlier studies on 
earlier periods because that city’s first complete sijills only commence from the first third of 
the seventeenth century. For the period 1640 and 1700, Wilkins identified at least 16 cash-
waqfs serving different neighborhoods of Aleppo, which were organized by city quarter and 
mostly endowed with the objective of serving the taxation need of the residents of their 
respective quarters. In this period, the Ottoman avariz (Ar. ‘awāriẓ) taxes were levied on city 
neighborhoods and much of the lending issued by the cash-waqfs of Aleppo was in the form 
of communal loans to facilitate the settlement of such taxes. Aleppo’s cash-waqfs in the 
seventeenth century were much like those in large Anatolian cities, most notably Bursa.430 
Wilkins compares his list of waqfs to a list of later waqfs for the years 1751-57 that was 
tabulated by Marcus for Aleppo and concludes that by the eighteenth century, the number of 
these waqfs had dropped to seven.431 He suggests several possibilities, and attributes the 
decline in numbers of such waqfs to the same factors that Çizakça’s argued for in the case of 
Bursa, namely that the longevity of waqfs was unsustainable without ongoing injections of 
new capital, and this took place less frequently in latter centuries as other sources of market 
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credit became available. Masters also recognized the role of the city’s cash-waqfs in 
supporting poverty alleviation and the city’s services.432 Masters identifies the first cash-waqf 
that was endowed in the city as that of its governor Aḥmad Mataf in 1597.433 More recent 
scholarship on cash-waqfs by M. al-Arna’ūṭ has shown that the roots of this practice began 
several decades earlier in the mid-sixteenth century, shortly after the legalization of the waqf 
al-nuqūd by the Ottoman state. Al-Arna’ūṭ has argued, also relying on waqfīya copies 
derived from seventeenth century sijill records, that a much larger cash-waqf of 30,000 gold 
dinars was established by Aleppo’s governor Muhammad Pasha Dūwākīn in 964/1556.434 
The capital of this waqf was to be invested by his heirs for the creation of various markets 
and religious institutions in the city. The waqf’s deed called for the deployment of its capital 
in specific terms, as credit to merchants and government officials, at a rate of 10%.435 This 
rate, as discussed below, was the official state-sanctioned lending rate for waqfs in the mid-
1550s, and would increase to a ribḥ ceiling of 15% later in the century. 
Masters also observed that it was generally the case that cash-waqfs in Aleppo in the 
mid-seventeenth century lent at higher rates than that those set in their founding deeds.436 
Masters reproduced Volney’s well-known impressions of the city in this regard, when the 
latter observed: 
“But nothing is more destructive to Syria, than the shameful and excessive usury 
customary in that country. When the peasants are in want of money to purchase 
grain, cattle, etc. they can find none but by mortgaging the whole, or part, of their 
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future crop, greatly under its value … the most moderate interest is twelve per cent, 
the usual rate is twenty, and it frequently rises as high as even thirty.”437 
For Volney, writing in the 1780s, given the fact that interest rates in Europe were 
ridiculously low, less than ten percent in the heyday of late mercantilism, the predominance 
of lending norms at twenty percent in Syria justifiably made no sense. That said, it is 
important to consider that Volney’s observations could be as readily applied to lending rates 
in Jerusalem in the second half of the sixteenth century, as I show below. I am not suggesting 
that the cash-waqfs should be viewed in monolithic terms, since they were responsive to their 
own market milieu. However, I think it is important to distinguish that these institutions 
should not be thought of as the “banks” or “financial-institutions” of their day. They were 
not. In the majority of cases I have reviewed, cash-waqfs were keenly tied to their charitable 
missions, and operated under (in Jerusalem’s case) the strict supervision of the district’s chief 
qāḍī. The fact that interest rates appeared rather static was therefore, I advance, more a 
condition of these cash-waqfs’ requirement to provide a fixed-return to support their required 
(charitable) expenses than a flexible mission to maximize returns while minimizing risk. As I 
show below, while the interest rates of loans given out by cash-waqfs could be responsive to 
the borrower’s creditworthiness, and the collateral and guarantors available, their loans could 
also be completely void of any such distinctions.       
Before turning to an investigation of the cash-waqf records, the issue of the cash-
waqfs of Damascus should be noted, since I am not aware of any studies that point to their 
existence. As previously noted, Rafeq and al-Arna’aūṭ presented a general claim that cash-
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waqfs in Bilād al-Shām were not widely used, and they rely on evidence from mid-17th 
century juristic literature. My own review of Damascus’ first sijill (966/1583), and the only 
one recorded for the sixteenth century, indicates that at least three cash-waqfs were operating 
in the city during that year. Their activities are obscured by the greater and more extensive 
lending activities of the city’s merchants and janissaries that are littered throughout this sijill.   
Although the majority of cash-waqfs founded in Jerusalem and Aleppo were 
established by Ottoman military elites, governors and qāḍīs, there were also several in 
Jerusalem that were founded by Jerusalemite ‘Ḥanafī ulamā, such as that of the imām Mūsā 
al-Dayrī, a scion of the al-Dayrī family in the mid-century which had produced a long line of 
Mamluk-era qāḍīs in Jerusalem. Several sijill acts relating to his waqf have a bearing on a 
number of chapters in this study. More interesting is the fact that a significant minority of the 
larger cash-waqfs had nāẓirs who were Shāfi‘ī qāḍīs from well-known Palestinian ‘ulamā’ 
families. This finding seems to go against Rafeq’s argument concerning the rigid Shāfi‘ī’ 
opposition to adoption of the cash-waqf in Bilād al-Shām. Their resistance, at least in the 
case of sixteenth century Palestine, seems to not have been so firm if my research data is 
taken as indicating norms. It was not the mere presence of Shāfi‘ī qāḍīs as nāẓirs of these 
waqfs, but also the integration of Shāfi‘ī contractual norms in the mu‘āmalāt registrations of 
cash-waqfs that made these jurists influential. When debtors registered mortgage liens on 
their homes or properties as collateral for the loans they took out from these waqfs, debtors 
frequently insisted on requiring the courts to adjudicate any disputes arising from their loans 
under Shāfī‘ī madhhab rules. Such cases routinely appeared when the recording qāḍī was a 
Shāfī‘ī, but also were registered under Ḥanafī qāḍīs in Jerusalem. This appears to support al-
Azem’s theoretical argument for inter-madhhab plurality discussed in chapter two.   
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An important finding that Çizakça elaborated in his review of Bursa’s cash-waqfs was 
that the “trustees borrowed capital from their own endowments and transferred these funds to 
the financiers (ṣarrāfs) of Istanbul with a markup. Consequently, two different rates of 
interest prevailed in the Ottoman capital market: while the trustees of the cash endowments 
supplied credit with the relatively low rates to the ṣarrāf, the latter transferred these to the 
merchants and tax-farmers with a substantial mark up.”438 While I have not carried out a 
quantitative evaluation of interest rates given to waqf nāẓirs as opposed to others, in the 
records of Jerusalem’s cash-waqfs, I have not found evidence to suggest significant loans 
were extended to nāẓirs from cash-waqfs that were to be used to relend at higher rates in the 
market. Jerusalem was of course not Bursa, and the former’s small size and focus as a center 
of religious pilgrimage rather than trade may be the reasons for this. The cash-waqfs of 
Aleppo, however, may have shared similar characteristics with those of Bursa, and Wilkin’s 
above-mentioned study indicates this, however, the fact that Aleppo’s court records only 
begin in the early seventeenth century precludes any assessment for the sixteenth.  
One of the few records of cash-waqfs I have come across from Damascus is indeed 
that of a mutawallī who takes a very large loan from the cash-waqf of two wealthy artisans, 
as follows. On 9 Shawwāl 991/October 26 1583, Muḥammad b. ‘Abd Allah the Ḥanafī qāḍī 
presided over, Ḥaydar b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Rūmī, the mutawallī of the waqf of the deceased 
Ilyās Ketkhudā and his brother Iskandar Ketkhudā, issued an attestation (iqrār) that he owed 
a loan of 412 ½ sulṭānī to this waqf, which was under the supervision of its nāẓir Muṣṭafa 
Shalabī b. Ḥamza.439 The record stated that “half of this amount, 206 sulṭānī relates to the 
loan principal” and that the total amount of 412 ½ was to be repaid in one year’s time; the 
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record further states that the remaining portion aside from the loan principal, the ribḥ that is, 
was for an unspecified deferred sale of a commodity purchased by the debtor, the waqf’s 
mutawallī, from the waqf’s kātib. The record was registered in the attendance and legal 
attestation and approval of its nāẓir, Mustafa Shalabī mentioned above. A janissary, Farrūkh 
b. ‘Abd Allah from the unit of the Blukbāshī Muṣṭafa was in attendance and guaranteed this 
mutawallī’s entire debt. No collateral was mentioned as having been registered for the loan. 
Given that half of the debt was classified as a previously held principal amount, this seems to 
have been a rolling-over of a previous debt by the mutawallī. Unfortunately, the record is 
missing other information that would allow us to determine its exact rate of interest. 
As noted in chapter one, the Ottomans instituted ḳānūnnāme regulations that capped 
market interest rates, referred to euphemistically as mu‘āmalāt shar‘īya. Despite efforts to 
contain the maximum interest rate limit between 10%-15%, extorting moneylenders often 
pushed lending rates far above 20%. In his study of Christian-Muslim relations in Cyprus in 
the period 1571-1640, Ronald Jennings observed numerous cases of courts cracking down on 
corrupt cash-waqf administrators who were lending at rates far higher than the legal limit. 
Jennings notes, by way of example, that “a mutawallī of a (cash) waqf for repairing roads and 
bridges in Lekosa was accused of lending money to the poor at 20% or 30% interest, thereby 
violating the condition of the donor that only 10% interest be charged.”440 The ten percent 
rate of this Cypriot waqf was not incidental, and rates from the waqf charters of Syrian cash-
waqfs likewise refer to prescribed interest rates, in one of two bands, either 10% or 15% per 
annum.  
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Perhaps the most famous cash-waqf of Jerusalem was that of its governor (Amīr al-
Umarā’) Khudāwardī Bey, also known by his sobriquet, the “wielder of two swords” (Abū 
Sayfayn). This waqf was incepted as a cash-waqf of 200 sulṭānī (in the form of 8,000 Shāmī 
paras) on 10 Muḥarram 996/11 December 1587.441 The founder appointed the Mevlevi 
Darwish Abd al-Qādir Celebi to be its mutawallī and instructed him to “deal in (its capital) at 
eleven and a half for every ten (i.e. 15%) for every year using legal stratagems (bi’l-ḥīla al-
shar‘īya), and this (rate) is not to be increased or lowered, and not to take ribā; and no loan is 
to be undertaken without having collateral of a higher value than the loan, or a guarantor.” 
The waqf’s profit proceeds for each year, expected to be 30 sulṭānī, were to be spent on 
salaries of the mutawallī and to three specific dervish musicians (by role), including the 
player of the nāyy, at the mutawallī’s lodge; any remaining money would be used to pay for 
olive oil fuel to light the lodge and meet its other expenses. This waqf’s sijill entry is not 
labelled a ḥujja, and some information is missing, such as the lack of any reference to the 
waqf’s nāẓir, who presumably would have been the founder.   
Within a year of its founding, the Khudāwardī Bey waqf issued over ten loans to a 
variety of debtors that were recorded in the same sijill, and at some point its founder must 
have added substantially to its capital, for five months after its founding in Rajab 996/May 
1588, this waqf issued a large 400 sulṭānī loan to the four heads of the city’s Jewish 
community at an interest rate of 15% in the form of three rolls of broadcloth worth 60 
sulṭānīs.442 While there was no collateral taken for this loan, the Jews took an oath to 
“mutually sponsor and guarantee” (mutakāfilūn mutaḍāminūn) each other’s debts on behalf 
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of the whole Jewish community of Jerusalem. The month prior, in Jumādā I 966/April 1588, 
Khudāwardī Bey’s mutawallī had issued a 30 sulṭānī loan to the Amīr Ḥusayn b. Ḥasan, a 
subaşı who owned a timar, with 4.5 sulṭānī of interest (15%) of interest. This subaşı 
deposited “two metal shields” with the mutawallī as collateral.443 In the same month, the 
waqf also gave an identical loan of 30 sulṭānī with 4.5 sulṭānī interest to a cavalry officer, 
Qīṭās Celebi b. Pīrī Alāy Bayk who mortgaged a home in Jerusalem as collateral. 
Since the influential founder of this waqf was still in office and in Palestine in the 
waqf’s first years, his ongoing control of the waqf must have determined its affairs, at least 
shortly after its inception when it gave out a huge loan to the Jewish community above. To 
place things in perspective, that community’s annual jizya payments amounted to 84 sulṭānīs 
at that time, less than one-fourth the size of the loan that the community took out. Notably, 
Khudāwardī Bey had appointed Jerusalem’s Shāfi‘ī deputy qāḍī, Muḥammad b. Ḥasan, to 
serve as his waqf’s nāẓir and he appears in most of this waqf’s debt registrations including 
the above two. Another Shāfi‘ī deputy qāḍī, Abū’l Hudā, also appears in some records as 
arranging loans (mubāshara) on behalf of the waqf’s mutawallī when he was away playing 
music.444 Certainly, these records indicate that the Shāfi‘ī qāḍīs of Jerusalem were enmeshed 
in the lending activities of cash-waqfs. It is notable that in many instances, rather than using 
expensive jūkh (broadcloth), soap, or other commodity as a pass-through for interest, a 
deferred sale of Kitāb al-minhāj of al-Nawawī, the epitome of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab, was used 
instead.  
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A notable feature of the Khudāwardī waqf’s loans is that the majority were not taken 
by military officers or officials, but rather were given to a diverse group of merchants, 
artisans, senior and junior mendicants, and farmers. We see for instance a relatively small 
loan to a well-known local merchant, Abū al-Yusr al-Fākhurī, who served as guarantor (as 
kafīl) on a 11 sulṭānī loan to a petty trader;445 there was also a 15 sulṭānī loan to Abū Bakr b. 
Ḥabīb, a butcher from Ṣafad (15% interest) who was guaranteed by his nephew446; and a loan 
of 30.5 sulṭānī to the Khawaja Ahmad b. Abi al-Khayr al-Ṭalāḥī (15% interest) with the 
mortgage of an olive orchard in the village of  ‘Ayn Kārim447.  
Significantly, in virtually all cases where loan collateral was registered under a 
Shāfi‘ī deputy qāḍī (as in all the Khudāwardī loans above that include collateral), the assets 
that are mortgaged are explicitly registered under the rules of the Shāfi‘ī madhhab. The 
mortgage of the olive orchard by the Khawāja al-Ṭalaḥī above was, for example, described in 
the sijill as a “legal mortgage (taken) under the legal maxim of the (Shāfi‘ī) madhhab of Qāḍī 
Abū’l-Hudā and he has ruled on its legal validity.” (rahnan shar‘īyyan ‘alā qā‘idat madhhab 
al-qāḍī Abū’l-Hudā wa ḥakam bi-ṣiḥḥatihi ḥukman shar‘īyyan).448 The rules governing 
pledges connected to credit sales differ greatly between Ḥanafī and Shāfi‘ī madhhabs. Under 
Ḥanafī fiqh, the ownership and right-of-use (manfa‘a) of a mortgaged asset must be 
completely alienated (ḥabs) from the debtor for the duration of the loan. Shāfi‘ī fiqh, in 
contrast, allows for debtors to maintain their right to benefit from the use of their pledged 
assets (whether it be a home, or an orchard as above) during their loan, and only mortgage 
their ownership rights. The conservatism of normative Ḥanafī rules on attaching conditional 
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clauses to sale contracts was grounded in the fear that doing so would convolute the essence 
of the sale contract and pose unnecessary risk (gharar) to the counterparties involved.449 
Thus, for creditors, adding right-of-use stipulations to the mu‘āmalāt listed in cash-waqf loan 
undertakings would have likely risked a sale’s nullification under a strict Ḥanafī qāḍī.450 It is 
not surprising, therefore, to see in the Jerusalem sijills debtors’ insistence on the Shāfi‘ī 
position and the proliferation and explication of Shaf ‘ī ī contractual norms, even when debt 
registrations were presided over by Ḥanafī qāḍīs. Ironically, because of this feature, the 
Ḥanafī inspired cash-waqf may have increased demand for Shāfi‘ī jurists to mediate, oversee, 
and authenticate such transactions in court.  
Sijill 67, which covers the 18-month period of 10 May 1587 to 20 December 1588, 
and in which Khudāwardī’s waqf and transactions appear, has records pertaining to 27 cash-
waqfs as follows: 
Cash-Waqfs Recorded in Jerusalem Sijill # 67 
No. Cash-Waqf Name Legal Acts Agg. Loan 
Value 
(sult.) 
Nāẓir Interest 
Rate (mode) 
Date Est. 
1 Khawaja Shams al-Din 
al-‘Aynbūsī* 
1 lawsuit  founder 15%  
2 Khudāwardī Bey 9 loans 690  15% 996/1588 
3 Ḥasan Bāshā 1 loan 12  [FILL]  
4 Jār Allāh Afandī 7 loans 134  15%  
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5 ‘Abdī 3 loans 18  20%  
6 Süleymān çelebī 1 loan 57  [FILL]  
7 Muhammad Bayk b. 
Murād 
4 loans, 1 
lawsuit 
39  [FILL]  
8 Muhammad Bayk 
Nā’ib of Safad 
3 loan     
9 Jamal al-Din Bin 
Rabi‘* 
1 repayment 50  n/a  
10 Mūsā al- Dayrī* 1 repayment   n/a 972/1565 
11 Rābi‘a Khātūn 4 loans 55  20%  
12 Nūr Allāh Bin Jamā‘a* 6 loans     
13 Bānū Khātūn 1 loan 100    
14 Ibn al-Mawṣilī 1 repayment 20   Before 
972/1565 
15 Baymāna Khātūn 22 loans, 1 
muḥāsaba, 1 
repayment 
390  20%  
16 Ṭūrghūd Āghā 4 loans, 1 
muḥāsaba, 2 
lawsuit 
against nāẓir 
150  15%  
17 Biyālā Ketkhūdā 4 loans 54  20%  
18 al-Qāḍī Sharaf al-Dīn 
al-‘Asaylī* 
6 loans 99  20%  
19 Injībāy Khātūn 3 loans 95  20%  
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20 Al-Muftī ‘Umar b. Abī 
al-Luṭf* 
11 loans 130  15%  
21 Muḥammad Aghā al-
Ṭawāshī 
2 loans 40    
22 al-Usta ‘Alī al-Ḥajār 1 loan 20  20%  
23 Muslih al-Din Afandī 1 loan      
24 Mahmud Bayk 1 loan 66    
25 Yaḥya Bin Shakhātīr* 1 loan 99     
26 Fāṭima Khātūn 1 loan 12  18%  
27 Qāsim al-Anṭākī 7 loans     
* Persons from well-known Jerusalemite families 
The above schedule of cash-waqfs from 996/1588 merits three general observations 
with respect to lending rates, the state’s supervision of cash-waqfs, and the organization of 
such institutions. First, with respect to interest rates, there does not appear to have been a 
sophisticated market driven impulse on the part of these waqfs. While they do vary, overall 
they tend to follow certain rate brackets: 15%, 20% or 30%. These rate brackets show 
consistency over time. Second, going against the assertion of al-Arna’ūṭ, the above table 
shows that local notables endowed cash-waqfs in significant numbers (at least in the 1580s), 
and that these represented about a quarter of all cash-waqfs at the time, 26% (7 of 27). Third, 
in the above table of 113 legal acts related to cash-waqfs, only four acts concerned litigation 
brought against debtors by cash-waqf nāẓirs (one of them being a waqf’s own nāẓir); this 
represents about 3.5% of the loans registered in this sijill (by number). This is an exceedingly 
small fraction, but, if this sijill is characteristic of others of the late century, then this would 
imply a very low default rate on such loans. It is also possible - although the sijill record is 
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the only source we can go by - it might be that defaults did occur more frequently and were 
either settled out of court. As notable is the fact that only 11% (3 of the 27 cash-waqfs) 
registered annual financial statements (muḥāsabāt) with the court. There is some evidence 
(below) that muḥāsabāt were regularly undertaken by waqf managers, but not registered in 
court, perhaps to avoid the legal fees associated with such registrations (rasm al-muḥāsaba), 
which was half a sulṭānī in the late 1500s. Additional court and witness fees would surely 
have also been significant for small waqfs where the annual surplus, after deducting 
expenses, was sometimes only a few sulṭānīs. The fact that so few cash-waqfs submitted their 
statements suggests that the state did not mandate the registration of muḥāsabāt. There is no 
mention in the sijills of any state-supervised procedure for managing these waqfs outside of 
the court’s supervision, so it is difficult to say for certain, but it would seem plausible that the 
state’s supervision of cash-waqfs was loose.   
The loans issued by the Baymāna Khātūn waqf and the Khudāwardī waqf do not 
reflect a concern for maximizing the interest rates that could be obtained, rather they 
prioritize a consistent rate of return, that is, stability over profit maximization. This is 
reflected in the tables below containing sample loan data from these three cash-waqfs. The 
objective certainly appears to have been to ensure that these cash-waqfs were able to deliver 
on their charitable mission and not operate as “for profit” institutions. Connected to this 
apparent disinterest in maximizing rates was the general indifference to raising or lowering 
loan interest-rates to reflect the creditworthiness of debtors who provided very significant 
collateral and guarantees. These (in general) did not receive a great discount on their interest 
rates, in spite of the large security they provided. This also supports my observation on the 
“non-profit” character of the Jerusalem cash-waqfs. 
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Sample loans issued by the Khudāwārdī Bey Waqf451 
Loan 
Amount 
Interest 
amount 
Interest 
rate 
Debtor Name Collateral Guarantor 
15 sulṭ. 90 para  15% Bin Ḥabīb the 
Butcher 
none nephew 
30 sulṭ. 4.5 sulṭ. 15% Ḥusayn the Ṣubāshī 2 shields none 
30 sulṭ 4.5 sulṭ. 15% Al-Khawāja Ṭalāḥī olive orchard none 
400 sulṭ. 60 sulṭ. 15% Jews of Jerusalem none Com. pledge 
30 sulṭ. 4.5 sulṭ. 15% Qīṭās Celebi mort. a “dār” none 
20 sulṭ. 3 sulṭ. 15% ‘Alī b. Salīm al-
Maṣrī  
none none 
Sample loans issued by the Baymānā Khātūn Waqf452 
13 sulṭ. 2 sulṭ., 30 para 21% al-Ra’īs M. Taḥrad453 none nā’ib-nāẓir 
of waqf 
guart. 
10 sulṭ. 2 sulṭ. 20% Ahmad b. Ali al-
Masrī 
none guarantor 
10 sulṭ. 2 sulṭ. 20% Khalil al-Haram and 
Hasan al-Dahān 
none Mutual 
surety 
5 sulṭ. 1 sulṭ. 20% Shaykh Ali  none none 
                                                     
451 J-67-424-3, 67-161-3, 173-7, 67-222-4, 67-270-2, 67-424-4 
452 J-67-133-3, 67-177-2, 67-177-3, 67-178-6, 67-177-5, 177-8, 67-256-1, 67-256-2 
453 This debt was a transfer of debts between artisans, recorded as being “the debt transferred from the ūstā 
‘Umar al-ṭaqījī (hatmaker?) to the “ra’īs” Muḥammad b. Abī Bakr Taḥrad?  
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20 sulṭ. 4 sulṭ. 20% al-Naqīb Ibrāhīm  mortg. of 1/6 
share of dār” 
none 
30 sulṭ. 6 sulṭ. 20% Muh. al-Sukkari and 
Yūsuf al-Bayṭār 
none Mutual 
surety 
9 sulṭ. 73 para 20% Ibrāhīm al-Kardūsh dār none 
5 sulṭ. 1 sulṭ. 20% Ḥusayn b. ‘Alī 
from454 village of 
Abū Thawr 
none guarantor 
Sample loans issued by Muftī ‘Umar b. Abī al-Luṭf Waqf455 
5 sulṭ. 30 para 15% Muhammad b. 
Muhiy’l-Din 
none none 
30 sulṭ. 4.5 sulṭ. 15% al-Kh. Mūsā al-Dakri none father 
20 sulṭ. 3 sulṭ. 15% Shaykh Abd al-
Qadir, deputy-nāẓir 
of Dome of Rock 
waqf 
none Two guar.: 
qāḍī, and 
mu’adhdhin 
of al-Aqsa  
10 sulṭ. 1.5 sulṭ. 15% Muṣṭafa b. Jānbāy al-
Ghazzī al-Timarī 
none Subaşı 
10 sulṭ. 1.5 sulṭ. 15% Ibrāhīm al-Mahruqi none brother 
5 sulṭ. 15 para 15%456 Shaykh Uthman b. 
Maḥmūd al-As‘ardī 
none none 
 
                                                     
454 This loan is also a transfer of another pre-existing debt to the same waqf.  
455 J-67-144-8, 67-145-1, 67-144-7, 67-144-6, 67-144-4, 67-144-2. 
456 This loan of 5 sulṭānī was for six months yielding 15 para of ribḥ = 7.5% profit, and equivalent to 15% 
interest when annualized on a simple basis. 40 para = 1 sulṭānī at the time.  
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  With respect to objectives, while many cash-waqfs were created to serve charitable 
objectives such as the recitation of the Qur’ān, paying for stipends of Sufis in lodges, or 
feeding the poor, others were created to support the salaries of administrators in Jerusalem’s 
citadel or court. An accounting statement (muḥāsaba) relating to the cash-waqf of Ṭūrghūd 
Āghā (no. 16 in the above table), shows that his waqf distributed almost all of its profits to 
pay for the salaries of court employees, including the chief qāḍī, his Ḥanafī and Shāfi‘ī 
deputies, and twelve other people. In this muḥāsaba, income attributed to the Ḥanafī deputy 
qāḍī Maḥmūd al-Dayrī for his services to the waqf were offset by a mu‘āmala that this qāḍī 
owed to the waqf at the time of the sijill. The sijill states that a separate muḥāsaba was 
entered into between the waqf’s mutawallī and the deputy qāḍī al-Dayrī to account for his 
loans from the waqf on the same day as the sijill’s general muḥāsaba. This muḥāsaba 
between the deputy qāḍī and the waqf does not appear elsewhere in the sijill; presumably it 
was never registered. This is significant because it illustrates a common norm - most 
accounts of cash-waqfs were not registered in court. Notably, of the 27 cash-waqfs that 
transacted loans in Jerusalem in 996/1588 above, only three had muḥāsabāt recorded in the 
sijill. This demonstrates that the filing of such accounts with the courts was not mandated. 
However, as this cash-waqf’s unregistered muḥāsaba with the deputy qāḍī demonstrates, 
while producing muḥāsabāt accounts was a part of cash-waqf operations, their infrequent 
appearance in the sijills indicates that the submission of these statements to courts was not 
necessarily a requirement. Whether qāḍīs had a separate procedure for the review and 
submission of muḥāsabāt to authorities is unclear, since the sijill record is all that remains.    
A copy of the founding deed of the al-Dayrī waqf can be found in a sijill entry from 
972/1565 which states that his waqf was established “in the amount of 150 sulṭānī” to benefit 
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“the daughter of his pre-deceased son and her children.” Mūsā al-Dayrī was the Imām of the 
Dome of the Rock sanctuary, and had assigned the nāẓirship of this waqf to his nephew 
Jamāl al-Dīn Bin Rabī ‘ who continued to manage his uncle’s waqf in 1588, the year during 
which the transactions of the above table occur.457 In the numerous records of his activities on 
behalf of this waqf, Bin Rabī ‘, who was a well-known merchant, acted judiciously over the 
years, filing lawsuits against a number of debtors (including other waqfs) who owed money 
to al-Dayrī’s waqf. At 150 sulṭānī, Mūsā al-Dayrī’s cash-waqf had a large capital for its day, 
given the date of its establishment over two decades before the wildly inflationary years of 
the 1580s and 90s. What is most significant about this waqf is that it was a hybrid between a 
family waqf and a cash-waqf. My research has not yielded other similar cases for Jerusalem, 
but I am sure they existed in small numbers. As will be shown in two case studies in chapter 
five, Ibn Rabī‘, the nāẓir of al-Dayrī’s waqf, imposed a strict accounting of this cash-waqf’s 
lending activities and distributions, and the business activities of al-Dayrī’s other waqf, a 
waqf of a soap factory that was previously owned by Mūsā al-Dayrī and endowed for the 
benefit of his grandchildren, and lastly, the lending that Ibn Rabī ‘ managed as executor of al-
Dayrī’s estate for the former’s orphaned grandchildren. Mūsā al-Dayrī was undoubtedly very 
wealthy and this was not on account of his Imām position at the Dome of the Rock; he was 
after all listed in the sijills with honorifics that reflect his high position in the al-Dayrī family 
of ‘ulamā notables. Indeed, the Ḥanafī deputy qāḍī of Jerusalem in 966/1588 (sijill 67), 
Maḥmūd al-Dayrī, appears to have been a relative of Mūsā’s.    
 
                                                     
457 Bin Rabī‘ had established his own cash-waqf (no. 9 in table above), although I have not been able to locate 
its founding deeds in the sijills.     
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3.3 The role of credit in conventional waqfs 
The prevailing relationship between waqfs and debt is not monolithic in the authoritative 
founding fiqh works of the Ḥanafīs and Shāfi‘īs, and there is some divergence. Overall, the 
madhhabs agree that waqfs cannot be established by debtors or mortgaged assets. However, 
there is evidence that ordinary waqfs did in fact issue market loans from time to time. What 
was the normative relationship between debt and conventional awqaf independent of the 
cash-waqf?  Did the cash-waqf spur the normalization of lending by conventional family and 
charitable waqfs? When did the visible effects of the price-revolution become manifested in 
Jerusalem and Bilād al-Shām?  
Masters observed that “pre-Ottoman institutions [in Aleppo], such as those of the 
Umayyad Mosque and Sulṭān al-Ghawrī … made extensive loans, especially to villagers, but, 
apparently following older practice, shied away from declaring whether or not they were 
charging interest. This would indicate that as far as the waqfs in Aleppo were concerned, two 
separate traditions coexisted at this time. On the one hand, there was the continuation of a 
pre-Ottoman waqf institution … which may have considered lending money without interest 
as a part of their charitable function, and the distinctly Ottoman practice of the cash-waqf.”458 
While lending from conventional waqfs before the cash-waqf surely took place, it was likely 
to have been on an exceptional or irregular basis. The nāẓirs of waqfs under the Shāfi‘īs 
generally required the permission of the waqf’s founder (to have been specified in the 
                                                     
458 Masters, Origins, 162–3.; Reinfandt notes that in these large waqf’s such as al-Ghawri’s, “waqf capital might 
have served, in not a few cases, as a highly profitable covert ‘bank’ providing the donor with considerable 
means of political power in times where money was chronically short.” Lucian Reinfandt, “The Administration 
of Welfare Under the Mamluks,” in Court Cultures in the Muslim World: Seventh to Nineteenth Centuries, ed. 
Albrecht Fuess and Peter Hartung (Routledge, 2011), 263. 
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waqfīya), a qāḍī, or ruler to take on loans for waqfs under their management. While legal, 
such loans, as al-Munāwī explains in his Taysīr al-wuqūf were not looked upon favorably 
and were usually allowed only in exceptional or pressing circumstances, to meet the capital-
improvement needs of a waqf and not its operating expenses.459 A debt to repair a waqf’s 
building if it was at risk of falling would be acceptable if its own budget could not support 
such expense. However, a nāẓir would not be allowed to take a loan on the waqf’s books to 
pay the salaries of waqf staff. Al-Munāwī elaborates that what jurists “mean by [allowing a 
waqf] to take a loan (iqtirāḍ) is indebtedness, even if it means taking one out through a 
deferred (usurious) sale” (murādihim bi-l’iqtirāḍ al-istidāna wa-law bi-l-sharā’ bi-nasī’a).460 
In fact, al-Munāwī notes that many jurists liken a waqf’s debt-seeking nāẓir to the debt-
seeking guardian of minors, in which he is only allowed to seek it “in the case of absolute 
necessity, or the need to travel, and so he indebts him (the minor) as his financial trustee and 
he produces a deed for it.”461  
Legal treatises on waqfs also generally prohibit their establishment among insolvent 
debtors. The driving rationale is that debtors would naturally seek to shield their assets 
behind waqfs, in order to remove them from the reach of courts seeking to use confiscation 
and other means to redress the rights of creditors. The role of courts, and particularly the 
inunctions of the state through the qānūn in the Ottoman case, was vital to the protection of 
the public interest. The fatwās of the Şeyhülislam were issued to chief qāḍīs and distributed 
with regular edicts that updated qānūn. A qāḍī’s failure to act according to such regulations, 
could therefore jeopardize his position. The Ottoman Şeyhülislam Ebu’l-s-Su‘ud, for 
                                                     
459 al-Munāwī, Taysīr Al-Wuqūf ʻalá Ghawāmiḍ Aḥkām Al-Wuqūf, 137. 
460 al-Munāwī, Taysīr Al-Wuqūf, 138. 
461 al-Munāwī, Taysīr Al-Wuqūf, 322. 
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instance, issued many legal opinions concerning the management of debt and it was clear that 
these legal opinions were actual supplements to the law or code. The legal opinion in 
response to the following question put forward to Ebu’l-s-Su‘ud, answers the person posing 
the question. But it also serves as an injunction to any qāḍīs considering going against his 
ruling : 
“Question: When the debtor Zeyd is in good health, he 
surreptitiously takes property from his creditors [property here 
implies borrowed money], and converts all his property to 
trust for his descendants. Is his trust valid?  
Answer: It is neither valid nor irrevocable. Qāḍīs are 
forbidden to validate and register as trust the amount of a 
debtor’s property that is tied up in the debt.”462 
Some Mamluk jurists had parallel concerns to Ebu’s-Su‘ud’s. Although the Mamluk 
sultanate did not apply a codified qānūn program, sultanic edicts (marāsim) on various 
matters to qāḍīs were common and such a ban could have been issued by the sultan. 
However, the legal pluralism of the Mamluk court system would have made such a 
combination of fatwā-cum-edict unthinkable. It is possible that all four chief qāḍīs could 
have been compelled to accept a sultan’s view and issue a uniform legal opinion, however, 
adjudication would continue on a distributed basis, with litigants able to choose the qāḍī and 
school they desired. In this respect, the Mamluk courts were distinct from the Ottoman 
                                                     
462 Colin Imber, Ebuʼs-suʻud: the Islamic legal tradition, (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1997), 
142; Paul Horster, Zur Anwendung des Islamischen Rechts im 16. Jahrhundert, Bonner orientalische Studien, 
vol. 10, (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1935), 42. 
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centralized hierarchy and, ostensibly, less effective at handling a uniform application of 
codes.    
In the case of Jerusalem, the cash-waqf does appear to have spurred lending by large 
family waqfs, although on a on a limited basis. There are instances of nāẓirs issuing loans 
from their family waqfs and taking on mortgages. However, Jerusalem’s sijills in the second 
half of the century do not show that the lending of conventional waqfs surpassed that of cash-
waqfs. As for the four large “public-waqfs,” the transactions of which litter the sijills (the 
Ḥaramayn waqf, the Dome of the Rock waqf, the al-Aqsa mosque sanctuary waqf, and the al-
Khalīl waqf), these did not engage in lending to the public. That is not to say they were debt 
free, however. As the sijills attest, debts were regularly registered against them or for them 
because of their heavily enmeshed relationship with the administration of the city, its public 
services and resources (particularly the Hasekī Sultān waqf), and Jerusalem’s hinterland 
economy. I argue that because of the “debt-enmeshment” that these waqfs had between their 
hinterland revenue sources and the myriad charitable ends they served, they were 
continuously in a state of debt-giving and indebtedness, and also a regular source for 
corruption on the part of their nāẓirs.  For the Ottoman state, and the Mamluks before them, 
such large waqfs were like the big-banks of the 2008 financial-crisis; they were “too big to 
fail” and had to be recapitalized from time to time. It was for these reasons that the 
supervision of these waqfs was centrally administered directly from the Sublime Porte (al-
Bāb al-‘Ālī), which, however, did not make their management any easier.   
The price revolution showed its effects in the last decade of the century, although 
increased pace of lending was apparent in the century’s penultimate decade. This coincided 
with administrative-tax changes that saw the increased use of avariz taxes and the breakdown 
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or disuse of the preceding iltizām system along with the diffusion of new groups into the 
janissary corps’, and that classes’ increased power. Also evident in the sijills is the transition 
to two currencies in the last quarter of the century. From around 1576, one begins to see the 
use of the Safavid silver coin, the Shāhānī, in wide circulation, where eight of these silver 
coins were used as a standard exchange for one gold sulṭānī coin. Then, in the last five years 
of the century, one observes a proliferation of the Mediterranean-wide Dutch and Spanish 
silver currency, the ghurūsh. The role of lending as a mainstay of the janissaries is widely 
reflected in acts from the first extant sijill of Damascus (sijill no. 1), however, it is less so in 
the case of Jerusalem, because of the former’s role as an administrative and military center.  
The above expression, “ten gold coins for eleven gold coins in every year” became 
the standard phrase for expressing the rate of interest to be earned. It is not clear when or 
whether this phrase was in regular use before the sixteenth century. However, it was certainly 
in use before the cash-waqf controversy. During the Ottoman qānūn reforms of 1540, the 
following modification to the law was made, which reduced the lawful rate of interest to 10% 
from the earlier rate of 15% of the qānūn of Bayezid II circa 1500: “[Persons] who make 
[loan] transactions in accordance with the sharī‘a shall not be allowed to [take] more than 
eleven for every ten [pieces of money lent].”463 
Cash-waqfs of local elites from Bilād al-Shām 
The cash-waqf of Khudāwardī b. al-Shaykh Ḥusayn al-Khalwatī was established on 2 
Rajab 984/ 25 September 1576 in the large amount of 400 sulṭānīs. The Khalwatī name refers 
                                                     
463 Uriel Heyd and Victor Louis Ménage, Studies in old Ottoman criminal law (Clarendon Press, 1973), 122; 
Imber, Ebu’ Su‘ud, 50. 
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to the Sufi order, family name and lodge in Jerusalem.464 This waqf should not be confused 
with the previously mentioned waqf of the former governor Khudāwardī, which was also 
established in the amount of 400 sulṭānīs. Like other cash-waqfs its profits were dedicated to 
charitable ends. Namely, these were to provide for the daily wage of 1 akce for each of the 
four Qur’ān reciters appointed “to read a complete section from the word of God” at a local 
shrine in the name of the waqf founder. The daily wage was “not eligible to be increased at 
any time,” and would total 1460 akce, or 37 sulṭānī per year.465 In addition to the cash 
endowed to this waqf, its founder also endowed his home. The waqf deed specified that any 
waqf income left after settling its dues (to the above readers) was to be applied to repair of 
the building endowed in the waqf and would revert, with the qāḍī’s approval, to the waqf 
nāẓir in his lifetime and his male heirs thereafter. Upon the death of the family line, the waqf 
would transfer to the benefit of the Dome of the Rock waqf. While the waqf deed states that 
its capital was to be lent at the lawful rate of 10% (eleven for every ten sulṭānī) in legal-
lending (al-mu‘āmala al-shar‘īya), which was well below the 15% allowed for in Ebu’l-s-
Su‘ūd’s fatwās, it is likely that the waqf actually would have lent at a much higher rate, in 
line with the market norms of 20%-30% which was the range at which most loans were given 
at the time of its founding.466  At 10%, Khudāwardī’s waqf’s would tentatively have yielded 
                                                     
464Khudāwardī b. al-Shaykh Ḥusayn al-Khalwatī appears in a transaction from twenty years earlier, from 22 
Rajab 972/ 23 February 1564-5, when he paid 300 sulṭānī for a large quantity of soap. Like other ‘ulamā’ he 
was heavily involved in the soap and olive oil trade of Jerusalem. J-46-166-6.   
465 Kāmil Jamīl al-ʻ Asalī, Wathāʼiq Maqdisīyah tārīkhīyah, vol. 2 (ʻAmmān: Muʼassasat ʻAbd al-Ḥamīd 
Shūmān, 1985), 264–266. J-57-95. 
466 The market rates for loans in this period were somwhat above 20% p.a. A loan recorded a week earlier to the 
Khudāwardī’s waqf’s establishment shows two borrowers, a father and son, take a loan of 23 sulṭānī with 5 
sulṭānī of interest - in the form of a sale of a green sash – for one year, an interest rate equivalent to 22%. J-57-
94-8; In another loan, recorded just three days prior to the founding of Khudāwardī’s waqf, another cash-waqf 
in Jerusalem, that of “Muṣliḥ al-Dīn the former chief-judge of Damietta” issued a loan of 30 sulṭānī with 5.2 
sulṭānī of attached interest – through sale of a copper bowl. The latter’s interest was 21%. J-57-100-2. 
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revenues of 40 sulṭānī per year, just enough to pay its Qur’ān reciters salaries, but 
realistically, the waqf would have been generating at least double that amount in revenues, 
meaning that - If managed prudently - 50%-60% of the cash-waqf’s income could revert to 
the founder in this case.  
The preceding discussion of the cash-waqf does not imply that ordinary waqfs did not 
engage in market lending, or that debts and their impacts on ordinary waqfs were not large. 
They could be. The practice of waqfs lending money was a commonplace in Syria and Egypt 
before the sixteenth century, however, it was never viewed independently of a given waqf’s 
cash flows and constraints, which first prioritized the needs of its properties and services. By 
the arrival of Ottoman rule in the Levant, the institution of waqf was firmly established as the 
most important legal-economic institution in society and as the most critical agent for 
urbanization.467 Economic exchange was therefore an indelible feature of the waqf system 
and the use of credit facilitated exchanges of various kinds and, in fact, waqfs could not live 
without credit. However, the lending of regular, as opposed to cash-waqfs, was qualitatively 
different due to the difference in which the waqf’s revenues were produced and distributed. 
The cash flows of regular waqfs could be locked up in overdue receivables that could 
mushroom to five years or more. Regular waqfs were less nimble than cash-waqfs and ill-
equipped for lending because, simply put, it was not their business. However, there are 
numerous examples of regular waqfs, engaging in a lending with their capital early in the 
waqf’s life. This is particularly the case with waqfs that were endowed with large sums of 
                                                     
467 Modern scholarship on the history of waqfs has generally located the zenith of waqf’s contribution to urban 
development in the Ayyubid and mid-Mamluk eras (late twelfth to late fourteenth centuries). From the fifteenth 
centuries on, one begins to see in the case of Cairo, a crowding out, as new sultanic waqfs are increasingly 
forced to locate in areas adjacent to the city’s Qasaba (the main thoroughfare); Sylvie Denoix, “A Mamluk 
Institution for Urbanization: The Waqf”, in The Cairo Heritage: Essays in Honor of Laila Ali Ebrahim, ed. 
Doris Behrens-Abouseif (AUC Press, 2000), 195-196.   
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money to be invested into income generating properties to fulfill a certain function and an 
interim investment of these funds could occur. Below are two examples of waqf founding 
deeds, from two major figures of the Mamluk and Ottoman eras, whom established waqfs in 
Jerusalem and how fears about debts and mismanagement of their waqfs, at a waqf’s 
inception, were active concerns for such elites.  
An Ottoman copy of the founding charter of the madrasa of the Mamluk amīr Tankīz 
(nā’ib of Damascus from 712-741/1312-1340), which continued to operate in the Ottoman 
period, shows that parallel concerns were expressed by its founder with respect to the village 
lands that were endowed for the benefit of this large madrasa.468 Tankīz extolls his 
endowment’s future administrators to make use of a variety of contractual means to 
maximize productivity of this land for the waqf, including sharecropping (mūzāra‘a), labor 
hire (?) (mūfālaḥa), and credit-sale contracts (mu‘āmala). The administrator has full 
authority to use the waqf’s cash assets to procure “oxen, tools and machinery (ālāt), and farm 
seed (taqwiyat fallāḥ)” to accomplish this. However, if making the land productive proves 
too challenging, the administrator can resort to leasing the waqf’s village lands, subject to 
this lease not being made under one contract, and never let out for a period of more than two 
years, nor could properties be re-leased before the end of their respective lease periods. Other 
income-producing properties of the waqf, follow similar rules, such as two bathhouses that 
are only leasable for maximum periods of one year at a time. The waqfīya further warns 
future administrators to be vigilant against leasing the waqf’s assets “to the bankrupt (al-
muflis), the delinquent (al-mutasharrid), the idle (al-‘āṭil), or to the itinerant (al-mutajāwil)”, 
                                                     
468 The Ottoman copy of Tankiz’s Jerusalem madrasa waqf dates from 1020/1611. First published in ʻAsalī, 
Kāmil J., Wathāʼiq Maqdisīyah Tārīkhīyah, vol. 1, 105-123. Later reproduced in Ghūshah, Muḥammad H. M. 
D. Al-awqāf Al-Islāmīyah Fī Al-Quds Al-Sharīf: Dirāsah Tārīkhīyah Muwaththaqah. Istānbūl: IRCICA, 
(Markaz al-Abḥāth lil-Tārīkh wa-al-Funūn wa-al-Thaqāfah al-Islāmīyah bi-Istānbūl, 2009).  
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and under no circumstances should these properties be leased to someone with the intention 
of re-leasing the property to a person with the above qualities.469 
The ease with which waqf income could be misappropriated was a key concern for 
large waqf founders. Lending out waqf proceeds could easily diminish the funds available to 
meet a waqf’s operating and capital improvement expenses, particularly in the case of 
overdue debts. This was also true of imprudent waqf administrators who would allow for 
overdue rents to accumulate. Further allowing waqfs to lend as a form of risk-diversification 
risked transforming charitable waqfs into for profit financial institutions. The waqf 
endowment charter of the Ottoman admiral Sinān Pāsha’s waqf explicitly prohibits any 
lending from its assets: 
“It has been stipulated that what God almighty and high has provided from 
rental income and crop yields (paid as rent) should [first] be put towards 
[paying for] building repairs and improvements (maṣāliḥ al-marmah wal-
ta‘mīr) in his most esteemed waqf, while abstaining from (ghabb) issuing  
sharecropping contracts (muqāṭa‘āt) and from writing off the waqf’s legal 
rights to collect tenant rents; (second) the remaining income should be 
used to pay for the salaries of the waqf’s earlier listed employees, and 
(third) to what follows concerning other expenses…”470     
 
                                                     
469 ʻAsalī, Kāmil J., Wathāʼiq Maqdisīyah Tārīkhīyah, vol. 1, 119. 
470 Wa sharaṭ an yaṣrif mimmā razaqqahū Allah al-malik al-muta‘āla min al-rai‘  wal-ghilāl ilā maṣāliḥ al-
marmah wal-ta‘mīr fī awqāfihū al-khatīr, ghabb adā’ diyūn al-muqāṭa‘āt wa īfā’ ḥuqūq al-ajarāt, thumma 
yaṣraf min al-bāqī īla ma marr min al-waẓā’if wa īla ma saya’tī bayānahū min al-maṣārīf. ʻAsalī, Wathāʼiq 
Maqdisīyah Tārīkhīyah   
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If agricultural revenues were the driving force behind urban waqfs in Bilād al-Shām, 
and Jerusalem in particular, then it is agricultural credit that ensured the mutual continuity of 
urban waqfs and their hinterland villages.471 Credit worked in many forms in this regard. 
First, the extension of credit from waqfs to peasants for the waqf’s agreed share of 
agricultural production, was critical to peasants in the hinterland economy. Large urban 
waqfs also extended loans to farmers to pay for labor, equipment and transport involved with 
the processing, storage and transport of the crops due to them. As importantly, shortfalls in 
the delivery of grain and olive oil from farmers could be, and often were, converted into 
debts to the waqfs that they served. These debts could roll over from one year to the next, 
binding certain villages to those people or institutions holding title to their annual crop 
yields, in the form of taxes. Of course, such a credit framework could also put at risk the 
waqf administrator’s ability to meet the basic provision of services related to its charitable 
mission, whether it was a school, mosque, soup kitchen, hospice or other mission. The over-
extension of credit by waqfs to villages could result in the exchange (to other waqfs through 
istibdāl) of weaker producing agricultural properties or their lease to another waqf or 
investor, and this could generate a loss to the original holding waqf, even leading to its 
dissolution.  
The Ṭāzīya school (madrasa) in Jerusalem presents such a scenario. The Mamluk 
amīr Ṭāz b. Ṭūghāj built the Ṭāzīya madrasa in Jerusalem in 763/1361, is located to the west 
of the Ḥaram al-Sharīf sanctuary, within the city’s walls near the Bab al-Silsila gate. As with 
                                                     
471 Amy Singer has noted, “The lion’s share of the revenues in the Sanjak of Jerusalem supported pious 
foundations (vakifs), most of them local.” The arrival of Ottoman rule added new awqāf in the city that also 
made use of hinterland revenues and maintained the Mamluk waqfs that preceded them; Amy Singer, 
Palestinian peasants and Ottoman officials: Rural administration around sixteenth-century Jerusalem. 
Cambridge University Press, 1994, 25. 
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other waqfs, the Ṭāzīya school’s nāzir would have been required to submit annual financial 
statements to the district’s qāḍī as well as the state’s nāẓir of charitable waqfs (nāẓir al-
nuẓẓār) in the district. The nāẓir al-nuẓẓār’s role was to supervise the continued operations of 
a district’s waqf services, intervene in assisting mutawallīs when waqfs were dilapidated or 
struggling, and to maintain a general ledger of waqf activities under his supervision.  
Under Ottoman rule, the nāẓir al-nuẓẓār’s regular reporting to Istanbul about the 
conditions of the waqfs under his supervision was important for several reasons. First, the 
timar military land-tenure system, which converted agricultural production from the sultan’s 
lands into military pay, was intertwined in Bilād al-Shām with the agricultural production 
and supply chains of hinterlands owned or operated by waqfs. That is, the state and private 
systems of economic production relied on a common distribution system; therefore, the 
state’s knowledge of waqfs productivity under its territory would have been critical for 
helping it to benchmark its own revenue generating and taxation abilities. Second, the 
Ottomans levied taxes on market properties. Lastly, the Ottoman state actively borrowed 
from waqfs from the last quarter of the sixteenth century, and taxed them through their avariz 
taxes, to bridge shortfalls in its fiscal budgets, in order to pay for their increasingly  
expensive military campaigns. The state’s supervision of waqfs in general would have given 
it unmatched intelligence about the economic condition of waqfs and which were more suited 
to support its borrowing needs. However, as I discuss below, the state did also use its long 
arm of supervision to intervene in arranging financing for waqfs that were at risk of 
imminent collapse. In doing so, the paternalistic nature of the Ottoman state, as purveyor of 
justice and social order, could result in positive outcomes with respect to how waqf nāẓirs 
managed their debts. 
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In 984/1576, the mutawallī of the Ṭāzīya madrasa submitted a muḥāsaba to 
Jerusalem’s qāḍī for a financial reconciliation explaining how several debts of the waqf had 
been repaid to the Ṭāzīya madrasa in that year.472 The sijill entry of this muḥāsaba also 
requests the qāḍī’s approval for the application of the received funds towards a variety of 
payables related to the madrasa’s operations and capital expenditures. The lump-sum nature 
of a total of 16,112 akce would have been equivalent to roughly 403 sulṭānī at the silver-gold 
conversion rate of the time, (forty silver akce to the sultan’s gold coin - the sijill refers to the 
currency as the official silver currency, qit‘a fiḍīya sūlaymānīya, in other words the akce). 
One must assume, however, that these different types of debts were repaid in a piecemeal 
fashion earlier on and applied to the madrasa’s operating expenses throughout the year. 
While the sijill purportedly asks for the qāḍī’s approval to disbursing the sums cited below 
towards various expenses, it is probable therefore that most of these expenditures were 
already settled by the time the issue was brought to court and the sijill functioned simply as a 
matter of record, to clear the mutawallī of financial liability (barā’at dhimma) for his 
management of the waqf. The following tables provide a summary of this reconciliation:  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
472 Jerusalem Sijill 57, p. 62, 984/1576; ʻAsalī, Kāmil J., Wathāʼiq Maqdisīyah Tārīkhīyah: Maʻa Muqaddimah 
Ḥawla Baʻḍ Al-Maṣādir Al-Awwalīyah Li-Tārīkh Al-Quds, 3 vol., (Al-Mu’asasa al-‘Arabiya li-l-Dirāsāt w-al-
Nashr,1983), vol. 2, 216-217. 
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Table 1 
Repaid Debts – 984/1576 Amounts 
 
Payment for grain sold on credit in 980/1572 (maḥsūl ghilāl). 
 
10,920 akce 
Overdue rents from the waqf’s buildings (musaqaffāt) for the year 
981/1573. 
2,160 akce473 
Repayment of debts waqf extended to peasants (fi dhimam al-
fallāḥin) working on the waqf’s farms during 979/1571. 
3,032 akce 
Total  16,112 akce 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
473 The term musaqaffāt refers to “roofed buildings” and appears in Mamlūk-era awqāf property descriptions. 
Income from roofed buildings was typically restricted in waqf deeds for one to three year periods, although in 
practice, leases could be drawn out for much longer periods and this was widely reported in court records from 
early seventeenth century Cairo. For Mamluk use of the term, see Layish, Aharon. "Waqfs of Awlād al-Nās in 
Aleppo in the Late Mamlūk Period as Reflected in a Family Archive." Journal of the Economic and Social 
History of the Orient 51.2 (2008): 319. For Egypt, see Mūhammad ‘Afīfī, “Asālīb Al-Intifā‘ Al-Iqtiṣādī Bī-L-
Awqāf Fī Miṣr Fī Al-‘aṣr Al-‘uthmānī,” Annales Islamologiques, no. 24 (1988): 104-5, 111-113. 
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Table 2 
Waqf Expenditures– 984/1576  Amounts 
 
Salaries to waqf nāzir and mutawallī (together 1,620 akce), 10 senior 
shaykhs (3,450 akce), and 10 orphans living at the waqf (250 akce) 
 
5,320 akce 
Salaries of 3 teachers and 21 Qur’an readers 1,500 akce 
Stipends of 16 students 775 akce 
Building repairs to the waqf’s granary in Safad  2,891 akce 
Building repairs to the Ṭāzīya madrasa structure in Jerusalem 2,092 akce 
Robes (kḥīla‘) for the villagers the waqf’s farms (120 for the heads, 
and 400 for the rest)474  
620 akce 
Court fees, nāẓir fees, and taxes  644 akce 
Other administrative costs 510 akce 
Discretionary reserve amount to be spent by mutawallī as required 1,760 akce 
 
Total  
 
16,112 
 
                                                     
474 The gifting of clothing to village heads was a custom of waqfs in Palestine. In another muḥāsaba, similar to 
that provided by the Ṭāzīya waqf, the mutawallī of the al-Jawharīya Khānqā waqf from Muḥarram 
966/December 1587, shows that in that year, the khānqā distributed 800 paras worth of robes (khila‘) to the 
village-heads of Ṭulkaram (present-day city of Ṭulkaram). It is unclear whether these were actual robes or 
referred simply to clothing in general. The villagers of Ṭulkaram were also allocated 220 paras of food rations 
(mū’annat fallāḥīn). J- 67-78-1. 
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While I have not carried out a full review of the other sijills pertaining to this waqf 
that are in the Jerusalem registers of surrounding years, an educated guess of this waqf’s 
average annual operating budget can be made by extrapolating comparable salary data of 
pupils and teachers from other Jerusalem waqfs operating at around the same time. Among 
these was the very large waqf of Hasekī Sultan, Sultan Süleymān’s wife, which is referred to 
as al-‘Imāra al-‘Āmira in Jerusalem, but there are also a number of large other waqfs 
established by the Ottoman elite, which include several cash-waqfs.475  
The daily wages at Hasekī Sultan’s soup kitchen in Jerusalem, from the record of this 
waqf’s deed registered in 964/1557, which is a little more than a decade before the debt 
reconciliation of the above Ṭāzīya madrasa, ranged between two dirhams for manual laborers 
to eight dirhams per day for each of the kitchen’s scribe (kātib) and director (shaykh). The 
endowment also employed a procuring agent (called a “wakīl kharj”) for a wage of six 
dirhams per day to procure all the food and other supplies required for the kitchen and 
bakery’s daily production. It is worth noting that the endowment’s head chef received a 
salary of seven dirhams per day, almost as much as the kātib, procuring agent and shaykh 
(the procurement agent’s two assistants received three dirhams each per day).476  
By way of comparison, a waqf of a very different order, that of Süleymān Pāsha 
(governor of Jerusalem during year 977/1569), established during the same year as the 
Tāzīya madrasa, indicates that low-level wages were around one to two akce per day. In the 
                                                     
475 Some of these have been published earlier by Kamil al-‘Asali, and others have been published more recently 
by Muhammad Hashim Ghawsheh in publications by the Organization for Islamic Countries Research Center 
for Islamic History, Culture, and Art (IRCICA) in Istanbul. See bibliography. 
476 It is worth noting that the endowment’s head chef received a salary of seven dirhams per day, almost as 
much as the katib, procuring agent and shaykh (the procurement agent’s two assistants received three dirhams 
each per day). al-ʻ Asalī, Wathāʼiq, 1983, 1:136–37; Between the years 1552 to 1557, this soup kitchen’s staff 
grew from thirty-seven to forty-nine employees making it one of the largest employers in Jerusalem. Singer, 
Constructing Ottoman Beneficence, 55–56. 
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former waqf, Süleymān Pāsha endowed an elaborately decorated Qur’ān manuscript in 
983/1575 to be read daily as a blessing to his family, as well as to the deceased Sultan 
Süleymān.477 The waqf deed stipulates that eleven adult and unobjectionable readers (khālī 
al-‘āriḍḍayn wa lā ṣibiyyān) are to be employed to read the Qur’an in segments at the 
northern gate of the Dome of the Rock sanctuary after sunrise prayers, completing the entire 
Qur’an within a period of three days. Each of these Qur’an readers is to receive a daily wage 
of two akce, and another junior employee (specified by name) is to receive one akce per day 
for watering plants there between sunset and evening prayers. The waqf’s founder assigns 
both the supervision (naẓār) and management (walāya) of this waqf to one individual, a 
shaykh who is the son of a well-known previous mūftī of Jerusalem.478 The latter receives 
four akce per day as his remuneration for fulfilling the services of both nāzir and mutawallī. 
In contrast to the Hasekī Sultan waqf, the wages-levels of Süleymān Pāsha’s Qur’ān waqf 
may appear to be slightly lower, albeit the work is different nature, the Qur’an readers above 
receiving a wage of two akce per day, in line with the low-level workers of Hasekī Sultan’s 
kitchen. The nāẓir/mutawallī’s pay here of four akce per day is also significantly lower than 
the eight akce or so per day that the director “shaykh” of the Hasekī Sultan kitchen received. 
However, being a ‘ālim notable, the Qur’an waqf’s nāẓir/mutawallī surely would have held 
posts in other waqfs in addition to this low-maintenance post and one also should consider 
that the Hasekī Sultan kitchen was operating at a generous budget, given its patron. 
Therefore, the four akce per month was likely a fair arrangement, particularly in view of the 
fact that the waqf deed calls for the Shaykh’s children to inherit his position.  
                                                     
477 Ghūshah, Muḥammad H. M. D. Al-awqāf Al-Islāmīyah Fī Al-Quds Al-Sharīf: Dirāsah Tārīkhīyah 
Muwaththaqah. Istānbūl: IRCICA, (Markaz al-Abḥāth lil-Tārīkh wa-al-Funūn wa-al-Thaqāfah al-Islāmīyah bi-
Istānbūl, 2009), Vol 1, 506. 
478 Ghūshah, Al-awqāf Al-Islāmīyah, vol. 1, 507 
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If we were to apply the above wage scale range (two akce to eight akce per day), the 
hypothetical budget of the Tāzīya madrasa would be roughly twenty-five to thirty thousand 
akce per year, which considerably dwarfs the repaid debts of 16,112 akce.479 The repaid debts 
thus represent 55% to 65% of the madrasa’s annual operating budget. Excluded from this 
budget are ten “shaykhs” appearing in the sijill who received a combined 3,450 from the debt 
repayment. These individuals appear to be temporary lecturers, rather than permanent 
teaching staff. These individuals do not represent their own category in the sijill and their 
payments appear in the same line item as the payments made to the nāẓir, mutawallī, and 
orphans who reside at the madrasa. My above estimate also excludes the roughly 5,000 akce 
of capital expenditures related to the repair of the madrasa itself and its granary in Ṣafad.  
The Ṭāzīya madrasa’s receipt of overdue debts presents a mixed picture. While the 
size of the repaid debts (16,112 akce) is very considerable, representing a little over half of 
the school’s annual budget, the portion that was used to settle in-arrears staff costs represents 
just 7,595 akce, a quarter to a third of the school’s operating budget. This is still significant 
because it means that for every four months of operations, the school was falling behind by 
one month in paying staff salaries. The mutawallī surely would have relied on other sources 
of funding (possibly even taking out loans on behalf of the waqf) to fill such gaps. The fact 
that the subject repaid debts were several years old indicates that this was a systematic 
problem for this, and probably most other waqfs that depended on revenues from agricultural 
production. On one hand, weather, disease and a host of other problems affected the ability of 
                                                     
479 I have calculated this based on the number of people at the madrasa who are presented in the sijill as 
permanent staff. I have applied the following daily wage rates: twenty-one Qur’an reciters each at two akce 
per/person/day, three teachers at three akce per/person/day, sixteen students at one akce per/person/day, one 
mūtawalli at three akce per day, and one nāzir at four akce per/day. The total budget based on this distribution 
results in an annual expense of twenty-seven thousand akce; factoring a margin for error, I estimate a total of 
twenty-five to thirty thousand akce.  
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peasants to pay back their debts. At the other end of the supply chain for grain were market 
brokers, merchants and tax administrators who sold the grain on behalf of waqfs. Waqfs 
would sell their grain on a wholesale basis, on credit. While the mutawallīs of often 
concerned themselves with the production and storage of grain and other agricultural-
industrial production, such as olive oil and soap, a chain of market players handled the 
distribution of a waqf’s production, with credit playing a key role in every part of the chain. 
Thus, it is no surprise to see that the majority of the debts in table 1 (10,920 akce out of 
16,112 akce) were debts owed to the waqf for the sale of grain from four years prior. It would 
be a mistake, however, to claim that the Tāzīya waqf was in dire straits. This waqf’s revenues 
must have been in excess of thirty thousand akce, in nominal terms, in order to support its 
annual budget that I have estimated at twenty to thirty thousand akce.  
The self-assuredness of the Ṭāzīya’s mutawallī is evident from the fact that he is able 
to set aside 1,760 akce in a discretionary reserve under his management, and to commit 2,891 
akce and 2,092 akce towards building improvements in Safad and Jerusalem, respectively. It 
is not clear whether this commitment to renovate the waqf’s buildings arose out of a bout of 
financial prudence and forward thinking on the part of the mutawallī, or because the 
mutawallī was instructed to do so by the authorities. The sijill points to the fact that such 
renovations are/will be carried out “in accordance to the [instructions] of the sijill defters of 
the qāḍīs of Safad and Jerusalem” which may imply the latter view.480 Either way, the 
management of debts was never at the sole discretion of a waqf’s nāzir or mutawallī, at least 
in theory. Rather such issues required the oversight and intervention of the courts, via the 
                                                     
480 “bi-mawjib defter mawlānā qāḍī Ṣafad … bi mawjib defter mawlānā qāḍī al-qūds al-sharīf”, 
ʻAsalī, Wathāʼiq, vol. 2, 217. 
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direct supervision of qāḍīs, and often under the guidance of the nāẓir al-nuẓẓār. The 
functioning of charitable waqfs was an issue that concerned the public welfare (maṣlaḥa), and 
was susceptible to mismanagement and corruption.   
A little over three decades later, the Ṭāzīya waqf appears again - in a recently 
published Qāḍī court register by IRCICA for the year 1023-1024/1623-1624.481 In a record 
from this later register, dating Jumādā al-Thānī 1033/April 1624, the Ṭāzīya waqf appears to 
be in urgent need of repair and in an insolvent state.482 The mutawallī of the waqf at this time 
testifies in court that, while he is aware of the school’s urgent need of repairs, he cannot do 
so because of defaulting rents from houses owned by the madrasa.483 The waqf’s reserves are 
so depleted that it is not able to pay its teachers’ salaries. In light of this, the qāḍī appoints the 
city’s chief builder (mi‘mār bāshī) of Jerusalem to assess the madrasa’s building repairs and 
advise on that which is absolutely needed. The chief-builder finds many parts of the building 
with leaking roofs and broken floor tiles in urgent need of replacement at a total cost of 
twenty-four and a half silver ghurūsh (equivalent to roughly 360 akce, at a rate of 15 akce to 
one ghirsh during this period). In light of the waqf’s financial distress, the mutawallī asks the 
qāḍī if it would be permissible for the waqf to borrow funds for its use and to repay those at a 
future date when it is able. The qāḍī grants permission to one of the residents of the madrasa, 
a certain Shaykh Ishāq b. Muhammad al-Qayssī, to issue a loan of twenty-four and a half 
ghurūsh to the Ṭāzīya waqf (wa li-yakūn dhālika dayynan shar‘īyan li-jihat al-waqf al-
mazbūr), and that this is to be a legal debt owed by the waqf.484  
                                                     
481 Jerusalem Sijill 107, published in: Bāyiʻah, Ibrāhīm, and Halit Eren. Sijillāt Maḥkamat Al-Quds Al-
Sharʻīyah: Sijill Raqm 107, (2013), 74, 82. 
482 Jerusalem Sijill 107, p. 507. 
483 Laysa taḥt yadihi li-hādhā al-waqf al-mushār ilayh li-ṣarfahu fī al-‘amāra bi-sabab qasr māl taqabbaḍahu 
min aḥad būyūt a-madrasa al-mazbūra, Ibid., line 5. 
484 Ibid. line 18. 
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Here we find that in addition to its use as a school for recitation of the Qur’an and the 
study of fiqh, having an enrollment of 17 stipend-receiving students of various ages, the 
madrasa also, at this time, housed ten orphans who are individually named in the sijill. 
Further, this madrasa also had annual outlays (ikhrājāt) of 6757 akce to fund the operation of 
two nearby mosques that were part of the Ṭāzīya madrasa’s assets.485 These expenses were 
roughly a third of the waqf’s annual revenues and illustrate the importance of countryside 
debts to the activities of urban waqfs.486 
Similar to the Ṭāziya madrasa, the collection of revenues in the 1560s for the Hasekī 
Sultan complex, Jerusalem’s “soup-kitchen,” from the villages owned by this waqf in outlying 
areas of Jerusalem, resulted in significant deficits to the waqf’s cash flows and impaired its 
ability to provide food to the poor. Some debts owed by peasants from this waqf’s villages had 
owed collected for many years. The size of the overdue amounts and the reason for their debts 
is not clear from the sijills, but another source, the Mühimme Defterleri (the “Registers of 
Important Affairs”) at the Turkish national archive contains edicts indicate at least one factor 
at play was the difficulty that Ottoman authorities faced in accessing and controlling these 
villages for tax collection. A firman from Muḥarram 972/Aug 1564 to the Beglerbegs and chief 
qāḍīs of Damascus and Jerusalem complains of several years of overdue debts from numerous 
villages surrounding Jericho, Ramla and Nablus. It seems that the Ottoman authorities 
struggled to maintain control over areas outside the immediate vicinity of the large cities. The 
firman cites that Jericho, "being held in an area held by insurgents, was exchanged for some 
villages belonging to the khass fiefs of the Begs of Jerusalem and Gaza." Moreover, "The 
                                                     
485 Jerusalem Sijill 57, p. 62, 984/1576; ʻAsalī, Wathāʼiq, vol. 2, 217. 
486 Ibid.; ʻAsalī, Wathāʼiq, vol. 2, 76. 
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people of some of these villages rely on the protection of insurgents and do not come to town; 
thus it has been impossible to collect the waqf's revenue from them. To collect it, six Damascus 
Janissaries under a boluk-basi and ten men from the garrison of the fortress of Jerusalem were 
usually employed."487 Tax collection and rural communal debts to urban waqfs is a primary 
topic of the following chapter, and as I note below, a number of other factors were behind the 
widely reported indebtedness of peasants, and subsequent cash-crunch of waqfs during the 
mid-sixteenth century. 
Conclusion  
 In this chapter, I have shown how the introduction of the cash-waqf in Bilād al-Shām 
was predicated on the use of a preexisting legal instrument, the mu‘āmala. The fact that the 
mu‘āmala was a customary legal form in Bilād al-Shām from the Mamluk-era, as I reviewed 
in chapter two, helped to cement the wide popularity of the cash-waqf and allowed the 
Ottomans to supervise such endowments within the regulations of Ottoman Law. As such, I 
contend that the dozens of cash-waqfs that are recorded for Jerusalem, Aleppo, and to a 
lesser extent Damascus, in the sixteenth century should not be viewed as the imposition of an 
Ottoman variant of Ḥanafism, or as some scholars have suggested, a foreign Ottoman 
innovation into the Levant, but as a natural development of preexisting legal norms into a 
new institutional format. In effect, what I suggest is that the legal and cultural groundwork in 
Bilād al-Shām was already in place to support the cash-waqf.  
I have argued that the popular endowment and use of cash-waqfs in Bilāḍ al-Shām 
was not demarcated along the lines of madhhab affiliation among local ‘ulamā’ elites. Shāfi‘ī 
                                                     
487 Uriel Heyd, Ottoman Documents on Palestine, 1552-1615; a Study of The Firman According to the 
Mühimme Defteri. (Oxford: Clarendon Press;, 1960), 143–44. 
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and Ḥanafī qāḍīs and mutawallīs in Jerusalem routinely supervised cash-waqfs. This is 
significant on two accounts. First, as I reflected in chapter one, the Shāfi‘īs for much, if not 
all of the sixteenth century, were a demographic majority and managed many of the city’s 
important waqfs. The fact that Shāfi‘īs served in this way reflects their integration into the 
city’s Ottoman administrative apparatus and their management of cash-waqfs is notable 
because this was not a customary institution in Bilād al-Shām. However, the adoption of 
cash-waqfs by local Ḥanafī elites is not surprising, since Ḥanafism was the state sponsored 
madhab. The second distinguishing feature is that many loans issued by cash-waqfs were 
registered, with the explicit stated preference of debtors, under the jurisdiction of a Shāfi‘ī 
qāḍī (or a Ḥanafī qāḍī on the stipulation that the loan and any future adjudication would be 
carried out on the basis of Shāfi‘ī law). I suggest that this was done by debtors to have 
greater rights to use their mortgaged collateral over the loan term, a practice allowed 
supported by Shāfi‘ī fiqh but quite restricted under Ḥanafī fiqh. Since it was not unusual for 
debtors to roll-over loans, the continued use of collateral, such as a mortgaged home or 
orchard, would have been vital. This reflected inter-madhab reliance and supports the idea 
that non-Ḥanafī madhabs continued to maintain their vitality under Ottoman legal system 
during the sixteenth century – another continuity of the Mamluk legal system. 
 That said, I have also showed that there is little evidence to show that the cash-waqfs 
from Jerusalem for this period served as sophisticated, or even effective, financial institutions 
(if they can be called that). Rather, I argue that they had far more in common in their 
management, and of course objectives, with the myriad property waqfs that had preexisted 
them. In this context, their presence in the region did not really disrupt the Mamluk-era legal 
norms concerning the endowment and management of waqfs. While some scholars have 
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posited that financiers in large centers, such as Bursa, used these waqfs to borrow money 
cheaply and relend it at much higher rates in markets, my findings for Jerusalem do not 
support this contention. However, as I have noted, Jerusalem should not be compared directly 
to larger commercial centers, and more work needs to be done on the cash-waqfs of Aleppo 
and Damascus before drawing any final conclusions on this front.   
On the side of conventional waqfs, this chapter has shown that indebtedness, and at 
times lending, was a necessary part of any waqf’s operations. My analysis of the Ṭāzīya waqf 
has illustrated how debt defaults, from hinterland villages under the waqf, could create cycles 
of indebtedness for the waqf itself and sometimes paralyze its operations. Rural-urban 
agricultural exchange was imperfect, and a variety of political and social relations also 
complicated the issue of rural taxation. Indeed, rural communities could become trapped in 
group debts to waqfs far removed from them, a topic of my next chapter. 
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Chapter Four – Mutual Surety 
 
This chapter examines the popular use of guarantorship (kafāla) in qāḍī courts to 
create mutual surety ties that had the effect of placing synthetic corporate liability on groups 
of people. While corporate personhood and liability have no basis in Islamic law, court 
practices in the late medieval and early modern Levant indicate the existence of such mutual 
surety ties among debtors. These were recorded in courts by individuals who pledged to 
guarantee “their own debts and those of others” (bi’l-aṣāla wa’l-kafāla),488 and to “mutually 
guarantee and ensure” the debts of others (mutakāfilūn wa mutaḍāminūn). While I refer to 
these corporate liability associations as “mutual surety”, other scholars who have observed 
their use in Levantine courts, have variously labeled them as “mutual-guarantorship,” 
“mutual accountability,” and “communal guarantees”.489   
I argue that mutual surety was not simply a legal mechanism for securing the 
repayment of loans, but rather, that it also served as a coercive instrument that was used by 
powerful elites and officers of the state, to exert political-economic control over specific 
groups under their jurisdiction. Such ad hoc legal instruments made the consolidation of elite 
interests easier to manage. I discuss the uses of mutual surety across three broad 
organizational categories in this chapter. These mirror sub-groups of society: Jewish urban 
communities, crafts/trading guild members, and village communities. I examine how tax-
farm beneficiaries used mutual surety registrations for loans held by villagers who farmed 
their lands, the perennial activity of cavalry officers, janissaries, and tax farmers. Merchants 
                                                     
488 Cohen, “Communal Entities,” 79. 
489 Wilkins, Forging Urban Solidarities, 103; Peirce, Morality Tales, 300; Cohen, “Communal Entities.” 
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and urban notables, but also qāḍīs and governors, actively lent to religious communities and 
their institutions (Christian and Jewish waqfs) and used mutual surety to apply similar 
corporate liability for the financing of the jizya (poll) and kharāj (land) taxes. With respect to 
guild interests, I examine how mutual surety operated to both strengthen the position of 
lenders against groups of guild members, as well its use by guild-heads themselves to police 
the group-wide interests of guild members, a form of intra-group policing. 
  
4.1 Mutual surety: a form of synthetic corporate liability  
As with other early Ottoman studies from Aleppo, Bursa and Damascus, the use of 
mutual surety in courts reveals a flexible legal process where savvy actors could use their 
knowledge of the law to exert their agency as “consumers” of the law.490 L. Peirce’s study of 
Aintab illustrates how the practices of qāḍī courts were neither monolithic, nor subservient to 
local customs, notably in cases where marginalized groups were able to negotiate their 
interests through legal-cultural constraints.491 However, as in our own day, the wealthiest and 
most politically connected figures have relied on circuitous legal devices to advance their 
interests. Under substantial stress, communal solidarity could sometimes fracture as 
individuals pushed back against the pressure of participating in mutual surety pledges. 
Although kafāla is a category of fiqh, it is generally restricted to one individual’s obligation 
to another and cannot be forced upon someone.  
                                                     
490 Among others: Elyse Semerdjian, “Off the Straight Path”: Illicit Sex, Law, and Community in Ottoman 
Aleppo (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2008); Singer, Palestinian Peasants and Ottoman Officials; 
Peirce, Morality Tales; Boğaç A Ergene, Local Court, Provincial Society, and Justice in the Ottoman Empire: 
Legal Practice and Dispute Resolution in Çankırı and Kastamonu (1652-1744) (Leiden; Boston, Mass.: Brill, 
2003). 
491 See for example the case study of “Haciye Sabah’s Story: a teacher on trial” in: Peirce, Morality Tales, 251–
75. 
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In view of this chapter’s focus on communal interests, it is useful to define the most 
commonly used descriptor for community in the sijills: ṭāi’fa (pl. ṭawā’if/ṭā’ifāt). Despite the 
absence of corporate bodies in fiqh, ṭawā’if operated in much the same way as corporate 
associations during the sixteenth century, and the state recognized their members as having 
common interests, whether they were professional, religious, or social (e.g. the Christian 
community, ṭāi’fat al-naṣāra, or the silversmith guild, ṭāi’fat al-ṣayyāghīn). Even though legal 
personhood was limited to living people in Islamic law, courts applied the term ṭawā’if to 
connect individuals with common obligations, often to the state, such as in the case of the 
organization and collection of taxes. When ṭawā’if was used as a label for a specific 
professional activity, it carried roughly the same weight as the term “guild” in the European 
context and continued to be in use till the nineteenth century.492 For the most part, guilds 
were also viewed as collectives by their members, each having a community head (or heads), 
who often carried titles such as shaykh, ra’īs, mutakallim, or mutaḥaddith.493 Since these 
mashāyikh also entered into debts, jointly or separately, on behalf of the community, the 
lines separating private (individual) and “public” (communal) dealings could be contentious. 
Creditors who sought to demand imprisonment of members of a ṭā’ifa for jointly holding 
unpaid debts had the right to do so; the documentary record of this goes as far back as the 
Geniza period.494 The debt triangle that connected individuals, community, and the state was 
                                                     
492 Pascal Ghazaleh notes the continued use of the term ṭāi’fa to designate guild-equivalent associations well 
into nineteenth century Ottoman Egypt. Ghazaleh, Pascale, Masters of the Trade: Crafts and Craftspeople in 
Cairo, 1750-1850, vol. 22, 23 (American Univ in Cairo Press, 1999), 15–17. 
493 For instance, the leaders of Jerusalem’s Jewish community in the 16th century were referred to in the sijills as 
“shaykh/shuyūūkh”, but also appear as “ra’is/ru’asā” and sometimes as “mutakallim/mutakallimūn”; Cohen, 
Amnon, Jewish life under Islam: Jerusalem in the sixteenth century, Harvard University Press (1984), 39. A 
similar term to the latter was used throughout the Mamluk period to refer to state-appointed supervisors of 
certain tax-paying communities, particularly groups of traders. Under the Bahri Mamluks, the state-appointed 
inspector of the Karimi trade held the title of Mūtaḥaddith; W.J. Fischel, “The Spice Trade in Mamluk Egypt”, 
JESHO, Vol. 1, no. 2 (April 1958), 167.       
494 These sort of conflicts highlight a long-standing scholarly debate concerning communal organization and 
solidarity in the pre-modern Near East, with particular reference to the Jews of the Cairo geniza. Branching off 
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a contentious balancing act and compounded debts could lead to social division as much as it 
could be used to assert communal unity vis-à-vis the courts.495 
Professional ṭawā’if, the crafts guilds, were required to maintain regular accounts by 
the courts and could be called to account in the event of financial dispute. A ṭāi’fa head (ra’īs 
or shaykh) might be summoned to court to attest to outstanding debts owed to his own ṭāi’fa. 
As an example, in 954/1547, the chief builder of Jerusalem, al-mu‘allim Ḥusayn b. Tāmir, 
was summoned to attest that he held no debts against any member of “ṭāi’fat al-yahūd”, 
except for a 300 silver coin debt owed by that community’s head, Ya‘qūb b. Falāq.496 Such 
attestations were important for both communities since such communities were allowed to 
manage their own property endowments and inheritance affairs, subject to an administrative 
approval by the state. It was common for Jerusalem’s Jews in the latter half of the century to 
manage this office (bayt māl al-yahūd), which the local qāḍī auctioned as an annual tax-
farm.497  
I contend that the legal procedure of mutual surety continued to operate with no 
significant change in the state’s use of this method as a legal way to control specific groups, 
and there is some evidence to suggest that this practice was a carry-over from the Mamluk 
period.498 This does not mean that all legal structures and practices remained in constant use, 
                                                     
from Goitein’s contention that the Jewish community functioned as a “state within a state”, a number of ideas 
have also been advanced concerning the role of the individual vis-à-vis his community. For a historiographical 
review of this debate see: Eve Krakowski and Marina Rustow, “Formula as Content: Medieval Jewish 
Institutions, the Cairo Geniza, and the New Diplomatics,” Jewish Social Studies 20, no. no. 2 (Winter 2014): 
112-115. 
495 For an example of how this worked in Jerusalem’s Jewish community, see: Cohen, “Communal Entities.” 
496 J-20-4-2 Cohen, A World Within, Vol. 1, 69. 
497 Cohen, A World Within, Vol. 1, 127, 152. 
498 This does not mean that all legal structures and practices remained constant. There were major legal 
innovations during the second half of the century that especially impacted Jerusalem such as the waqf-al-nuqud. 
It is a major topic in chapter four of this dissertation, that which relates to the use of waqfs as vehicles for 
providing credit. However, group-guarantees appear in the sijills from the 1530s to the end of the sixteenth 
century without perceivable difference in how they were used as legal arrangements for debts.  
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or retained the same form. There were major breaks and transformations, as the major legal 
innovation of the waqf-al-nuqūd represents. However, for mutual surety – as with the case of 
the mu‘āmala - appears to have a long historical arc; it appears in the first surviving 
Levantine sijills from the 1530s and is also documented in legal deeds from the Ḥaram al-
Shārīf archive of the last quarter of the 1300s. The first instance of the customary practice of 
mutual surety I have been able to locate is from a contract for the lease of an agricultural land 
published by K. al-Asali from Jerusalem in 799/1394. The part concerning mutual surety has 
the exact same phrase “mutakāfilūn wa mutaḍāminūn” that is used in the sixteenth through 
nineteenth centuries. The part of the lease contract concerning mutual surety reads: “the 
lessees undertake to pay the rent at the end of each year, and the lessees have taken legal 
custody of the leased property after their review, full consideration and contractual obligation 
to carry out the lease conditions and have given mutual surety (mutakāfilūn wa 
mutaḍāminūn) with respect to fulfilling the abovementioned lease.”499     
 
4.2 Tax farming and the policing of peasant tax debts 
During much of the sixteenth century, tax farms in Damascus and Jerusalem were 
sourced from state owned (Ar. amīrī/ Tr. mīrī) village lands and issued or renewed annually. 
Tax farming could be very profitable when there were information gaps concerning the value 
of crop yields, the likelihood of payment, and the cycle between when taxes were collected 
and when such money was paid to district authorities.500 Credit was a central part of the 
                                                     
499 al-ʻ Asalī, Wathāʼiq, vol. 2, 62-63. 
500 Peirce has shown how such imperfect market information often led the state to carry out periodic audits of 
tax-collectors in the mid-sixteenth century. Peirce, Morality Tales, 276–310; On the process of credit and 
guarantorship in tax farm purchases: Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy, 146–60. 
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process, given that tax farm payments were routinely financed. As local specialists, tax 
collectors had local-specific knowledge and influence that allowed them to trade in, assign 
and profitably discount the receivables of tax-revenues.501 The agricultural tax system was 
thus an extremely complex and shifting web of tax assignments and cross-assignments.  
Tax-farming was a principal avenue for acquiring wealth and a seasonal activity 
which allowed tax farmers to engage in other activities. Tax-farming stemmed from the 
trickling-down of large tax-farms assigned to military officers which could devolve to a 
variety of actors. Sipāhis and other military officers regularly assigned their timār allotments 
to tax farmers when they were deployed in warfare. There was significant crossover between 
tax-farming and the activities of government appointed tax collectors in that many tax-
collectors also invested in the trading of tax-farms. Tax collectors’ relationships with qāḍīs, 
waqf administrators and military officials naturally gave them a first-mover advantage in 
sourcing and operating attractive tax-farming investments. However, while professional tax 
collectors were also often involved in tax-farming, a variety of other professional actors, 
ranging from butchers to money-changers, also took up this activity, both by buying tax 
farming rights or through fixed-term appointments with salaried remuneration. 
Tax collection was managed by district-level administrators (amīns) and local police 
administrators (subaşıs), but its collection on a local level was performed by local tax agents, 
‘āmils. The latter were often salaried officials, but could also be tax-farmers.502 ‘Āmil 
appointments tended to be inherited within certain elite families, perhaps similar to the way 
that several generations of Copts from select families dominated the tax bureaucracy of 
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Mamluk Cairo.503 Although the majority of the population in and around Jerusalem during 
the sixteenth century were Muslim, ‘āmil positions were disproportionately occupied by 
Christians and Jews, but especially the latter. Documenting the trading of tax farms, and the 
recording of debts related to this trade, took place in court, making the qāḍīs activities central 
to the regulation of this makeshift marketplace. Although the transfer of tax farms required 
the consent of a qāḍī, the actual transfer of these tax obligations was through a simple legal 
assignment (wakāla). The Jerusalem sijills illustrate that tax farmers regularly assigned their 
rights to relatives, business partners, or even to those to whom they owed debts, as in-kind 
settlement of obligations (discussed below). Technically speaking, when Ottoman military 
officers faced unpaid taxes, they could bring claims directly against individual tax debtors 
(the peasants) in court. However, this rarely, if ever, happened. The cost of doing so far 
outstripped the reward in most cases. For these reasons, tax-farming was the domain of a 
well-informed clique of local tax-collectors, qāḍīs, and administrators who formed the 
connective bureaucratic strand between the town and country. In Amy Singer’s words, this 
relationship “rested on a triangular balance between the military-bureaucratic officials of the 
sanjak bey’s staff, the kadi as judge of all and sundry matters for arbitration, and the peasants 
who produced food and agricultural revenues.” 504 
When disputes with local authorities arose, the Jewish community appears to have 
skillfully defended its claims at the highest levels. The community succeeded in obtaining 
several royal decrees in response to their various appeals to Sultan Süleymān I, for instance. 
Several important fatwās in their favor were issued from the highest-ranking qāḍī of the land 
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Şeyhülislam Ebu’s-Su‘ud. Copies of Ottoman royal decrees recorded in the sijills portray a 
sympathetic position from the sultan’s court towards Jerusalem’s Jewish community. For 
instance, in the middle of 963/1556, a Sultanic decree was addressed to the governor and 
qāḍī of Jerusalem that ordered an inquiry be made to investigate allegations by the Jewish 
community that the jizya tax being levied on them was higher than what was “prescribed by 
the sharia or actually authorized by the tax registers.”505 And, in another decree from 
967/1560, we find the sultan ordering both the local governor and qāḍī to intervene and 
prevent harassment by the mutawallī of a Jerusalem endowment who was trying to raise the 
rent on a long-term lease of land to the Jews that was used as a cemetery – who threatened to 
disinter their dead if they rejected the new rent.506  
However, it would be a mistake to interpret this partisanship as simply a sign of 
Sultan Süleymān’s much lauded just rule imposed on corrupt local officials. As Singer 
illustrated in her study on peasants and administrators in rural Palestine, the sultan and the 
local administrators were at this time in a “tug-of-war” over local revenues. Like the Jewish 
community’s above described petitions, the peasants of sixteenth century Palestine were 
active in “defending the routines established by the sultan and their own custom … a tacit 
alliance of purpose against the officials existed between the sultan and the peasants.”507 
Interests of bureaucrats in the center were not necessarily in line with those of bureaucrats at 
the periphery, and it is useful, in my view, to view social-economic relations as carrying over 
from Mamluk-era tax customs and market procedures up to at least the mid-sixteenth 
century. The different and sometimes conflicting interests of regional military officials, qadis 
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and other ‘ulamā’ who served as administrators, and the central bureaucracy were susceptible 
to factionalization. At times, local rebellions and power sharing arrangements resembled 
those that the Mamluks engaged in with bedouin tribes and rebellious urban militias in Bilād 
al-Shām. Thus, it would be more profitable to view some of the disputes discussed below 
through the framework of the Jewish community’s navigation of factions in order to 
maximize control over social resources, rather than through the binary of local corruption 
versus central justice.  
Singer has also posited that the debts of Palestinian villages were usually backed by 
guarantees from their village heads: “Basically, the village leader was a guarantor, a kafīl, for 
the rest of the village population … as a guarantor in the village, the ra’īs was liable for the 
payments and fines owing from ‘his group.’”508 Moreover, Singer has illustrated how village 
leaders around Bethlehem in the 1560s could consolidate their interests and enter into 
“mutual guarantees” for debts.509 As with debts owed to Jerusalem’s public and family waqfs, 
peasants who farmed the sultan’s lands, often faced indebtedness for not paying their tax or 
sharecropping dues; during the middle of the sixteenth century, this was often a product of 
labor shortages and widely reported peasant mobility.510 The frequent records of debt defaults 
and imprisonment (i‘tiqāl) of peasants in the sijills from the late 1550s and early 1560s, a 
period of demographic expansion, suggest that administrators of Jerusalem’s major waqfs, as 
well as those of the sultan’s lands, were challenged when it came to policing the mobility of 
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peasants between villages and to urban centers. Farm labor during this period was in short 
supply, despite (or perhaps because of) the overall demographic-economic growth, destined 
for urban centers. This phenomenon is best illustrated in a sijill from Jerusalem in Rabī II 
927/November 1564, when the village heads of the village of Burqā, on the outskirts of 
Nablus, appeared in Jerusalem’s court to settle their tax debts of eight years to the former 
governor of Damascus, the Amīr Farrūkh Bāshā.511 In addition to the mutual surety oath that 
these village mashāyikh took, they also promised to “abide by the law in farming their own 
land and to abstain from farming the lands of others.”512  
While the ḳānūnnāme of Jerusalem treated peasants’ abandonment of their lands as a 
crime, there was a ten-year statute of limitations on this law. However, this did not prevent 
tax-farmers and political administrators from filing cases against peasants who had long 
abandoned their land, as a way to return them to their land in order to cultivate it.513 It was 
not uncommon for tax-farmers, often military elites, to seek out and imprison people who 
had abandoned their villages many years prior, sometimes decades after some individuals 
had left their ancestral communities. This kind of policing apparently worsened towards the 
end of the century. Rafeq examined numerous records from Bilād al-Shām in the last quarter 
of the century and found that political turmoil was creating havoc in rural communities as 
sipāhis levied excessive arbitrary taxation such as the “rasm al-ra‘īya” that was used to 
“indemnify them (sipāhis) for the money they paid to the government in lieu of military 
service (māl al-badal).”514 While such taxes were less prevalent earlier on in the century, 
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rural mobility from the mid-century made the fulfillment of this tax even more onerous on 
villagers, leading to a stress on the availability of agricultural labor. 
While peasants from Palestinian villages were routinely brought to court and 
imprisoned for tax debts in mid-century, subaşıs, sipahis and other officials also were widely 
reported, from villager complaints in the sijills, to have pursued extrajudicial violent 
punishments against villagers for debts. The courts, though integrally involved, did not have 
complete control over tax collection, as Singer observed in a case that characteristic of the 
policing of rural taxation from the late 1550s: “the villagers of ‘Ajjūl owed two years’ taxes 
to Mami sipahī, the tımār holder of nearby ‘Aṭṭara where they also cultivated some land. The 
villagers refused to pay Mami the outstanding sum. Two officials were then sent who read a 
letter to these villagers commanding that they come before the kadi. When they again 
refused, the kadi requested that ‘Ali bey, tımār holder of ‘Ajjūl, bring them in. ‘Ali answered 
that ‘he was unable to produce them, for they were rebellious and persistently fractious’ 
(mutamarridīn wa-mustamirrīn ‘ala-’l-‘iṣyān). The matter was thus recorded, to be passed on 
to a higher authority, presumably, the beylerbeyi of Damascus or the sultan.”515 Entangling 
peasants in mutual surety obligations was, therefore, useless when villagers were recalcitrant 
and resisted together. 
That said, the sijills also contain many acts of the imprisonment of individual 
peasants, who were not village leaders or heads, for defaulting on their individual tax debts to 
holders of tax-farms or waqf administrators. In such cases, the sijills don’t usually give the 
back story for the peasant’s debt, but simply list the peasants’ name, the accusation made 
against him, his admission of guilt, and invariably his imprisonment. At other times, peasants 
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were jailed for owing agricultural production that had recently converted to debt, such as 
when two villagers, ‘Alī Abī Jābir and Salam b. Ḥaydar from the village of Ṣūrbāhir were 
jailed after their reconciliation of accounts with a certain Shaykh Luqmān b. al-Shaykh 
‘Umar left them owing him 10 mudd of wheat.516 In another, a farmer named Nāṣir b. 
Sulaymān from the village of Jālūd was jailed for owing 3 gharāra of wheat to the al-Khalīl 
(Hebron) waqf.517 Numerous other cases of imprisonment of individual farmers involved 
debts similar debts owed to the Dome of the Rock waqf, the Nabī Dāwūd waqf, and the 
Ḥaramayn waqf in Jerusalem.518 These cases were pressed by the administrators and other 
officers of large public waqfs and the peasants involved in these cases do not hold any 
honorific, titles (shaykh/ra‘īs etc.), apparently as punitive measures that were intended to set 
an example. Similar portrayals are frequent in sijills 45 and 46, for the period 971-3/1563-5, 
and peasants were also detained in the city’s prison for debts owed to merchants, even for 
relatively small debts of a few sulṭānī. This may reflect a period of stricter law enforcement, 
partly motivated by the local Ottoman authority’s concern with policing the rural 
population.519 
For Jerusalem, it is striking that the decades which appear to have had the greatest 
policing of peasant debts and imprisonment, were the 1550s and 60s, several decades before 
the financial hyperinflation and political instability of the late 1580s and 90s set in. The fact 
that peasant debts to waqfs in the mid-century could accumulate for three, five or more years 
was not unusual; the case of the medium-term village debts of the Ṭāzīya waqf reviewed in 
chapter three is normative in this regard. Yet even in the middle decades, the inflationary 
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period was taking its toll, not only in increases in prices of goods, but also rents. Peasants 
who paid fixed rents on land, rather than shared in its revenues, as had happened to the 
peasants farming the Ṭāzīya waqf’s lands in these years, who were forced to enter into higher 
rental contracts, for instance.520  
As Singer’s example of rebellious peasants from the village of ‘Ajjūl demonstrates 
above, peasants were far from powerless. Other than recalcitrance, peasants were also 
successful in negotiating their claims, obtaining surety from relatives or other members of 
their village, and contesting claims put against them in courts and winning. Sometimes, the 
best course of action for peasant debt defaults was to attempt amicable settlement and the 
very registers that are littered with debt cases and imprisonment charges against peasants also 
contain a significant minority of settlement registrations entered into between waqf 
managers, tax-farmers, and peasants. Settlements seem to have been especially attractive for 
administrators of family waqfs and the farmers on their lands.521 Settlement was not the 
position ordinarily taken up by the amīns, whether with peasants or even the beneficiaries of 
waqf lands that were partly shared with the state. However, when faced with rigid 
administrators, beneficiaries and peasants could rely on petitioning their cases to the Imperial 
Council in Istanbul (the Dīvān-i Hümāyūn) and request the sultan’s intercession. A record 
that demonstrates how land tax increases worked in such instances appears in an official 
decree from this period that was issued by the Dīvān-i Hümāyūn to the Governor (Beglerbeg) 
and Treasurer (Defterdār) of Damascus, concerning a village in Gaza, on 23 Jumādā II 
976/13 December 1568: 
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“Maḥmūd, who formerly was Qāḍī of Majdal, has sent a letter to My 
Threshold of Felicity and has reported that one fourth of [the land of] the 
village named Majdal in the sanjak of Gaza is a waqf of the Two Noble 
Sanctuaries (ḥaramayn-i serifeyn) and three quarters of it are waqf [for the 
benefit] of the descendants [of its founder] (vakf-i zurriyet). The tithe (‘ushr) 
on the [land of the] waqf of the descendants has been recorded in the new 
[Cadastral Register as a fixed sum (maktu‘) of 3,750 aspers. At present, it 
belongs to the hass-fiefs of the Beg of Gaza. The said sanjak-beg [as if?] there 
were no fixed sum, takes 20,000 aspers, [thereby] committing [an act of] 
inequity. When thereupon the inhabitants of the village came with a noble 
firman to the court they read the noble firman in the presence of the sanjak-
beg. When it was said that he should not take anything beyond the fixed sum 
of money, the said sanjak-beg was not restrained. The inhabitants of the 
village and the beneficiaries of the waqf (aṣḥāb-I vakf) complained of 
oppression and said, ‘If the fixed sum mentioned above were seized for the 
imperial domains and its equivalent granted to the above-mentioned sanjak-
beg from the vacant (dusen) [fiefs], [this] would be most beneficial to the poor 
[villagers] and the Public Revenue.’ I have therefore commanded that when 
[this firman] arrives you shall henceforth seize the fixed sum mentioned above 
for the [imperial domains], grant the sanjak-beg its equivalent from the vacant 
[fiefs], and give [him] a certificate (tezkire) for it.”522     
                                                     
522 Heyd, Ottoman Documents on Palestine, 1552-1615; a Study of The Firman According to the Mühimme 
Defteri., Document #93, 145-6. 
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The above edict demonstrates how waqf beneficiaries appealed to the state by 
framing their interests under the pretext that raising taxation, when unjustified, had 
deleterious consequences on farmers. The striking, and unexplained, difference between this 
village’s fixed-maqtū‘ tax of 3,750 akce and the cadastral survey levy of 20,000 akce was 
surely not due to market differences and suggests a sharp shift in taxation strategy in the 
region. Although from much later on, in Rabi II 1013/Sept 1604, another firman sent to the 
Beglerbeg of Safad ordered him to return to imposing the customary tax on the villagers of 
the northern Palestinian village of Tiberias (it is not clear what that custom was), because the 
imposition of a lump-sum (qasm) tax (synonmyous to maqtū‘) has "caused the peasants of 
the said waqf to scatter."523 Irrespective of the seemingly opposite particulars of the case, the 
taxation directives of the center played a determining role in easing the debt pressure on 
peasant communities, serving as a release valve to the pressure applied by the local judiciary 
and political administration in generating the required tax revenues, also dictated from the 
center.  
 
4.3 Mutual surety among Jerusalem’s Jewish community  
The Jews of Jerusalem were well integrated into the city’s bureaucratic and market 
institutions and, save for Ottoman military or legal posts, the opportunities available to them 
were not markedly different than those for other subjects in Bilād al-Shām or Egypt. In the 
Jerusalem sijills they are represented in a variety of professions, as craftsmen, butchers, tax 
collectors (sing. ،āmil), doctors and money changers. With respect to Egypt, as a comparative 
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benchmark, sharia court registers from the sixteenth century point to a confluence of 
economic and social interests that brought Copts, Jews and Muslims together. In Cairene 
marketplaces, traders and artisans from all three faiths shared membership in commercial 
partnerships, loan syndicates, and guild associations. Market traders were organized 
according to commercial activity or artisanal craft, rather than by religious affiliation; 
consequently, traders and artisans of different confessional backgrounds were often 
storefront neighbors and shared warehouses and workshops.524 Shared market interests could 
also lead to price-fixing and monopolies. For instance, commodities wholesalers could 
squeeze the margins of retailers by engaging in prohibitive credit restrictions for the latter 
when such wholesalers wished to raise market prices.525 
A suitable point of departure for examining the role of mutual surety in this 
community is by looking at the activities of Jewish tax farmers in Jerusalem. The activities of 
Jews in this sector were more apparent in the first half of the century, than the second. This 
may be attributed to the financial difficulties the community witnessed towards the end of the 
century.526 Two Jewish tax collectors of significance in the 1530s and 1540s were the 
brothers Bayram and Yūsuf Shū‘ā, who held several “senior āmil positions into the early 
1550s in Jerusalem and Gaza”.527 These brothers dealt with such large amounts of taxes that 
they needed to obtain guarantors (kafāla) before carrying out their activities.528 There are 
several examples below of Jews who traded in tax farms of villages in the districts of Gaza 
                                                     
524 ʻAfīfī, al-Aqbāṭ, 172–77. 
525 ʻAfīfī, al-Aqbāṭ, 180; for comparable documentary evidence from Jerusalem, an inventory of the al-Aqsa 
Mosque endowment’s leases of shops for the year 1003AH/1595CE in various markets of the city shows many 
Muslim, Jewish, and Christian names listed in the same markets without segregation, as tenants. J-77-565-569. 
526 Cohen, Jewish Life under Islam, 141. 
527 Cohen, Jewish Life under Islam, 142–45. 
528 Ibid. 
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and Jerusalem. Jews were also employed as tax collectors to collect taxes from Christians, 
specifically, in the district of Jerusalem, while Christians were not generally engaged to 
collect taxes from Jews. It is noteworthy, that hardly any Jews resided in Jerusalem’s 
hinterland during mid-century.529    
The seeking out of guarantors for tax-farming was a regular practice, irrespective of 
the religion to which a tax collector belonged, and a critical legal instrument in the tax-
farming system. Linda Darling has shown that the state maintained high concern for the 
effectiveness and reliability of tax collectors during this period, as the military’s entire fiscal 
order rested on the effectiveness of guarantors who guaranteed the ability of tax farmers to 
meet their commitments. This was the case whether guarantors were employed by the state or 
had purchased tax farm rights. Guarantors were carefully vetted and sijills regularly provided 
descriptions of a given guarantor’s reputation and abilities, using a hierarchy of terms to 
denote a guarantor who was “maldar (wealthy), mal edasina kadir (able to pay the money), 
yarar (capable), makbul (well-esteemed).530 However, despite such precautions defaults were 
inevitably a part of the process. In what follows, I will examine a case which illustrates how 
one ‘āmil’s default could implicate other members of a community of guarantors (all Jewish), 
even after the death of the former ‘āmil.      
Although he was not a merchant, Yūsuf b. Shū‘a (active between 945-959/1538-
1551) once held the honorific khawāja, a sign of his influence in powerful circles.531 
Although he was a  ‘āmil, a subordinate of the district amīn, Yūsuf b. Shū‘a had a great deal 
                                                     
529 The taḥrīr registers of 952/1545 and 967/1560 do not record any Jewish households in villages within the 
vicinity of Jerusalem, indicating an exclusively urban Jewish population at the time. Singer, Palestinian 
Peasants and Ottoman Officials, 31.  
530 Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy, 155. 
531 Cohen, Jewish Life under Islam, 145. 
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of control over the organization and administration of the tax collection that took place under 
his watch, involving the management of several accountants (mustawfīs), kātibs and crop-
yield assessors (‘ulūfjis).532 A number of sijills reflect that Shū‘a’s dealings were very large, 
in the tens, and sometimes hundreds, of sulṭānīs. His transactions often involved high-
ranking officials such as amīns, subaşıs, and governors.533 Although his work as an ‘āmil, 
stretches back to the 1530s, this appears to have come to an end when he entered into a 
mutual surety arrangement with two other Jews supporting the debts of another (recently 
deceased) Jewish ‘āmil, named Ibrāhīm Tarānā, who collected taxes for the amīn of Gaza. 
The son of Ibrāhīm Tarānā, Yūsuf, who also worked as a kātib in the field of tax collection in 
Gaza, was implicated in 959/1552, in a case of unpaid debts that his father owed to his 
employer, ‘Alī Bey, the amīn of Gaza and Jerusalem (amīn ḥawāṣil al-quds al-sharīf wa 
ghazza).534 When the case was raised in Jerusalem, the qāḍī there reviewed a deed in which 
the son was listed as a guarantor (kafīl) for his father, and determined this document to be 
valid, in spite of Yūsuf Tarānā’s insistence that the deed was a misprint and he had served as 
his father’s agent (wakīl) rather than a kafīl. 535   
This case was filed in Jerusalem’s court, rather than Gaza’s, presumably because of 
the amīn’s knowledge of Tarānā’s affiliation and guarantees with Jerusalem’s Jews; Gaza 
had its own court (majlis al-shar‘) and was a separate tax district (liwā’, Tr. sanjak) with its 
own local tax administration.536 ‘Alī Bey rightly assumed that Yūsuf b. Ibrāhīm Tarānā’s 
                                                     
532 For descriptions of some of these administrative positions see: Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy, 
67–75; Cohen, Jewish Life under Islam, 144. 
533 Cohen, Jewish Life under Islam, 145. In an attestation from Ramadan 948/1541, Yūsif b. Shū‘a 
acknowledges a debt of 6,800 ūthmāni (approximately 140 dinars) to the qādī of Ramla, J-Sij 14-120b. 
534 J-27-65-3 
535 J--25-287-2 
536 Lewis and Cohen, Population and Revenue in the Towns of Palestine in the Sixteenth Century, 12–13. 
249 
  
links to Jews in Jerusalem would help him settle his father’s dues. The case’s appearance in 
Jerusalem may also imply that ‘Alī Bey had no luck in retrieving the funds from Ibrāhīm 
Tarānā’s original kafīls in Gaza, because ‘Alī Bey presented a copy of Yūsuf b. Ibrāhīm 
Tarānā’s pledge that was issued in Gaza. The filing of cases outside one’s jurisdiction in 
Palestine was not uncommon, so much so that it raised concern among the Ottoman central 
authorities. In the very same year as the case discussed here (959/1552), a royal order was 
issued from Istanbul to all qāḍīs of the empire explicitly prohibiting them from hearing cases 
brought to them from outside their jurisdiction (man‘ qiyām al-quḍā’ min al-naẓar fī al-
da‘āwī khārij ḥudūd aqḍīyatihim).537 Without a doubt, the proliferation of such cases 
diminished the central state’s control over taxation and could immeasurably complicate the 
state’s oversight. 
On 7 Rabi al-Awwal 959/3 March 1552, the qāḍī decided to jail Yūsuf b. Ibrāhīm 
Tarānā at the citadel of Jerusalem until the matter could be further investigated by the 
regional tax department in Damascus.538 After spending a little under two months there in 
jail, on 27 Rabī‘ al-Thānī /21 April, three Jerusalemite Jews, Yūsuf b. Shū‘ā, the prominent 
‘āmil mentioned above, Yūsuf b. Ibrāhīm, a wealthy physician in Jerusalem and a third lesser 
known Jew come to Yūsuf b. Ibrāhīm Tarānā’s rescue, each individually pledging to repay 
Ibrāhīm Tarānā’s debts. Of importance here is that their personal guarantees were recorded 
on an individual basis and did not contain any references to a mutual surety of any sort. 
Rather, as becomes evident in a later sijill, they each guaranteed a specific portion of Ibrāhīm 
Tarānā’s debt. Of note is the fact that Yūsuf b. Shū‘ā’s guarantee for Tarānā was itself 
                                                     
537 Fāḍil Mahdī Bayāt and Halit Eren, al-Bilād al-ʻarabīyaẗ fī al-waṯāʼiq al-ʻuṯmānīyaẗ (Istanbul: Istānbūl : 
IRCICA , Munaẓẓamaẗ al-Muʼtamar al-islāmī, Markaz al-Abḥāṯ li-al-Tārīẖ wa-al-Funūn wa-al-Ṯaqāfaẗ al-
islāmīyaẗ, 2010), Vol. 2, 187. 
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guaranteed by another ‘āmil, the even more prominent Shemtūb b. Ya‘qūb. The latter 
appeared after the fact, as the sijill states and undertook to pledge his additional support.539 
Shemtūb appears in several sijills as a ‘āmil and trader who, like Yūsuf b. Shū‘ā’, engaged in 
very large transactions.540 Thus, at this stage in the early 1550s the use of mutual surety does 
not seem to have been dominant in the policing of tax collector’s debts to the state, although 
various layers of individual guarantorship were the norm.  
A sijill from seven years earlier, in 952/1545, shows that both Shemtūb and Yūsuf b. 
Shū‘ā’ were indeed close associates. There, Shemtūb who was listed as the ‘amīl of 
Jerusalem and Gaza (al-‘amīl bi-liwā’ ghazza wa bi-liwā’ al-quds al-sharif) appointed Yūsuf 
b. Shū‘ā’ as his agent (wakīl) in “all his property related affairs, the collection of debts owed 
to him and the management of his payments due to others”.541 The fact that two ‘āmils 
guaranteed Yūsuf b. Ibrāhīm Tarāna, the above defendant, not only points to the 
embeddedness of the activities and mutual liabilities of tax collectors in the tax-villages that 
lay between Jerusalem and Gaza, but also reveals the courts’ concern with the 
creditworthiness of kafīls, in line with Darling’s above noted observation, and Shū‘ā’s 
creditworthiness could probably be described as “makbul (well-esteemed)”. We should also 
recall that the debt in question was for taxes from villages that Ibrāhīm Tarānā had been 
responsible for, and it would have been likely that Yūsuf b. Shū‘ā’ and Shentūf b. Ya‘qūb 
had the experience and resources to collect taxes from these specific villages, given their 
                                                     
539 J-25-360-1 
540 In early 953/1546 the jizya tax for Jerusalem’s Christian community was levied by the district head of the 
imperial treasury (the amīn), a Muslim, but managed by Shemtūb, J-Sij 18-8d. Shemtūb appears in three sijills 
about a decade before the above case, where he provides attestations in support of senior Ottoman officers 
(sipahis), sometimes serving as a kafil, J-17-472-3, 17-477-1, and 17-477-1. 
541 “fī jamī umūūrahū mā [ya]ta‘llaq minnahū wa illayh [unclear word] wa-l-‘aqār wa-l-qabḍ wa-l-ṣarf … ‘an 
al-mablagh…”, J-17-469-2.  
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network. Their standing in as guarantors, thus, was therefore more suited than the other two 
guarantors, one of whom was a physician. Within two days from issuing their guarantee, ‘Alī 
Bey and Yūsuf b. Ibrāhīm Tarānā’s guarantors arrived at a settlement, and on 29 Rabi al 
Thani 959/23 April 1552, ‘Alī Bey attested that all tax claims charged against Yūsuf b. 
Tarānā for the year 957-958 had been resolved, and the prisoner was free to go.542  
Had the case ended here, we would be left with the impression that the matter was 
closed, but this settlement was not lasting, since a sijill dated 26 Rabi al-Thani 960/10 April 
1553, ‘Alī Bey is again in court requesting that Yūsuf b. Shu‘ā and Yūsuf b. Ibrāhīm, the 
physician who had guaranteed Yūsuf b. Ibrāhīm Tarānā, be detained if they did not reveal the 
whereabouts of Yūsif b. Tarāna who apparently has gone into hiding. The court sijill states 
that “they (Yūsuf b. Shu‘ā and Yūsuf b. Ibrāhīm) had pledged to guarantee him in body and 
spirit (rūḥīyan wa badnan) and that now, after exhausted attempts to furnish him, after they 
were requested and failed to do so, they [the guarantors] should be held liable for the 
remaining taxes … related to the amount due on 27 Rabī‘ al-Thānī 959 /21 April 1552 … in 
the amount of 3,805 silver coins (qit‘a).”543 Such debt settlements were of course contingent 
when a further default occurred and bring to mind A. Singer’s contention that “sijills do not 
recount the final resolution of conflicts, but only their adjudication.”544  
The above case shows that, up to the mid-sixteenth century, while Jewish tax farmers 
maintained professional solidarity, such ties did not extend into a corporate liability for their 
loans upon the Jewish community at-large when such tax farmers defaulted on their debts. In 
                                                     
542 J-25-364 
543 “(‘Ali Bayk) qāl fi taqrir da‘wattahhu innahuma (Yusif b. Shua and Yusif b. Ibrahim) kafallāā ‘indahū Yusif 
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rabi‘ al-thāni sannat 959…”, J-25-364, lines 3-4.    
544 Singer, Palestinian Peasants and Ottoman Officials, 129. 
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contrast, several cases of loan defaults brought against the heads of this community later in 
the century reveal an extensive use of mutual surety. Some of these debts were connected to 
financing the Jewish community’s jizya obligation, which remained remarkably stable at 
around 84 to 90 sulṭānī (one sulṭānī for each household) for most of the latter-half of the 
century. This was despite several attempts by the governor and his tax-administrators to 
recount the community’s households, since it had grown significantly in mid-century 
although Jewish leaders contended several times in court that it had subsequently shrunk. 
Nevertheless, by the mid-1580s Jerusalem’s Jews were borrowing heavily to refinance or 
fund all sorts of unspecified community expenses, as the 400 sulṭānī loan from the 
Khudāwardī cash-waqf I discussed in the prior chapter suggests. This indebtedness and high 
spending would result in significant problems for the community, and it is here that mutual 
surety obligations are most evidenced in court.     
The subject of the jizya, the tax levied on adult male Christians and Jews in the pre-
modern era, has attracted a great deal of scholarship, but much of it has explored the 
connection between jizya and religious conversion.545 Less has been written on this tax’s 
collection in the medieval period, due to the lack of surviving state archives. The early 
Ottoman state treated the jizya as a special tax and generally excluded it from tax-farming 
(iltizām) in the sixteenth century.546 This is in contrast to the second decade of the 
                                                     
545 Felicita Tramontana, “The Poll Tax and the Decline of the Christian Presence in the Palestinian Countryside 
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546 Lewis and Cohen, Population and Revenue, 72; Cahen, Cl.; İnalcık, Halil; Hardy, P.. 
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seventeenth century when the Ottoman state regularly farmed out the jizya tax, this perhaps 
being an outcome of the reform of the tax regime as a whole in that period.547 For much of 
the sixteenth century, the administration of the jizya in Bilad al-Shām was (usually but not 
exclusively) the mandate of qāḍīs who employed tax collectors to service it.548 Most often, 
Jerusalem’s jizya proceeds were applied to funding the operations of the city’s major 
endowments, such as the Haram al-Sharif, rather than for military expenses.549 Muḥtasibs in 
early Ottoman Jerusalem appear to not have been involved in jizya collection at all. As far as 
Jerusalem’s Jews were concerned, the muḥtasib only surfaced in the sijills when he attempted 
to place fines on the Jewish community for market infractions by its members (silversmiths 
and other market actors), these arbitrary fines were referred to as jarā’im (designating fines 
rather than ‘crimes’ in the literal sense).550 
Under Islamic law, the muḥtasib was responsible for collecting market (īḥtīsāb) taxes, 
as well as the jizya poll tax and the kharāj/‘ushūr tax on agricultural surplus.551 For the 
Mamluk period the muḥtasib manual of Ibn al-Bassām gives the following description of its 
collection (although it too, as prescriptive literature, may not have reflected reality then): 
                                                     
547 Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy, 47. 
548 Jizya tax collection could take on a number of forms, depending on the type of land (e.g. 
khass/iltizam/private waqf) being farmed, and tax collectors could be appointed by the central government, 
rather than by judges. Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy, 160–63. 
549 This practice appears throughout the century. The earliest record is from the end of 941/1535, when a Jewish 
money changer paid 520 ‘ūthmānī silver coins (equivalent to between 10-12 gold coins at the prevalent rate of 
exchange, i.e., the jizya for about 10-12 individuals out of a community of around 90 tax-payers) to the preacher 
(khatīb) of the al-Aqṣa mosque (J-Sij 5-50d); another example appears in Ramaḍān of 959/1552, when the 
entire jizya tax was paid to the head of “tile repairs” of the Ḥaram al-Sharīf endowment (J-Sij 25-616f); and, 
also at the beginning of 982/1574, the Ḥanafī mūftī of Jerusalem acknowledged receipt of the community’s poll 
tax for that year and that his salary would be paid from such sum (J-Sij 56-130f).     
550 For a definition of jarīma see Ed.. "D̲j̲arīma." Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition. Edited by: P. 
Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. Brill Online, 2015. 
551 Cahen, et al., "Ḏj̲izya." Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition.  
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“If the muḥtasib or his agent comes to collect the jizya, he should stand 
in front of the [Jew or Christian], slap him on the side of the neck, and 
say: ‘Pay the jizya, unbeliever.’ The dhimmī will take the money from 
his pocket and pay it with humility and submissiveness.”552  
Notwithstanding, the discrepancy between prescription and market custom, the organization 
of the jizya payment, as described above by the community heads (mashāyikh), rather than 
its payment by individuals directly to the state was likely the case in late Mamluk Syria. As 
would be the case with the Jews of Jerusalem in the following century, Damascene Jews 
appeared to have used petitions to the sultan to appeal against abuses. In Dhū’l-Ḥijja 
903/August 1498, Ibn Ṭūlūn reported that a Mamluk Amīr issued a sultanic edict that 
instructed the city’s chief qāḍīs not to chide or mistreat the city’s Jews when collecting the 
jizya, but rather to follow ‘custom.’553  
While the above prescription involves debasement and fiscal exactness in almost 
equal measure, the documentary record of jizya collection in the sixteenth century, as in 
previous centuries, reflects far more pragmatism. While the jizya was an individual 
obligation, its collection was invariably communal. Payment of the jizya by Jews and 
Christians of medieval Mamluk Cairo, for instance, was often coordinated and funded by 
                                                     
552 Reproduced from Kristen Stilt, Islamic Law in Action: Authority, Discretion, and Everyday Experiences in 
Mamluk Egypt (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 122. Variations on this prescriptions 
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553 Ibn Ṭūlūn, Mufākahat, 1998, 161. 
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wealthy community leaders, even though it was levied individually.554 During periods of 
economic strain, the jizya and kharāj (land) taxes – were financed or even rolled over into the 
future. As mentioned, in the case of Jerusalem’s Jews, although the community grew rapidly 
over the course of the sixteenth century, the number of tax-paying khanes remained 
remarkably stable.555 This may have been because this tax was paid annually by the Jewish 
heads to the city’s qāḍī in a fixed lump-sum, a customary practice. When debates arose 
questioning this sum, it was in response to accusations that the community’s household 
members differed from those in the cadastral (taḥrīr) registers. However, unless compelled to 
by Istanbul, qāḍīs in Istanbul seemed to stick to the customary figure and practice. In a 
similar vein, Singer has shown that the amount of ‘ushur taxes paid by peasants in 
Jerusalem’s hinterland often differed from those prescribed in the taḥrīr defters, since such 
taxes were customarily paid as a percentage of the crop yield, rather than as fixed lump-sums 
as the taḥrīr defters suggest.556 In dealing with how the community financed its jizya 
obligations, the state realized that obtaining all the jizya dues that it levied on this community 
was unrealistic. For later centuries, population registers and sijills records show that the 
number of tax-paying households was much lower than the surveyed number of taxable 
households.557 
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557 For the eighteenth century, Oded Piri contends that the jizya tax probably represented Jerusalem’s largest 
tax, however for the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries this was clearly not the case as there are several larger 
taxes levied on the community, discussed below; Oded Peri, “The Muslim Waqf and the jizya in late 
eighteenth-century Jerusalem”, in ed. Gilbar, Ottoman Palestine, 1800-1914, 291. 
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Unlike the jizya tax, the kharāj tax appears to have been farmed out by qāḍīs to the 
head(s) of the Jewish community. 558 In 964/1557, the subaşı of Jerusalem confirmed receipt 
of this tax, in the amount of 88 sūltānīs from a Jew who had leased this revenue.559 Eight 
years earlier a sijill points to the chief night magistrate of Jerusalem (the ‘ases bashi) 
acknowledging his receipt of 33 gold coins from the Jewish community head Yūsuf b. Falāq 
(active 945-958/1538-1558), relating to a debt that Falāq latter owed to the military 
commander of the area, the subaşı, also on account of the community’s kharāj tax.560 
Just as with the case of Ibrāhīm b. Tarāna above, the communal debt taking of the 
city’s Jews in the 1530s to the 1550s appears to not have relied on mutual surety pledges of 
the sort found later in the century. In this earlier period the community’s borrowing was done 
in a simpler fashion; almost all make community members would appear in person in court to 
take on a debt (unlike in the last decades when two or three communal heads would 
figuratively represent their members), without all giving mutual surety for each other’s 
obligations equally. Rather, what did happen was that the community’s leaders would 
individually guarantee the group’s liability. The earliest example of this is a debt recorded in 
a sijill from Rabī‘ I 940/October 1533, in which 22 Jewish men appeared in court to 
personally borrow 16,000 silver coins (ḥalabīya siyaqāt) from a Muslim silversmith, Fatḥ al-
Dīn al-Ṣā’igh. Although the names of the 22 individuals were written out in the sijill, it was 
                                                     
558 The issue of tax collection is highly circumscribed by local conditions and customs. For Cairo, for instance 
ʻAfīfī provides numerous examples of the tax-farming of the jizya tax to Copts. The fact that it wasn’t farmed 
out in Jerusalem does not preclude that it was elsewhere in Bilād al-Shām. ʻAfīfī illustrated that the taxes of 
Coptic Christians in outlying parts of Cairo and Alexandria, the earliest being the purchase of an iltizam for the 
collection of jizya taxes for the Christians of the South-East (“al-wajh al-qiblī”) quadrant (?) of Cairo in 
937/1530 for 165,000 silver niṣfs. ʻAfīfī also notes the overwhelming presence of Copts in all offices of the 
jizya tax department, the Dīwān al-Jawāli, of the local government administration. ʻAfīfī, al-Aqbāṭ, 19; Bāb al-
‘Ālī, 1:12-54. 
559 J-33-486-1  
560 J-25-115-3 
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rather the guarantee provided by two other Jews, Mūsā b. Ḥayyīm and Faraj-Allah al-Jawjarī 
(presumably the community’s leaders), for the 22 borrowers that facilitated the loan.561 This 
is significant, because in the event of a default, it would have been these two guarantors who 
would have been left with the liability of the loan, and probably not the borrowers 
themselves.  
Five years on, in Rajab 945 / December 1538, a similar pattern was recorded when 
Falāq, the head of the community (listed as in the sijill as shaykh ṭā’ifat al-yahūd), appeared 
in court in with eight other Jews to guarantee (kafāla) to repay all debts outstanding to the 
police superintendent (subaşı) of the district of Jerusalem owed by the Jews of the city.562 
Again, here is the same dynamic of a few senior members guaranteeing the debts of the 
many, and doing so in their individual capacities. The two formulas mutaḍāminūn wa 
mutakāfilūn and bi’l aṣāla wa’l-kafāla that are seen in later years are not recorded in this first 
half of the century among the debts taken by Jews in the city. There is no description of the 
specific obligation to which said debt relates. However, given that the last recorded tax 
payment of the community was from four years earlier (941/1535), it is likely that this 
undertaking was connected to overdue taxes.563 Supporting evidence from other communal 
debt is found in a sijill from earlier in that same year, in which Falāq appears in court to 
answer for non-payment of ‘ushr tax connected to the community’s lease of Jewish cemetery 
land from a Muslim endowment.564 The Jewish community must surely also have undergone 
greater scrutiny in 945/1538, the year in which a major taḥrīr survey was carried out for 
                                                     
561 J-3-273-2 
562 J-10-170-1; The earliest record of Falaq is from 1533, when his name appears in a tax record of Jews who 
paid the jizya for that year, J-3-149-2.  
563  Jumada'l Akhir 941 / December 1534, J-4-526-3  
564 Ramaḍān, 944 / February, 1538; J-5-374-6 
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Jerusalem, Safad and Gaza. Indeed, there is a smooth record of jizya payments for the six 
years between 952/1546 and the last year of Falāq’s leadership of the Jewish community in 
958/1551, with the exception of 954/1548 when the community faced accusations from the 
Imperial Treasury of under-reporting their population size. After an investigation, the 
treasury officials assess that there were five more Jewish households than those for which 
jizya was collected over the past five years, and consequently, the community was assessed 
an additional 25 sūlṭānis.565 
The evidence for the community’s financing of its jizya tax obligation is implicit. In 
952/1545 and 954/1547, Falāq paid the jizya of 85 sūlṭānis in the first month of each year, 
Mūharram.566 The subsequent two years saw delays, no doubt connected to the Imperial 
Treasury’s investigation of the community’s size in 954/1547 which determined, in the last 
month of that year (Dhū’l-Ḥijja) that the community had been underrepresented by five 
households. Falāq paid 25 sulṭānī gold coins for these additional five households who had 
escaped the jizya tax during the past five years, in the last week of that same month, at the 
end of 954/1547.567 Then in 955/1548, the tax was for ninety households. As with the prior 
year, it was also settled in the last week of the year 955/1548. It appears that Falāq waited 
until the last minute to settle these dues, before facing possible penalties. The timing of these 
payments suggests that communal taxes only became delinquent after a year from when they 
were due and Falāq’s annual payments took place at the eleventh hour.  In Ṣafar 956/1549, 
Falāq and another community leader, Mūsā b. Shulāl, appeared in court to record a partial 
repayment of a debt to a notable, Shaikh Zain-l-dīn b. al-Ḥāj ‘Alī al-Mardīnī, in the amount 
                                                     
565 J-20-167-8 
566 J-16-148-1; J-18-634-4 
567 J-20-167/8; The last third of Dhū’l Ḥijjah 954/1547 
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of sixty sūlṭānis out of an original debt of eighty coins.568 Eight months on, and in the same 
year, this creditor attested to the loan’s repayment by Fulāq, Mūsā b. Shulāl, and Yaḥyā al-
dayyān (the Rabbi) on behalf of the Jewish community. Clearly, this debt, for which we don’t 
have an initial record, was issued before Ṣafar 956/1549 and was likely used to settle the 
shortfall in jizya payments from the prior year.569 Clearly, by the mid-century mark, the 
financing of this community’s taxes was becoming more routine and treated as a corporate 
obligation, in figurative terms. Legally, however, it was still the responsibility of the 
community heads who would guarantee these loans on behalf of their community’s members. 
 In the last two decades of the sixteenth century, this routinized activity came to have 
deleterious effects when such loans began to involve mutual surety undertakings that 
assigned equal liability for the community’s debts to each of its members. Under the 
community head, Shamīla b. Jūkār (active 977-997/1570-1589), disagreements about the 
division and responsibility of jizya debts among the community members came to a head. 
The conflict between individual versus group responsibility for such debts led to the 
intervention of the city’s qāḍī. Some qāḍīs ruled that it was the communal responsibility of 
Jewish elites to support their economically weaker brethren - even though the tax burden 
was, in legal terms, levied individually. Shamīla b. Jūkār, the sesame oil dealer (al-
sayrajānī), was a member of the Jūkār family, a prominent family in Jerusalem’s Jewish 
community, and relatives of Shamīla held various important market and administrative 
posts.570 In late 977/1570, he paid the jizya tax on behalf of the community, and two years 
later, he filed a complaint against five Jews of his community for owing him thirty ṣūltānīs 
                                                     
568 J-21-542-2 
569 J-22-440-2 
570 A record from Sha‘ban 979 / January 1572 shows him described as the sesame oil dealer, J-54-436-2. Cohen, 
Jewish Life under Islam, 40. 
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on account of their portions of the jizya tax debt; they admitted to only owing eighteen 
sūlṭānīs and the qāḍī provides them a grace period to provide proof.571 In 982/1575, Shamīla 
brought another case against two other Jews who denied having owed him two gold coins on 
their behalf, again for tax dues. The qāḍī then ruled in his favor and ordered them to pay. 
These examples point to the centralized nature of taxation and that deficits caused the Jewish 
heads to borrow in order to make up for deficits. By the end of Shamīla’s tenure, at the 
beginning of 997/1589, financial difficulties were creating serious fissures within the 
community and disputes between the wealthier members of the community over how to split 
the cost of burgeoning community debts, providing a subsidy to weaker members of the 
community. On 22 Safar 997/9 January 1589, Jerusalem’s chief-qāḍī required Shamīla to 
appear in court and pledge to treat all Jews equally, irrespective of whether they were “rich 
or poor” with respect to the assignment of communal taxes and other impositions – clearly 
Jewish elites had become bitter about shouldering the responsibility of the community’s 
mushrooming accounts.572  
It was seven months earlier, in Rajab 996/May 1588, that 21 Jews (the community 
elites among them, including Shamīla) undertook the above-mentioned mutual surety loan of 
400 sulṭānī to the cash-waqf of Khudāwardī Bey.573 This debt, which carried an associated 
interest of 15% (60 sulṭānī) was due within a year’s time, and moreover the sijill suggests 
that it was a rolling-over of the principal from the prior year, since the waqf’s mutawallī 
acknowledges having received payment for “the prior year’s profit”. The Jewish debtors 
undertook to enter into “mutual surety in this obligation, in both their personal assets as well 
                                                     
571 J-54-436-2 
572 J-69-82-1. 
573 J-67-222-4; On Bey Khudawirdi, see Amnon Cohen, Economic Life in Ottoman Jerusalem (Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 51.   
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as liabilities, having each given their expressed permission and recognized each other’s 
(joint-liability)” (wa-hum mutaḍāminūn mutakāfilūn fī dhālik fī mālihim wa-dhimmatihim 
b’idhin kull minhum l’il-ākhar). Significantly, this debt record does not mention that these 
individuals belong to the Jewish “ṭā’ifa.” Perhaps this explains the conjoining of their 
interests through the explicit annunciation of their “mutual surety for each other’s assets and 
liabilities”.  
It was not long after this period, about five years later, that the community had to rely 
on donations from Jews abroad to maintain Jewish institutions in the city and, indeed, to 
prevent the confiscation of Jewish assets from over-indebtedness. A sijill from the end of 
1002/1596 shows that a wealthy Istanbul rabbi who engaged in cloth trading, donated 20,000 
silver coins to Jewish cloth merchants in Jerusalem as charity for the community there.574 A 
sijill from a year later, in 1003/1597 revealed that the payment of interest on an existing debt 
of 300 sulṭānīs to the “Shaykh al-Tujjār” of Jerusalem by the Jewish community had to be 
guaranteed by an expanded mutual surety by other Jews of the area because of their risk of 
default, and that the interest at this time amounted to 27% (80 gold coins for the year), almost 
double the rate they had paid to the Khudāwardī waqf seven years earlier.575 
The use of mutual surety had become increasingly used by both powerful creditors, as 
well as the Jewish community, that it began impoverishing its once wealthy elites. A court 
deposition of an imprisoned Jewish debtor from Rajab 1008/January 1600 shows how the 
community’s self-policing and coercive tactics worked to perpetuate this, since it was not 
only the insistence of creditors that was responsible for mutual surety. After a Jewish man 
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was imprisoned on charges brought against him by creditors, he provided testimony to the 
qāḍī pleading his bankruptcy. In jail, he was interrogated for lengthy period, and it appears 
that it was the qāḍī’s intention that Isḥāq’s deposition be used as evidence to indict or 
crackdown on Jewish elites who abused the mutual-pledge system. In his testimony, this 
debtor was quoted as saying “they (a group of Jewish leaders) take upon themselves and 
others debts by writing pledges in the names of others without their permission or physical 
presence [in court] and this is how [I] became heavily indebted and imprisoned.”576 
Subsequently, and in the same proceedings, the qāḍī requested that the Jews he named be 
brought to the court for questioning, upon which they agreed that “it was their custom to 
enter into debts [as a group] and for the names of debtors to be written down without their 
presence.”577 In the end, the sijill shows that Isḥāq pleaded with the qāḍī noting that he said 
he “had spent everything that he had left on repaying these debts, and did not have access to 
any of his wife’s money, and that after his bankruptcy was proved, he divorced his wife 
while still in jail;” presumably because he no longer had the means to support a household.578 
The context of this deposition suggests that his affirmation of having divorced his wife also 
serves to severe any responsibility for liability on her part. This deposition was taken as a 
matter of record and the end of the sijill states “for future reference when needed” (yūrja‘ 
ilayh waqt al-ḥājja).  
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4.4 Mutual surety and guilds 
The sijill evidence of guild loans backed by mutual surety undertakings is limited to 
Jerusalem, and if the data from Jerusalem is indicative of wider trends, it would seem to me 
that mutual surety was adopted by individuals from different guilds who came together to 
take loans in their own name, not in the name of their respective guilds, or even among 
members of the same guild. This limitation may have been due to restriction placed upon 
guild indebtedness by qāḍīs; however, I have not found any explicit evidence of this. Guild 
members relied on cash-waqfs especially. Given the scant information on borrower 
backgrounds in the sijills, I have assumed an artisan’s guild status based on the professional 
affiliation in debtors’ last names. In Rabī‘ II 966/March 1588, the Baymānā Khātūn waqf of 
Jerusalem issued joint loans to artisans such as the loan of 10 sulṭānīs to Khalīl al-Haram and 
Ḥasan al-Dahhān, or the 30 sulṭānīs this waqf lent to Muḥammad al-Sukkarī and Yūsuf al-
Bayṭār; both loans were at 20% interest.579 These groups of individuals issued oaths of 
mutual surety for their loans. That is not to ignore the prevalence of intra-guild loans also, 
which were common. From the same sijill, there is the debt of Ḥasan b. Darwīsh al-Qahwajī 
(the coffee-house owner/worker) was owed three sulṭanīs by the head of his guild ‘Alī b. 
Aḥmad b. Abī al-Faḍl; this debt, in the form of a mu‘āmala, had interest in the form of a sale 
of three coffee cups (fanājīn).580 This latter debt is representative of most debts between 
                                                     
579 J-67-177-3, J-67-177-8 
580 J-67-293-4, Many of the mu‘āmalāt between members of the same guild involved small amounts. N. Hanna 
has recently shown that the physical property of guilds in cairo, such as copper bowls, could acquire their own 
status as “guild waqf.” It would be interesting to consider how these guild assets could be mortgaged, in my 
above example I have considered that the fanājīn are simply a subterfuge for interest and are hypothetical, 
however, they could have indeed existed, and been part and parcel of this artisan’s work. See Hanna, “Guild 
Waqf: Between Religious Law and Common Law.” 
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guild-members, and probably the majority of debts recorded in the Jerusalem courts, that 
often did not exceed ten sulṭānīs. 
As with the case of the Jewish community’s use of mutual surety, qāḍīs were also 
keen to police the recording and settlement of commercial debts undertaken by guilds and 
groups of traders. Because qāḍīs in sixteenth-century Jerusalem and Damascus were 
responsible for the financial oversight and accounting (istiftā’) of district treasuries and their 
tax-farms, as with the jizya tax, the settlement of guilds’ debts and the maintenance of 
healthy markets was vital to their broader tax regime. Like religious communities, guilds fell 
under the rubric of “ṭā’ifāt.” Guilds’ reporting of debts owed to them was routine and of vital 
economic importance to the judiciary. For example, the butcher’s guild was relied upon for 
the provision of a city’s meat, as Cohen has amply shown.581 This interest in the affairs of 
guilds remained fairly constant by the courts over the course of the century, and frequently 
merged with the activities of the muḥtasib, who reported to the chief qāḍī. An inventory of 
debts and credit-sales from the butcher’s guild in 948/1541, for instance, showed an 
inventory of the guild’s general account, effectively their payables and receivables for that 
year, which show a number of personal debts owed by the guild’s members individually, and 
on behalf of the guild as a whole.582 However, nowhere in this statement is a reference to 
mutual surety, and the guild-wide debts are related to its on-going operation. When guild 
heads were summoned by qāḍīs to attest about the debts owed to their guild by other 
“ṭā’ifāt,” as in a case from 954/1547, when the chief builder of Jerusalem was summoned by 
the chief qāḍī to issue a deposition concerning all outstanding debts by the city’s Jewish 
                                                     
581 Amnon Cohen, The Guilds of Ottoman Jerusalem (Brill Boston, MA, 2001), 17; Cohen, Economic Life in 
Ottoman Jerusalem, 11–60. 
582 J-13-251 
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community to his guild, the purpose was typically associated with gathering evidence for a 
larger investigation. Given the above discussion on the Jewish community’s propensity for 
financing their jizya taxes, the city’s qāḍīs often had to investigate the liabilities of this 
community before allowing them to pile-on increasing debts.583 As the century progressed, it 
became apparent that this form of supervision was either slipping, or that qāḍīs simply 
loosened their grip on the political-economic regulation of the city.    
The patterns of supervision of guilds in the Jerusalem and Damascus sijjilāt are 
largely in line with the findings of studies on Bursa and Damascus, for the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, by Gerber and Rafeq. Indeed, the wide-ranging depositions that were 
required of guilds sought various objectives, from policing guild-members whose activities 
fell out of line with the guild’s rules; to recording financial statements and agreements, to 
serving as a public record of the qāḍī’s own policing of guilds by the state.584 Both Gerber 
and Rafeq also found that the activities of guilds were, moreover, important for fulfilling tax-
collecting functions that were outsourced to them (from the seventeenth century), the 
collection of the state’s “yamak” (assistant guild) army tax.585 To a degree, the qāḍīs’ 
ordinances to guilds on prices, taxation and their duties, bypassed the muḥtasib’s supervision 
which dealt more on the functioning of markets themselves; guild-leaders were often 
                                                     
583 J-20-4-2; The butchers guild was required to make similar attestations of debts and accounts; see J-13-250-3 
and 13-251; The attestation by the butcher’s guild does not infer that the butchers guild excluded Jews. There 
are many references to Jewish and Christian members of the butchers guild, and Jews headed this guild on 
several occasions. Cohen, The Guilds of Ottoman Jerusalem, 17–22. 
584 Gerber, State, Society, and Law in Islam, 122–25. 
585 Gerber, 118–19; Abdul-Karim Rafeq, The Law-Court Registers of Damascus, with Special Reference to 
Craft-Corporations during the First Half of the Eighteenth Century. (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la 
Recherche Scientifique, 1976), 141–59. 
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required by qāḍīs to issue personal guarantees for one anothers’ actions (kafāla bi’l-nafs) in 
carrying out their professional duties.586    
 
Conclusion 
During the Mamluk period, mutual surety was used as a legal mechanism to secure 
loans, as the appearance of the formula “mutakāfilūn wa mutaḍāminūn” in agricultural leases 
preserved in the Ḥaram al-Sharīf archive from 1390s Jerusalem suggests. However, it is 
impossible to evaluate the extent to which mutual surety arrangements were used, nor which 
groups of society they affected the most, in Mamluk times. The widespread appearance of 
mutual surety during the early Ottoman period, not only in Bilād al-Shām, but also in South 
Anatolia, does indicate some measure of continuity of this legal custom in the broader 
Levant. In the case of Jerusalem, I have shown how the use of mutual surety was not 
restricted to specific communities according to confessional, professional, or other affiliation. 
Rather, it was used as a way to bind common debtor obligations to create a synthetic 
corporate liability. I have chosen to frame my discussion of mutual surety around three 
separate communal categories: hinterland peasants, the urban Jewish community, and urban 
guilds.  
Debtors often adopted mutual surety when they lacked sufficient collateral to obtain 
loans as individuals, such as when guild members borrowed; however, for tax-paying 
communities, it was political pressure that drove their use of mutual surety. The debts 
undertaken by Jerusalem’s Jewish community in the late-sixteenth century took place under 
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the direction of the city’s qāḍīs and governors and such lending appears to have been a long-
standing legal custom. Sijill complaints by some imprisoned debtor Jews at the end of the 
century suggest that this was very much the case. Similarly, the peasants of rural 
communities were considered to have mutual liability, often focused in the village leaders, 
who were assumed (or forced) to take oaths of mutual surety for the tax debts owed to the 
state. Yet, as I have argued above, the use of mutual surety, whether entered into willingly or 
forced upon debtor groups, was an ineffective means of ensuring repayment. Peasant debts 
could pile up for years, and increased cajoling or imprisonment by the authorities, in the 
middle years of the century, appear to have done little to improve the recovery of these debts.  
With respect to historical change, it is notable that the frequency of mutual surety 
claims in the court records increases over the century. When Ibrāhīm b. Tarānā, a Jewish tax-
collector from 1540s Jerusalem engaged in a variety of borrowing (himself being a senior 
member of the Jewish community), the guarantees he entered into stressed individual 
guarantees, rather than communal ones, although mutual surety was not uncommon in his 
day. By the 1580s and 90s, though, mutual surety arrangements had become so widespread 
that it became difficult for Jerusalem’s Jews, and the city’s qāḍīs, to distinguish between 
individual and group indemnity among the Jewish community’s members. This shift reflects 
two realities. On the one hand, the community’s increasing dependence on debt was used to 
finance its obligations in a period of high inflation, that of the so-called price revolution. On 
the other, it is a reflection of how market lenders readily accepted increasing levels of risk by 
lending to this community, and this may have likely been due to the state’s implicit 
promotion of mutual surety.  
268 
  
In my next chapter, I turn to a rather different credit structure, the practice of lending 
from orphan estates to provide for the care of orphans, a practice that was heavily imbued 
with socio-religious significance. Like mutual surety, lending from orphan estates also built 
on long standing Mamluk-era traditions.   
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Chapter Five – Orphan Estate Lending 
 
Scholars of the premodern Near East have tended to study the history of orphans with 
the poor and other vulnerable members of society such as widows, mendicants, the destitute 
and the sick.587 This categorization was also shared by Muslim jurists. Strictly speaking, 
orphans are defined in Islam as any children whose fathers have died – irrespective of social 
or economic standing. Indeed, the Qur’ān is explicit about placing orphans alongside those 
who are “needy, travelers and beggars.”588 In response to an ethical mandate to care for 
orphans and the poor, rulers and elites in the pre-industrial Near East constructed myriad 
waqfs for housing, feeding and schooling orphans. By studying waqf deeds, chronicles and 
court records, historians have, in the past two decades, begun to examine how patronage, 
labor, and institutional resources came together to alleviate the material conditions of weaker 
members of society.589 Much of this scholarship has focused on resources and labor, such as 
revealing the operations of soup kitchens, schools and Sufi lodges. However, there are few 
studies of the role of economic exchange as a means for providing for the social welfare of 
orphans. This is especially important since orphans inherited the social-economic status, and 
often titles and professions, of their fathers, which could be far removed from the conditions 
                                                     
587 Singer, Constructing Ottoman Beneficence, 19, 64, 81; Mark R Cohen, Poverty and Charity in the Jewish 
Community of Medieval Egypt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 88, 148, 186. 
588 “Truly righteous are those who believe in God and the Last Day … and give away some of their wealth to … 
to their relatives, orphans, the needy, travelers and beggars..” Qur’ān 2:177,; For similar expressions of this 
topos see verses 2:83, 4:8, 76:8, 107:2-3.  
589 Nazan Maksudyan, Orphans and Destitute Children in the Late Ottoman Empire, 2014; Singer, Palestinian 
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of material poverty. In this chapter, I evaluate the practice of what I refer to below as orphan 
credit, that is, the practice of lending out orphans’ inheritances, by executors of estates as a 
method to preserve and grow the capital bequeathed to orphans, and to provide for the latters’ 
care.590  
A key objective of this chapter is to investigate how orphan credit practices were 
defined and applied in the Mamluk and early Ottoman periods in and outside of courts, by 
looking at the record of such lending activity in both the legal literature as well as court 
records from the fourteenth through sixteenth-centuries. I trace the historical roots and 
development of this practice, from vague references of its use in Abbasid Baghdad, to its 
formulation as an institutionalized court-managed practice in Mamluk Cairo, and ultimately 
as a court-supervised (though not managed) activity in the sixteenth-century Ottoman Levant. 
As will be discussed below, this form of customary lending continued to be recorded in 
sharia courts until the late Tanzimat period in Bilād al-Shām, in the second half of the 
nineteenth-century. 
The most common way in which orphan credit was transacted was through mu‘āmalāt 
(sing. mu‘āmala), this being the informal term used in the legal literature and court records to 
refer to loans that used legal subterfuges to avert the association of ribā. Mu‘āmalāt were the 
popular instruments for orphan credit during both Mamluk and Ottoman eras, although, their 
exact formulation differed somewhat between the two periods. While Mamluk-era shurūṭ 
texts (manuals of legal formularies) rarely mention mu‘āmalāt, we know of their popularity – 
as far as orphan credit was concerned – from the Mamluk-era fatwā compilations (legal 
                                                     
590 I deploy the term orphan(s) in this chapter to refer to fatherless children, irrespective of the mother’s 
survival, since the duty to provide for material support is the father’s.  
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responsa) and encyclopedias of Taqī al-Dīn ‘Alī b. ‘Abd al-Kāfī al-Subkī (d. 756/1355) and 
Shihāb ad-Dīn Aḥmad al-Nuwayrī (733/1333). Ottoman shurūṭ, on the other hand, present 
numerous examples of how mu‘āmalāt were applied in court in the sixteenth century, and 
these are testified to with examples from court records that I also present in this chapter, as 
well as a popular jurist manual by Darwish Muḥammad al-Bursawī (d. 937/1530) . Legal 
literature from later jurists in Bilād al-Shām, such as those from the seventeenth-century 
fatwās of Khayr ad-Dīn al-Ramlī (d. 1081/1670), seem to reinforce a legal support for the use 
of mu‘āmalāt, as not only a legitimate subterfuge for orphan credit, but a prerequisite for 
preventing the abrogation of such loans.  
Notwithstanding the abovementioned continuity of mu‘āmalāt, a secondary finding of 
this chapter is that that the Ottoman merger of the muftī and qāḍī posts resulted in a 
loosening, rather than consolidation, of the state’s supervisory role over mu‘āmalāt for the 
management of orphan credit. The line separating rulings from legal opinions under the 
Ottomans was thin, and at times, appeared to be conflated in courts to jurists who had a 
Mamluk era legal lineage, such as the Egyptian qāḍī Ibn Nujaym (d. 970/1563). On the one 
hand, this allowed the Shaykh al-Islam to issue rulings-cum-fatwās that could delineate good 
versus bad practice to provincial qāḍīs. However, on the other, it did create anxiety for some 
jurists, such as Ibn Nujaym who composed a treatise critiquing the common practice of qāḍīs 
issuing rulings on court proceedings for which there was no dispute or claim. As an example, 
with respect to orphan credit, I present a court case from 998/1588 Jerusalem that reflects Ibn 
Nujaym’s concern and illustrates the nominal control that Ottoman qāḍīs had over the actual 
management of orphan capital. With respect to the Ottoman period, I contend that the 
consolidation of the judiciary under a Shaykh al-Islām, the development of an Ottoman 
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canon and legal academies, and a common legal circuit that all qāḍīs had to traverse to attain 
promotion – naturally suppressed the possibility, let alone desire, for chief qāḍīs’ engagement 
in independent legal reasoning. The high turnover of qāḍīs in the provinces (judicial posting 
were for 1-3 years) further facilitated this trend and contributed to a reification of regional 
customary legal practices in court; these would tend to place the power to control orphan 
credit in the hands of orphans’ relatives and executors, with little direct management of the 
loans issued on behalf of orphans – in spite of their regular registrations in court.  
A third point I raise concerning the late-Mamluk/early Ottoman loosening, is that the 
centralization of the Ottoman judiciary’s power resulted in a less structured local bureaucracy 
with respect the management of orphan capital. Under the Mamluks, the administration of 
orphan capital (at least in the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries) was directly supervised 
by an Orphan’s Bureau headed by a director of orphan affairs (Nāẓir al-aytām), and a separate 
but related function of a specialized state depository, the mawdi‘ al-ḥukm. The latter 
institution took on physical custody of inherited orphan estates and managed them on their 
behalf. It had its own supervisor, the Amīn al-ḥukm, who was often – but not always – a 
qāḍī. I have found no evidence for the continuity of these offices in the later fifteenth or 
sixteenth centuries, and their survival as functions of state offices under a different name is 
not apparent from court records or legal manuals. I suggest that, as in the late Mamluk 
period, the management of orphan estates under the Ottomans was subsumed under the 
general responsibilities of qāḍīs. Overall, the lending of orphan capital witnessed a continuity 
of legal-customary practice from the Mamluk period. The religious-social imperative 
connected to the protection of orphans imposed a quasi-legal mandate on the state for 
supervising, if not regulating credit from orphan estates. Ottoman and Mamluk judiciaries 
273 
  
vested in qāḍīs the power to determine inheritance rights, estate disposition proceedings, and 
to appoint executors of orphans’ estates as part of supervising probate courts.   
This chapter begins with a review of fiqh discourses on the merits and risks of 
investing orphan capital in loans, and in the process, discusses some views on the 
problematic issue of ribā. I analyze the discursive elements of this juristic literature 
concerning the demarcation of licit gain from ribā, which is sometimes expressed by its 
informal and euphemistic synonym: fā’ida. This is followed by an analysis of the historical 
record of institutional practice for orphan credit in the Mamluk period, and the transition to 
Ottoman rule. Here, I study institutions, such as the aforementioned mawdi‘ al-ḥukm, and 
discuss the problems that accompanied management of orphan credit. I also consider 
prescriptive writings on judicial procedure and assess what muftīs and qāḍīs would have used 
as guidebooks when considering the supervision of orphan estates (e.g., appointing or 
removing guardians). This is paired with a discussion of the Ottoman muftī-qāḍī nexus and 
its effects on judicial autonomy and decision making, and legal reasoning with respect to the 
management of mu‘āmalāt. Lastly, I present a series of court records that offer portraits of 
the characteristic types of activities that connected guardians, qāḍīs, and orphans in orphan 
capital. Most notable among these are muḥāsabāt, financial statements of accounts, of loans 
issued on behalf of orphans that were reviewed and produced for the benefit of the courts.  
 
5.1 The Mu‘āmalāt of Orphan Lending 
In his evaluation of nineteenth-century sijill (court register) records from Jerusalem, 
Mahmoud Yazbak observed that the practice of qāḍī court-managed orphan estates during the 
period was coming under increased pressure to reform. In seeking to rapidly strengthen and 
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recentralize the Ottoman state, the Ottoman Tanzimat reforms put into effect, in 1851, an 
“Administration of Orphan Funds” (niẓārat amwāl al-aytām) and an Orphan’s Treasury 
(ṣundūq al-aytām) in Jerusalem. These new institutions “were intended to limit the spheres of 
action of the sharī‘a court” and had several effects.591 First, these measures would limit the 
power of qāḍīs and associated elites who had personally benefitted from lending out monies 
from orphans’ estates in the interim between when legatee inheritances were escrowed by 
qāḍī courts and when the debts of their deceased fathers were fully settled. The new 
regulations also stated that “each orphan will have a detailed account which will contain his 
fund’s investments and accrued profits.” This was intended to minimize the potential for 
financial abuses by nefarious trustees. While these measures were well-intentioned, the new 
laws ironically created opportunities for the same elites who, were shareholders in new 
banking and mercantile ventures that stood to benefit from the rerouted investment of orphan 
capital into new Ottoman state bonds and other savings schemes. Thus, the effect of such 
reforms was the introduction of new forms of institutional abuse and commercial 
exploitation. Yazbak’s rare study is a critical contribution towards understanding the 
institutionalization of new forms of orphan credit practices in the modern period, such 
processes standing in stark contrast to the activities of Ottoman qāḍī courts. This may 
inadvertently give one the impression of qāḍī courts as sites for the perpetuation of timeless 
customary laws and practices. As with numerous other legal practices, orphan credit, via 
mu‘āmalāt, was indeed manifested in a broad historical continuity. However, this was of 
course historically contingent, on political-economic stability, the legal institutional character 
of the time, and the social-economic dynamics of different periods. Greater or lesser 
                                                     
591 Yazbak, “Muslim Orphans and the Sharīʿa in Ottoman Palestine According to Sijill Records,” 135. 
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institutionalization took various forms, had different impacts, and as with Yazbak’s assertion 
for nineteenth-century Palestine, did not necessarily lead to better results for the orphans in 
question.592  
Indeed, during the long Mamluk period (1250-1517) chronicles and documentary 
evidence of the institutional management of orphan estates through the mawdi‘ al-ḥukm are 
thin and suggest that this office had its heyday in the mid to late fourteenth century; its 
existence into the fifteenth century is not recorded and it may have waned or vanished 
altogether as a state institution in the turbulent last years of Mamluk rule. This is not to 
suggest that the state was completely removed from the affairs of orphans, as will be 
discussed below. For instance, there is a record of a Damascene notable holding the position 
of Nāẓir al-aytām (“administrator of orphan affairs”) as late as 1510. Evidence from a private 
narrative source, the diary of Shahāb ad-Dīn Aḥmad Ibn Ṭawq suggests that, by the end of 
the fifteenth century, issuing loans from orphan estates was mediated by qāḍīs, albeit out of 
courts. Ibn Ṭawq’s notarial record of this transaction may indicate that that this was an extra-
judicial activity that was not formally supervised by the state. His diary records the 
following:  
[On the tenth of Rabi‘ī al-Ākhir 905/14 November 1499]593 
“Today, I was witness to the wife of Shaykh Aḥmad al-Arbadī 
from Qūbaybāt (a suburb of Damascus). She was dark, short 
                                                     
592 To the best of my knowledge, the only other study to have directly engaged with this topic is: Ronald C. 
Jennings, “Women in Early 17th Century Ottoman Judicial Records: The Sharia Court of Anatolian Kayseri,” 
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 18, no. 1 (1975): 53–114. 
593 For a review of this work and a background on Ibn Tawq, see Li Guo’s review in MSR,; Li Guo, Mamluk 
Studies Review (University of Chicago, 2008), 210. For a detailed review of this work as a source for social and 
urban history see: Torsten Wollina, “Ibn Ṭawq’s Ta‘līq: An Ego Document for Mamlūk Studies,” in Ubi 
Sumus? Quo Vademus?: Mamluk Studies – State of the Art, ed. Stephan Conermann (V&R unipress ; Bonn 
University Press, 2013), 337–58. 
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and large. Zayn ad-Dīn ‘Abd al-Qādir, the merchant, attended 
with two witnesses and delivered to her fifty-six ashrafī dinars 
that had been deposited with him. Shaikh Aḥmad’s wife then 
paid this money to a dark-skinned woman in peasant clothing. I 
was informed that the latter was the mother of Shaikh Ahmad’s 
nephew, this amount being part of the boy’s inheritance. 
Shaikh Aḥmad’s wife wrote a receipt for delivering this 
payment. The boy’s mother attested that she received twelve 
ashrafī dinars on a prior date, making the total sum, to date, 
sixty-eight dinars. The boy’s mother then absolved ‘Abd al-
Qādir the merchant’s liability for this deposit (wadī‘a). Of the 
total collected by the widow twenty-four ashrafī were paid by 
Shaikh Ahmad’s wife, and the remaining forty-four ashrafī 
were transferred to Najm ad-Dīn the qāḍī, who was present, to 
loan out on behalf of the widow’s orphaned son, for a year on 
interest (li-yū‘āmal fīhā li’l-walad ilā sana bi’l-fā’ida).”594     
On one level, Ibn Ṭawq’s above entry suggests that such activities were performed 
informally outside of courts, since there is no reference to a court (or location). Alternatively, 
and in view of the qāḍī’s presence in the above record, and his receipt of the money to be 
invested in a mu‘āmala, I am inclined to think that this was indeed part of this qāḍī’s 
responsibility, and seems to be a process that was mediated by the qāḍī’s own service of 
investing the orphans’ estate in loans. The apparently informal nature of this judicial 
                                                     
594 Ibn Ṭawq, Taʻlīq, 1766. 
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arrangement, having taken place probably in someone’s home, may not have been unusual in 
the Mamluk era, and perhaps even was characteristic of qāḍīs’ work in the early Ottoman era.    
For the early seventeenth century later, Gerguis has hypothesized that many of the 
activities of Ottoman qāḍīs that were registered in sijills were actually performed outside of 
court and later inserted into the court record. He observed that qāḍīs’ personal signature 
stamps (‘alāmāt) appeared simultaneously across multiple sijills from different courts of 
Cairo concurrently (sometimes on the same day). Given the distances between courts, the 
only plausible answer, he suggests, is that chief qāḍīs and their deputies recorded oaths, 
depositions and other forms of sijills outside of court at personal residences.595 This may have 
very well been the case in Ibn Ṭawq’s record. Also complicating matters is that the period 
between the two long reigns of Sulṭān Qāytbāy (r. 1468-1496) and Sulṭān al-Ghawrī (1501-
1517) was a tumultuous interregnum when four sultans vied for power. This did destabilize 
the judicial order in Damascus at the turn of the sixteenth century, and may have altered the 
procedural aspects of qāḍīs’ work.596 That said, Ibn Ṭawq’s record is characteristic of his 
record keeping during other periods of relative peace in Damascus, his diary covering an 
unusually long period – 885-908/1480-1502. 
Ibn Ṭawq’s above use of the term “benefit,” “fāyda” (fā’ida) refers to interest, in 
surprisingly the same way that it would be used today as a synonym for ribā. Had Ibn Ṭawq 
recorded this transaction in a court sijill, he would rather have used the word “profit” ribḥ to 
express the interest taken as legitimate profit. However, it is worth noting that the taking of 
explicit interest, although disguised as profit in mu‘āmalāt for orphans, would have been 
                                                     
595 Guirguis, “Manhaj Al-Dirāsāt Al-Wathā’qiyya Wa Wāqi‘ Al-Baḥth Fī Miṣr,” 272–74. 
596 Winter, “The Judiciary of Late Mamluk and Early Ottoman Damascus.” 
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more tolerated when undertaken to protect the assets of orphans than perhaps any other group 
in society. Indirectly, the Qur’ān’s recognition of remunerative rights for guardians of 
orphans may promote such lending: “Let not the rich guardian touch the property of the 
orphan ward; and let him who is poor use no more than a fair proportion of it for his own 
advantage” (Q 4:6), the term “poor” here referring to the guardians or executors tasked with 
care of orphans. As I detailed in my review of al-Subkī’s fatwās on mu‘āmalāt above, in the 
early Mamluk era the practice of using mu‘āmalāt to invest the estates of orphans was 
already institutionalized. It may seem ironic that the paragon of moral conduct, the qāḍī, is 
tasked with investing an heir’s inheritance in interest-bearing loans, yet, it was common 
practice for qāḍīs to do so by the early fourteenth century, if not earlier. 
In support of Ebu’l-s-Su‘ūd’s earlier mentioned disparagement of exchanges that 
relied upon assets of orphans, Ottoman judicial policy was keenly attuned to the need for 
active supervision of executor creditors who abused their mandates. In al-Bursawī’s biḍā‘at 
al-qāḍī we find a formulary labelled “The form (ṣūrat) of recording the removal of an 
executor after his betrayal (of trust) has been exposed” that is states the correct form for 
registering such a mu‘āmala: 
Fulān (so and so) and fulān witnessed, in the adjudication presided over by 
qāḍī fulān … that the legal executor of fulān’s estate, whose father fulān b. 
fulān is deceased … purchased, from the estate of the aforementioned heir, a 
piece of red cloth for three hundred dirhams, paying less than what it’s worth 
(rābiḥ aqal min qīmatihi). Then (the executor) immediately sold it for four 
hundred dirhams and obtained for himself the profit… the witness testimony 
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has been accepted … the qāḍī rescinded his executorship and appointed fulān 
b. fulān to be legal executor of the minor…597 
 
 
 
5.2 Institutions Regulating Orphan Credit 
The references to mu‘āmalāt and a dīwān al-aytām (the “bureau of orphans”) in al-
Subkī’s legal responsa are detailed enough to suggest that a sophisticated bureaucracy was 
engaged in the management of orphan capital, especially when combined with other evidence 
of the mawdi‘ al-ḥukm, which refers to a depository where orphan estates were stored. In al-
Subkī’s day, the dīwān al-aytām had direct custody of orphans’ capital. Al-Subkī relates a 
case of an executor who was entrusted to invest 9,000 dirhams on behalf of an orphan; the 
executor was paid this sum directly “from the dīwān al-aytām.”598 This bureau appeared to 
have centrally administered the affairs of orphan inheritances across the sultanate. Al-
Maqrīzī relates that, in Dhu’l-Hijja 746/ September 1363, Taqī Dīn al-Subkī had the chief 
qāḍī of Jerusalem indicted and removed from his post after presenting evidence that he was 
selling orphaned Muslim children to “Christians” (Frankish/Byzantine slave traders?).599 
Indeed, al-Subkī’s position as head of this institution in Cairo, as well as in Damascus later in 
his life, required him to not only supervise the activities of debtors who operated the accounts 
of orphan estates but also ensure that monies held for orphans were kept separate from the 
                                                     
597 al-Bursawī, Biḍā‘at Al-Qāḍī, fol. 47a. 
598 al-Subkī, Fatāwā, vols. 1, 347. 
599 al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk li-maʻrifat duwal al-mulūk, vol. 4, 19. 
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state’s own funds. In an episode from two-years prior, al-Maqrīzī narrates that al-Subkī, 
along with other heads of government bureaus and institutions in Damascus, was forced to 
surrender money in the treasury of orphans to the amīr Quṭlūbughā al-Fakhrī who was 
extorting funds from the city’s waqfs and elites.600  
As A. Sabra observed, amīrs and rulers drew on the Mawdi‘ al-Ḥukm’s funds to meet 
their military expenses; in 791/1389 and 796/1394, the Amīr Mintāsh and Sulṭān Barqūq, 
respectively, withdrew over a million dirhams from this fund. Mintāsh used these funds for 
defending Cairo from Barqūq’s insurrection, and the later used this fund for meeting the 
expenses of a military campaign.601 This depository was established during the short reign of 
Sultan Lājīn (r. 1297-99) and it operated at least until the reign of Sultan Barqūq (d. 
801/1399), the entire span of the fourteenth century.602 The administrative practice of 
managing orphan estates, though, predated the establishment of this institution and can be 
traced to Sultan Baybars’ rule (d. 676/1277).603  Although the mawdi‘ al-ḥukm was used as a 
sinking fund for military campaigns, money withdrawn from this fund was not easily 
removed, and was considered a debt to this depository when it was. The funds borrowed by 
Barqūq were eventually repaid. However, it appears that this fund and its associated 
buildings fell into disuse after Tamerlane’s campaign in Syria, according to al-Maqrīzī. Sabra 
                                                     
600 Maqrizi, Sulūk, vol. 3, 349  
601 Sabra, Poverty and Charity in Medieval Islam, 62–63. 
602 Ibid. 
603 Sabra observed, "it appears that some sort of judicial control over the property of orphans existed previously. 
The position of amānat al-ḥukm existed as early as the reign of al-Ẓāhir Baybars.” Sabra, Poverty and Charity 
in Medieval Islam, 62, note 221; Muḥammad ibn ʻAbd al-Raḥim Ibn al-Furāt, Tārīkh Ibn Al-Furāt, ed. 
Qusṭanṭīn Zurayq (Beirut: al-Maṭbaʻah al-Amīrkānīyah, 1936), viii, 39; Abū al-Maḥāsin Yūsuf Ibn Taghrībirdī, 
Al-Manhal Al-Ṣāfī Wa-Al-Mustawfá Baʻda Al-Wāfī, ed. Muḥammad Muḥammad Amīn (Cairo: al-Hayʼah al-
Miṣrīyah al-ʻĀmmah lil-Kitāb, 1984), vol. 3, 467. 
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suggests that by the late eighth/fourteenth century, the “exigencies of wartime and the 
corruption of the judiciary led to the destruction of this institution.”604 
Before the Mamluk era, the mawdi‘ al-ḥukm and its related supervisor (amīn al-
ḥukm) had a long history, likely having its genesis in the Abbasid era.605 The title amīn al-
ḥukm, which could loosely be translated as the “fiduciary of the courts”, is quite broad, but 
nevertheless implies the judiciary’s care for orphans. Escovitz found evidence that the post 
was often a stepping stone to other judicial appointments, noting that “this post (the Amīn al-
Ḥukm) was concerned with accounting and investing the funds and endowments reserved for 
orphans.”606 Sabra, citing Ibn al-Furāt, observed that the “depository was in the hands of a 
qāḍī, known as the amīn al-ḥukm, who reported to the chief Shāfi‘ī qāḍī.”607 The Egyptian 
historian, encyclopedist, bureaucrat and contemporary of al-Subkī, Shihāb ad-Dīn Aḥmad al-
Nuwayrī, defined the holder of this post as “the superintendent of orphans appointed by the 
ruler” (wa hūwa al-nāẓir ‘ala’l-aytām min qibal al-ḥākim) in his Nihāyat al-arab fī funūn al-
adab.608 Legal formularies from the fourteenth century refer to the conjoining of judicial 
authority and the fiduciary care of orphans. Al-Nuwayrī refers to acts that the Amīn al-Ḥukm 
recorded in court when selling property on behalf of orphans (from one orphan’s estate to 
that of another):  
                                                     
604 Sabra, Poverty and Charity in Medieval Islam, 63. 
605 For Abbasid period, see: Claude Cahen, “Amīn”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, Edited by: P. 
Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs; Émile Tyan, Histoire de l'organisation 
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607 Sabra, Poverty and Charity in Medieval Islam, 62; Ibn al-Furāt, Tārīkh Ibn Al-Furāt, 16. 
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 “This is what was purchased by fulān from qāḍī so and so, the amīn al-ḥukm 
al-‘azīz in such and such jurisdiction, the seller of the below-mentioned 
property to fulān, the minor by the court.”609    
Other formularies presented by al-Nuwayrī suggest that the amīn al-ḥukm also 
catered to other inheritance cases more broadly, and that this post was not restricted to the 
management of orphans’ capital. For instance, Al-Nuwayrī presents a formulary used for a 
widow seeking in-kind repayment (in property) of her deferred ṣadāq from her deceased 
husband’s estate following the latter’s death. This formulary involved a sale of property from 
“al-Ḥukm al-‘Azīz”, which indicates that the mawdī‘ al-ḥukm was also the custodian of 
property escheated by the treasury (the bayt al-māl), as the state would become a partner with 
the widow in the deceased husband’s assets if he had no children. Here the amīn al-ḥukm 
serves as the state’s executor.610 In her Study of Six Iqrārs from al-Quds, Huda Lutfi located 
and translated one such example from Jerusalem of a widow who obtained payment from her 
deceased husband estate’s property, aside from her legal inheritance from him, in settling a 
ṣadāq debt owed to her by her husband. Lutfi noted that the structure of this iqrār closely 
followed the formulary given by Al-Nuwayrī.611 In another interesting example, al-Nuwayrī 
presented a formulary in which the amīn al-ḥukm was required to approve the marriages of 
minors under the state’s supervision (men and women alike), whereby the state became their 
legal guardian (walī). However, the assets of these young adults would remain under the 
mawdi‘ al-ḥukm, even after marriage, until their legal majority was established in court.612 
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Qāḍīs’ management of orphan properties undoubtedly left room for abuses, and legal 
proscriptions or warnings against the personal trading of orphan property by qāḍīs and others 
under the authority of qāḍīs, such as the terminally ill, are common in medieval judicial 
literature. However, the ambivalence of such restrictions sometimes cannot be avoided, given 
that qāḍīs were mandated to regulate trading of such properties in order to provide for the 
maintenance of orphans. In his famous work, al-Ashbāh wa’l-naẓā’ir, the Egyptian Ḥanafī 
jurist Ibn Nujaym (d. 970/1563), adopted a view that was put forth much earlier by the 
Anatolian jurist Badr al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. Qāḍī Simāwna (d. 1416?), who had studied in Cairo: 
“As for the qāḍī, if he purchases the property (lit. māl) of an orphan for 
himself, from himself [assumes here that the qāḍī is also the orphan’s 
executor], or from an executor, this has been addressed in Jāmiʿ al-
fuṣulayn as such: it is forbidden for a qāḍī to sell his own property to 
an orphan, and the opposite also holds true. However, what he (the 
qāḍī) purchases from an executor, or that which he sells to an orphan 
via an executor is permitted, even if the executor is appointed by the 
qāḍī (wa law-waṣīyan min jihat al-qāḍī).”613 
The Amīn al-Ḥukm duties also overlapped with those of the Nāẓir al-aytām, who 
appears to have been a supervisor tasked with the welfare of orphans under the state’s charge, 
assessing legal guardianship, determining their maintenance requirements, and having 
authority over allowing them to enter marriages (as noted above). Al-Subkī’s references to 
the nāẓir al-aytām implied the same functions that were attributed to the amīn al-ḥukm, 
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suggesting these two labels may have referred to the same post. Yet, documentary evidence 
from late fourteenth- century Jerusalem, below, indicates that these were two distinct posts, 
serving overlapping but different functions. Such an administrative overlap should not be 
surprising, and was characteristic of these functions. For instance, al-Qalqashandī’s 
foundational administrative text, Ṣubḥ al-aʿshā fī ṣināʿat al-inshāʾ, mentions that the mawdi‘ 
al-aytām of Alexandria came under that city’s nāẓir al-awqaf, also indicating proximity 
between the supervision of waqfs and aytām.614 And, as with other posts, such positions were 
heritable; Taqī ad-Dīn al-Subkī’s son, Bahā’ ad-Dīn al-Subkī inherited the office of nāẓir al-
aytām from his father and continued to hold this post even after losing the chief qāḍīship that 
he had also inherited.615 
As alluded to by al-Qalqashandī, the trading of orphan-inherited properties was an 
active arena for investment, taxation and collusion for some qāḍīs because of their proximity 
to the Mawdi‘ al-Ḥukm. As an amīr, the future Sulṭān Qalā’ūn reportedly purchased 
properties from an amīn al-ḥukm, Ibn Makhlūf, whom he would later appoint as the chief 
Mālikī qāḍī and Nāẓir al-khizāna al-sulṭānīya.616 A few decades later, under the unrelenting 
tax raids of the infamous al-Nashw, the tax collector whom Sulṭān al-Nāṣir Muḥammad 
appointed as his nāẓir al-khāṣṣ in 733/1333617, a spotlight was shone on the purchase and sale 
of orphan properties held by the mawdi‘ al-ḥukm on their behalf. In 739/1339, al-Nashw 
chided the chief Shāfi‘ī qāḍī of Cairo for ignoring an edict (marsūm) that taxed the sale of 
                                                     
614 al-Qalqashandī, Ṣubḥ al-aʻshā, vol. 11, 407. 
615  Escovitz, Qāḍī al-quḍāt, 191. 
616 Escovitz, Qāḍī al-quḍāt, 49; Also, in later years, citing al-Nuwayri’s Nihāyat al-arab fī funūn al-adab, 
Escovitz states that “the Mālikī chief judge, Zayn al-Dīn Ibn Makhlūf, had been an amīn al-ḥukm, an official 
who helped administer a mawda‘ al-ḥukm on behalf of orphans and others.” Escovitz, Qāḍī al-quḍāt, 210. 
617 Amalia Levanoni, A Turning Point in Mamluk History: The Third Reign of Al-Nāṣir Muḥammad Ibn 
Qalāwūn (1310-1341) (Leiden; New York: E.J. Brill, 1995), 73–80. 
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properties that were purchased with funds from the mawdi‘ al-ḥukm, for orphans, by the 
amīn al-ḥukm. The qāḍī in question refused to entertain the possibility of taxing orphaned 
property and ignored al-Nashw. Al-Nashw turned this episode into a political scandal by 
accusing the amīn al-ḥukm of throwing the edict on the ground and disrespecting the sultan 
(since the sultān’s name and insignia were on the edict). Sulṭān Nāṣir Muḥammad summoned 
the amīn al-ḥukm and ordered that he be beaten and forced to pay the tax for this purchase.618 
Although we cannot be certain of how extensive the state’s management of orphan 
inheritances was in the Circassian period, because of the patchy historical record for this 
office, the historian Ibn Ṭūlūn provided a short biography for ‘Abd al-Rahman b. Ibrāhīm al-
Dasūqī (d. 927/1521), an ‘ālim who took up a deputy qāḍīship in Damascus in 916/1510. At 
the time, these authors report that al- Dasūqī was the nāẓir al-aytām in Damascus.619 
However, there is no trace of either the mawdi‘ al-ḥukm or the amīn al-ḥukm in Ibn Ṭawq’s 
diary, the biographical, legal or chronicle sources, and this supports the dominant view of 
scholars such as Sabra regarding its disappearance by the fifteenth century.  
The amīn al-ḥukm’s activities as recorded in court deeds from the Ḥaram al-Sharīf 
archive of Jerusalem illustrate how this figure was similar to, yet different from, the nāẓir al-
aytām. The activities of holders of these offices appear concurrently in this archive.620 The 
numerous court quittances of money owed and paid to the children of Burhān ad-Dīn Ibrāhīm 
b. Rizq Allāh al-Nāṣirī, a mendicant and Qur’ān-ḥadīth reciter who lived at the Salāḥīya 
khānqāh in Jerusalem, shed light on this. Although Burhān ad-Dīn was active as a reciter in 
                                                     
618 Escovitz, The Office of qâḌî Al-Quḍât in Cairo under the Baḥrî Mamlûks, 156; al-Maqrīzī, al-Sulūk li-
maʻrifat duwal al-mulūk, Vol. 3, 199, 251. 
619 Ibn Ṭūlūn, Mufākahat, 1962, vol. 1, p. 366; Naǧmaddīn al- al-Ghazzī, Al-Kawākib as-Sā’ira Bi-a’yān Al-
Mi’a Al-’āshira, ed. Jibrā’īl S. Jabbūr (Beirut: American Pr., 1945), vol. 1, p. 226. 
620 Little, Catalogue. 
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Jerusalem for two decades during the middle of the seventh/fourteenth century, he only 
established professional tenure and some social standing in the early 780s/1380s, when court 
deeds began attaching the title “Shaykh” to his name and several amīrs and naẓirs of waqfs in 
Jerusalem patronized him with posts as a teacher and Qur’ān reciter.621 This contrasts to a 
decade earlier, when court documents show that he had trouble finding steady 
employment.622 In a hyperbolic petition for tenure he submitted to the chief qāḍī of Jerusalem 
in 781/1380, Burhān ad-Dīn complains of having performed ḥadīth recitation for twenty 
years without pay.623 In his last years, and a few years before his death in Dhū’l-Qa‘da 
789/November 1387, Burhān ad-Dīn was able to buy a house, begin construction on another, 
and purchase a slave for one of his two wives at the time (By this point, he had already 
divorced two other wives). 624 Burhān ad-Dīn left behind Shīrīn bt. ‘Abd Allāh, the mother of 
his two sons Mūḥammad and ‘Alī, and an unnamed wife who was the mother of his other son 
Maḥmūd (Maḥmūd is referred to as Kamāl in most of the records pertaining to him – 
probably short for Kamāl al-Dīn). 625  
                                                     
621 Little, Catalogue, 17, 26, 32, 307. 
622 In 770/1368, Burhān al-Dīn submitted a petition to Jerusalem’s chief judge requesting “a stipend of a raṭl of 
bread a day from al-Ribāṭ al-Manṣūrī in exchange for recitations and prayers.” Little, Catalogue, 39. 
623 The petition stated that “he has no position in Jerusalem to support himself and his family and that he has 
recited ḥadīth for twenty years without pay, (and) requets confirmation of the salary of twenty dirhams (per 
month) to recite hadith on Fridays."” Little, Catalogue, 38. 
624 A record from 782/1381 shows that Burhān al-Dīn divorced a former wife, Fātima al-Khalīlīya and that the 
latter had no claim against him except her ṣadāq. A later court registered receipt records that he paid her father 
support for his son from her. Little, Catalogue, 208, 215; In Ṣafar 784/April 1382, Būrhān al-Dīn divorced 
another wife, Qaratamur bt. ‘Amr, and also owed her ṣadāq. Little, Catalogue, 220. 
625 In 780/1379, Burhan al-Din purchased a “dar” for 825 dirhams from the Bayt al-Mal. Little, Catalogue, 278; 
In Jumada 788/July 1386, A court attestation is registered by Burhān ad-Dīn’s future neighbor in which the 
latter gives Burhān al-Dīn permission to build the home using a part of his wall. Ibid., 232; In Rajab 
784/September 1382, Burhān ad-Dīn’s wife Shīrīn purchases a Takrūrī slave girl for 489 dirhams. Little, 
Catalogue, 291; A probate court inventory of sales from the auction of Burhān ad-Dīn’s assets is recorded on 14 
Dhū’l-Qa‘da/26 November 1387 and the first maintenance payments issued to his children by the Amīn al-
Ḥukm take place a week earlier. Little, Catalogue, 369. 
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At least 12 legal deeds from the Ḥaram archive pertain to the management of Burhān 
ad-Dīn’s estate by agents of the state on behalf of his children for about a year, from his 
death in Dhū’ al-Qa‘da 789/November 1387 to Ramaḍān 790/September 1388. These records 
show how the management of debts owed to Burhān ad-Dīn’s was a complex task to manage. 
Even though he was not wealthy elite, the court’s disbursements to his heirs indicate that 
executors were abiding by a testament he must have left, since some of his children received 
larger shares of debt repayments than others. The same applied to their maintenance 
payments, which were not equally divided among his sons. Further, the deeds relating to this 
figure indicate that his estate was managed by two amīn al-ḥukms and a careful study of the 
deeds indicates that there was a transition in this post. Four deeds indicate that a certain 
Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Shihāb ad-Dīn Aḥmad al-Ḥisbānī occupied this position for at 
least four consecutive months, from Dhū’ al-Qa‘da 789/Nov 1387 to 22 Safar 790/March 
1388.626 Al-Ḥisbānī then presumably stepped down and his post was taken over by another 
jurist, Shams ad-Dīn Muḥammad b. Jamāl ad-Dīn b. ‘Abd Allāh al-Adhra‘ī who is listed as 
the amīn al-ḥukm in May and June of the same year.627 Significantly, the deeds these Shāfi‘ī 
deputy judges produced in connection with the orphans’ maintenance appear to have 
conformed to those in al-Suyūṭī’s manual for judges, Jawāhir al-‘uqūd. 628  
In an article on the interplay between judicial rulings (aḥkām) and judicial 
certifications (thubūt) from the Ḥaram archive, Christian Muller reproduces a court record 
                                                     
626 Little, Catalogue, 190, 196, 200–201, 247. 
627 Little, Catalogue, 196, 198, 208. 
628 Little notes that the nafaqāt award deeds issued by the Nai’b al-Hukm were in line with the “formularies for 
maintenance recommended by al-Asuyṭī." Little, Catalogue, 330.  
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from 795/1393 (unedited but translated by him) that clarifies aspects of how orphan estates in 
Jerusalem were transmitted: 
“On 5 Ramaḍān 795, testimony was given at the Shāfi‘ī court in Jerusalem 
[confirming] that Jamāl al-Dīn ‘Abd Allāh, guardian of the estate of his late 
brother, had presented a judicial decree (marsūm) issued and certified in 
Damascus concerning the bequest of his brother. He asked the qāḍī Abū ‘l-
Rūḥ to place the property of his brother’s children under his control, in 
accordance with the bequest and Damascene decree. This being in the 
orphan’s interest, the qāḍī Abū ’l-Rūḥ gave his written permission in the 
month of Rajab, but asked for a court certificate of the deceased’s legal 
competence (ahlīya) and [financial?] situation (ḥāl). In response to this 
request, the claimant produced a maḥḍar, issued by the former qāḍī of 
Jerusalem, Taqī ’l-Dīn, which was then certified by Abū ’l-Rūḥ. Thereupon 
the qāḍī ordered the delivery of the orphan’s money and debt certificates 
(masāṭir shar‘īya), which had been kept by the deputy qāḍī (khalīfat al-
ḥukm), to the claimant. The document specifies that the guardian, ‘Abd 
Allāh, had in fact received everything, and it then lists the names of all 
debtors and the amount of the debts.”629   
The above record confirms what we know, that qāḍīs exercised enormous power and 
discretion over the testamentary and probate process, not only in vetting the suitability of 
executors, but also in assessing the legal validity of debts issued by creditors before their 
deaths. Had the deceased creditor above been proven legally incompetent, the management 
                                                     
629 Document no. 709, not edited. Christian Müller, “Settling Litigation without Judgment: The Importance of a 
‘Hukm in Qāḍī’ Cases of Mamlūk Jerusalem,” Dispensing Justice in Islam : Qadis and Their Judgements, 2012, 
62; cf. Little, Catalogue, 269. 
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of debts owed to him may have compelled a qāḍī to keep them under the state’s control. 
Given the aforementioned evidence of an amīn al-ḥukm in Jerusalem at this time, the person 
referred to as “khalīfat al-ḥukm,” which Muller translates as “deputy judge” may have also 
referred to the amīn al-ḥukm position discussed above.  
Turning to the nāẓir al-aytām position, and its relationship to the amīn al-ḥukm, two 
further deeds of disbursements to orphans from the Ḥaram archive list al-Adhra‘ī (above) as 
being Jerusalem’s “nāẓir al-aytām” (Ṣafar 790/February 1388) and wakīl al-aytām (Rajab 
790/March 1388).630 These posts predate al-Adhra‘ī’s taking up of the amīn al-aytām position 
by a few months. This suggests that the nāẓir al-aytām and amīn al-aytām positions were not 
held jointly. It is also notable that when, as a nāẓir al-aytām and wakīl al-aytām, al-Adhra‘ī 
issued payments to orphans, they were recorded as legal depositions in much the same way 
that he would record them later as amīn al-ḥukm  for payments to Burhān ad-Dīn’s orphaned 
children. Since both the nāẓir al-aytām and amīn al-aytām managed payments to orphans, in 
apparently the same way, we cannot point to this as a mark of difference. Notably, a third 
deed, from Ramaḍān 789/ October 1387, when al-Adhra‘ī was the nāẓir al-aytām, he is 
shown as paying out 485 dirhams to Fāṭima al-Ḥamawīya, the widow of a wealthy merchant, 
as four months of maintenance payments from the estate of her deceased husband for her 
children.631 In this record, al-Adhra‘ī’s is only referred to as the “agent of her husband’s 
estate” (al-mutakallim ‘ala tarikat zawjihā), or rather the executor. One may conjecture that 
the nāẓir al-aytām’s role was to manage orphan capital that was not physically held by the 
mawdi‘ al-ḥukm, but, rather, perhaps as tarikāt managed under separate testamentary custody 
                                                     
630 Little, Catalogue, 197–98, 218. 
631 Ibid., 200; For a study on Fāṭima al-Hamawīya and her husband’s records see: Donald P. Little, “Documents 
Related to the Estates of a Merchant and His Wife in Late Fourteenth- Century Jerusalem,” Mamluk Studies 
Review, no. 1998 (n.d.): 93–193. 
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with the courts. The nāẓir al-aytām’s role, therefore, may have fulfilled an intermediary 
function that interacted with the courts, but was not necessarily their representative as the 
amīn al-ḥukm was.   
Further documentary support for the above assertion is limited, although in at least 
one case, there is a reference to a depository (the mawdī‘ al-ḥukm?) and heirs. A legal 
deposition from Jumādā 797/April 1395 records that a certain Ḥ/Jajak? bt. ‘Abd Allāh, the 
widow of an itinerant merchant from Mosul (al-Mawṣilī at-Tājir as-Saffār), acknowledged 
receiving - as the guardian of her children - a large sum of 500 Egyptian dinars, five gold 
florins, and other currencies from what Donald Little translated as the “depository of the 
Shāfi‘ī Court in Jerusalem.”632 Little did not provide the Arabic term, and I have been unable 
to access the original, yet it would be reasonable to assume that the “depository” he refers to 
is none other than the mawdi‘ al-ḥukm.  
If the main difference between the nāẓir al-ḥukm and the amīn al-ḥukm was one of 
judicial-administrative latitude, that is, only the latter had legal authority to assess disputes, 
issue directives (e.g., maintenance payments), legalize the registration of debts to orphans, 
and so on, then it would be fair to assume that the fulfillment of these duties would have been 
taken over by the chief qāḍī and his deputies in the late Mamluk period, when the amīn al-
ḥukm office disappeared. The non-survival of Mamluk court records from the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries precludes taking an absolute position on this. However, the lack of any 
mention of an amīn al-ḥukm in the earliest qāḍī court records dealing with orphan issues 
from Ottoman Jerusalem and Damascus (based on my limited review) should lead us to 
consider that this was indeed the case. Further, the extensive regulation of orphan lending 
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that was carried out by Ottoman era qāḍīs should, I contend, be viewed as symptomatic of a 
historical continuity of judicial practice from the late Mamluk era, rather than a break from it 
– in general terms.633 Indeed, with respect to institutional organization, the Ottoman sixteenth 
century could be viewed as an extension of the de-institutionalization of such functions, 
given the consolidation of powers in the office of the chief qāḍī and the wide discretion given 
to such qāḍīs to manage local economic affairs (e.g. tax collection, tax-farming, supervision 
of muḥtasib’s etc.) on behalf of the sulṭān and these could have significant political/military 
impact (e.g., avāriz taxes and settling military disputes). Indeed, if we are to consider a 
historical break, it would be the institutional break-down of the late fourteenth to early 
fifteenth century. 
 
5.3 Views on Mu‘āmalāt from Qāḍīs and Court Procedure 
Under Islamic law, the activities of guardians (sing. walī) of orphans are divided into 
two roles: the estate executor (sing. waṣī) whose duty it is to manage the assets of minors 
assigned to him or her, and the care-taking guardian (sing. nāẓir), responsible for their care. 
Unless otherwise noted, references to the “waṣī” in sijills relate to the former function, 
although it was possible that both positions could be held by the same person, but this usually 
would have been noted in records. The language of judicial manuals, as well as sijills, 
reflects an awareness and concern for promoting the welfare of orphans by rooting out 
malfeasance when detected. 
                                                     
633 I have also found no references to the amīn al-ḥukm or mawdī‘ al-ḥukm in any of the Ottoman era legal 
manuals or fatwa collections referred to in this chapter. 
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Sixteenth century Ottoman courts generally adopted a standard view on how the 
inheritance of minors should be handled. The assets of minors were subject to the legal 
interdiction (ḥajr) of their walī, usually the father or grandfather in their lifetimes, or the 
designated wasī near or upon their death, usually a close relative or a trustworthy caretaker 
appointed by the qāḍī. The classification of ḥajr was also placed on those who were deemed 
to be insane, irresponsible, spendthrifts, the bankrupt, slaves, and those with a mortal illness 
that could have impaired their thinking. The fear that insolvent debtors could easily abscond 
with the property of the senile, or dispose of it without settling their debts, was put forward 
as a rationale for interdicting the assets of those at risk. With respect to achieving adulthood, 
the transition from minority status (qaṣr) to majority status (rushd), and the removal of 
interdiction, was a subject that is discussed frequently in fiqh works because while physical 
maturity may have been reached and attested, claims could be made against the mental 
maturity of a new adult and this person’s ability to responsibly manage their own money.  
The relationship between majority and financial independence was also a point of 
debate among adherents of the Ḥanafī school of law. At a most basic level, Abū Ḥanīfa 
“denied that the irresponsible person who was of age was subject to ḥajr; Abū Yūsuf and 
Shaybānī held that he was.” 634 The charge often levied in this category was that an orphan 
was still mentally incompetent (sāfih) even though physically mature; being a spendthrift and 
mentally immature were personal qualities that required vetting, usually by a qāḍī. 
Depending on the circumstances, young adults were therefore allowed to achieve a hybrid 
form of majority. They were allowed full recognition as adults to undertake certain legal acts, 
                                                     
634 J. Schacht, “Ḥad̲j̲r”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, Ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, 
E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs. 
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such as the ability to enter into marriages (as in al-Nuwayrī’s aforementioned formulary) but 
not others, such as buying or selling their own property. 
While Ḥanafī qāḍīs had wide discretion in determining the maturity of minors, they 
did not have retroactive powers to reconsider their judgement based on the minor’s actions. 
This is something that Shāfi‘ī qāḍīs could apparently do. Shāfi‘ī qāḍīs could reverse their 
recognition of majority and return control of an orphan’s assets to their former waṣī if the 
orphan in question (who had achieved mental maturity) was shown to have become a 
spendthrift following majority.635 In practical terms, and in courts, both Mamluk and 
Ottoman jurists were allowed considerable discretion when determining orphans’ transition 
to adulthood, and this depended on the particulars of the case.  
Nevertheless, most ‘ulamā of the sixteenth-century (perhaps without exception) 
emphasized that it was qāḍīs who should typically control the funds of orphans. This was the 
view of the Gazan Ḥanafī jurist, and student of Ibn Nujaym, Muḥammad al-Tumurtāshī (939-
1004/1531-1596),636 who elaborated such in his advice manual for qāḍīs, entitled The 
Principles of Jurists and Judges (al-Aḥkām fī-mā yata‘allaq bi’l-quḍāt wa’l-ḥukkām). 
According to al-Tumurtāshī, when a qāḍī served as an executor, it was his duty to have total 
control over the respective orphan’s inherited estate (tarika), in question in order to prevent 
mismanagement of the orphan’s assets. For al-Tumurtāshī, instances where a qāḍī had 
                                                     
635 E. Chaumont and R. Shaham, “Yatīm”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, Ed. P. Bearman, Th. 
Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs.  
636 Known by the name “al-Khaṭīb al-Tumurtāshī” (939-1004/1531-1596), his Allepan biographer al-Muḥibbī 
(d. 1111/1699) related that al-Tumurtāshī was the preeminent faqīh of his day in Gaza where he was born and 
settled again after spending time receiving instruction from leading scholars in Cairo. Among others, he was a 
student of Ibn Nujaym and the chief judge of Cairo, “Alī Ibn al-Ḥanā”ī. According to al- Muḥibbī, al-
Tumurtāshī’s commentaries were also widely read and used as reference works by later Damascene jurists, such 
as the muftī of Damascus “Alā”l-Dīn al-Ḥaṣkafī (1012-1082), although it doesn’t seem that he held any 
appointments. Muḥammad Amīn ibn Faḍl Allāh Al-Muḥibbī, Khulāṣat al-athar fī aʻyān al-qarn al-ḥādī ʻashar 
(Miṣr: al-Maṭbaʻah al-Wahbīyah, 1867), vol. 4,  19. 
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executorship but not control of the orphan’s estate were undesirable, due to the fact that such 
an estate would likely have involved the interests of other family members, and would have 
opened room for conflicts of interests to play out.637  
Al-Subkī was also concerned about the excessive drain on returns that fees could 
have on orphan capital, given that mu‘āmalāt were sometimes arranged through financial 
brokers (mubāshirūn). Al-Subkī’s opinion on this is preserved in a compilation work on 
waqfs arranged by the Shāfi‘ī Egyptian scholar ‘Abd al-Rū’ūf al-Manāwī (d. 1031/1621), 
entitled Kitāb taysīr al-wūqūf ‘ala ghawāmiḍ aḥkām al-wūqūf.638 It seems that such 
mubāshirūn were retained by the Orphan’s Bureau to arrange lending with creditworthy 
borrowers.639 In his own fatāwā, al-Subkī notes that the mubāshirīn were retained to provide 
services to waqfs and individuals on a salaried basis and that, at times, the salaries of the 
mubāshirīn were so exorbitant that they could “consume three quarters of a waqf’s assets”.640  
 
5.4 Case Studies 
Early Ottoman Sijills from Damascus, Aleppo, and particularly Jerusalem, contain 
many records of loans given out on behalf of orphans by their executors. These records range 
across social groups, from hundreds of dinārs by the children of the elite to those of a few 
dirhams by orphans from modest backgrounds. Typically, the information that is recorded is 
                                                     
637 Muḥammad al-Tumurtāshī, Al-Aḥkām Fī-Mā-Yata‘Laq Bi’l-Quḍāt, (Copied in AH 1044), King Saud 
University Library Manuscript Collection, fol. 20. 
638 An Azharī scholar, al-Munāwī was is recorded by al-Muḥibbī as having studied, among others, under ‘Abd 
al-Wahhāb al-Sha‘rānī and al-Ramlī. al-Munāwī, Taysīr Al-Wuqūf ʻalá Ghawāmiḍ Aḥkām Al-Wuqūf, 6 For al-
Subkī’s opinion, ibid. pg. 488. . 
639 The term is also used to refer to any number of financial officials. 
640 Al-Subki, Fatāwā, vol. 2, 157. Al-Subki also discusses their similar involvement in waqf’s endowed as  
sadaqat, and the control of entire endowed villages. Al-Subki, Fatāwā, vol. 2, 137 
295 
  
sparse, listing the names of the orphans whose money was lent out, the amounts and 
durations of the loans, the persons lending such monies on their behalf, and the names of the 
borrowers involved. Many records refer to the person who is arranging the loan as the 
“mubāshir,” literally the “introducer” of the lender to the borrower. In most cases, the 
mubāshirs are the executors of the orphan’s estate, however the term is also used elsewhere 
in the sijills to indicate an activity that may have been required court vetting or approval.  At 
times, loans are arranged or introduced by qāḍīs. The normative term used to describe a loan 
undertaking in the sijills is tartīb (lit. “arranging”), and a record of a loan would usually 
begin with “tarattab li-fulān bi-mubāsharat fulān.” In some cases, no record is left of who 
introduced the borrower to the lender, and it is simply recorded as “tarattab li-fulān.” 
Cases filed by orphan creditors (by their executors) against debtors who defaulted on 
repayment of their principal are not uncommon; however, cases specifically concerning 
disagreements over interest, are less so. This may imply that lenders avoided the explicit 
recording of interest as a way to have more discretion in the event of a dispute. While 
creditors and borrowers surely entered extra-judicial debt contracts, such agreements were 
subordinate – as evidence – to what was registered in court sijills, unless the former were 
registered as ḥujjas in court sijills. As will be discussed in the below cases, in instances 
where interest is noted, it is described as an amount relative to the loan principal and referred 
to as ribḥ rather than fā’ida.  
The mu‘āmala form in al-Busrawī’s manual occasionally appears in orphan-related 
sijills. However, more often, the mu‘āmala only includes reference to the loan principal 
without referring to the due interest. The reason why references to interest rates or amounts 
are sometimes included and sometimes excluded is puzzling. Perhaps, given the court’s tacit 
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support of a normative market interest rate, loans that were transacted above such rate would 
have come under scrutiny, thus prompting borrowers and lenders to exclude them. It is also 
possible that the court itself did not require a recording of interest rates, or may have 
excluded mention of interest unless explicitly requested to do so by the parties to the loan. 
One possibility is that the latter practice would have given qāḍīs greater discretion in 
determining what constituted a reasonable interest amount in the event of a dispute.   
As with other financial activity, of waqfs and tax-collectors for example, the activities 
of executors were supervised by qāḍīs, and occasionally financial statements of accounts 
muḥāsabāt were requested by qāḍīs.641 Muḥāsabāt usually involved a laborious review of the 
various ḥujjas and other records that constituted such accounts from past periods, and the 
court charged a rasm al-muḥāsaba fee for registering and reviewing such statements,.642 In 
muḥāsabāt concerning orphans, executors and guardians were required to declare funds that 
they borrowed from the capital of orphans under their management. Additionally, it was not 
unusual for executors to leave instructions concerning how the orphan’s capital was to be 
invested in loans. In at least one case from Jerusalem, below, fathers chose to invest funds 
dedicated to their children’s welfare in cash-waqfs to be invested in mu‘āmalāt. Such debt 
                                                     
641 From those that I have reviewed, the accounting aspects of these muḥāsabāt appear similar to those issued 
for other activities such as waqfs, tax-farms and business partnerships. They provide a simple ledger of credits 
and debits from the account, but not a full accounting. Muḥāsabāt also do not appear to have been issued in a 
regularized manner, rather they were issued when the situation called for an accounting to be performed, such 
as during the distribution of profits in a partnership, a major costly repair of a waqf building, or in the case of 
orphans, the settlement of accounts between executors and guardians.  
642 Information from the sijills indicates that this fee ranged from half a ṣulṭānī to one ṣulṭānī, or the equivalent 
of 20-50 Damascene paras in this period. Muḥāsaba accounts usually were a balance sheet reconciliation of 
assets to liabilities, for a given institution or financial account under the supervision of the court. In many cases 
muḥasabāt were submitted to judges with expressed requests for permission to distribute salaries to employees 
from revenues, or to repay outstanding to expenses – such as loans. Since most institutions were awqāf, most 
muḥāsabāt related to awqāf. See for example the muḥāsaba of al-hamam al-‘ain (J-Sij 67-197-1), muḥāsabat 
waqf al-marstān, Jerusalem’s hospital (J-Sij 67-197-2), muḥāsabat maḥsul al-ribāt al-mansuri (J-Sij 67-211-1).  
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registrations in court may have been a strategy to alienate certain assets for specific children 
and separate them from the assets of other legal heirs upon death.  
A case of this sort of mu‘āmala has survived from a ḥujja of an iqrār that was 
recorded in Jerusalem on 7 Rajab 971/20 February 1564. It details the repayment of a 29 
sulṭānī loan to the executor of the heirs of a former Ḥanafī Imām of the Dome of the Rock 
sanctuary, Mūsā al-Dayrī, a member of a well-known Jerusalemite family of qāḍīs from 
Mamluk times. The executor is a merchant named Sa‘d ad-Dīn Bin Rabī‘ (Bin Rabī‘ is the 
family name) and he was chosen (al-waṣī al-mukhtār) to be an executor during al-Dayrī’s 
lifetime.643 The abovementioned 29 sulṭānī debt had been loaned (tarattab bi’mubāsharat al-
waṣī) by the executor to a local ‘ālim, Shaykh Abī al-Hudā al-Ghazzī (perhaps from the 
eponymous family of Damascene jurists) and his uncle. Upon attesting the repayment of this 
sum, the sijill also records that the above executor credited 6 of this 29 sulṭānī debt to Mūsā’s 
four children, while the remaining 23 sulṭānī were credited to a cash-waqf that Mūsā had set 
up for the benefit of his two grandsons, children of his pre-deceased son, Kamāl al-Dīn.644 
This ḥujja records that this distribution of these amounts was being carried out in accordance 
with Mūsā’s stated instructions during his lifetime, as recorded in a previous sijill (that the 
executor presumably brought a copy of with him to court).645 Further, in this ḥujja, the 
executor acknowledged that he agreed to relinquish 1 sulṭānī from the amount originally due 
to the orphans, since the executor had recalled the loan three months before it’s intended 
maturity. The total originally owed to the orphans was 30 sulṭānī. Even though there is no 
                                                     
643 Yazbak contends that the title al-waṣīī al-mukhtār refers to the trustee delegated by the legator before death. 
Yazbak, “Muslim Orphans and the Sharīʿa in Ottoman Palestine According to Sijill Records,” 128–1289. 
644 “Min qabl al-māl al-mawqūf min qabl al-shaikh Mūsa al-mushār īlayh ‘ala waladayy waladahū al-marḥūm 
al-shaikh Kamāl al-Dīn.” J-Sij 45-151-7  
645 J-Sij 45-151-7, lines 5 and 6. 
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mention of profit/interest in this case, it is implied that this amount was comprised of an 
original principal of 26 sulṭānī, with a planned interest of 4 sulṭānī (1 sulṭānī x 4 quarters / 26 
≈ 17%). Only 3 sulṭānī of the interest was realized. 
The above case not only illustrates that Mūsā al-Dayrī’s cash-waqf (which was 
profiled in chapter three), following his death, was used to fund his grandchildren’s estate, 
but that money advanced by this cash-waqf was pooled and invested alongside other loans 
pertaining to his own children. This was despite the fact that his cash-waqf was established 
for the charitable purpose of paying for Qur’ān reciters at the Dome of the Rock sanctuary 
waqf, and not established from the outset as a family waqf.646 While it was the executor’s job 
to prudently segregate these accounts, he had to do so while relying on specific instructions 
recorded in a court-registered will, reflecting the court-mediated nature of executorship. 
Significantly, Mūsā’s cash-waqf, without the benefit of any additional information, appears 
to have been endowed for the private benefit of his grandchildren, and not for charitable ends 
as cash-waqfs ordinarily were designed to be.  
The above record also illustrates the time value of money. As with other types of 
loans, the normative loan period – on which interest was calculated – was one year. While 
loans for shorter periods were common, appearing regularly in the sijills, profit/interest was 
always calculated on an annualized basis, and then expressed in shorter periods, if required. 
The concept of a time value for money was alive and well in the executor’s explicit 
                                                     
646 Waqfs are of two types: those founded with the objective of funding a public charitable objective (waqf 
khayrī) and those endowed for family beneficiaries (waqf dhirrī/ahlī), so-called family waqfs. Upon the 
termination of heirs in family waqfs, the endowment proceeds eventually are applied towards a charitable 
purpose. To my knowledge, none of the cash-waqfs founded in Jerusalem were established as family waqfs. For 
a dated, but still useful definition of the waqf, see: Heffening, “Waḳf,” Encyclopaedia of Islam, First Edition 
(1913-1936). 
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acknowledgement and acceptance of foregoing an extra 1 sulṭānī of profit for retiring a loan 
early, three months before its maturity date. 
A ḥujja of another muḥāsaba from a few days later recorded that Mūsā’s above 
executor, Sa‘d ad-Dīn Bin Rabī‘, also managed, in his capacity as both waṣī and nāẓir, a soap 
factory waqf that was endowed by Mūsā al-Dayrī. This record is a muḥāsaba of the revenues 
and expenses related to al-Dayrī’s factory, and the distribution of shares related to al-Dayrī’s 
wife and heirs, which at the time of the record had a soap inventory worth 525 sulṭānīs.647 
This soap factory waqf (it was held as waqf) was still in operation twenty-years later in 
996/1588, when a 199 sulṭānī sale on credit of soap was recorded as being owed to another 
merchant who was acting as the agent of Fatima Khātūn, the daughter of Mūsā al-Dayrī, and 
presumably the waqf’s nāẓir at this later date.648 Fatima Khātūn was one of Mūsā’s four 
orphaned children recorded in the record from twenty four years earlier, 971/1564, and even 
at that earlier time, although she was classified as an “orphan,” she was also referred to in the 
sijill as an adult and appeared as being married (her husband’s name is noted).  
The fact that Sa‘d ad-Dīn Bin Rabī‘ had been collecting loans on her and her siblings’ 
behalf when she was an adult – under her nominal status as an orphan – prompts us to 
consider the category of “orphan” broadly, and is an example that shows that fiqh 
prescriptions, regarding sifh and majority that I discussed earlier in this chapter, were applied 
in courts. Such a record also shows how relationships between “executors” and “orphans” 
were multi-layered ties of kinship, which were built on market relations and social-status. As 
                                                     
647 J-Sij 45-154-5  
648 J-Sij 67-409-1 
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the muḥāsabāt and executor-familial relationships of al-Dayrī show, such associations very 
often outlasted the lives of their founders.     
When qāḍīs borrowed from orphan estates, they also registered their activities in 
courts. In a court registered ḥujja from Sha‘bān 971/April 1564, a Shāfi‘ī qāḍī in Jerusalem 
presided over an attestation given by a Ḥanafī Jerusalemite qāḍī,  Muḥammad b. Aḥmad Ibn 
al-Muhandis (the record shows that this debtor’s father was also a noted local qāḍī and 
‘ālim). The debtor qāḍī represented that he owed 105 sulṭānī to a Tripolitan merchant, 
Aḥmad b. Muḥammad al-Aṣfar, which he had borrowed two years prior, before the creditor’s 
death. He now owed this sum to his heirs. This ḥujja, was requested by the waṣī of this 
merchant’s children as part of his itemized estate inventory and states that the father/elder 
qāḍī guaranteed the younger’s debt. A previous court ḥujja was presented by the debtor qāḍī 
to the heir’s waṣī in court, as evidence of this pre-mortem debt. The debtor qāḍī was obliged 
to settle his debt immediately.649 In another record, dating from Dhu’l-Hijja 996/October 
1588, a Shāfi‘ī qāḍī presided over a debt claim presented by the children of a former 
(deceased) qāḍī against their cousins, the heirs of the latter’s brother. In this case, the heirs on 
both sides are minors represented by agents and waṣīs. The deceased qāḍī had lent his brother 
a sum of twenty-eight sultanīs, against which the brother had provided collateral of three-
fourths of a share he owned in a family farm. After establishing the veracity of the debt in 
question, the qāḍī ordered that ownership shares in the farm be sold to repay the outstanding 
debt.650 
                                                     
649 J-Sij 45-180-5 
650 J-Sij 67-56-2 
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These accounts also display the occasional friction between executors and guardians. 
I present below three such statements from Jerusalem’s court sijill 67, during 995-996/1587-
8. The frequent references within these muḥāsabāt to previous court produced legal copies of 
deeds (ḥujjas) indicates an active part on the court for mediating and monitoring their 
activities, although as I argue below, this was carried out with broad oversight. The presence 
of such accounts also demonstrates the care taken – even if nominally so – to recognize the 
segregation of an executor’s accounts, his own loans and business dealings, from those of 
orphans under his or her care. There does not appear to have been a gender segregation of 
roles and women frequently appear as both executors and guardian roles in the sijills. 
Muḥāsabāt records also reflect a judicial authority that gave little discretion to either 
guardians or executors for undertaking important decisions on behalf of orphans under their 
management without the consultation and approval of the courts. Periodic disbursements, for 
instance, of maintenance payments for the feeding and clothing of orphans appear to have 
required a qāḍī’s approval, even if these were granted retroactively.  
Muḥāsabāt of orphan-related mu‘āmalāt are diverse and can be quite complex. 
Despite their variety, however, they share a common structure with three parts. The first part 
of the muḥāsaba introduces the parties to the financial accounting, typically the executor and 
guardian, with a phrasing such as “this muḥāsaba has been issued between so and so, the 
waṣī for the orphans of .. and so and so the nāẓir..”  This first section includes reference of 
the family relationship between these figures to the orphans in question, if one existed, as 
well as a mention of any additional figures who may have been party to the muḥāsaba. These 
would have included, for instance, as special witnesses or property evaluators brought by 
either party to testify. The second part of the muḥāsaba, the body, always begins with a 
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statement of the original sum of capital inherited by the orphans at the time of their father’s 
death. Then it proceeds to list all the recorded mu‘āmalāt that have been undertaken on their 
behalf since then, or to note previous ḥujjās or muḥāsabāt in this regard. This middle section 
may be brief or lengthy; sometimes dates of ḥujjas of mu‘āmalāt are included, and at other 
times simply the amounts are recorded. Profits are not always specified for each transaction, 
and sometimes appear as a lump sum for the period in question, sometimes several years. 
Notably, reference to the term mu‘āmala in muḥāsabāt is sometimes used to mean all the 
capital under management that is invested in loans, or to particular single loans. For example, 
in the first muḥāsaba reviewed below, the body section states that of the orphan’s capital, “81 
sulṭānīs are maintained in the form of a mu‘āmala,” and then the record proceeds to list the 
various mu‘āmalāt that are represented by this amount. The third and concluding portion of 
muḥāsabāt serves as an attestation record of the total maintenance payments made by the 
executor to the guardian for feeding and clothing the orphans, since the inception of the 
orphan’s capital under his or her management, to the date that the muḥāsaba in question was 
recorded in court. In this final section, the guardian absolves the executor for any liability, 
that is any overdue amounts pertaining to payments owed to the orphans. On the executor’s 
part, in this last portion, he or she must declare any loans that they have personally drawn on 
from the orphan capital, if any are outstanding. The oaths of witnesses are recorded in this 
section, as are any observations or rulings issued by the presiding qāḍī. 
In what follows, I review three muḥāsabāt that reflect how diverse such statements 
can be and the role of courts in supervising the activities of executors and guardians. The first 
muḥāsaba reviewed below dates from 5 Rabī‘ al-Thānī 996/27 May 1588, and relates to the 
management of mu‘āmala capital on behalf of two orphans, a sister and brother, who, in 
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addition to the capital bequeathed to them by their father, have inherited capital from an older 
sibling whose death shortly followed his father’s. The record is explicit in following the letter 
of the law with respect to the distribution of this inheritance between the siblings, where the 
brother’s share is double that of his sister. It is not clear whether this applies to the entire 
capital or just to the portion inherited from their deceased brother. The executor in this case 
appears to be court appointed, even though he is the orphans’ uncle. He is referred to as the 
court-appointed executor, al-waṣī al-shar‘ī, and not the one personally appointed by the 
deceased, al-waṣī al-mukhtār, as was the case in Mūsā al-Dayrī’s earlier discussed record 
above. Following is the muḥāsaba transcript:651 
The reason for this sijill, enacted in Jerusalem’s qāḍī court, [2] in the 
presence of the undersigned qāḍī Ilyās Afandī, is the issuance of a 
statement of accounts (muḥāsaba) between, on the one hand, the 
Khawāja Shams ad-Dīn b. Khawāja Ibrāhīm, the Kātib al-Zayt and 
legal executor (waṣī) of [3] his paternal niece and nephew, the minors 
Mūsā and ‘Ā’isha, who are the children of  ‘Abd al-Nabī and, on the 
other, Ibrāhīm b. al-Ḥāj Muḥammad Shakhātīr, the orphans’ maternal 
uncle and guardian (nāẓir). [4] The amount that remains from the 
original principal (aṣl māl al-yatīmayn) bequeathed to the orphans 
from their abovementioned father and from their brother Karīm al-Dīn, 
who also passed away after his father died, is 81 sulṭānī kept in the 
form of a mu‘āmala of Damascene paras (akces)(qita‘ shāmīya). (5) 
Two thirds of this belongs to Mūsā and a third to ‘Ā’isha, after their 
                                                     
651 J-sij 67-126-3. See Fig. 2 at the end of this chapter for Arabic transcriptions of the reviewed muḥāsabāt. 
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mother, Ṣālḥa, took her inheritance share from Karīm ad-Dīn in the 
amount of 7 sulṭānīs; she has arranged (rattabat) for this money to be 
lent out to a group of borrowers introduced (bi mubāsharat) by (6) the 
children’s abovementioned guardian, as has been recorded in the 
previous court sijill. This was represented by [a mu‘āmala of] 10 
sulṭānī to ‘Alī b. ‘Askar with a profit (ribḥ) of 2 sulṭānī; of 10 sulṭānīs 
to the children (awlād, read: orphans) of al-Muharbash from Silwān 
with a profit of 2 sulṭānīs; (7) 30 sulṭānīs to Mikhā’īl b. Khalīl al- 
Qindulaft for a profit of 6 sulṭānīs; 15 sulṭānīs to the above referenced 
Ibrāhīm b. al-Ḥāj Muḥammad for a profit of 3 sulṭānīs; (8) 3 sulṭānīs to 
Shaykh Maḥmūd b. al-Ḍāfī for a profit of 30 para; and 10 sulṭānīs to 
Munā b. Mas‘ūd al- Qindulaft for a profit of 2 sulṭānīs. The last 
recorded expense related to the children’s clothing was 70 paras. (9) 
The expenses of two ḥujjas and a maḥḍar ta’bīn at the time of receipt 
of the orphans funds from Ibn Abī Sulaymān were 50 paras. All this 
relates to the above transactions, and is being managed and held by the 
children’s executor. (10) No amounts are overdue. The two parties 
have jointly absolved (taṣādaqā) each other of liability and attested 
that these are the facts. This has been recorded and published (sajjal 
wa taḥarrar) on 5 Rabī‘ al-Thānī 996.   
The executor in this case was a merchant. Merchants, not surprisingly often served as 
executors. The rationale for appointing merchants as executors was straightforward, since 
they would have had access to professional and market resources to secure loans with 
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qualified debtors, pursue debts and arrange for the sale of merchandise – possibly connected 
to an estate – as necessary, in fulfilling their duties. For their services, such executors could 
expect compensation; however, no reference is made to that expense in the above muḥāsaba. 
Rather, the only expenses noted concern the children’s maintenance and some legal costs at 
the time of their inheritance. This may have been because the above executor was not an 
outsider, but rather the paternal uncle of the orphans. Ironically, he is not the one arranging 
the loans. Rather, as the sijill states, it was the orphan’s mother who “arranged (rattabat) for 
this money to be lent out to a group of borrowers introduced (bi-mubāsharat)” by her 
brother, the executor. The executor would have been held liable for managing the servicing 
of these loans, although he would not have been personally liable for their repayment. 
Nevertheless, the court required – for good order – that the guardian and mother announce 
the roles they played in arranging these loans. Court practice, thus, provided some flexibility 
to families for managing the loans of their heirs, although, the reporting of such activities to 
qāḍīs was always required.    
This muḥāsaba lists the names and interest collected on each of the mu‘āmalāt listed 
above, perhaps because the loans were arranged by the guardian, rather than by the executor, 
a reversal of roles. This is the only muḥāsaba, from the dozen or so muḥāsabāt of orphans I 
have reviewed from Jerusalem sijills, which lists the names of borrowers and their profit 
rates (although this is a common feature of muḥāsabāt of cash-waqfs). Notably, all the loans 
issued above were exactly at the rate of 20%, indicating the court’s acceptance of this level 
as a normative rate for such loans. The intimate family relationship between the executor and 
guardian, the orphan’s grandmother and maternal uncle respectively, was not unusual. 
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In a second muḥāsaba, dated 1 Rajab 996/27 May 1588, we see how such intimate 
family management could lead to tensions between related guardians and executors, or 
alternatively, could be a source of suspected collusion or abuse which would necessitate a 
court muḥāsaba to remove doubt of wrongdoing. 652 This muḥāsaba makes reference to four 
prior ḥujjas of mu‘āmalāt and other arrangements to invest the capital of the orphans in 
question (including a receipt, an earlier court report, taqrīr, and two loan registrations):  
The reason for this sijill, enacted in Jerusalem’s qāḍī court, [2] in the 
presence of the undersigned qāḍī Ilyās Afandī, is the issuance of a 
statement of accounts (muḥāsaba) between, on the one hand, Ḥusayn 
b. ‘Alī b. Fawwāz, (3) the legal executor for the orphaned children of 
his brother Ḥasan, whose children are Aḥmad, Muḥammad, and 
Ibrāhīm, all of whom being minors, and, on the other, his mother al-
Ḥurma Ḥamīda, (4) the (legally) competent woman, legal guardian and 
paternal grandmother of the abovementioned orphans who are in her 
custody (fī ḥaḍānatihā), daughter of Muḥammad b. ‘Umar al-Nāṣirī. 
(5) She is in attendance with her witnesses, who have been vetted as 
reliable witnesses by the court, and her son al-Ḥāj Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn b. al-
Ḥāj Aḥmad b. Fawwāz, (6) and Ibrāhīm b. Khalīl b. Dukhān who have 
confirmed her identity and have confirmed the amount of capital 
bequeathed to the above orphans by their father and that the amount of 
profit (7) accrued to this capital over five years and three months, 
                                                     
652 J-Sij 67-228-3     
 
307 
  
starting from 1 Dhū’l-Qa‘da 989 and up to the end of Muḥarram 994, 
was as follows: (8) The principal of 83.5 sulṭānī was invested in a 
mu‘āmala as reflected in a ḥujja dated 16 Rabī‘ I 990, (9) and the total 
profit for the above period was 67 sulṭānī resulting in a combined total 
mu‘āmala capital of 150.5 sulṭānī [at Muḥarram 994]. (10) The amount 
[to be] spent on maintenance and clothing for the orphans over a 
period of 6 years and seven and a half months, (11) was recorded 
[projected] in a ḥujja of a court report (taqrīr) dated 15 Shawwāl 989 
was [forecast as] 150 sulṭānī. (12) A ḥujja produced under qāḍī 
Maḥmūd Afandī, dated at the end of Rabī‘ I 994 showed that the 
recorded mu‘āmala was [had reached] 150 sulṭānī. (13) 59 sulṭānī was 
paid to the orphans today, per a ḥujja produced today and (14) 46 
sulṭānī continues to be held as a mu‘āmala for the benefit of the 
orphans, and this is attested (i‘tirāf) by the abovementioned guardian. 
(15) 20 para is outstanding as a loan owed by the abovementioned 
executor to the orphans. (16) A financial account reconciliation has 
been produced (ṣadarat muḥāsaba) to reflect this. (17) In so doing, the 
executor’s liability to the orphans for all amounts managed by him is 
cleared (al-barā’a al-shar‘īya), save for his above-mentioned loan. 
(18) The executor swore on oath that he has paid the above amounts 
that have been spent on the orphans and he [and the guardian] entered 
into a legal settlement (taṣādaqā ‘ala dhālik) to reflect this. (19) The 
witnesses [of al-Ḥurma Ḥamīda] informed the qāḍī of their correct 
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understanding of this, and other witnesses were also called upon and 
attested their understanding of the facts. (20) A succinctly-stated, legal 
ruling was hence issued, having fulfilled its conditions and requisite 
foundation.653  
The above muḥāsaba illustrates the creative use of ḥujjas. At first reading, the 
muḥāsaba does not appear to present any objectionable aspects, although it is difficult to 
follow. The most noteworthy part of this document is arguably its last line, which states that 
the presiding qāḍī had issued a “succinctly stated legal ruling” concerning what appears to 
have been a deposition. While I have translated the phrase taṣādaqā ‘ala dhālik (line 18) as a 
“legal settlement” between the executor and guardian, it may very well have simply been an 
acknowledgement by the two parties of their acceptance of the financial reconciliation of 
accounts, as would have been the case in records of business partnerships, and does not 
necessarily imply a conflict. This record therefore brings to mind Ibn Nujaym’s acerbic 
criticism of the practice of his day, of qāḍīs issuing rulings without the “presentation of a 
case (da‘wa) or dispute (khuṣūma)” since this muḥāsaba presented neither dispute nor 
litigation.  
I suggest that the ruling above is fictive in the traditional sense (it does not rule over 
the claims of one party over another) but that it was a legitimizing method by which 
executors and guardians could use for glossing over minor legal/financial discrepancies or 
missing documentation to support their reporting of orphan lending to courts. The qāḍī’s 
ruling, and the witness testimony, would have removed traces of impropriety given the qāḍī’s 
                                                     
653 The last part of this record that reads: thubūtan shar‘īyyan wa-ḥukam b’mawjibihī ḥukman shar‘īyyan 
masbūk fīhi mustawfīyan sharā’iṭ al-sharī‘a wa-wājibātihī al-mar‘īyya. J-Sij 67-228-3    
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supervisory position over orphan estates. While we have no way of knowing what financial 
evidence was provided to the qāḍī for his review, there are a number of supporting ḥujjas and 
iqrārs mentioned in this case, and these do show that there was an underlying logic that the 
executor and guardian were trying to justify. Apparently, there must have been significant 
time gaps, of at least two years in reporting the affairs of their accounts, and this muḥāsaba 
seems to be trying to set the record straight. 
 This muḥāsaba (dated 1 Rajab 996) recounts that six and a half years earlier, in a 
ḥujja from Dhū’l-Qa‘da 989 (line 7), the executor had been anticipating a pro forma profit of 
67 sulṭānī to be earned on the inherited orphan capital of 83.5 sulṭānī over a period of four 
years and three months, resulting in an aggregate capital of 150 sulṭānī by Muḥarram 994. 
Indeed, a ḥujja dated Rabī‘ I 994 showed that this result had been produced and exceeded by 
a half-sulṭānī (line8-9). Also, in this muḥāsaba, the executor relied on a court issued report, 
taqrīr, from Shawwāl 989 (line 11), to estimate that the total amount (pro forma) to be spent 
on maintenance and clothing for the subject orphans over a period of six years, seven and a 
half months should be 150 sulṭānī. This latter period of six years, seven and a half months 
corresponds to Jumādā II, 997, a full six months after the date of the subject muḥāsaba itself, 
1 Rajab 996. The executor thus used a court taqrīr, that likely stipulated the monthly 
maintenance allowance, from seven years earlier, likely issued immediately following the 
death of the father, to project a nominal plan to justify the accumulation of 150 sulṭānī  worth 
of orphan’s maintenance expenses by 997, in order to match it up to the mu‘āmala capital 
that had achieved two years earlier, in 994. This muḥāsaba is not, therefore, an accounting of 
what happened, but rather a plan to smoothen out the income and expense projections related 
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to the subject orphan capital, to show what should have happened. For a review of this 
analysis, see Figure 2.  
A ḥujja was produced on the date of this muḥāsaba that acknowledged a 59 sulṭānī 
distribution by the executor to the guardian, leaving 46 sulṭānī remaining in mu‘āmala capital 
(lines 13-14). There is also a minor 20 para loan that the executor acknowledges to the 
orphans (line 15). What does this mean for the earlier mentioned 150 sulṭānī capital? 
I offer two possibilities. First, it may have been that the 150 sulṭānī capital built up 
until mid-994 was severely eroded by losses between 994 to the date of the muḥāsaba in 996, 
such that only 105 sulṭānī was remaining left (59+46 sulṭānī). Although there is no mention 
of past distributions to the orphans, there is also no mention of past losses which is very 
strange, although this possibility may have explained the qāḍī’s “ruling.” The date of this 
sijill is 996/1588, and the 150 sulṭānī capital recorded in 994/1586, a year after the Ottoman 
state’s currency devaluation. This may have had a major destabilizing effect on the loans in 
Jerusalem during that year, or shortly after. My cursory review of other loans in the same 
sijill though does not indicate reports of huge losses from a few years prior or extensive 
records of bankruptcies, although this is a subject for future research.  
The second, and more probable likelihood, in my opinion, is that parts of the prior 
mentioned 150 sulṭānī capital had been already been distributed before 994. Because both the 
interest income and maintenance expenses were proforma projections, this 150 sulṭānī may 
never have existed as a single amount. Rather, the executor and guardian would have been 
drawing, as necessary, from the mu‘āmala capital to pay for the orphan’s expenses on an as-
needed basis, and re-investing the remaining funds. The financial reconciliation presented to 
the court would have been performed periodically to show that the orphan capital’s balance 
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sheet was healthy, rather than, to reflect actual accounting. If this latter hypothesis is correct, 
then the return on investment for the orphans was rather large indeed. I have calculated that 
the simple annual rate of return achieved between 990-994 was 22%, and that had this money 
been re-invested, the return for 994-996 would have been 32%, given the total amounts that 
were listed in this muḥāsaba over seven and a half years.   
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     The third muḥāsaba from 15 Jumādā I 996/27 May 1588 presents a rather different story 
from the previous muḥāsabāt discussed above.654 Here, we find the case of a mu‘āmala 
capital of a soap merchant’s daughter. Her paternal uncle served as her executor while her 
maternal uncle was her guardian. While having the same three-part structure of other 
muḥāsabāt, this muḥāsaba is concerned with giving an inventory of the various loans given 
out on behalf of the orphaned girl, and the respective amount of profit earned on each loan. 
Moreover, this record details that the executor kept two balance sheets, one for mu‘āmalāt 
entered into in Egyptian paras (qit‘a miṣrīya), and another one or those in Damascene paras 
(darāhim shāmīya), since much of the mu‘āmala capital was concerned with a sale on credit 
of the orphan’s inheritance of a quantity of soap, its sale in Egypt on credit, and the 
subsequent reinvestment of that sum in Egyptian mu‘āmalāt. The investment of Damascene 
paras related to the investment of cash from her father’s estate locally, in Jerusalem or 
Damascus. The muḥāsaba record follows: 
The reason for this sijill, enacted in Jerusalem’s qāḍī court, [2] in the 
presence of the undersigned qāḍī Ilyās Afandī, is the issuance of a 
statement of accounts (muḥāsaba) between, on the one hand, Khawāja 
‘Abd al-Qādir son of (3) the deceased Khawāja Muḥammad al-
Dimashqī, and executor (al-waṣī) for Fatima, his orphaned niece and 
daughter of his deceased brother Aḥmad al-Dimashqī, and on the 
other, the orphan’s maternal uncle and guardian (nāẓir) al-Zaynī 
Maḥmūd son of the deceased Muḥammad b. Shirwīn. (4) The original 
principal (aṣl māl) related [bequeathed] to the orphan in the form of 
                                                     
654 J-Sij 67-176-1 
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the value of her soap (lit. min thaman ṣābūnahā) and her share of gold 
specie delivered from Egypt by Mūsā b. Mar‘ī (5) is 223 sulṭānī and 25 
silver Egyptian para [being the value of her soap that was sold in 
Egypt]. (6) The value of her assets that were disposed in Jerusalem is 
64 sulṭānī and 29 para, all in the form of Damascene para. The total 
profit accrued to [the deceased] Khawaja Muḥammad from registered 
mu‘āmalat (7) for an entire year, starting on 3 Rabī‘ II 994, was 22 
sulṭānī in gold and 15 Egyptian para. (8) As for the profit of dirhams 
[Damascene para?] that arose from this mu‘āmala, these were 8 sulṭānī 
in gold and 10 [Damascene] para. The profit that was produced in the 
second year [of the mu‘āmala], being the year 995, was 24.5 sulṭānī in 
gold. (9) The total principal and profit arising from these two years is 
278.75 sulṭānī in gold. (10) The total sum of the mu‘āmala of 
Damascene para is 64 sulṭānī and 29 para. (11) The amount deducted 
for the orphan’s maintenance and clothing for 2 years, 2 months and 
21 days, (12) from 1 Rabī II 994 to 11 Jumādā II of that year, was 3 
paras per day; (13) and from 12 Jumādā II 994 to the present day has 
been 4 Eastern/Damascene para (sharqīya) per day. The total of this 
[expenditure] expressed in gold is 30.75 sulṭānīs in gold [sic.]. (14) 
The amount spent to date on legal documentation (ḥujjas), taxes 
(‘ushur), the executor expenses, the guardian’s expenses, and other 
minor expenses is 7 sulṭānīs in gold. At the time her estate came into 
effect (waqt khulāṣ al-māl) 8 sulṭānīs in gold was spent from the 
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inheritance of her father’s nephew [i.e., the orphan’s cousin], to cover 
court trial expenses (rasm da‘wā), maḥḍar ta’bīn (funerary 
deposition?), the copying of several legal documents (ḥujjas) that had 
to do with recording an increase in the estate, recording the payment of 
maintenance, and for registering a settlement of accounts (muḥāsaba); 
(16) the sum of these expenses was 43.75 sulṭānīs in gold. The 
remaining capital held on behalf of the orphan to-date is (17) 233 
sulṭānīs in gold and, in Damascene para, an amount equivalent to 64 
sulṭānīs in gold and 29 para. (18) This sum is (hereby) lent out through 
legal subterfuge (bi’l ḥīla al-shar‘īya) for a period of one year from 
today’s date. Let this be a statement of fact. Recorded and published 
(sajjal wa taḥarrar) on 15 Jumādā I 996. 
As with the case of Mūsā al-Dayrī’s earlier mentioned estate, the mu‘āmala capital of 
the abovementioned orphan Fāṭima is also large, being close to three hundred sulṭānī, and 
reflects the vital importance of industrial soap production and its regional trade to 
Jerusalem’s economy in this (and earlier) periods. As al-Dayrī’s records suggested, soap-
manufacturing businesses were often inherited and operated on behalf of orphans by their 
executors, and this may have been the case for Fāṭima here, but I have not searched for her 
father’s factory in the sijjilāt to know for sure. What is certain is that her father’s agent, Mūsā 
b. Mar‘ī, sold an inventory of soap in Egypt and delivered to her executor a little over 233 
sulṭānī in income. The entire record not only points to the bifurcation between Egyptian and 
Shāmī currencies, but also to the meticulous care used to record the value of gold specie 
versus silver specie. Again, given the date of this earlier soap trade, having taken place in 
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994/1585-6 which coincides with the major akce/para devaluation of the same year which 
devalued it by about 100%, this attention to maintaining a bifurcated record between gold 
and silver would have been vital. Given the precarious state of the silver currency at the time, 
it was gold – as this record shows – that was the more important and stable currency of 
account for maintaining these mu‘āmalāt of orphans.  
Fāṭima’s record authenticates the legal validity of the underlying transactions in 
explicitly stating that the mu‘āmalāṭ were performed legally, “through legal stratagems” (bi’l 
ḥīla al-shar‘īya) (line 18). Given the numerous legal deeds presented in court during this 
muḥāsaba, I would think that Fāṭima’s executor presented copies of each mu‘āmala contract 
that was transacted to support this statement of fact. Attesting that the mu‘āmalāt were 
performed under accepted ḥīla norms would have absolved the executor from the charge of 
benefitting from ribā in the various loans, soap credit-sales, and currency exchanges that 
underpinned this balance sheet. Such attestations of engaging in mu‘āmalāt bi’l ḥīla al-
shar‘īya are not uncommon in the sijills. While these contracts do conceal interest taking, 
such statements should be viewed – I suggest – as reinforcing mechanisms for ensuring 
compliance with legal standards. This would have had the same effect, perhaps, as how 
accounting firms today must issue and present company audits within specific legal and 
accounting standards. The reference to the ḥīla al-shar‘īya in this muḥāsaba also corresponds 
to al-Ramlī’s view on ribā and mu‘āmalāt that appears in his above mentioned fatwā.  
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Conclusion  
The material reviewed in this chapter illustrates how credit was central to the welfare 
of orphans in both Mamluk and Ottoman contexts. Up till the beginning of the fifteenth 
century, orphans benefitted from a dedicated depository and bureau for managing the 
investment of their inheritances in loans. The disappearance of this institution in the later 
period does not necessarily imply that orphans were worse off. We do not possess historical 
proof about how effective the orphan bureaus were in Mamluk times; if al-Subkī’s 
skepticism is a measure for mu‘āmalāt, it is a pessimistic one. However, what we know for 
certain is that loans generated by orphans continued to be recorded in courts, as they had 
been before. The emphasis on legal subterfuges was used for mu‘āmalāt issued from orphan 
capital, in much the same way as they were for loans given by other social groups or 
institutions, such as the cash-waqf. And, although a legal, religious, and social imperative for 
protecting orphan capital was certainly at work, the state’s actual supervision of the 
management of mu‘āmalāt by executors and guardians does not appear to have been 
sophisticated or regimented. The sijill records suggest that the court vital role with respect to 
orphan capital was, I suggest, largely notarial. That is, that the primary use of courts – from 
the perspective of guardians and executors – was as a venue for registering the debts issued 
(and taken) by orphans under their management, but not necessarily as a site for adjudication. 
This view is my impression given the exceedingly scant records of cases filed against 
absconding debtors by executors. Settling out of court may have been the order of the day; 
this is something that needs more investigation.  
What is clear, however, is that executors and guardians in sixteenth century Jerusalem 
did carry out the investment of these loans with a fair degree of autonomy. Even in the case 
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of a judge issuing a “ruling” on a muḥāsaba (the second translated muḥāsaba above), the 
presentation of an ideal situation, by presenting a pro-forma picture of the cash inflows and 
outflows, leads one to consider that the court’s knowledge of the actual credit transactions 
that underpinned mu‘āmalāt was quite limited, and perhaps even non-existent in some cases. 
In contrast, executors and guardians benefitted and used, to a significant extent, the courts 
notarial capacity for producing all manner of ḥujja and depositions related to their activities. 
The limited oversight of courts surely must have also been promoted by the relatively short 
duration of judicial appointments, which typically lasted no longer than two-years during the 
second half of the sixteenth-century, giving judges very little stake in investing resources to 
effectively supervise these activities. This would have been even more pronounced during 
the rampant political and economic instability of the last quarter of the century.           
From the long-term lens, what becomes evident when tying together the views of 
legal treatises, manuals and responsa, is the overwhelming resilience of legal customs, which 
at times went counter to normative fiqh rules. Take for instance Ibn Nujaym’s criticism of 
judges issuing rulings without the presence of disputes, or the use of cloth sales as a ḥīlā to 
disguise interest. Indeed, even in the discursive aspects of judicial prescriptive literature 
concerning the demarcation of licit gain (ribḥ) from ribā, jurists sometimes slip and use the 
informal and euphemism fā’ida when referring to ribā, indicating a customary window-
dressing of ribā.  
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Chapter Six – Gender, Social Status, and Credit 
 
This chapter studies how the transacting of debts by women, in and outside of courts, 
was differentiated on the basis of social status and access to legal forums. While male agents 
served as facilitating intermediaries for elite women’s credit activities in markets and courts, 
this was usually not so for non-elite women. More often, men negotiated the interests of 
women household members. This does not mean that the intercession of men should be 
viewed as an extension of men’s control over women’s capital, or that it was necessarily a 
constraint on women’s agency. Rather, I take note of Petry’s assertion that understanding the 
autonomy of elite women must be addressed within “the context of their partnership with 
spouses, immediate families, and extended lineages.”655 Power relations were negotiated, and 
elite women’s ownership and management of significant capital cannot be ignored in the 
process.  
This chapter emphasizes the activities of elite women due to the greater depth of 
information available about them in the late medieval and early modern narrative sources. 
Notwithstanding the advantages held by elite women, the muted presence of non-elite 
women in the court records may suggest that their economic activities were mostly informal. 
The same reasons that compelled women elites to use the courts, namely, access to male 
intermediaries, and the ability to retain witnesses, notaries, specialists, and pay court fees, 
were largely out of reach to non-elites and this would have, I suggest, limit non-elite use of 
the courts beyond for the simple registration of debts through attestations (iqrār). Often debt 
                                                     
655 Carl F. Petry, “Class Solidarity versus Gender Gain : Women as Custodians of Property in Later Medieval 
Egypt,” in Women in Middle Eastern History : Shifting Boundaries in Sex and Gender (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1991), 343. 
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cases filed by non-elite women in court suggest that these complaints were never registered 
in court to begin with. While this was sometimes the case with elite women, it appears more 
so with non-elites, perhaps because of the abovementioned structural barriers. Other court 
cases involving non-elite women were those relating to defaulting female debtors, who were 
usually referred to as “brokers” (dallālat). In one case, reviewed below, this meant temporary 
imprisonment and bankruptcy. 
 
6.1 Public Spaces, Markets and Occupations 
Scholarship on women in the premodern Middle East has focused on the particularly 
modern issues of women’s agency in marriage, social mobility, and access to professional 
opportunities. Assessing the contours of the scholarship on women and public spaces will 
assist us to interpret the activities of female lenders. For instance, did restrictions on 
women’s movements outside the home lead women towards lending to other women, rather 
than to men in markets? Or, were women’s lending activities to other women more due to 
household and professional networks, rather than the constrictions of public spaces?  
Leslie Peirce contended that female honor was principally framed in a woman’s 
marriageability, and then, after marriage, in her ability to maintain her reputation as an 
honorable wife (i.e., one that did not mix with non-related women and spent most of her time 
at home attending to her children and housework). Women’s public interaction with male 
non-relatives casted shame on young women by eroding their marriageability, and, for the 
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state, threatened the socially reproductive capacities of families.656 Young women and 
married women in their prime, were especially vulnerable to this sort of honor effacement, as 
they had the greatest potential for building and maintaining households. On the other hand, 
the presence of older women in public places (those past their reproductive years), did not 
challenge the integrity of households in the same way, and, as a result, such women enjoyed 
far greater freedom of movement than the former group. Young girls also shared the same 
benefit. Thus, the promotion of domesticity and the policing of young women’s movement 
outside the home, a principal issue of Ottoman ḳānūnnāmes and edicts on women, placed 
heavy penalties on promiscuity and adultery. For the Ottoman state, proscribing women’s 
movements and activities was directly connected to protecting their reproductive capacities 
as wives who would maintain socially and economically productive households.657  
As Huda Lutfi noted, in her study of gender and sexuality in the fourteenth century 
prescriptive text of the Egyptian jurist Muḥammad Ibn al-Ḥājj (d. 736-7/1336) al-Madkhal 
ila tanmīyat al-a‘māl bi taḥsīn al-niyyāt (An introduction to the development of deeds 
through the improvement of intentions), by the Egyptian jurist Muhammad Ibn al-Ḥājj, 
“Muslim prescriptive literature viewed the female body primarily as the repository of male 
sexual pleasure, and hence a source of fitna (temptation) that should be concealed.”658 
However, framing women’s sexual power as a threat to the Muslim social order was a 
product of much earlier legal commentaries and exegesis, that reified this notion in the legal 
                                                     
656 Leslie P. Peirce, “Seniority, Sexuality, and Social Order: The Vocabulary of Gender in Early Modern 
Ottoman Society,” in Women in the Ottoman Empire: Middle Eastern Women in the Early Modern Era, 
Ottoman Empire and Its Heritage 10 (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 184–87. 
657 Leslie P. Peirce, “Seniority, Sexuality, and Social Order: The Vocabulary of Gender in Early Modern 
Ottoman Society,” 190–91. 
658 Huda Lutfi, “Manners and Customs of Fourteenth-Century Cairene Women : Female Anarchy versus Male 
Sharí Order in Muslim Prescriptive Treatises,” in Women in Middle Eastern History : Shifting Boundaries in 
Sex and Gender, ed. Nikki R Keddie and Beth Baron (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 109. 
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literature of ninth and tenth century Iraq.659 Ibn al-Ḥājj’s diatribe illustrates that the wide 
presence of women in public space was very far removed from his ideal. Ibn al-Hājj 
bemoaned this, especially during popular religious festivals when “they mingle with men, 
and on feast days you find the mosque crowded with women.”660 Ibn al-Ḥājj’s view held a 
utilitarian emphasis on maintaining adāb al-khurūj (manners of conduct outside the home) 
because the mixing of the sexes would not only subvert men’s status authority over women, 
but also breakdown the institution of marriage and society as a whole.661 He was particularly 
distressed at the religious instruction received by women when they established bonds with 
popular preachers. “These (Sufi) orders established covenants of fraternity between men and 
women without disapproving or hiding it … they went so far as to tolerate women sitting 
close to men, claiming that they were the spiritual children of the shaykh, and once women 
became the spiritual sisters of men they did not need to veil themselves from them.”662  
Ibn al-Ḥājj’s logic circumscribed women’s activities outside the home to necessity. 
Since women were a source of fitna, in Ibn al-Ḥājj’s view, it was the duty of men to guard 
themselves from women’s licentiousness. The honorable shopkeeper should “be careful 
when a woman comes to buy something … (he should) look at her behavior, for if she was 
one of those women dressed up in delicate clothes, exposing her wrists, or some of her 
adornments and speaking in a tender and soft voice, he should leave the selling transaction 
and give her his back until she leaves the shop.”663 Ibn al-Ḥājj was, therefore, not entirely 
                                                     
659 Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1992); Kecia Ali, Marriage and Slavery in Early Islam (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
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against the presence of women in public spaces, but rather, against the indignities that could 
accompany interactions between the sexes. As difficult as this was for shopkeepers, the task 
would have been harder for Cairene husbands, who Ibn al-Ḥājj admonished for allowing 
male peddlers to come to their homes to sell wares or produce, and in the process, develop 
friendships with women of their household.  
The representation of the market as a corrupting place, where the mixing of the sexes 
could promote the potential for social depravity was an old trope. The Andalusian 
philosopher Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064) observed that “women plying a trade or profession … 
(gave) them ready access to people (and they) are popular with lovers – the lady broker, the 
coiffeuse, the professional mourner, the singer, the soothsayer, the school mistress, the 
errand-girl, the spinner, the weaver and the like.”664 In his view, the various professional 
elements of women’s market activities are conveniently collapsed into one, the prism of 
adultery. Ibn Bassam’s ḥisba manual, Nihāyat al-rutba fī ṭalab al-ḥisba is explicit about 
preventing unrelated men and women from interacting in any seclusion. If an unrelated man 
and woman were found meeting in seclusion (khalwa), it is the duty of the Muḥtasib to 
interrogate them.665 Notwithstanding polemical works of the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries, jurists in both earlier and later periods expressed ambivalence regarding popular 
customs and seemed to often turn a blind eye to the results of women’s ubiquitous presence 
in public spaces. Two contemporary examples of apprehension, but muted resignation, can 
                                                     
664 ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm and A. J Arberry, The Ring of the Dove: A Treatise on the Art and Practice of 
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Hazm’s views towards the socially corrupting role of women in markets is mirrored by similar descriptions in 
hisba manuals. See Shatzmiller, Labour in the Medieval Islamic World, 357–58. 
665 Ibn Bassam, Nihāyat al-rutba, 20. 
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be viewed in the works of the Damascene historian ‘Alā’ al-Dīn ‘Alī al-Buṣrawī (842-
905/1438-1500) and the Egyptian jurist Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Ramlī (d. 957/1550). 
In contrast to the religious and social constraints that women faced in navigating 
through public commercial space, as workers and traders, women’s relationships with courts 
could be expressed as being largely on par with men’s. Women’s legal rights to inheritance, 
and their equal legal rights (vis-à-vis those of free Muslim men) to own and trade in property 
created a situation that was contradictory to the patriarchal public legal order that jurists 
sought to preserve. This order sought to, on the one hand, segregate the sexes, publicly 
maintaining a normative Muslim social ideal, where women’s domesticity was equated to 
social stability. On the other, jurists sought to provide women full access for representing 
their legal rights in courts, on a myriad range of issues spanning from divorce and child 
custody to the adjudication of trading disputes. Maya Shatzmiller has argued that the 
abovementioned asymmetry between women’s banishment from markets and simultaneous 
support of their legal rights in court should be viewed as a “reflection of the desire to remove 
women from bread winning occupations;” essentially, women’s economic empowerment 
presented a threat to men’s control over their households.    
The historian al-Buṣrawī was a Damascene Shāfi‘ī deputy qāḍī, who also wrote two 
shurūḥ works and the historical chronicle discussed here, illustrated the different contentions 
at play in the minds of jurists when it came to the issue of women’s movement outside the 
home.666 He referred to these episodes as “events” (waqāi‘) or framed as responsa with 
commentary. The following episode demonstrates the multiplicity of views on the subject: 
                                                     
666 ‘Alā’ al-Dīn ‘Alī b. Yūsif al-Buṣrawī (842-905/1438-1500) was a Damascene shāf‘ī vice-judge who wrote 
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biographical dictionary (in manuscript form) of Ibrāhīm b. ‘Umar al-Baqā‘ī (d. 885/1480), “Unwān al-zamān fī 
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“Our shaykh Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba (d. 851/1447) was asked about a man 
who said to his wife: ‘If you leave home without my permission, 
consider yourself divorced. The wife asked her husband for permission 
to leave the house and he responded by laughing. Taking his laughter as 
indicating her husband’s approval, the wife proceeded to leave the 
house. Ibn Qāḍī Shuhba noted that this resembles another case 
presented to the jurist Bulqīnī, in which a man took an oath, on pain of 
divorce, towards his wife if she were to visit the bathhouse without his 
explicit permission. The wife was subsequently approached by a man 
who falsely told her that her husband had granted her permission to 
visit the bathhouse. She proceeded to do so unwittingly, thinking that 
she was acting under her husband’s authority. Ibn Qādī Shuhba argues 
that the wife’s action in the second case is licit because her action was 
based on the assumed and explicit verbal instruction of her husband 
(whereas the first case is implied). Moreover, the wife did not go to the 
bathhouse with the intention of spiting her husband (lam takhraj 
mūrāghimatan lahu)[which adds legitimacy to her action]. I responded 
that (the legality) of it then depends wholly on what is assumed by the 
wife. If a wife then assumes that her husband’s permission has been 
                                                     
tarājim al-shuyūkh w”l-aqrān. The editor of al-Buṣrawī’s supplement, Akram Ḥūsayn al-‘Ilbī, named it “tārīkh 
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Buṣrawī : ṣafaḥāt majhūlah min tārīkh Dimashq fī ʻAṣr al-Mamālīk, min sanat 871 H li-ghāyat 904 H 
(Damascus: Dār al-Maʼmūn lil-Turāth, 1988), 18–21. 
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granted, even if falsely communicated by someone else, does it 
represent a legally valid authority (of the husband)?”667 
Another view on the matter is that of al-Ramlī, whose fatwās were preserved by his 
son, Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Ramlī (d. 1004/1595), and published in the margin of Ibn 
Ḥajar al-Haytamī’s al-Fatāwā al-kubrā.668 When al-Ramlī is approached with the following 
query: “Are women required to veil their faces in front of strangers, or not, as ruled in the 
works ‘ibārat al-irshād and al-rawḍ? Qāḍī ‘Ayāḍ has stated that this is the generally agreed 
upon view of the ‘ulamā’” Al-Ramlī answers: 
 “Women are required to veil their faces in front of any stranger (non-
related male) as was authenticated (ṣaḥaḥū) in the minhāj669; the strength 
of its argument in the small commentary precludes its evaluation in any 
other way.670 (In contrast to Qāḍī ‘Ayāḍ) It is generally understood by 
Muslims that women are prohibited from leaving the home with their 
faces uncovered (al-khurūj sāfirātin). This was also noted in (al-
Nawawī’s work) the Rawḍa671, which reinforces this understanding. Al-
Bulqīnī evaluated and issued opinions on this issue in line with this 
interpretation of the minhāj, and he was partial to this in his 
teaching/training (wa jazzam bihī fī tadrībihī). Al-Adhra‘ī, said this was 
                                                     
667 Al-Buṣrawī, Tārīkh, 53–54. 
668 Aaron Zysow, “Al- Ramlī,” ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2 (Online: BRILL, 2016); Abū al-ʻAbbās Aḥmad b. Muḥammad Ibn Ḥaǧar al-Haytamī 
and Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Ramlī, al-Fatāwī al-kubrā al-fiqhiyya (al-Qāhira, 1891). 
669 This refers to the classic Shāfi‘ī fiqh reference work of al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277), Minhāj al-ṭālibīn wa-
ʻumdat al-muftiyīn.  
670 “Small commentary” most likely refers to al-Ramlī’s own commentary of the Minhāj. See Zysow, “al-
Ramlī”. 
671 Refers to another work of al-Nawawī, Rawḍat al-ṭālibīn wa ‘ūmdat al-muftiyyīn, an abridgement of al-
Rifā‘ī’s al-fatḥ al-‘azīz bi sharḥ al-‘azīz. 
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determined by the majority practice (inahū ikhtiār al-jumhūr). Some 
people have not viewed these two positions of the shaykhs (Al-Bulqīnī 
and Al-Adhra‘ī) as representing the same view.” 672 
How were the above fears about women’s dangerous presence in public space 
manifested? Ibn Ṭawq relates an incident from Shawwāl 889/ November 1484 where women 
congregated in large numbers to pray at the Umayyad Mosque and the mosque of Manjak, 
with the urging on of a popular ‘ālim/preacher named al-Najmī (?), Ibn Ṭawq notes that their 
attendance increased in occasions when the Prophet’s sīra (biography) was recited. Men and 
women mingled after these sermons, to Ibn Ṭawq’s shock and disdain.673 In contrast to his 
outward traditionalism, though, Ibn Ṭawq himself had direct dealings with women outside of 
his household and some took place in private settings. Ibn Ṭawq took loans from a 
professional female moneylender and also managed the collection of rents and alimony 
payments for several women who were not related to him. Ibn Ṭawq also regularly met 
women who had retained his services in the company of professional male notaries and 
witnesses. Proscriptions against the public mixing of the sexes were not strictly observed, 
and this was complicated by fiqh’s non-discriminatory prescriptions on the financial and 
property dealings of men and women. There was no restriction or distinction between 
business partners or property owners on the basis of gender. Indeed, as far back as the early 
medieval period, ḥisba manuals refer to female weavers and embroiderers who congregated 
                                                     
672 Abū al-ʻAbbās Aḥmad b. Muḥammad Ibn Ḥaǧar al-Haytamī and Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Ramlī, Fatāwī, 
vols. 3, 169–170. 
673 Ibn Ṭawq comments that such “obscene incidents” had been on the increase (zādat al-ashyā’ al-fāḥisha). Ibn 
Ṭawq, Ta‘līq, 395. Ten years later, in Rabi al-Akhir 896/March 1491, further evidence of such long term 
anxieties comes from Ibn Ṭulūn who reported that women’s presence during Friday prayers led to official 
sanctions by the Hajib in Damascus who prohibited bystander women, Jews and Christians from sitting in and 
listening to the Friday sermons at the Umayyad mosque, the ‘Umari mosque and various zawiyas. Ibn Tulun, 
Mūfākihat al-Khillān, vol 1, 114.  
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in front of fabric shops doors or by the river bank, or entrances to mosques and bathhouses.674 
Even though jurists were anxious about women’s public activities, they simultaneously 
recognized the needs of working women who needed to access markets. “Widows and 
divorcees in their waiting period retained the right to leave their homes during the day in 
order to purchase raw material or sell … At night these women were also allowed to go to 
neighbors’ houses to spin together and chat.”675 
During the early Ottoman period, neither the sharī‘a nor Ottoman ḳānūnnāmes barred 
women from transacting in property or goods in a patriarchal marketplace. In both Mamluk 
and early Ottoman contexts, the commercial activities of women were gendered. A 
supporting factor was women’s general exclusion from market guilds.676 This exclusion 
affected women’s ability to inhabit shop space in markets, because most storefronts were 
allocated to members of guilds. Stores leased by guild-members would typically pass down 
to their sons, if guild members. While women could inherit the leases of such stores from 
their fathers, they could not operate these businesses without being members of guilds 
themselves, from which they were excluded. Thus, women’s primary benefit would have 
come from the sub-leasing of such property.677 This may be a contributing factor to the lack 
of evidence pointing to women’s activities in market workshops or stores and leads me to 
                                                     
674 Shatzmiller, Labour in the Medieval Islamic World, 359. 
675 Rapoport, Yossef, “Women and Gender in Mamluk Society: An Overview,” Mamluk Studies Review 11, no. 
2 (2007): 24ʿAbd al-Karīm ibn Muḥammad al-Rāfiʿī, Al-ʿAzīz Sharḥ al-Wajīz, ed. ʿAlī Muḥammad Muʿawwaḍ 
and ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd (Beirut, 1997), 9:510; al-Subkī, Fatāwā, 2:314–20. 
676 In her study of women and artisanal work in eighteenth and nineteenth century Istanbul, Farbia Zarinebaf-
Shahr notes that she was not able to find any evidence of female guild members in the sijills. Marcus also had 
similar findings. Fariba Zarinebaf-Shahr, “The Role of Women in the Urban Economy of Istanbul, 1700-1850,” 
International Labor and Working-Class History, no. 60 (2001): 146; Abraham Marcus, Columbia University, 
and Middle East Institute, The Middle East on the Eve of Modernity: Aleppo in the Eighteenth Century (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 159. 
677 Zarinebaf-Shahr, “The Role of Women in the Urban Economy of Istanbul, 1700-1850,” 145. 
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consider that this was a factor that would have pushed women into investment, rather than 
professional, activities.678  
Women’s commercial exclusion was also the indirect result of the state’s patriarchal 
system of market taxation. As H. Gerber illustrated, guild membership was mainly (though 
not exclusively) evidenced by the occupancy of shops in markets. Accordingly, guilds were 
taxed by the state according to the number of shops occupied by their members.679 While no 
formal restrictions on guild membership existed, membership was not universal and excluded 
women, low-skilled workers. Control over guild membership by a guild’s leaders allowed its 
members to maintain certain privileges such as maintaining market controls on the prices and 
distribution of their goods, and monopolization benefits for the purchase of raw materials and 
goods for a guild’s members.680 Indeed, as Gerber sums it up, “holding a shop in the market 
leads to payment of guild taxes; paying taxes makes the traditional privileges of the guilds 
legally enforceable.”681  
There were some exceptions to women’s general exclusion from guilds. Market 
brokerage (dalāla), an important activity for connecting women’s informal artisanal work in 
textiles, weaving, and embroidery, to markets, was an area in which court records attest 
women’s guild membership in. Narrative historical sources also record women as dominating 
the abovementioned crafts.682 Mamluk biographical dictionaries and legal responsa featured 
women as peddlers and brokers (dallālāt), as well as serving as hairdressers, female 
                                                     
678 For earlier periods, Shatzmiller found no evidence of such places in her study of women’s labor in markets 
and concluded that “even the major industrial manufacturing, spinning, weaving, and ebroidery was carried out 
at home.” Shatzmiller, Labour in the Medieval Islamic World, 358–59. 
679 Gerber, Economy and Society, 34–36. 
680 Gerber, Economy and Society, 48–51. 
681 Gerber, Economy and Society, 36. 
682 Shatzmiller, Labour in the Medieval Islamic World, 241. 
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attendants in public baths and hospitals.683 With respect to dalāla, Amnon Cohen has argued 
that the etymology of the term dallāl (m.)/dallālā (f.) likely reflects a reference to the 
occupation of public-cryers; however by the sixteenth century the sijill records make it clear 
that the occupation of dallāl referred purely to market brokerage, whereas, a separate title 
(sing. munādī) was given to public-cryers.684 According to Cohen, the dallāl guild in 
Jerusalem “was one of the most active guilds during the 17th century.”685 Membership in, and 
leadership of, this guild was very competitive due to the fact that most crafts guilds appointed 
exclusive market brokers, those who would negotiate prices on their behalf and secure 
favorable market distribution. As such, brokers, in addition to their independent activities 
could rely on an almost guaranteed income from such appointments, which could be 
lucrative.686 Relying on the seventeenth century guild sijill records edited by Maḥmūd ‘Alī 
‘Aṭā Allāh687, Cohen observed: “whenever the term ‘all’ members was used in association 
with this guild, it had a much wider meaning than normally assumed: it also included women 
and Jewish members. There were Muslim women involved in brokerage, as specific 
references were made to guild members – ‘male’ and ‘female’ alike.”688  
In Cohen’s annotated catalog of sijills related to Jerusalem’s Jewish community, he 
noted a sijill from Ṣafar 1004/October 1595 in which three Jewish dallālāt made attestations 
and defended claims at court, on the same day.689 In the first case, a Jewish dallāla registered 
a guarantee on her behalf for all debts she had undertaken in doing her work, and this was 
                                                     
683 Rapoport, Marriage, Money and Divorce in Medieval Islamic Society, 32–33. 
684 Cohen, The Guilds of Ottoman Jerusalem, 178–79. 
685 Ibid. 
686 Ibid. 
687 ‘Aṭā Allāh, Maḥmūd ‘Alī, Wathā’iq Al-Ṭawā’if Al-Ḥirafiyya Fī’l-Quds Fī’l-Qarn Al-Sābi‘ ‘Ashar (Nablus: 
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688 Cohen, The Guilds of Ottoman Jerusalem, 181. 
689 Cohen, A World Within, vol. 1, 195. J-77-162. 
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issued by a Jewish saddle-maker (sarrāj). In the second, a Jewish woman (without any 
professional title, presumably not a dallāla) was guaranteed by a Jewish dallāla for any debts 
she incurred, while the former also guaranteed the debts of the latter – a mutual surety. 
Notably, the debts of both women were additionally guaranteed by a Muslim dallāl. Lastly, 
the third case involved a third Jewish dallāla who was summoned to court and berated by the 
qāḍī for engaging as a broker without having a formally registered guarantor. The qāḍī 
subsequently banned her from brokerage until she obtained one. Despite the clear religious-
communal solidarity that bound these three dallālāt, the aforementioned records indicate that 
professional ties crossed religious and gender lines, as the guarantee of a Jewish dallāla by a 
Muslim dallāl indicates. This case may also provide an example of how one woman entered 
the brokerage profession, by building her professional mettle through obtaining credit from 
other brokers through mutual surety oaths.  
Cultural taboos concerning the public mixing of the sexes and the exclusion of 
women from workspaces did not extinguish women’s commercial activities in markets; 
rather, women seemed to move with ease and occupy informal public places. Chronicles, 
sijills, legal treatises and diaries from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries show that women 
were active market participants in public spaces, at times presenting challenges to the 
normative ideals of a socially-religiously male dominated public sphere. Elyse Semerdjian’s 
work on the state’s regulation of prostitution and alcohol brewing, for instance, indicates that 
women working in these occupations were protected by, unsurprisingly, the same authorities 
that were tasked with policing them.690 
                                                     
690 Elyse Semerdjian, “Sinful Professions: Illegal Occupations of Women in Ottoman Aleppo, Syria,” Hawwa 1, 
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Despite women’s brokerage and lending in markets, such activities could be 
controlled within the patriarchal social structure by applying social and cultural restrictions 
on women’s lending. In other words, extra-judicial means could silence women’s lending 
activities. The easiest of these was to discredit the honor of female lenders, even those who 
engaged in the legitimate putting out of loans on behalf of orphans. Men who wished to do 
so, could simply claim they were women of disrepute and initiate a court case against them 
on that basis. These claims could be made by male associates, or even husbands, of women 
engaged in these activities to control these women’s social behavior. Ibn Ṭawq provides one 
such case, of a woman popularly known as Bint Sha‘bān. Bint Sha‘bān practiced the 
profession of putting out loans for orphans. Following marital strife, her husband repudiated 
her and filed a complaint against her character to the local qāḍī, claiming that she was lewd 
(fāsiqa) and “ill-suited to manage the accounts of orphans.” After questioning her and 
investigating the matter, the concerned qāḍī ordered the stamping of their home’s entrance 
with a seal (to demarcate and prohibit her activities).691 When the outraged qāḍī found out 
about the couples’ reconciliation, he removed the seal on their home, and instead imprisoned 
the husband for violating his order.  
For Ottoman Jerusalem, the case of Bīla bt. Sham‘ūn provides a case of the 
entrenchment of Jewish women’s lending activities in this city. It is not clear when she 
settled in Jerusalem, but she is described as being an itinerant non-Muslim resident (al-
amānīya) in the registers. Her wealth becomes apparent when we learn that she sold a house 
she owned in Jerusalem in 980/1572 for the substantial sum of forty sūlṭānīs.692 Cohen 
                                                     
691 Ibn Ṭawq, Ta‘līq, 414-415. 
692 Jerusalem Sijill acts 58(b), 58(c), 59(b), 60(a), 61(c), 63(d), 64(e), 65(b), 105(d), 123(b), 131(d), and 163(f) 
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recorded twelve court documents in which she was a litigant, mainly as a defendant, and all 
occurring within a period of four months.693 While the short-lived nature of these cases may 
lead one to speculate that she was not a long-standing member of the Jerusalemite 
community, possibly an itinerant trader or pilgrim, her diverse commercial activities and 
deeply entrenched lending transactions in the community may indicate otherwise. She 
received a high level of support from leaders of the Jewish community who came forward to 
collectively guarantee some of her debts, and the few surviving court records of her debt 
dealings are likely a subset of a much larger debt footprint that appears to have been lost.  
Of Bīla’s abovementioned eleven court cases, nine were filed by creditors claiming 
that she had defaulted on her debts. The concentration of these complaints in such a short 
period reflects an organized effort by several creditors acting jointly against Bīla, particularly 
since several of the cases raised against her in court were made in tandem.694 This was not the 
first time that Bīla had faced financial difficulties. She had been imprisoned for what the 
court sijill noted was “a long period,” such that the court could “find out whether she was 
[just] stubborn or [really] poor,” as stated in one sijill, since she had claimed bankruptcy.695 
Several months later, after release on bankruptcy, she was back in court to face further claims 
from other creditors. Sympathetic to her claim of insolvency, the qāḍī offered Bīla the 
opportunity to retrieve and present proof to the court regarding her impoverished situation.696 
This was the normative court procedure and referred to the furnishing ḥujjas of deeds of 
court rulings, attestations, contracts and such, in order to support her case, which she did. In 
                                                     
693 Bīla’s twelve court cases were recorded between 7 Muḥarram, 980/19 May, 1572 to 11 Rabī‘ al-Thānī, 
980/20 August, 1572. 
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line with the procedural norms of bankruptcy described in chapter two, Bīla’s incarceration 
was intended to pressure her to uncover hidden assets and truly prove her insolvency rather 
than deliver penitential justice.697 Her status as a non-Muslim woman does not appear to have 
prejudiced either the court procedure or the instituted punishment. 
 
6.2 Social Status, Agency and Litigation  
Women’s delegation of control of their waqfs and properties to men’s management 
(typically as their agents, sing. mutawallī) reflected a common need to insert male authority 
in the day to day management of properties, particularly to deal with vexing cases of waqf 
mismanagement, theft and defaulting renters. Although discerning the intentions behind the 
actions of women in this regard is difficult, some records of this kind of delegation can 
illuminate the sort of challenges faced by women’s management of inherited waqf estates.  
In Dhū al-Qa‘da 911/November 1583, Fatima bt. Abdul Rahman al-Baqqāl, the nāẓir 
of her grandfather’s waqf, appointed her brother-in-law "Shaykh ‘Alā’ al-Dīn, as her agent 
and representative (wakkalat wa anābat). The sijill states that his principal duties, in addition 
to maintaining the waqf’s structures (īṣlāḥ al-‘amāyir), was to improve the waqf’s revenues 
and income generating ability (ḍabṭ mutaḥaṣṣil wa ray‘ al-waqf) and to pursue legal action 
against those aiming to steal from the waqf’s revenues (min al-da‘wa ‘la man waḍa‘ yadihi 
‘ala mutaḥaṣṣāl al-waqf) and to bring cases against such people to account and take them to 
court (al-mūkhāṣama wa-l-mūḥākama). The two witnesses to Fatima’s agency appointment 
                                                     
697 For the late fifteenth century, see J.J. Witkam, Inventory of the Oriental Manuscripts of the Library of the 
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of her brother-in-law indicates her family’s connection to the marketplace. One was a simsār 
(real estate broker) while the other carried the title ketkhūdā (guild-head).698 Her case 
illustrates a typical well-to-do woman’s reliance on the market and legal enforcement power 
of her male kin and their entrenched social networks. 
With respect to social class distinctions, it seems that elite women relied on wakāla 
arrangements far more than non-elite women, and this may have been due to several reasons. 
First, elite women were far more bound to the preservation of household honor codes given 
their importance for marriageability. As Peirce’s abovementioned analysis suggests, male 
agents, especially husbands, sons or cousins, shielded elite women from public purview and 
ensured them protected (ḥaram) status. Second, wakāla contracts were costly, both in the fees 
paid to agents as well as those paid to courts were they were registered. Third, and most 
important, elite women benefited from an inherited network of legal and market 
professionals associated with their patriarchal household structures that facilitated their 
successful management of capital. Non-elite women had to develop them, at great financial, 
as well as social, cost. Elite women who inherited this social capital could develop it though. 
Elite women’s networks also allowed them control over hinterland properties, sometimes far 
beyond their localities.  
Women’s reliance on male representation to manage distant assets transcended the 
bounds of agency agreements, and was also incorporated into partnership associations. 
Property and agricultural production were the predominant arenas of women’s involvement 
in this regard. Agricultural rental income trumped industrial production, particularly under 
the economic strain of the late Mamluk period. Several surviving waqf deeds from late 
                                                     
698 D-1-72-2. 
335 
  
fifteenth century Damascus refer to waqf agricultural estates that were leased out to 
partnerships, and some of these were spearheaded by women. One such waqf, created by a 
certain Ibn ‘Imād al-Qawwāṣ in 882/1477 consisted of small shares in three farms and a 
village. This waqf’s founding deed states that these farms were “under the hand”, or 
management, of Khadija and her three male partners.699 Khadija and her partners also appear 
as managers of another Damascus farm, owned by a certain Muhammad al-Khashshāb, at the 
time of its inclusion into a waqf two years earlier.700 As Ibn Ṭawq also offered, though, it was 
more often the case that female heirs hired intermediaries, such as himself, to rent out their 
shares of waqf agricultural lands and collect their dues in late fifteenth century Damascus.701 
Ibn Ṭawq personally leased waqf lands as an investment activity and then subcontracted the 
collection of crops to tenant farmers, as well as managed the sale of crops, usually at auction. 
This is a process that Ibn Ṭawq describes repeatedly for fields he leased and visited 
frequently, often with his business partners.702 To my knowledge, none of Ibn Ṭawq’s 
agricultural investment partners were women, however, he did lease plots from numerous 
women and some of these lands came from waqf properties under their management as 
nāẓirs. These were often very small shares, usually two or three qirāts, in agricultural estates 
that were rented for a few hundred dirhams per year.  
Over the course of the fifteenth century, with the successive drain of the Mamluk 
treasury to Ottoman campaigns, and economic crises, there came a steady disposal of bayt-al-
māl properties, particularly in the latter half of the century, which made their way into private 
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ownership and then endowment as family waqfs.703 These properties were bought by Mamluk 
and non-Mamluk elites, and was a preferred mode of investment for women elites during this 
period.704 It was not since the Ayyūbid period that women were recorded as having been so 
involved in the land investment market and the patronage of waqfs.705 Rapoport has 
hypothesized that it was the lack of such investment opportunities for elite women during the 
height of the Mamluk period, when conditions were more favorable to the state’s tax regime, 
that compelled them to increasingly engage as moneylenders, among other professional 
pursuits.706 Waqfs were sites of household power, galvanizing intermarriage, supporting the 
continuity of lineages and keeping money in the family, so to speak. By purchasing 
properties and endowing their own waqfs, women elites also contributed to the maintenance 
of household waqfs. To speak about women’s activities in waqf management as reinforcing 
patriarchal structures, though, is misleading. Fifteenth century waqfs from Damascus indicate 
that women served in a variety of roles, as both managers/tax farmers of private estates as 
well as endowers of waqfs. While waqf deeds show that women were sometimes explicitly 
excluded as beneficiaries, such waqfs are in the minority. Rather, the most common practice 
was the distribution of waqf beneficiary interests according to sharia inheritance rules. Like 
men, women employed multi-nodal waqf strategies for partitioning and managing family 
estates under master waqfs, and these reflect individualized plans that mirrored the social 
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relationships and kinship hierarchies that were promoted by the beneficiaries, rather than the 
founders.  
That said, the waqf strategies employed by elite women often speak to the 
imperatives of maintaining a patriarchal household order. As an example, Fatima bt. Abī 
Bakr Bin Qamar al-Dīn, a member of the Ibn al-Farfūr clan whose men occupied many of the 
qāḍīships at the turn of the sixteenth century, endowed minority shares in ten agricultural 
properties she owned in 862/1457, around Damascus and in the Bekaa valley.707 These were 
geographically scattered and bought from the bayt al māl a year prior to the waqf’s founding. 
Her waqf deed stated that one quarter of these properties was to be for her benefit and her 
mother’s benefit during their lifetimes, and that three quarters would be allocated to her four 
siblings (two males/two females). The lack of reference to any of her own children and the 
passing of the waqf supervision to her mother suggests that Fāṭima was quite young and 
unmarried. Indeed, this process may have been a managed process initiated on her behalf by 
her mother.708 After the end of the family line, the waqf income would be dedicated to the 
orphans and widows of the ribāṭs of the waqfs of the two holy cities, al-Ḥaramayn al-
Sharīfayn. When this waqf was founded, its properties were leased to Fatima’s nephew, Badr 
al-Din Bin al-Farfūr, who would later become the Ḥanafī chief qāḍī of Damascus during the 
last decade of Mamluk rule (noted in chapter one above). Waqf deeds produced in the early 
sixteenth century refer to him as a qāḍī. At the end of her long life, in 925/1519, Fatima 
chose to endow her remaining ownership shares from the same villages and farms in a new 
waqf entirely for the benefit of her nephew Badr al-Din bin al-Farfūr and his heirs.709  
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 While land and credit were two lucrative sectors that increasingly opened up to 
female investors in the late fifteenth century, as shown above, the way transactions were 
navigated by women in these fields relative to men during this period is still vague. The 
disposal of bayt-al-māl properties created investment opportunities for women, for sure, and 
these cannot be viewed outside of women’s waqf strategies. Gender distinctions in the 
management of waqfs were less gendered, than one would expect. Women were able to 
manage waqf properties and manipulate credit as means for transmitting inter-generational 
familial power. Although women administrators of waqfs had to rely on male agents, by 
social necessity, this did not necessarily constrict their ability to control their assets. Beyond 
a safety net, it was more useful for women to be the founders of waqfs than the beneficiaries 
of waqfs, since they could change the course of waqfs during their lifetimes. As 
beneficiaries, they could not. Damascene elite women used different waqf strategies to 
advance different social interests, and these were not static or unresponsive to material 
changes around them. They could not do so, however, without their male relations and their 
male relations held in-common a desire to maintain the integrity of their household through 
consolidation of waqf assets, a process which itself relied on the transmission and 
management of waqf property by women. In the late sixteenth century Damascus, women 
regularly appear in court registers, in person, as purchasers of property. Such purchases were 
often on their own account, but they could also be on account of other family members and 
children. Wives of deceased military elites bought property for their minor children, using 
their own funds and those inherited by their children.710  
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6.3 Adjudicating Debt Disputes in Court  
The experience of women in courts was certainly that of a minority. Not only did 
women’s litigation represent a minority of cases, relative to men, when women appeared in 
court they were also a physical minority in the court room. When women appeared in court, 
that is when they did not engage with the courts through a male agent, they were 
outnumbered by the all-male staff of the courts, the presiding qāḍī, witnesses, notaries, other 
staff and experts that the court sometimes drew upon, who were, largely men. Other legal 
constrictions, such as the discount on women’s legal testimony in sharia courts (women’s 
witness testimony counted for half of that of men’s) may have also complicated their 
dealings and increased their dependence on the legal intercession of their male relatives and 
agents.  
Generally speaking, elite women represented themselves in person, in court, less 
frequently than non-elite women. This was not because elite women engaged in less 
litigation, but rather, that elite women more frequently relied on the services of male relatives 
and employees to act as their agents in courts through wakāla appointments. Substantial court 
fees for registering claims, contracts, and attestations as well as those related to notaries, 
witnesses, and experts placed elite women at an advantage over non-elite women as 
consumers of the law. However, both elite and non-elite women appeared in court with the 
same frequency as plaintiffs at the time that cases were initiated. This was in line with Ḥanafī 
judicial practice (and Mālikī and Ḥanbalī practice, though not Shāfi‘ī and Shī‘ī practice) that 
required the appearance of both principals to a case at its initiation.711 Cases of elite women 
                                                     
711 With respect to the da‘wa, E. Tyan observed that “the appearance of the parties, is, in principle, a necessary 
condition precedent to the fighting of the issue; there does not exist, in Islamic Law, a procedure of judgment in 
default of appearance. Further, various procedures of indirect coercion are laid down with the object of securing 
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regularly surfaced in court, however, such women rarely appeared in court, whether to face 
claims by creditors or to pursue claims against debtors. Two cases from the Damascus sijill 
of 991-993/1483-1485 illustrate this dynamic between elite women’s social status and their 
influence using agents in court litigation.  
In Ṣafar 991/October 1583, a Ḥanafī qāḍī (perhaps the chief qāḍī) of Damascus, Lūṭf 
Allāh b. Mūsā, witnessed the attestation of an elite Damascene woman, Badria bt. 
Muḥammad b. Shihāb al-Dīn Ibn al-Muzalliq, likely a great grand-daughter of the Mamluk 
merchant and qāḍī Shams al-Dīn Ibn al-Muzalliq (discussed later in this chapter) to a debt of 
twenty sulṭānīs that she owed her brother-in-law, Shams al-Dīn Muhammad al-Kattānī, a 
merchant grandee (al-khawājā al-kabīrī) and son of a reputed qāḍī. In the record, she 
appoints her nephew to undertake the future repayment of the loan on her behalf and any 
court appearances in this regard. Her attestation was witnessed by three merchant notables 
(khawājas), her above brother-in-law, nephew, and several other male witnesses. Her 
attestation in this sijill also serves to legalize (taṣāduq wa thubūt shar‘ī) this obligation, 
perhaps indicating that this was an informal debt owed to her brother-in-law that was now 
being formally registered in court.712 In the following month, Badrīya’s above brother-in-law 
appears again in court to register a debt against a Christian man; Badrīya’s debt attestation 
appears to have been part of a larger set of collections claims by her brother-in-law during 
this period. Notably, this latter record lacks any of the elite witnesses and grandiosity of 
                                                     
the appearance of a recalcitrant defendant. As a last resort, the judge will appoint for such a defendant an 
official representative ( wakīl musak̲h̲k̲h̲ar ).” E. Tyan, “Daʿwā - Brill Reference,” 1965, 
http://www.brillonline.nl./entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/dawa-
SIM_1739?s.num=2&s.au=%22Tyan%2C+E.%22; Boğaç A Ergene, Judicial Practice: Institutions and Agents 
in the Islamic World (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2009), 218–21; For this general rule, see also: Galal H El-Nahal, 
The Judicial Administration of Ottoman Egypt in the Seventeenth Century (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 
1979), 21. 
712 D-1-14-3.  
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Badrīya’s record. The numerous entitled men witnessing her appearance in court reveals a 
performative aspect that accompanied such women’s presence in court.713 
Over a year later, in a sijill from Rabi al-Thani 993/April 1585, the same Ḥanafī qāḍī 
issued a court order mandating (ilzām) a certain Fāris b. Ibrāhīm al-Ḥamawī al-Ṣaḥrāwī to 
pay overdue rent to a landowner, al-ḥurma Fatima bt. ‘Abd al-Bārī Ibn al-Qamar, for rent of 
an orchard outside the city’s Bāb Touma gate. This woman’s elite status seems to have been 
more the product of her propertied wealth than a connection to an influential husband or 
esteemed lineage. The rent (thirty-six sulṭānīs) was for a two-year period from 990-
992/1583-1584. A year after the end of the period, Fāṭima claimed that twenty-three sulṭānīs 
remained unpaid, this amount now having become converted into a debt. In the case, the 
renter had failed to provide evidence (bayyina) supporting his claim that he had paid all his 
dues. Notably, Fāṭima, who was not present at the issuance of this ruling, was represented in 
this case by her agent, a merchant grandee, Muḥammad b. (illegible name in margin). This 
merchant was tasked with collecting this due amount, and his presence was witnessed by 
several other merchants, and two witnesses.714 The Damascus sijill contains numerous other 
examples of elite women acting on behalf of elite women’s credit claims. Ramadan 
991/September 1583, a brother appeared in court to represent himself, and to act as his 
sister’s agent, in collecting overdue proceeds from an oil press they jointly inherited from 
their father. She is referred to as al-sit al-maṣūna sayyidat al-tujjār (the honorable maiden, 
lady of merchants).715 In the end of the same month, a daughter of a senior military 
                                                     
713 D-1-21-2. 
714 D-1-147-2. 
715 D-1-7-3. The travel chronicle of Sigoli Frescobaldi (1384) makes reference to many female traders at the 
ports of Cairo and Alexandria in the fourteenth century. Ahmad ‘Abd al-Rāziq, La Femme au Temps des 
Mamlouks en Egypte, 48.  
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commander (blūk bāshī) appoints her brother as agent, himself a janissary, to collect all debts 
and money due to her. 716   
Elite married women also did file cases against debtors without the involvement of 
their husbands, and at times, on behalf of business partners, siblings or other relatives with 
whom they were partners. These were exceptions, rather than the rule. By legal necessity, 
such women would have had to appear in person, in court, to file their cases. One such case 
from the 991-992/1583-1584 Damascus register, involves the daughter of a merchant, 
Mistress Fāṭima bt. Muhammad al-Shaddād. Fāṭima had filed a case against a debtor on 
behalf of herself and her three brothers Yaḥya, Maḥmūd, and ‘Alī (the last two of whom also 
carried the title khāwāja) for an overdue debt of fifty-five sulṭānī. This may have been a debt 
owed to their deceased father. The register states that Fatima’s brothers had appointed her as 
their agent for the task, to secure repayment of the money, whether through out of court 
settlement (ṣulḥ) or through the courts, in front of two vetted and reputable (maqbūlīn) 
witnesses who had appeared in court to support her claim. The sijill presents an incomplete 
case; as it concludes with the debtor denying any debt owed, and the qāḍī ordering Fatima to 
produce evidence (bayyina) for the debt, most likely in the form of an agreement or receipts. 
The sijill concludes with Fatima leaving to obtain such proof.717 As was commonly the case 
in commercial disputes, the burden of proof here was on the plaintiff.718 Such cases seem to 
                                                     
716 D-1-35-3; In the same month, another woman Amina bt. Rajab al-Jarāḥ is accompanied by her husband to 
court to attest the sale of her fractional ownership of a farm to a sipahī, D-1-22-2.   
717 11 Ramaḍān 992/16 September 1584; D-1-74-2.  
718 This corresponds to the popular legal maxim that “The burden of proof (by testimony) lies upon the one who 
makes the allegation and the oath belongs to him who denies” / “al-bayyina ‘alā l-mudda‘ī wa-l-yamīn ‘alā man 
ankar.” Brunschvig, R., “Bayyina”, in: Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, Edited by: P. Bearman, Th. 
Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs.    
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support a priority for written evidence (e.g., ḥujjas) over oral testimony in Ottoman courts, as 
Reem Meshal has recently advanced.719  
In a case from a year earlier, another married woman, Fatima bt. Muhammad who 
was known by the moniker Bint al-‘Ajamī filed a case against a man (first part of name 
illegible) al-Dīn b. Yūsuf, who was known as al-Qāri’ (the teacher/Qur’ān reciter), to whom 
she had loaned five sulṭāni. This was not a substantial amount, and Fāṭima’s lack of a 
surname, as well as her laqab, give me reason to think that she was a small-time 
moneylender. Further, unlike the above case, this lender did not present any witnesses to 
support her case, but she did present a debt contract as evidence to the qāḍī. The loan was 
undertaken as one that would be repaid “on-demand” (‘ala ḥukm al-ḥulūl).720 This type of 
loan was common, and in my estimate, was used mostly in cases where collateral was 
insufficient or altogether absent. It is not unique to women’s credit activities. Fatima’s case 
here illustrates court practice for the legalizing of credit contracts that were incepted outside 
of court, as appears to have been the case.721 After being presenting with the debt contract, 
the qāḍī questioned the debtor, who confirmed that he had indeed received a debt from 
Fatima. In order to “formalize” this debt obligation upon the creditor, Fatima asks the qāḍī: 
“does this (loan contract) obligate him (the debtor) to pay it? (hal īlayhi ilzām al-mūd‘ī 
‘alayh?). The qāḍī affirms that this agreement does indeed form a legal obligation on the 
debtor (ilzāman shar‘īyyan), and that he was therefore “legally obligated to settle the subject 
                                                     
719 Meshal, Sharia and the Making of the Modern Egyptian, 103–24. 
720 This formula is identical to that applied for marriage contracts, discussed further below. It was an on-demand 
callable debt. 
721 Even in the absence of contracts, debtors usually were made to register attestations (sing. iqrār) in court 
regarding amounts they owed, such that this testimony could serve as evidence in the event of a default. No 
such record is noted here.  
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amount.”722 The question and response format of this interplay between plaintiff and qāḍī 
brings to mind that of fatwās, and seems to me to be a formulaic trope used to register such 
liabilities in court. 
The preceding two cases point to the greater prominence given by sharia court qāḍīs 
to written evidence versus oral testimony. This is despite the sufficiency, in Islamic law, of 
oral witness testimony for the validation of contractual dealings. While this surely may have 
been due to the court’s increasing bureaucratization and bias towards documentary evidence, 
Meshal also posits that “overwhelmingly, it was women, former slaves, and members of 
religious minorities who asked the court for ḥujjas.”723 Certainly, this surely would have 
strengthened the case for disenfranchised members of society, and non-elites. However, my 
review of credit transactions from the registers of Damascus and Jerusalem indicates that 
elite men also relied heavily on the formal registration of their loans and the obtaining of 
ḥujjas. Most prominently perhaps were the plethora of loans issued by qāḍīs, janissaries, 
governors and other employees of the state to a variety of urban and rural debtors, ranging 
from group loans to religious and professional communities, to loans to tenant farmers on 
timār lands. While I agree with Meshal’s contention, I would tend to think that the mobility 
of Ottoman officers and bureaucrats would have necessitated the registration of debts in 
courts, this being an imperative for defending against possible future litigation in their 
absence. Local Syrian Arab elites may have had less need for court ḥujaj, but it is hard to tell.  
 
                                                     
722 Shawwāl 991/November 1583. Apparently no relation to other Fatima bt. Muhammad referred to above. D-
1-32-3 
723 Meshal, Sharia and the Making of the Modern Egyptian, 134. 
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6.4 The Role of Credit in Marriage and Divorce 
The bifurcation of the dotal gift (ṣadāq) under Islamic law, into an advanced portion 
and a deferred portion, gifted by the husband, inherently incorporates a debt component into 
the institution of marriage; moreover, the common medieval practice of husbands providing 
in-kind and cash payments for the annual maintenance of their wives, to meet their clothing, 
food, bathing and other needs, placed a further financial duty on husbands, one that 
automatically converted into debt when marriages came to an end as a result of divorce or a 
husband’s death. Rapoport’s comprehensive study of marriage and divorce in the Mamluk 
era examines a wealth of documentary, legal, and narrative sources to reveal how, from the 
mid-fourteenth century onwards, marriages in Egypt and Syria underwent unprecedented 
monetization.724 Indeed, as Rapoport shows, over years of marriage, it was the yearly 
maintenance installment that mushroomed to overtake the deferred portion of the ṣadāq as 
the largest financial obligation to wives, and such obligations were rarely, if ever, settled on 
time, it being the customary practice for these to exist as ongoing debts during marriage.725 
The size of such marriage debts could be very large. Al-Sakhāwī reported, for instance, that 
Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī’s will included a debt attestation of “300 gold dinars for undelivered 
clothing, a sum which could have allowed her (his wife) to buy a large house in the center of 
Cairo.”726  
Sixteenth century sijill records from Jerusalem and Damascus appear to reflect a 
continuation of such customs and the use of courts as sites where women recorded marriage 
                                                     
724 Rapoport, Marriage, Money and Divorce in Medieval Islamic Society, 51–68. 
725 Rapoport, Marriage, Money and Divorce in Medieval Islamic Society, 55, 63. 
726 Rapoport, Marriage, Money and Divorce in Medieval Islamic Society, 62; al-Sakhāwī, Muḥammad b. ‘Abd 
al-Raḥmān and Ibrāhīm Bājis, ‘Abd al-Mājid, Al-Jawāhir Wa’l-Durar Fī Tarjamat Shaykh Al-Islām Ibn Ḥajar 
(Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 1999), 1203. 
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debts over the course of marriages, as well as after their dissolution, as a result of divorce or 
the death of husbands. In this regard, women’s recording of marriage debts appears little 
differentiated in function from the previously discussed recording of commercial debts in 
court. The relationship between a husband’s repudiation of wives and their marriage 
indebtedness, is not something easily captured in the sijill record, due to the methodological 
constraints previously mentioned with this source type. Biographical dictionaries and unique 
narrative sources, like the diary of Ibn Ṭawq, however help to fill gaps. While fundamentalist 
jurists like Ibn Taymīya and his disciple Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīya preferred a hardline 
approach towards barring women from receiving cash allowances, and preventing loose 
interpretations of how a deferred portion of the ṣadāq was to be paid, prevailing juristic 
attitudes and customs seem to indicate a reasonable acceptance of these practices in Mamluk 
courts.727 Moreover, the attitude of reactionary jurists, Ibn al-Ḥājj included, should not lead 
us to jump to conclude that marriage, for men, was simply an irreconcilable debt trap. 
Examples from fatwās, polemical tracts, and biographical dictionaries tend to present one 
dimensional exposes of women preying on their husbands, who were forced to sell their 
assets to service their marriage debts and the like. This is, however, in contrast to Rapoport’s 
finding that most divorces were consensual separations (khul‘), which were mostly 
negotiated. I agree with Rapoport, that “the formalities of divorce deeds concealed a complex 
interplay of various “legal and extralegal” pressures,” and moreover, assert that sijills and 
documentary evidence alone cannot reveal the workings of divorce arrangements.728 This is 
even more so when one considers that most divorces were consensual (khul‘ ).729  
                                                     
727 Rapoport, Marriage, Money and Divorce in Medieval Islamic Society, 60–61. 
728 Rapoport, Marriage, Money and Divorce in Medieval Islamic Society, 69. 
729 Rapoport, Marriage, Money and Divorce in Medieval Islamic Society, 95. 
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Let’s take the case of Shahāb al-Dīn al-Raqqāwī who promised to issue a divorce his 
wife, ‘Ā’isha bt. Ibn al-Ḥūrānī, a case of infidelity and settlement reported on by Rapoport. 
After returning from a trip to Cairo, this husband, in 887/1482, is recorded by Ibn Ṭawq as 
promising his wife, on pain of divorce, that he had not had sexual relations with anyone 
except her and the female slave (jāriyā) they had at home since the start of their marriage.730 
Two years later, Ibn Ṭawq is again witness to this couple. Rapoport relates that in the second 
instance, “before going on another trip, al-Raqqāwī pledged again that were he to marry 
another wife or take a concubine, his wife was free to divorce him, provided that she was 
ready to give up the remainder of her marriage gift.”731 My own reading of Ibn Ṭawq’s entry 
differs in that I did not locate a reference to the wife offering to give up her marriage gift in 
exchange for a divorce. This second attestation rather appears to be a settlement of dues 
involving ‘Ā’isha bt. Ibn al-Ḥūrānī marriage gift, as well as her own debts to her husband.  
Ibn Ṭawq is witness to the husband’s attestation that the “only dues” owed to him by 
his wife is an existing debt of 130 ashrafī dinars. In turn, the wife attested that the “only 
dues” owed to her by her husband was the unpaid deferred portion of her marriage gift, the 
ṣadāq (amount not listed). At this attestation, the husband paid his wife one dinar of this 
deferred liability as well as undertook an oath that he had “thrice divorced” his of other wives 
and has no wives other than ‘Ā’isha. Further, on pain of repudiation (a single divorce), he 
undertook not take on any other wives or slave-girls in future. Lastly, Ibn Ṭawq witnessed 
the husband’s gifting of most of his household belongings to his wife, including a “china-
set.”732 The debt attestations of this pair compel one to see this case in  a different light, as a 
                                                     
730 Rapoport, Marriage, Money and Divorce in Medieval Islamic Society, 75; Ibn Ṭawq, Taʻlīq, 198. 
731 Rapoport, Marriage, Money and Divorce in Medieval Islamic Society, 75; Ibn Ṭawq, Taʻlīq, 402. 
732 Ibn Ṭawq, Taʻlīq, 402. 
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wife making her husband pay, literally, for his promiscuity. The husband’s giving up of 
rights to future sexual partners provides a sordid view into how negotiated debts factored into 
household life and could be used as a measure of social control. Notably, in contrast to most 
cases covered in the literature, it is the wife, rather than the husband, who owes most of the 
debt. While the remainder of her marriage gift is unknown, she owes a very substantial debt 
to her husband. Regardless, though, it is likely that such khul‘  negotiations were most 
effective, in serving as a tool for partners to arrive at mutually beneficial remedies outside of 
courts.  
Should ‘Ā’isha and her husband have opted to settle their dispute in court, they would 
have had to accept the uncertainty of a qāḍī’s ruling and interpretation, which may have been 
moot on deciding the payment of deferred ṣadāq during the course of marriage. By the mid-
fourteenth century, marriage contracts were typically defined by treating the dowry’s 
deferred portion as a debt obligation (‘alā hūkm al-ḥulūl) payable on demand.733 While 
popular accounts of jailed husbands abound, as a result of this customary practice, one should 
not be led to believe that it was applied without differing interpretations, even among qāḍīs 
of the same legal school, madhhab. A case from the responsa collection of the Egyptian 
Ḥanafī jurist Ibn Quṭlūbughā reflects the strength of patriarchal resistance against this 
measure, and although Ibn Quṭlūbughā’s opinion is in support of the customary norms of 
paying out the deferred ṣadāq in installments over the course of marriage, or as decided by 
                                                     
733 The successive marriages of the slave woman Zummurud all relied on sadaq based on hūkm al-ḥulūl. 
Rapoport, Marriage, Money and Divorce in Medieval Islamic Society, 65; Rapoport observed that, “This new 
feature (the on-demand marriage debts) attracted the attention of Najm al-Dīn al-Ṭarsūsī (d. 758/1357), the 
chief qadi of the city, who devoted a treatise to the interpretation of the clause. According to his view, a 
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husband to jail if he refuses to pay up.” Rapoport, Yossef, “Women and Gender in Mamluk Society: An 
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married partners, his opinion shows how acerbic this practice was to some Ḥanafī jurists, of 
his own madhhab, even though the Ḥanafī jurists were far more at ease with this practice 
than the Ṣhāf‘ī, and certainly Ḥanbalī madhhabs.734  
In his fatwā, Ibn Quṭlūbughā is told about a wife who married a man for a ṣadāq of 
100 dinars, of which forty was paid in advance (mūqaddam) and the remainder (sixty dinars) 
was deferred (mū’akhkhar), and payable at will (‘alā hūkm al-ḥulūl). After entering into 
marriage, the wife refused her husband (sexual) access and raised a case against her husband 
demanding the immediate payment of her deferred ṣadāq. The Ḥanafī qāḍī denied her 
request, and relied on the saying of Najm al-Dīn al-Zāhidī (d. 658/1260?) contending that 
“at-will” sadaq arrangements had come to be customarily understood as delayed until divorce 
or the husband’s death (“Ṣār ta’khīr al-ṣadāq ila’l-mawt wa-l-ṭalāq lizūman ‘ādah wa 
sharī‘a ma‘rūfah”).735 Requested to opine on the legal validity of this view, Ibn Qūtlūbughā 
issued a staunch rejection. He argued that resorting to claims about what comprises 
customary practice and what does not is beside the point. Rather, Ibn Quṭlūbughā contends 
that marriage contracts are similar to commercial rental contracts, where a given good or 
service is procured for a fixed amount, that are to be consumed over an amount of time. He 
further argued explicitly for a literalist reading. He says: “what is understood by 
‘immediately’/ḥālan, (i.e., hāl, hulūl), even if one were to apply our customary 
understanding, is that it means ‘now’/al’ān(!)” Hence, for him, the wife’s demand for being 
repaid according to hūkm al-ḥulūl must be understood as an immediate obligation and has 
                                                     
734 This work is in manuscript of collected treatises and fatawa by Ibn Qutlubugha, owned by Leiden University. 
Another copy of this majmu, although with substantial differences, is found at Princeton University and has 
been recently published. See: al-Qāsim ibn ʻAbd Allāh Ibn Quṭlūbughā, “Rasāʼil Al-ʻallāmah Qāsim Ibn 
Quṭlūbughā” (Leiden, n.d.), folio 135, Or. 789, Leiden University Library; Ibn Quṭlūbughā, Majmūʻat Rasāʼil 
Al-ʻallāmah Qāsim Ibn Quṭlūbughā. 
735 Ibn Quṭlūbughā, Rasāʼil Ibn Quṭlūbughā, 135f. 
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nothing to do even with the issue of postponement or deferment. While Ibn Quṭlūbughā’s 
opinion accords to the marriage customs of the day, his substantiation rather relies on the 
literal terms of the contract rather than reflecting on the customary norms that conditioned its 
practice.    
A century on, in the late sixteenth century, sijills reveal that the prevailing marriage 
contracts were based on at-will (‘alā hūkm al-ḥulūl) payment of the deferred ṣadāq.736 The 
practice of husbands accruing debts related to clothing, bathing, food and other expenses are 
also prevalent. For instance, in Ramaḍān 992/September 1584, a woman named Fatima bt. 
Muhammad al-Khayḍarī sued her husband for a debt of twenty-five dinars in Damascus, 
equivalent to ten years’ worth of accrued payments he was obligated to make for clothing her 
(kiswatīhā ‘alayhī) during this time. She also demanded her half of three brown cows they 
jointly owned, and the return of all her belongings and personal items that she had brought 
into their marriage, among them cups, plates, rugs, and some curtains. Of note here is that 
Fatima pursued her case while being married, and not in person, but rather through her agent, 
the son of a well-known senior military officer (jāwīsh).737 
Baldwin stresses that women seeking to obtain what he terms judicial divorce, that is 
a divorce enacted by a qāḍī in the event of a husband’s impotence or abandonment, could be 
obtained fairly easily outside of Egyptian Ḥanafī courts, as it had been in the Mamluk period. 
In Egypt throughout the sixteenth century, Cairo’s court records suggest that women had 
recourse to courts of other madhhabs, the Mālikī and Ḥanbalī in particular, for this purpose, 
and doing so did not prejudice the recognition of these women’s’ divorces by the Ḥanafī 
                                                     
736 As token examples , see several from Damascus D- 1-7 and D- 1-19. 
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courts, or the Bāb al-‘Ālī – although a short treatise by Ibn Nujaym explicitly argues for 
women’s protection in this regard, implying that it was not the Ottoman state’s preference to 
do so (the state’s Ḥanafism was generally opposed to the ease with which women could 
obtain such divorces).738  
While the sixteenth century sijill records from both Jerusalem and Damascus are 
those of the Ḥanafī chief qāḍī’s court and his deputy (the sessions of other madhhab qāḍīs are 
exceedingly rare in abound. For Jerusalem, one routinely comes across cases where qāḍīs 
order arbitrary detention or temporary imprisonment (i‘tiqāl) for husbands who have not met 
their financial duties to provide for clothing, housing, or have missed installment payments 
of their deferred dotal gift. As previously noted, although such practices were criticized and 
debated by Mamluk polemicists, such as Ibn al-Ḥājj, they were the order of the day in late-
Mamluk Cairo, Mamluk qāḍīs in the fifteenth century routinely sided with women against 
their husbands, when the latter were found to be debtors. In Ottoman Jerusalem a virtually 
identical pattern emerges indicating a strong continuity in this culture and the judicial 
practices attached to it. Some examples from sijill 46 (972/1564-5) suffice here to illustrate 
this point: In 3 Ramaḍān 972/ 4 April 1565, the chief qāḍī of Jerusalem jailed al-Zaynī ‘Abd 
al-Qādir Abī al-Sifa after reviewing a case brought against him by his wife, Um al-Ḥamd bt. 
Khalīl Minṭāsh. ‘Abd al-Qādir admitted that he had overdue kiswa payments to his wife.739 
The very next day, Um al-Ḥamd arranged to drop the charges against him, after he agreed to 
pay his dues following a night in jail, and this amicable settlement (taṣāduq) was recorded in 
                                                     
738 Baldwin, Islamic Law and Empire in Ottoman Cairo, 85–88. 
739 J-46-228-3. For another case from the same month, see that of ‘Uthmān al-Sharīf b. ‘Alī who is jailed by his 
wife for not paying her dowry (mahr). J-46-240-1. 
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court by the same qāḍī.740  Wives also routinely sought to preempt such actions by 
incorporating a clause in their marriage contract, or an oath undertaken during marriage, their 
marriage would be automatically repudiated in of a default in maintenance or other agreed 
payments by the husband. The Jerusalem sijill’s show that when such instances occurred, 
husbands had to register their settlement of debts to their wives in court before returning their 
wives to the marriage.741  
 Perhaps one of the most contentious practices concerning debt and marriage was the 
forced divorce oath, that had come to prominence in the early fourteenth century and was 
famously debated between Ibn Taymīya and Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī.742 As the following cases 
demonstrate, this practice was still widely practiced in early Ottoman Jerusalem. This 
practice arose out of the customary practice by Mamluk amīrs to force subordinate Mamluk 
officers to undertake loyalty oaths that would set-off the latter’s divorce from their wives if 
broken, however it expanded to become a widely adopted practice by and between elites of 
different status. In Jerusalem, one can observe political elites enforcing similar oaths on 
debtors, referred to as ta‘līq al-zawāj, under their supervision. This was a practice that 
highlighted the high inequities between the power of elites and non-elites and was used on 
groups, as well as in individual cases. One can look, for instance, at the case of four peasants 
from the village of Irṭās (a village belonging to the Hebron waqf) who took oaths promising 
to repudiate their wives if they failed to pay their joint tax-debt of 50 sulṭānī to the Hebron 
waqf’s administrator within one month’s time.743 Such oaths could also be abused by qāḍīs. 
                                                     
740 J-46-230-1. For other cases of a husband’s imprisonment for not paying for his wife’s clothing payments, 
kiswa, see J-46-36-7 and J-46-137-3.  
741 J-46-11-1 
742 Rapoport, Marriage, Money and Divorce in Medieval Islamic Society, 91–103. 
743 J-46-36-2 
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In what was surely a humiliating act, the Ḥanbalī deputy qāḍī of Jerusalem took a divorce-
oath in Rabī I/October 1564 in which he undertook to repay the (small) sum of 7 sulṭānī in 
seven monthly installments to the nāẓir of the Ḥaramayn waqf, on pain of divorce if he 
defaulted. In another case from Rabī II 972/November 1564, Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Fākhūrī gave a 
similar oath to the Ḥanafī deputy qāḍī of Jerusalem, Maḥmūd al-Dayrī, who al-Fākhūrī had 
borrowed 7 sulṭānī and 3 para from.744 In a twist of fate, twenty three years later, on 26 
Muḥarram 966/27 December 1587, al-Fākhūrī’s son, Shams al-Dīn who would issue a loan 
of 20 sulṭānī (in paras) with a ta‘līq promise to a certain Abdulla b. Ali al-Ramlī. The 
mu‘āmala was in form of a sale of a yellow cloth, and this debtor paid 1 sultānī with 19 
deferred in installments of 2 para per day. The sijill records that al-Ramlī, the debtor, 
“promised him to pay the amount and if he were to miss a payment for any given month, he 
hereby undertakes to irrevocably divorce his wife (“wa ‘alaq al-mushtarī al-madhkūr ṭalāq 
zawjatahū … ‘ala inahū lā yaksur qisṭ”).745 Such ta‘līq registrations, though, could be taken 
to absurd ends such as the case of wife who took her husband to court to forcibly cause a 
divorce (he had taken an oath to divorce his wife if he ever bought her sweets again) because 
he had brought home qaṭā’if (pastries) and kishk (cheese curd) one day. The husband argued 
to the qāḍī that this food was intended for his daughter, and not his wife, and had obtained a 
fatwā beforehand from the muftī of Jerusalem to do so. The qāḍī dismissed the case.746  
 Ta‘līq cut across social status and class; as well, this custom relied on inter-madhhab 
facilitation and interdependence. A ta‘līq case involving the famous jurist Najm al-Dīn al-
                                                     
744 J-46-60-3. The Ḥanafī deputy-judge in this case foresaw his debtor’s default because he filed an injunction 
(ilzām) against the debtor three months later to settle his debt. J-46-84-8. For another case of ta‘līq, unrelated to 
the prior two cases, but from the same sijil, see J-46-199-1.   
745 J-67-76-1 
746 J-67-95-3 
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Ghazzī (d. 1651) highlights this importance, found in Ibn Ayyūb’s diary-cum-biographical 
dictionary, which I reproduce here. This event occurred some five years after Badr al-Dīn al-
Ghazzī’s death, father of Najm al-Dīn, and a good friend of Ibn Ayyub. At this juncture, 
Najm al-Dīn would have been around twenty and Ibn Ayyūb, who was a deputy Shāfi‘ī qāḍī 
in Damascus, would have been around sixty years old: 
“On Thursday, the third (day) of the month (Muḥarram 999/October 
1590), I was visited at my home by our Shaykh, Shaykh al-Islām Najm al-
Dīn Muḥammad b. al-Shaykh Badr al-Dīn al-Ghazzī al-Shāfi‘ī who was 
accompanied by a man from the peasantry. He (al-Ghazzī) told me he had 
repudiated his wife at the hand of the Ḥanbalī qāḍī and it was his intention to 
return to her. She [subsequently] gave him her permission to reconcile, and 
this was witnessed by two men. So, I (Ibn Ayyūb) returned her to him. I 
issued a ruling that removed the contingency upon which his divorce was 
conditioned and nullified it altogether (hakamtu lahū bi‘adam ‘awd al-ṣifa 
al-mu‘allaq ṭalāq al-zawja ‘alayhā wa’inḥilāliha min aṣlihā). And I voided 
all oaths the husband undertook before and after the reconcilable separation 
(al-baynūna) occured, irrespective of whether he acted upon these oaths or 
not, as it [the custom] is in our madhhab.”747     
Ibn Ayyūb’s above entry does not specify details concerning the divorce, whether it 
was due to an unpaid marriage debt, an oath that al-Ghazzī had made to his wife, or other 
cause. However, beyond being consensual, it is implied that the divorce was triggered by al-
Ghazzī and brought by his wife to the Ḥanbalī deputy qāḍī.  
                                                     
747 Ibn Ayyūb, Nuzhat, 154–55. 
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Historians of the Mamluk and Ottoman eras have widely acknowledged women's 
administration of waqfs, and in particular, their use of waqfs as vehicles for investment and 
credit.748 Beyond the use of waqfs to provide a more equitable distribution of inheritance to 
their daughters, waqf founders were keenly aware of the many methods available for trading 
and monetizing waqf assets.749 Moreover, they were aware changes in distribution and 
management of waqf properties were likely to happen decades down the line, and perhaps it 
is because of this that founders generally treated their waqfs as going-concerns, generally 
retaining control of their own endowments during their lifetimes, as the case of Fāṭima Bin 
Qamar al-Dīn above indicates. As Carl Petry’s study suggests, late Mamluk women’s 
management of patrimonial waqfs demonstrate how female nāẓirs could be undermined by 
other family members seeking to sabotage their control over family assets. Conversely, 
female nāẓirs deployed marriage strategies to enmesh their interests with influential men who 
could safeguard their control over waqf assets. In so doing, such marriage alliances also 
provided upward social mobility for Mamluks who married the widows of Mamluk amīrs 
and rulers, and expanding their influence through the management and redistribution of their 
waqf property interests, this being produced somewhat loosely in the name of maintaining 
the continuity of certain Mamluk military household lines.  
The use of family waqfs as instruments of indebtedness, in association with marriage 
and family-alliances, were important tools for thwarting the encroachment of male relatives, 
                                                     
748 Carl F. Petry, “Class Solidarity versus Gender Gain : Women as Custodians of Property in Later Medieval 
Egypt”; Carl F. Petry, “The Estate of Al-Khuwand Fatima Al-Khassbakiyya: Royal Spouse, Autonomous 
Investor,” in The Mamluks in Egyptian and Syrian Politics and Society, vol. 51, Medieval Mediterranean 
(Leiden ; Boston, MA: BRILL, 2004); Jennings, “Women in Early 17th Century Ottoman Judicial Records - the 
Sharia Court of Anatolian Kayseri.” 
749 Muḥammad Muḥammad Amīn, Awqāf wa-al-ḥayāh al-ijtimāʻīyah fī Miṣr, 648-923 A.H./1250-1517 A.D. : 
dirāsah tārīkhīyah wathāʼiqīyah (Cairo: Dār al-Nahḍah al-ʻArabīayh, 1980), 341–60. 
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or even the state’s reach, in controlling assets. Women had to rely on alliances with men 
from inside and outside the family in order to do this. Between the Mamluk and early 
Ottoman periods, women’s relationship to waqfs continued to operate on a similar basis, 
albeit, the Ottoman sixteenth century offered more efficient and predictable legal recourse, 
with a secure judiciary that provided much wider powers to local qāḍīs. Significantly, 
women’s reliance on men does not imply a position of weakness, elite women adeptly used 
institutions and social-legal norms to meet their objectives. To borrow Leslie Peirce's phrase, 
women “maximized their control of property within an environment of constraints and 
opportunities.”750 Petry’s work on the master waqfs of Qāytbāy and al-Ghūrī reveals that 
waqf revenues far exceeded the expenses required by their charitable services. Although the 
subjects of his studies were concerned with the highest military elites of society, a similar 
dynamic was at play on a much smaller level for non-Mamluk elites. Excess waqf income 
(lit. fāyiḍ) was distributed to beneficiaries or reinvested to purchase more waqf assets. Since 
most waqf revenues came from agricultural revenues, waqfs regularly issued credit to 
farmers, and the process of monetizing agricultural production could itself often lead to the 
use of short and medium-term debt, as shown with the accumulation of peasant debts in 
Jerusalem’s al-Ṭāzīya waqf in chapter four. Expenses and amounts drawn by beneficiaries 
also were registered as debts and could lead to waqf insolvency. While mostly temporary, 
these situations could lead to years of overdue salaries and stipends for teachers and students 
of schools, soup kitchens, and other endowed institutions that relied on benefaction. Ibn 
Ṭawq reports on a number of cases where this occurred.  
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Women’s manipulation of waqf debts is illustrated in the story of Sāra bt. Shahāb al-
Dīn Ibn al-Muzalliq, the daughter of a Damascene trading magnate, who drew on her father’s 
future waqf revenues to use as dowry in order to enter into a marriage with Ibn Ṭawq’s 
shaykh, and patron, the chief qāḍī of the Damascus Shāfi‘ī court, Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Qāḍī 
‘Ajlūn. Ibn Qāḍī ‘Ajlūn used this loan from to serve as part of his marriage gift to Sāra in 
Rajab 903/February 1498. This marriage alliance came exactly one year after the murder of 
her husband Shams al-Dīn Mūḥammad b. Ḥasan Ibn al-Muzalliq in a Mamluk conspiracy 
that was involved in al-Ghūri’s struggle to become sulṭān.751 Their marriage was short-lived, 
lasting only two weeks, and appears to have been done out of political expediency. Ibn Ṭawq 
reports that Sāra’s marriage ṣadāq was 200 dinars, and only a quarter was paid by Ibn Qāḍī 
‘Ajlūn, with the remainder being a combination of a loan provided by Sāra (from her father’s 
waqf) and the rest as deferred debt portion of her ṣadāq.752 The ṣadāq was not paid to her at 
the time of the marriage contract itself, but two days later, at her home. It was Ibn Ṭawq 
himself who personally delivered the Shaikh’s ṣadāq with two male witnesses. One of the 
witnesses was the accountant of Sāra’s father’s waqf, and she instructed her accountant to 
draw on a debt from the waqf’s revenues (maḥṣūl) or excess income (fāyiḍ) of her father’s 
waqf and gift it to Ibn Qāḍī ‘Ajlūn, thereby making it legally his.753 We do not have a 
reconciliation of Ibn Qāḍī ‘Ajlūn’s debt repayment to Sāra following their divorce two weeks 
later, however, it is certainly likely to have taken place.754 Sāra divorced Ibn Qāḍī ‘Ajlūn 
                                                     
751 al-Ghazzī, Kawākib, vol. 1, 37. Ibn Ṭawq, Taʻlīq, 1591. 
752 Ibn Ṭawq, Ta‘līq, 1586. 
753 Ibn Ṭawq, Taʻlīq, vols. 4, 1586   “Adhanat li-Shihab al-Din an yaqbiḍa min muḥtaṣal waqf wālidiha wa 
fayidīhū… wa mallīkatahā li-mawlānā al-Shaikh wa adhanat fi qabḍihā”, 1589. 
754 Or, in Judith Tucker’s words, “A woman who was no longer a virgin could only assent to a marriage by 
clearly voicing her agreement in terms that brooked no other interpretation.”; Judith E Tucker, Women, Family, 
and Gender in Islamic Law (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 42. 
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after implicating him of engaging in immoral acts (ta‘n) and colluding with Mamluk’s to 
bring about her husband’s death.755 
Ibn Ṭawq’s entries from thirteen years prior give some context to Sāra’s association 
to this waqf, and possibly to Ibn Qāḍī ‘Ajlūn himself, for he now occupied the chief qāḍī 
position that her husband had once held a decade prior to his death. Ibn Ṭawq’s good friend 
al-Shaikh Zayn al-Din Khiḍr al-Ḥisbānī purchased the rights to the mūtakallim position (or 
tax farm) of the Ibn Muzalliq waqf and served as its manager for at least five years, during 
885- 890/1480-1485.756 As mūtakallim, Khiḍr was in charge of administering the waqf’s 
financial accounts, collecting revenues, and paying salaries to the teachers of the waqf’s 
zāwiya. In Rajab 887/August 1482, Khiḍr paid 140 dirhams in overdue stipends to students 
of the waqf’s zāwiya which he performed at its premises.757 Six months later, Shaikh Abu al-
Faḍl al-Qudsī, the head of the Ibn al-Muzalliq zāwiya, was a witness, along with Ibn Ṭawq, 
to Khiḍr’s payment of 2,000 dirhams to Sāra bt. Ibn al-Muzalliq’s maid-servant (jāriya) as 
payment towards the share of Sāra’s deceased son in the Ibn al-Muzalliq waqf revenues.  
Things took a sour turn for Khiḍr in Muharram 890/January 1485, when he reached 
out to Ibn Ṭawq in a distressed state. Khiḍr had been jailed by Shams al-Din Mūḥammad al-
Muzalliq (Sāra’s husband and chief qāḍī at the time) for debts that he was reported to have 
owed Sāra. Khiḍr had apparently purchased the mutakallim position over the Ibn al-Muzalliq 
waqf for a period of three years at a consideration of 10,000 dirhams per year, payable to 
Sāra directly. This arrangement was concluded with Sāra’s husband on her behalf, and it 
                                                     
755 Boaz Shoshan, On the Marital Regime in Damascus, 1480-1500 CE, ASK working Paper 15, Annemarie 
Schimmel Kolleg, Bonn, 2014, 4. [Accessed online: https://www.mamluk.uni-bonn.de/publications/working-
paper/wp-15-shoshan.pdf]  
756 Ibn Ṭawq, Ta‘līq, 660. 
757 Ibn Ṭawq, Ta‘līq, 178. 
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seems that the Ibn al-Muzalliq family had claimed that Khiḍr misappropriated funds, and had 
not kept up with the agreed lease payments.758 Ibn Ṭawq recounted Khiḍr’s plea, when the 
latter said to the former “by hook or by crook obtain a (taḥayal-lī) loan for me from the 
orphaned heirs of Ibn Huṣn’s estate, at least for two or three days, even if on interest!”759 
Khiḍr had been in jail for about four days at that point, and it would take almost a week for 
him to be allowed to go and obtain the necessary amount to repay Ibn al-Muzalliq. Ibn Ṭawq, 
in the following week, recorded spending an entire day working over a reconciliation of the 
Ibn al-Muzalliq waqf accounts on Khiḍr’s behalf. In addition to being a notary and witness, 
Ibn Ṭawq was also an accountant. With the help of Ibn Ṭawq, Khiḍr was able to submit the 
complete accounts for the Ibn al-Muzalliq waqf for the period 885-886/1480-1481760, and 
about two weeks on, Khiḍr obtained a sizable loan of 4,000 dirhams (about 80 dinars) from 
Ibn Ṭawq’s shaykh (Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Qaḍī ‘Ajlūn) and an unspecified woman. Khiḍr likely 
applied this loan to settle his debts with the Sāra Ibn al-Muzalliq, although there is no explicit 
record of that in Ibn Ṭawq’s diary. 
Several observations are noteworthy. First, over a period of at least thirteen years, but 
perhaps longer, Sāra had access and, it seems, control over her father’s waqf. This is in spite 
of there being no explicit reference to her being the waqf’s nāẓir. She also controlled the 
income attributed to her deceased son’s share in the waqf. She borrowed from the waqf to 
finance a marriage. And she was able to ensure administrative oversight of its finances, 
through her husband, by threatening its mūtakallim, Khiḍr, with imprisonment – which she 
carried out on at least one occasion. In exercising such measures of control, Sāra required the 
                                                     
758 Ibn Ṭawq, Ta‘līq, 437. Ibn Ṭawq recalls that Khiḍr was asked by Ibn al-Muzalliq: “Where is the thirty 
thousand dirhams? Go do the accounts properly (لاصفو لاصا باسحلا لمعا).” 
759 Ibn Ṭawq, Ta‘līq, 437 
760 Ibn Ṭawq, Ta‘līq, 438 
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use of male relatives and employees. Whether it was a husband pressing charges or an 
accountant recording debts in the waqf ledgers on her behalf. These actions should be viewed 
as male resources serving implicit matriarchal power. However, her distressed marriage to 
Ibn Qaḍī ‘Ajlūn also  suggests that maintaining her control of the family waqf needed a 
powerful male intercessor who could thwart the attempts of powerful political figures and 
male relatives from sinking their teeth in the waqf.761  
The tendency of elite women’s waqf management to serve the interests of 
maintaining patriarchial household structures was well established. Alif, the daughter of a 
Damascene qāḍī, Sāliḥ b. ‘Umar al-Bulqīnī, endowed two zāwiyas in Damascus during her 
lifetime. After four marriages, one of which was to the Caliph al-Mustanjid bi’l-lāh, to whom 
she bore a child, Alif married her paternal cousin Badr al-Din after the death of his wife, who 
herself was Alif’s sister. After this last husband had died, Alif had accumulated a large 
amount of family wealth, and it is at this point, as al-Sakhāwī informs us, that she began to 
increase her gift giving and charitable contributions (fatazāyad iqbālūha ‘ala al khairāt). Alif 
patronized many ḥadīth recitation gatherings by famous scholars, she expanded the madrasa 
endowed by her father to teach the Qur’ān to widows, she gave to orphans, and, notably, she 
lent vast sums of money to her brother’s son, Badr al-Dīn, to invest in the purchase of 
political and administrative posts previously held by her father. Sakhāwī saw no 
contradiction in jointly classifying Alif’s loans to her nephew and her various charitable 
giving as good deeds. By promoting the purchase of offices in her branch of the al-Bulqīnī 
family, Alif, was perpetuating her household’s political-religious power and thus nobly 
                                                     
761 In narrating her marriage to his shaikh, Ibn Tawq clearly relays the disdain and disapproval of her Sara’s 
cousin, a certain Shams al-Din to her marriage to Ibn Qadi Ajlun. When he was approached to act as the male 
representative of Sara in officiating her marriage, he refused and cursed them both. A nephew of Sara’s 
interceded to serve this role. My view is drawn from this, as an educated guess.  
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sustaining Damascus’ religious economy.762 Indeed, indebtedness for the purchase of political 
offices was rather a norm. Al-Sakhāwī’s good friend and notable Jerusalemite Ḥanafī ‘ālim 
Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad al-Dayrī (d. 876/1471), who studied in Cairo in the early fifteenth 
century and held numerous posts, had to let go of his kātib al-sirr post, only fifteen days into 
his tenure in that position, due to the numerous debts he had collected to pay for this and 
various other offices he held.763      
The transition from Mamluk to Ottoman rule, as concerns the establishment and 
management of waqfs in Syria, does not seem to have been very disruptive, at least.764 While 
cases of waqf property confiscation and misappropriation were recorded in the first three 
years of Ottoman rule, this seems more likely due to the corruption and careless 
administration of the first Ottoman Defterdār in Damascus, Nūḥ Çelebi, than to any 
systematic state plan for appropriating waqfs.765   
The deeds of cash-waqfs founded or managed by women elites in Jerusalem have 
similar constraints as men’s and voice the same fears about the likelihood of future abuses by 
corrupt administrators, or the negligent issuance of loans to bad debtors. The pool of cash-
waqfs I have reviewed indicates that waqfs endowed by women were typically smaller than 
                                                     
762 Al-Sakhāwī, al-daw al-lām‘i, entry no. 39, vol. 12, 7-8.  The Bulqīnī family had strong ties with the house of 
the Mamluk era caliphs. The above Badr al-Din’s granddaughter entered into two marriages, first to her first 
cousin, also a Bulqīnī, and then to a caliph. Idem., entry no. 128. Other cases of interfamily marriages by 
women of this family can be seen in entries 180 and 221 from Sakhāwī’s work.  
763 Al-Sakhāwī, al-daw al-lām‘i, Vol. 1, 150. This person is of the same al-Dayrī family that inherited the 
administration of the Ṭāzīya waqf discussed in chapter four.  For similar cases: Idem, vol. 5 – 97, 167;     
764 Winter has reviewed several notable awqāf established by former Mamluk elites in the immediate aftermath 
of the Ottoman conquest, in the years 927/1520, 932/1525, 936/1529, 946/1539, and as late as 947/1540. He 
attributes this pattern to the Ottoman general disregard for the smaller potential, and lesser threat, of Mamluk 
reprisals in Damascus, than Cairo, the Mamluk stronghold. The legal and formulaic structure of the early 
Ottoman era waqf deeds in Syria correspond to those of the late Mamluk period. Michael Winter, “Mamluks 
and Their Households in Late Mamluk Damascus: A Waqf Study,” in The Mamluks in Egyptian and Syrian 
Politics and Society, ed. Michael Winter and Amalia Levanoni, vol. 51 (Leiden; Boston, MA, 2004), 312. 
765 Michael Winter, 300. 
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those of men. I am not sure if this is due to women’s smaller inheritances or was a deliberate 
choice to incept smaller cash-waqfs. The objects of endowment of these waqfs are, however, 
the same between men and women (e.g., endowing recitation of the Quran, feeding and 
housing the poor, etc.).  While the larger more well-known cash-waqfs in the city were 
established by Ottoman women elites (such as the Baymāna Khātūn waqf discussed in 
chapter three and the Balqīs Khātūn waqf discussed below), cash-waqfs were also managed 
by elite Jerusalemite women from well-known ‘ulamā’ families, such as the 150 sulṭānī cash-
waqf that was established by Mūsā al-Dayrī, the imam of the Dome of the rock sanctuary, for 
the benefit of his granddaughter Ā’isha, daughter of Mūsā’s predeceased son Jamāl al-Dīn.766 
In 977/1569, almost a decade after this waqf’s founding, Mūsā’s granddaughter Ā’isha 
appeared as the waqf’s nāẓir and renewed a 30 sūlṭānīs loan to Yūsīf b. Ishāq b. Mūghān, a 
wealthy Jewish resident of Jerusalem. She was not present in court, but acted through her 
agent, and likely close relative, Sa‘d al-Dīn Muḥammad Bin Rabī‘.767 This loan was 
guaranteed through the mortgage of a property owned by Mūghān and accrued 6 sūlṭānīs of 
interest (a rate of 20%) per year. The mu‘āmala on this loan recorded the sale of a yellow silk 
robe (qaftān kamḥaz aṣfar) by the waqf to Mūghān and that it was paid and received by 
’Ā’isha’s agent, in good order in accordance to the law (wa tasallamaha minahu al-taslīm al-
shar‘ī).768  
Administrators of women’s awqaf could also abuse their privileges by taking loans 
from awqaf under their control. This was the case of a waqf of a certain Fatima Khatun from 
1540s Jerusalem. The administrator of this waqf took an in-kind loan from the waqf, in the 
                                                     
766 J-53-200-3. For a description of this waqf’s founding deed, see the end of section 3.3.  
767 Another figure from the same family, Jamāl al-Dīn Bīn Rabī‘, was listed as the nāẓir of Mūsā al-Dayrī’s own 
cash-waqf as well as Mūsā’s first cousin; also discussed in chapter three. 
768 Ibid. 
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form of a half-qinṭār of olive oil with a one-year deferred payment. Such a transaction could 
allow this administrator to monetize this commodity and trade in its capital, to the detriment 
of the waqf.769  
 The waqf deed of Balqīs Khātūn (dated Muharram, 1000/ November 1591), an elite 
woman from Cairo, relates that “when she realized that the time to depart from this world 
was approaching and that life was nearing its end,” she delegated her agent, Mustapha Agha 
b. Abdulla, to proceed to Jerusalem and establish her cash-waqf of 170 “Mūrādī” sūlṭānīs 
(the coinage during the reign of Murad III, 1574-1595) towards recitation of the Qur’ān. 
Mustapha Agha b. Abdulla’s agency (wakāla) was enacted in the presence of three other 
Aghas, all retired in Cairo. Balqīs Khātūn’s 170 sūlṭānī endowment was to be managed 
judiciously and its administrator was called upon to be “wary of any hint or association of 
ribā” (wa yattaqī shabhāt al-ribā) when lending out funds. He was to “deal in money at [the 
rate of] ten for eleven and a half (11.5%), no less and no more – in accordance with legal 
artifices” (yū‘āmal fī al māl biḥīla shar‘īyya). The waqf founder also explicit forbade the 
administrator from lending to any sipahi or janissary. This was further to other prohibitions 
on lending to speculators or those “from whom securing payment is difficult” (“wa lā li man 
ya‘sar al-khalāṣ minhū”).770 
 Most telling of the political shifts of its time is the prohibition in Balqīs Khātūn’s 
waqf for lending to sipahīs and janissaries. The power of the sipahi cavalry officers had 
waned to a great degree by the turn of the seventeenth century and was giving rise to a new 
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770 Ghanāyim, Zuhayr, Ashqar, Maḥmūd, and Shannāq, Fārūq, Al-Wathāʼiq Al-Waqfīyah Wa-Al-Idārīyah Al-
ʻāʼidah Lil-Ḥaram Al-Qudsī Al-Sharīf : Sijillāt Maḥkamat Al-Quds Al-Sharʻīyah, vol. 2 (ʻAmmān: al-Lajnah al-
Malakīyah li-Shuʼūn al-Quds, 2006), 106–7. 
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landed elite, with the dying away of the timār system. Likewise, at the time of this waqf’s 
establishment, the janissaries were charged with having instigated a series of revolts in bilād 
al-shām that placed them in conflict with the sipahī corps, as well as the Ottoman sultan, and 
gangs that they formed allowed them to occasionally prey on urban populations. Rivalry 
between these and other groups produced a period of local political instability in Syria 
broadly, and chronicles relating to Jerusalem during this period refer to marauding bands that 
were assisted, or worked in conjunction with, sipahis and janissaries that were quelled by 
other Ottoman forces. In proscribing lending to these groups, Khātūn’s waqf was certainly 
prioritizing the repayment of debts over lending to heavily influential local elites, those who 
may have been more likely to act outside of the law during this period, and therefore, 
threaten the integrity of the waqf’s capital. 
 Khātūn’s waqf also contains a legal formula that reflects the legal anxiety concerning 
the cash-waqf instrument in the last quarter of the sixteenth century. This stratagem, which 
was also applied to ordinary waqfs, was used to cement the legal integrity of cash-waqfs at 
founding, and prevent future devolution by jurists opposed to the cash-waqf. The stratagem 
involved the waqf founder recording an attempt to rescind the waqf upon founding, in effect, 
changing his or her mind. The waqf founding deed then would state that such an attempt was 
repelled by the presiding qāḍī, who reinforced its validity by explicitly authenticating the 
subject waqf’s legal validity. In doing so, future opponents to the subject waqf could not cite 
judicial malfeasance in order to devolve it. The waqf’s founding deed records the following 
in this regard: 
“Following the waqf’s establishment, further to the completion of all 
procedures and the legalization of the waqf by his noble honor, the guide of 
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qāḍīs, Ismā‘īl effendi, the agent (of Balqīs Khātūn) attempted to retract the 
endowed amount from the waqf’s administrator, protesting that the legal 
legitimacy of the cash-waqf (waqf al-naqd) is in dispute (ghayr muḥakam) 
due its illegitimate status in the eyes of the great Imam (Abu Ḥanīfa)(al-
imām al-a‘ẓam).  The qāḍī subsequently took up the matter for 
reconsideration (fa’astakhār Allāh), and ruled in favor of the waqf’s 
legitimacy, legal integrity, in both specific and general terms, along the lines 
of the position of Imam Zafar, may God be pleased with him – while fully 
aware of the on-going conflict among leading jurists (al-a’imma al-ashrāf) 
on this issue.”771      
Thirty-two years later, Balqīs Khātūn’s cash-waqf was still operational and under the 
management of a seemingly judicious administrator. In Dhū al-Ḥijjah 1032/October 1623, 
Balqīs Khātūn’s waqf administrator, Hibat Allāh al-Dayrī issued a modest loan of 4 ghurush 
to a man named Ibrāhīm bin Mūsā, with the collateral of a lien on half a residence/apartment 
(dar) in the Bab al-‘āmūd neighborhood, as well as a personal guarantee from the debtor’s 
brother.772 The following month, on 28 Mūḥarram 1033/21 November 1623, al-Dayrī raised a 
case against Abd al-Ḥaq al-Fityānī, the guardian of four orphaned nieces of al-Fityānī, for 
demanding payment of a ten sūlṭānī debt owed by the children’s father, Muhammad al-Samit 
a year earlier. Upon the request of the waqf’s administrator, the court reviewed the sijill 
record from a year earlier (Mūḥarram 1032/November 1622), in which the debt was 
recorded. On the basis that registered debt,  the presiding qāḍī ruled in favor of the waqf’s 
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administrator’s right to call on a loan guarantee if needed in order to settle the waqfs debt of 
ten sūlṭānī coins, plus an additional one and a half coins (10.5% of interest) that the waqf was 
entitled to.773 The sijill act subsequently shows that Abd al-Ḥaq al-Fityānī was able to 
negotiate additional time for repaying the debt to Balqīs Khātūn’s waqf, as two months later 
we find al-Dayrī’s acknowledgement of receipt of the debt and exoneration (barā’a) of al-
Fityānī in court.774 The size of al-Fityānī’s loan is exceptional, as other records of Al-Dayrī’s 
management of Balqīs Khatūn’s debt portfolio is characterized largely by much smaller 
loans.775 The sijill record reveals that al-Fityānī was a employed as a reciter, qāri’, by this 
waqf, along other members of the same family, indicating an inherited position. The size of 
this loan, the relationships involved, and the interest rate of 10.5% (lower than the 20% 
charged on the other loans), suggest that this loan was a preferential one.  
Conclusion  
As the above cases illustrate, women’s various uses of credit, for both private (e.g. 
marriage) as well as professional (e.g. moneylending) pursuits, was commensurate to their 
social standing. Lower class women, who lacked a professional network and property, were 
not only disadvantaged financially, but also had inadequate representation in courts and 
markets. In the latter respect, women’s experience would have mirrored similar challenges 
faced by men; for instance, dallālāt needed guarantors to perform brokerage and 
                                                     
773 Rabāyiʻah and Eren, Sijill raqm 107, 81; J-107-237. 
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moneylending, and in this respect these requirements were parallel to men’s. However, the 
witness testimony of women dallālāt would have been lesser to men’s in court, and even 
inadmissible if they were not Muslims. However, notwithstanding the structural-legal 
disparity that privileged Muslim men’s testimony, litigating against women debtors in court 
appears to have followed the same procedural and legal rights and basis as that afforded to 
men, if the case of Bīlā the Jewish debtor is to be taken as representative of bankruptcy 
proceedings for women. Bīlā’s imprisonment also reflected the normative fiqh consensus 
which considered imprisonment as a means coercive means for proving financial insolvency 
and revealing hidden sources of money, rather than as indefinite punishment. In contrast, the 
lending of elite women tended to be carried out through awqāf rather than directly to market 
borrowers. A number of cash-awqāf endowed by women operated in Jerusalem in the last 
decades of the 1500s; most notable among these were the Baymāna Khātūn,  Fāṭima Khātūn, 
Injībāy Khātūn and the Balqīs Khātūn awqāf. In common with the cash-awqāf in Jerusalem 
that were founded by Ottoman military elites, women’s awqāf were reliant on elite local 
‘ulamā’ families for their management. These cash-awqāf came to affect conventional family 
awqāf in Jerusalem that came to be used to put out credit in the market and take mortgage in 
collateral in exchange. This process was mediated by professional network, as noted in the 
case of Amina. 
Courts were more concerned with the use of written rather than oral evidence for 
adjudicating debts produced by women, and there is not a discernable difference between 
elite and non-elite women’s cases in this regard, despite elite’s much greater access to 
services, specialists, and witnesses who could arguably influence outcomes.  
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The picture on the side of awqāf and debt was a double-edged blade. Women often 
had to fight off male relatives, or the state, or those who sought to discredit women by 
claiming them unsuited/incompetent to manage investments on behalf of minors. While 
women usually maintained absolute control over awqāf during their lifetimes, such control 
was usually administered through male relatives and associates as intermediaries. Moreover, 
the anxiety that some deeds express was warranted, as sijill records often reflect the abuse of 
these awqāf by male intermediaries and administrators. Judges were not unaware of such 
abuses, yet allowed for them as long as they did not represent major impairments to the 
awqāf they related to.  
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Conclusion 
One cannot overstate the prevalence of credit in the late medieval and early modern 
history of Bilād al-Shām. From the late fifteenth century, the Ottoman state set interest rate 
limits in ḳānūnnāmes to prevent predatory lending. Şeyhülislam Ebu’s-Su‘ud’s rulings also 
required that all interest-loans should take the mu‘āmala shar‘īya legal form. However, as 
this dissertation has shown, it is worthwhile to consider that the mu‘āmala shar‘īya was 
neither an Ottoman invention, nor a legal instrument used exclusively by Ḥanafīs. The 
mu‘āmala shar‘īya, and ḥīyal more broadly, were commonly used by Mamluk jurists of 
different madhhabs. Shāfi‘ī jurists, who continued to be the demographically dominant 
madhhab in Bilād al-Shām for most of the sixteenth century, were instrumental in the 
continued use of mu‘āmalāt shar‘īya in Ottoman courts in an environment of inter-madhab 
collaboration, where, for instance debtors relied on Shāfi‘ī madhhab rules for registering their 
debt guarantees in Ḥanafī supervised courts. Thus, while Ottoman law was set apart from the 
legal pluralism of the Mamluk period, certain elements in the practice of law carried over 
from Mamluk times. 
Notwithstanding the cash-waqf’s introduction to Bilād al-Shām in the mid-sixteenth 
century, it is hard to say whether the use of credit expanded, declined or remained the same 
between the late Mamluk and early Ottoman periods. What is certain, however, is that the 
power and jurisdiction of qāḍīs with respect to regulating debt in the market changed and 
grew. As reflected in my chapter five, Mamluk qāḍīs had long been associated with the 
activity of lending the capital of orphan estates, an activity that carried forward in Ottoman 
times. The widespread use of mu‘āmalāt was also an aspect of continuity. However, what 
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was distinct in the latter period was the codification of lending norms in the qānūn and the 
explicit mandate of qāḍīs, as the state’s agents in regulating market lending, and ensure the 
public’s adherence to both the sharī‘a and the qānūn. In this regard, qāḍīs regularly imposed 
fiqh protocols on indebtedness, such as enforcing imprisonment and ilzām orders on 
defaulting debtors, and in facilitating bankruptcy declarations for those who were insolvent. 
However, ironically, Qāḍīs did not police interest rates to ensure they meet ḳānūnnāme 
restrictions on ribā.  
The emphasis placed by qāḍīs was more on whether a debt was enacted legally, under 
a mu‘āmala shar‘īya, and less (if at all) on the extent to which a debt exceeded the maximum 
lending rate listed in the ḳānūnnāme. This finding is significant because it suggests that 
Ottoman Law, as it concerned credit, developed a legally formalistic attitude towards the 
ḳānūnnāme only when it concerned already established legal customary (‘urf) practice (the 
mu‘āmala being one such custom), and seemingly allowed qāḍīs more room for judicial 
preference (istiḥsān) when it came to ḳānūnnāme laws that were less anchored in ‘urf. The 
ḳānūnnāme interest rate restrictions, were relatively recent for both those living in the 
Ottoman central lands, as well as in Bilād al-Shām or Egypt in the sixteenth century. The 
earliest ribā laws date from the late 1400s, but only became securely in place in terms of their 
legal importance in the 1540s, with Ebu’l-s-Su‘ud’s edicts. When compared to the 
established practice of mu‘āmalāt the ribā laws had little foundation in legal custom. 
However, by the late eighteenth century, a jurist such as Ibn ‘Ābdīn could speak confidently 
about abiding by the state’s interest rate limits, those which by that point were long-standing, 
dating from two centuries prior.     
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In view of this aspect of the law, I have argued that qāḍīs did not show concern for 
regulating, for lack of a better word, market credit. There is little evidence in the sijills to 
suggest that qāḍīs sought to uphold an interest rate policy, in Jerusalem at least. Market rates 
floated, in spite of the ḳānūnnāme rules. Market lending rates were frequently between 
twenty and thirty percent at the end of the century, a period of high inflation, but they were 
demonstrably much lower in the 1550s. This was not due to a laissez-faire interest rate policy 
on the part of the central Ottoman state, but a lack of one, I would suggest. The main 
strategies employed by the Ottomans to fund their treasury deficits towards the turn of the 
seventeenth century were starkly similar to those deployed by the late Mamluk state: devalue 
currency and the imposition of arbitrary or new taxes. Rebellions and popular revolts, of 
course followed in both cases. For credit, it would mean a reinforcement of the above 
dynamic in times of economic stress.  
I have argued that limited record of financial accounts, muḥāsabāt, in sijills suggests 
that courts did not have a strong financial enforcement ability, or interest. This was as true 
for the accounts of executors of orphan estates as it was for cash-waqfs, and the accounts of 
other institutions. When they do appear, the disproportionately low number of muḥāsabāt 
indicate that managers of capital invested in loans came to courts to register accounts in order 
to clear potential (or outstanding) liabilities, rather than as part of a regular court-mandated 
practice. This was also the case with the (more frequently occurring) muḥāsabāt of 
conventional (non-cash) waqfs, like the Ṭāzīya waqf. The fact that courts charged a specific 
fee for legalizing muḥāsabāt, supports the contention that there was very limited judicial 
oversight over market credit as well. 
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‘Urf debt practices, such as the ta‘līq divorce oaths that were popularized during the 
Mamluk fourteenth century, continued to be popular in sixteenth century Jerusalem and 
appear in the court records, as does the oft cited practice of a deferred dotal (ṣadāq) debt. The 
latter was callable at any time by wives and cases of imprisoned husbands, while infrequent, 
do appear in court registers from Bilād al-Shām.    
Some scholars have recently put forth a picture of Ottoman law as having been very 
diffused, whereby judicial agency and authority was distributed among different sites and 
stakeholders, rather than just held by qāḍīs. Conversely, others have argued that the 
hallmarks of Ottoman law, the ḳānūnnāme and legal bureaucratization, were designed around 
the centrality of the authority of qāḍīs. This group advances beyond the traditional, and 
outdated model of a ‘secular’ kānūn and a ‘religious’ sharī‘a law of the jurists, by arguing 
that the later expansion of juridical power in the seventeenth century, was the result of 
political and economic, rather than religious, forces. All scholars agree, however, that qāḍīs 
played a central role in the day to day registration of debts and the adjudication of related 
disputes. Qāḍīs had the power to imprison defaulting debtors at will, as I have shown above. 
On this aspect, I contend that this activity by qāḍīs should not be viewed as policing. In all 
instances, it was in reaction to complaints brought forth by creditors. Rarely do the sijills 
produce a qāḍī censuring a moneylender for usurious lending as qāḍīs regularly did in 
response to market abuses by guildmembers, merchants and, notably, silversmiths (whose 
work was integrally tied to the supply of currency). Unlike all these aforementioned sectors, 
that were under the direct supervision of qāḍīs in Jerusalem, the moneylenders were not a 
group whose activities were regulated by courts, whether one speaks of interest rates or the 
availability of credit. 
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Connected to this unevenness is a problem concerning judicial procedure. Of the 
numerous muḥāsabāt discussed above, on more than one occasion, we come across a judicial 
“ruling” (ḥukm) at the end of a sijill. In normative fiqh terms, this suggests a legal ruling in 
favor of a litigant in a dispute, however, such muḥāsabāt do not mention disputes. A court 
notarized muḥāsaba, on the contrary, was used by its preparer (e.g. executors, waqf 
administrators) as a writ absolving them of liability, and courts served a notarial-
authenticating function for producing these and all manner of other ḥujjas. Why were such 
rulings there when they served no clear judicial purpose, and for which there was no dispute? 
It is a court routine that bothered both Ibn Quṭlūbughā and Ibn Nujaym on grounds of 
violating generally agreed upon court procedure and rule-determination (tarjīḥ). Both were 
also distressed at the generous discretion that junior jurists-qāḍīs had to issue rulings on 
matters that did not warrant a ruling, such as in the absence of any underlying dispute. 
Issuing rulings outside of the taqlid of one’s madhhab was also apparently frequent in both 
Mamluk and Ottoman eras, according to Ibn Quṭlūbughā and Ibn Nujaym. They attest the 
overwhelming resilience of legal customs, which at times went counter to normative fiqh 
rules in both periods. There is no simple answer to the question of such judicial rulings, but 
my observations tentatively argue for a connection to this having been a kind of legal 
preempting of sorts that parties to an agreement used to clear their name, for example, in 
anticipation of reprisal or a court dispute.   
It is appealing to think that the continuity of Mamluk judicial practices in the early 
Ottoman era were enabled by the relatively short judicial appointments of Ottoman chief 
qāḍīs, lasting one to three years. This would have given chief qāḍīs little stake in investing 
resources to effectively supervise their underlings, even though they had expansive power to 
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do so. The rampant political and economic instability of the last quarter of the century may 
have made such supervision more pronounced. The Ottomanization of legal institutions in 
Bilād al-Shām and the incorporation of Damascene ‘ulamā’ households into the patronage 
networks of the center was also slow in coming. Indeed, institutes of learning in the region 
were not incorporated into the ilmiye system and there is some evidence of an aloofness in 
attitudes of ‘ulamā’ in Egypt and Bilād al-Shām toward the Ottoman legal establishment, yet 
accommodation was of course a requirement for maintaining professional privileges. In this 
sense, lineages of ‘ulamā’ elites were able to negotiate and maintained some political power 
well into the end of the sixteenth century, and for some families, such as al-Ghazzī, well 
beyond it.  
In my evaluation of Jerusalem waqfs, and the Ṭāzīya madrasa waqf, I illustrated the 
extent to which urban waqfs were connected to rural villages, and the dependencies that these 
associations created over the long-term. The Ṭāzīya madrasa’s case illustrated the extent to 
which waqf credit could cripple their operations and create a cyclical dependency on the need 
for waqfs to borrow money to fund repairs and other services. The role of the state was central 
in managing the supervision of debt claims as well as the reconciliation of debts to the 
operating costs of waqfs and qāḍīs and state-appointed waqf nāẓirs regularly appeared in waqf 
proceedings that could work out the distribution of funds. In comparison to cash-waqfs, regular 
waqfs had a longer horizon for realizing revenue, since grain and other agricultural production 
was sold on credit and the debts arising from non-payment and other losses ate into a waqf’s 
ability to pay its bills.  
The market devaluation of the Ottoman akce in 1583-5, and related inflation, seems 
to also have been connected to a spike in interest rates and widespread insolvency towards 
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the end of the century. The prevalence of mutual surety arrangements in the 1580s and 90s 
also indicates that while the availability of credit increased, it came at a higher cost and 
increased indebtedness on the part of the Jewish community of Jerusalem resulted in a series 
of communal defaults for it. The increase in mutual surety may also suggest that there was 
too much money chasing too few suitable opportunities for investment, as lenders accepted 
continuously higher risks.  
In both Mamluk and Ottoman contexts, the state played a central role in managing 
orphan estates. Up till the beginning of the fifteenth century, orphans benefitted from a 
dedicated depository and bureau for managing the investment of their inheritances in loans. 
The disappearance of this institution appears to have taken place in the late Mamluk period. 
We do not possess historical record of how effective the orphan bureaus were in Mamluk 
times, but if al-Subkī’s cynicism is to be taken seriously, the effectiveness of this institution 
must have been dubious from its start in the early fourteenth century. Ottoman qāḍīs 
continued to manage orphan estates , as they had been under the Mamluk era. The main 
difference, however, was that the legal subterfuge of the mu‘āmalāt shar‘īya had become 
more institutionalized, as noted above. Although it was a legal, religious, and social 
imperative for protecting orphan capital was certainly at work, the state’s actual supervision 
of the management of mu‘āmalāt by executors and guardians though does not appear to have 
been sophisticated or regimented in either the late Mamluk period or the Ottoman sixteenth 
century. The muḥāsabāt of loan portfolios of orphan estates indicate that the court’s role with 
respect to supervising orphan capital was mostly notarial. And while executors did use courts 
to initiate cases against defaulting debtors, courts did not actively police the activities of 
executors of orphan estates.  
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Lastly, my evaluation of the relationship between gender and credit reveals that 
women’s registration of loans in court, as creditors, was commensurate to their social 
standing. Lower class women, who lacked a professional network and property, were not 
only disadvantaged financially, but also had inadequate representation in courts and markets 
and were unlikely to register their loans in court, in contrast to elite women who tended to so 
with frequency. Despite elite women’s much greater access to services, specialists, and 
witnesses who could arguably influence outcomes, elite women faced the same structural-
legal disparity that privileged Muslim men’s witness testimony over women’s. That said, 
credit disputes involving both women debtors and creditors in courts followed the same 
procedural basis as that of men, and the sijills indicate that there was an overwhelming 
emphasis on ḥujjas for proving debts, which held as much or more weight than witness 
testimony in the sixteenth century.  
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